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1 
Introduction 
Phoebe H. Cottingham 
U.S. Department of Education (retired) 
Douglas J. Besharov 
University of Maryland School of Public Policy 
Over a decade ago, Congress initiated a major shift in federal work-
force policy through the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. WIA
aimed to consolidate and modernize disparate workforce programs, and 
to assure that job seekers and employers benefited from a more open 
and effective utilization of federal funds. No single study has examined 
all aspects of the act. There are many studies of its program features, as 
well as efforts to estimate the economic outcomes for those receiving 
WIA services. 
This volume examines WIA’s objectives and the evidence on 
program performance and impact. The chapters originally were com-
missioned for a meeting held with staff of the European Commission for 
a discussion of WIA lessons and the implications for future workforce 
programming in the United States as well as Europe.1 The chapters are 
organized into five general areas: 
1) understanding WIA, 
2) program implementation, 
3) performance management, 
4) impact evaluations, and 
5) future evaluation choices. 
The 2009 congressional appropriation for WIA was over $15.9 
billion, including $3.3 billion for three WIA employment and train-
ing programs that replaced prior Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
programs.2 WIA funds are allocated to states based on five-year plans. 
States are responsible for using the funds for services operated under 
1 
  
 
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
  
 
 
 
2 Cottingham and Besharov 
local entities. The European Social Fund of the European Commis-
sion (EC) allocates approximately $70 billion across seven-year cycles 
(roughly equivalent to the annual WIA appropriation) to EC member 
states for workforce services, of which occupational training is a major 
component. 
The chapters in this volume focus exclusively on the U.S. experi-
ence, framed to help the European Commission staff in its deliberations 
on workforce programming to understand how the WIA performance 
management systems function, as well as the role of evaluations assess-
ing workforce programs. 
UNDERSTANDING WIA 
WIA’s main purpose, as set forth in the 1998 legislation, was 
broad: “to consolidate, coordinate, and improve employment, train-
ing, literacy, and vocational rehabilitation programs in the United 
States.” Indeed, WIA introduced extensive changes in the nation’s 
publicly funded workforce programming. As summarized by Dianne 
Blank, Laura Heald, and Cynthia Fagnoni in Chapter 2, “An Overview 
of WIA,” public workforce programs had become “fragmented”—an 
“uncoordinated patchwork of programs and agencies” suffering from 
“inefficiency, duplication of effort, and confusion for the job seeker.” 
The solution in the 1998 WIA legislation, Blank, Heald, and
Fagnoni note, was to decrease the previous focus on income eligibil-
ity as the only basis for accessing services (as well as the focus on job 
training as the primary means for getting a job) and increase the fo-
cus on assessment and marketing existing skills. These changes placed 
more emphasis on personal responsibility, self-service, and consumer 
awareness in choosing options. The consolidation of services was to 
take place locally, through a new system of WIA One-Stop centers, 
guided by state and local entities to assure service coordination and 
customer access as required by WIA. 
Whether WIA indeed produced the efficient streamlining of funds 
into open access systems as intended is a question that Blank, Heald, and 
Fagnoni believe is not fully answered. There are 25 reports by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) over the decade responding 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 3 
to questions raised by members of Congress about WIA (see Chapter 
2). (Editor’s note: The Government Accountability Office changed its 
name from the General Accounting Office in 2004. For readers’ ease 
and consistency, we use the current name in the text and references 
throughout the book.) 
By being made available at the local level through one entry point— 
the One-Stop centers—the 16 different federal programs (see Table 2.1) 
would no longer require potential applicants to go to different offices 
to apply for services. For fiscal year 2009, Congress appropriated over 
$15.9 billion for the 16 mandatory programs, including $3.3 billion 
for three new WIA programs (Adults, Dislocated Workers, and Youth) 
replacing prior JTPA programs.3 The federal program offices were ex-
pected to work with the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), as the 
department was given overall responsibility for administering the pro-
visions of WIA.4 
WIA also initiated major changes in how funding for training ser-
vices is distributed, by mandating that training funds be sent through 
individual training accounts (ITAs) to the training providers chosen by 
the WIA participants eligible for training services. Under JTPA and the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), training funds 
went directly from the governmental entity at the state or local level for 
training service contracts with providers who were also responsible for 
recruiting trainees, typically from other local agencies. A second change 
under WIA required a process for establishing eligibility of WIA train-
ing providers. The training providers who are to receive ITA funds for 
training services to WIA participants need an established track record of 
positive outcomes that meet or exceed each state’s performance criteria. 
WIA required states to establish eligible training provider lists (ETPLs) 
of providers and approved training course offerings that have met and 
continue to meet the state’s performance criteria. 
Blank, Heald, and Fagnoni point out that in 2001, the GAO found 
the requirements on training providers to be overly burdensome because 
so few people were referred under WIA. Subsequently, the USDOL
began to provide waivers of the ETPL requirements, and 40 states ob-
tained such waivers (see Chapter 6 for more on ETPLs). 
In terms of governance, WIA required state governors to set up a 
state Workforce Investment Board (WIB) to oversee WIA implemen-
tation at state and local levels, with local WIBs organized to oversee 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
4 Cottingham and Besharov 
the One-Stop center operations. Governors decide how many members 
will serve on the WIBs, and they are required to assure that a private 
sector representative is named to chair each board, and that those repre-
sentatives make up the majority of board members. Blank, Heald, and 
Fagnoni report that WIBs average 40–60 members, and that in 2007 
there were 1,850 One-Stop centers, under the jurisdiction of a WIB (a 
regional WIB can be given several centers in its jurisdiction). 
A key question in many GAO reports on WIA is whether the 
new performance management was being established. GAO reports 
repeatedly urge the USDOL to move more quickly to establish the re-
quirements in clear, unambiguous terms. In particular, WIA mandated 
that the USDOL establish performance measures on five outcomes to 
be used by all states, and that the USDOL negotiate with each state on 
their minimal performance levels for each measure. (States may add 
measures or set higher levels for particular jurisdictions.) Central in the 
WIA performance system is the congressional requirement that states 
use Unemployment Insurance (UI) records for three of the five WIA
performance measures—job placement, retention, earnings—with other
sources for measuring skill attainment and customer satisfaction.5 
The early years of WIA showed how challenging it was for states 
to develop new performance systems based on the UI records. Blank, 
Heald, and Fagnoni note that overall, the use of UI records for timely 
analysis and reporting at the operations level in WIA has proved less 
successful than hoped for time-sensitive management functions. In re-
sponse, the USDOL has allowed states to use “supplemental data” to fill 
gaps in the UI wage records and collect job placement outcome infor-
mation from sources other than UI records, or the “supplemental data 
sources.” In 2004, over 75 percent of local areas reported that “they 
directly follow up with participants after they leave the program . . . to 
help fill gaps until the data are available from the UI wage records.” In 
some cases the supplemental data are viewed as interim indicators to 
manage WIA programs or predict WIA performance outcomes. Blank, 
Heald, and Fagnoni believe the GAO recommendation to allow contin-
ued use of supplemental data is sensible. 
Ultimately, WIA did advance the linking of WIA and UI record sys-
tems to record the placement and earnings results, but states, USDOL, 
and researchers use these files more for monitoring overall progress. 
The USDOL operates a nationwide, computerized WIA Standardized 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 5 
Record Data (WIASRD) system for states to input data on aggregated 
counts or averages, based on what states collect from the One-Stop cen-
ters, providers, and employers. 
The central and more difficult part of the performance management 
challenge emanating from WIA was the required establishment of defi-
nitions of participant status to be used across the state-run WIA system 
to measure performance at the local and state levels. In 2005, the U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget called for common measures—the 
harmonization of performance measures across a larger swath of fed-
eral workforce and training assistance programs managed not only by 
the USDOL but other federal agencies, according to Blank, Heald, and 
Fagnoni. In general, progress was slow, although USDOL eventually 
made advances to improve the accuracy of performance data and settle 
performance measures, beginning in 2005.6 
The WIA performance management system was further compli-
cated by Congress asking that the performance goals be set through 
negotiations between individual states and the USDOL. Blank, Heald, 
and Fagnoni summarize the criticism of negotiation without a stan-
dardized and uniform procedure for establishing what are reasonable 
performance goals. Also, many expressed concerns that without ad-
justment procedures, the system discourages One-Stop centers from 
providing services to those who appear less likely to get and keep a job. 
Most recently the USDOL has used a regression model to set national 
performance goals, based on data on job seekers in local labor markets, 
using the WIA database and other data.7 Another concern the authors 
describe is that only a small proportion of job seekers who receive ser-
vices at One-Stops are actually reflected in WIA outcome data. In the 
2004 GAO study, only about 5 percent of job seekers who walked into 
a One-Stop center were registered for WIA and tracked for outcomes. 
The self-service customers, those seeking information on their own, are 
actually the largest group served under WIA. Blank, Heald, and Fagnoni
point out that the GAO has recommended that the USDOL consider 
ways for states to track all job seekers coming into One-Stop services, 
but this presents problems when self-served customer results are com-
bined with other WIA customers who obtain more intensive services, 
especially training. 
Blank, Heald, and Fagnoni conclude that there still is not a uniform 
national practice for tracking registrants in WIA, undermining accuracy 
  
  
 
 
6 Cottingham and Besharov 
of performance data and the ability to compare states equitably. They 
also note the inherent tensions between local entities, state entities, and 
the federal government. 
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
Many of the WIA issues noted by Blank, Heald, and Fagnoni are 
explored in depth in other contributions to this volume. All draw on fed-
eral studies of WIA’s implementation, especially during the first half of 
the 2000–2009 decade, when attention focused heavily on the new role 
of One-Stop centers, the performance management system, and what 
features appeared to be more successfully implemented than others. 
In Chapter 3, “The Use of Market Mechanisms,” Christopher T. 
King and Burt S. Barnow summarize the early implementation chal-
lenges in eight states in 2003–2005. They draw conclusions similar to 
those of Blank, Heald, and Fagnoni concerning the central importance 
of a potentially stronger performance management system in WIA than 
existed under JTPA. Under JTPA, the federal government did not at-
tempt to set performance standards at all, leaving it to local service 
delivery areas (SDAs) to set their own performance standards with 
approval by the lead state office. Under WIA, the top level of the per-
formance management structure is now at the federal–state level, after 
the startup phase when states had less performance system direction 
from the federal level. 
King and Barnow conclude that there was considerable tension 
associated with the implementation of the new WIA performance man-
agement system. Having local and state layers of government adjust to 
operating with a set of standards derived from a higher level brought 
resistance from some at the local level. The focus was on state WIA
leaders first “negotiating” standards with federal officials and then 
translating them to local areas, often with differing rules according to 
state policy. The principal complaint about this approach centers on 
states having to apply the negotiated state performance standards for all 
One-Stop centers within their state. King and Barnow find that in the 
eight states studied, there was considerable variation across the states 
in their performance standards under WIA. Both state and local staff 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 7 
disliked WIA performance measures and standards, believing JTPA
performance management worked better. According to King and Bar-
now, performance standards are seen as arbitrary numeric goals, with 
no allowance or adjustments for serving more distressed areas (as many 
claimed the JTPA adjustment allowances provided). 
Another concern arising during the transition from JTPA to WIA
was who collected the data to measure program outcomes and how ac-
cessible it was for program operators. JTPA performance measures of 
program outcomes relied on job placement reporting by providers who 
would conduct their own follow-up contacts with program participants. 
WIA deliberately sought to shift the reporting responsibility to state 
entities, requiring the utilization of Unemployment Insurance admin-
istrative records to document who was employed. The plan was that 
state entities first collect participant information from One-Stop center 
providers and then match the individual participant records with reports 
submitted by employers to the state Unemployment Insurance office. 
King and Barnow describe the extent to which this intended change 
in who collected outcome data brought extensive deliberations and 
contentions over how program entry and exit status would be defined 
in the WIA performance management systems. One-Stop center opera-
tors understood that who counts as a WIA participant would form the 
base count for establishing their performance record for judging how 
many of the WIA participants succeeded in finding jobs. Naturally, pro-
gram operators want to include as WIA participants those most likely 
to succeed in finding jobs, and exclude those who are likely to fail in 
achieving the outcome. After considerable negotiation at the federal 
level, it was finally agreed to exclude job seekers who do not utilize the 
core WIA services, focusing on those using the second and third service 
tiers, called “intensive” and “training.” This shifted attention to defin-
ing what were core services. Similar disputes arose over defining when 
a WIA participant has exited WIA, and thus is countable as a successful 
job placement or not. 
In response, the USDOL established a reporting system to be used 
by states and One-Stop centers, containing a standardized set of defi-
nitions, extensive documentation, and technical explanations. More 
recently, the USDOL commissioned work on how to introduce ad-
justments to performance standards to take account of state and local 
economic conditions and job seeker characteristics (see Chapter 9). 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
8 Cottingham and Besharov 
Another key change in workforce programming under WIA was the 
requirement that there be universal access at entry to the One-Stop cen-
ters, meaning no barriers on entry to core services of the job search and 
information assistance. Users of One-Stop centers do not have to pass 
eligibility requirements that in the past limited core services to low-
income persons or the long-term unemployed. This was a major change 
from most of the JTPA job training programs that had requirements 
to keep training just for the economically disadvantaged or long-term 
unemployed.8 
Some believe that disadvantaged populations have had less ac-
cess to job training under WIA than under JTPA because of the open 
access and no low-income eligibility requirement. In their state case 
studies conducted during the early phase of WIA, King and Barnow 
find tension over spreading WIA funds in a way that may not be for 
those who would gain the most, the disadvantaged. Studies looking at 
very large samples of WIA participants in training do not necessarily 
support the presumption that disadvantaged populations have lost out 
on access to training through WIA due to open access policies. (See 
Chapter 13 for a summary of an extensive study of WIA participants.) 
It appears that disadvantaged populations are the beneficiaries of WIA
adult training and the youth programs. While the total number of dis-
advantaged people in WIA training may be less than was true under 
JTPA, the most recent study, across 12 states, finds that adults in WIA
training are, on average, disadvantaged in prior earnings, employment, 
and education. Dislocated workers receiving WIA services, as was true 
during the JTPA decade, overall have less disadvantaged backgrounds, 
and reflect the general population in terms of education, work experi-
ence, and prior earnings. 
Another major change under WIA is the funneling of job training 
funds through ITAs, essentially vouchers tied to the job seeker, not job 
training providers. States and localities have some flexibility in set-
ting the dollar value of ITAs, and within a One-Stop center can tailor 
the value to fit with individual customer choices. The main purpose of 
ITAs is to provide job seekers who need and/or want training with many 
choices among eligible providers and training courses, rather than be 
limited to just a few training options or slots determined by contracts 
with a few providers to provide training for groups of job seekers. 
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King and Barnow find that ITAs have been well received and appear 
to be working because there is flexibility in ITA values, as determined 
by states and localities. They report that in most centers, policies al-
lowed ITAs to be adjusted by center staff based on the job seeker’s 
needs. 
During the JTPA and CETA program years, many focused on the 
seemingly ineffective job preparation programs for the disadvantaged. 
In Chapter 4, “Customized Training,” David A. Long explains why tra-
ditional job training was unpopular with many employers, noting the 
trade-off that companies see between retraining their own employees 
for new skills needed in the business versus finding new employees 
trained by others, especially training paid for by government as a way 
to reduce unemployment or help the disadvantaged. Long explores why 
customized training may be more effective than the training focused ex-
clusively on raising general skills of the unemployed or disadvantaged, 
typically for jobs at the lower end of the job market. As the economy 
changed, traditional job training became disconnected from job-specific 
skills needed by employers in high-growth, new markets. Long defines 
customized training as “the provision of particular employee skills 
needed by specific firms in their current and new workers.” 
Customized training is done outside the firm, by intermediaries 
who take on the role of recruiting and screening applicants for custom-
ized training when partner employers are looking to hire new skilled 
workers, which Long notes also allows programs to give priority to 
low-income and disadvantaged groups. He believes customized train-
ing should also be distinguished from “off the shelf” training provided 
by vocational education. Customized training is responsive to the needs 
of specific local employers in filling particular skilled work positions, 
with a commitment by the employer to employ some or all successful 
completers of the training (or continue employing incumbent workers) 
and share the costs of the training. 
Long also examines research on incumbent worker training, that is, 
in-house training of employees by employers. Several nonexperimental 
studies used large 1990s data sets to look for a difference between the 
productivity (wage growth, performance ratings, and career advance-
ment) of employees who reported receiving in-house training provided 
by employers and the productivity of employees who did not have the 
training. The three studies produced varying estimates of the average 
  
 
  
10 Cottingham and Besharov 
rate of return (from 17 to 50 percent) to the firms from in-house train-
ing, but it is not clear how well these studies controlled for selection 
biases. 
Long recalls early efforts under WIA and by private foundations to 
fund demonstration projects or partnerships that engaged business and 
training entities to align WIA-sponsored job training with private sector 
employers, with a focus on sector training. He summarizes why the idea 
of customized training is even more popular under WIA, and reports on 
a recent study that rigorously examines customized training impacts in 
three sites in a foundation-supported project. He says that participants 
earned 18 percent (about $4,500) more than controls during two years 
from baseline during the 2004–2008 period (Maguire et al. 2009). The 
three sites were located in urban areas with trainees who appeared little 
different from WIA training program entrants and therefore may be rel-
evant for WIA efforts to develop customized training. 
Studies limited to a few sites where a particularly impressive pro-
gram has been established, while useful to learning if something quite 
unusual actually is making the differences claimed, need further testing 
through replication. This is where the news can go sour, as rigorous 
replication studies often fail to find the same effects as in the origi-
nal program site where strong vision and commitment may produce a 
charged-up staff with specific synergy with customers and businesses. 
Some believe original sites may have built fortuitous partnerships with 
particular employers that are most difficult to replicate in new sites. 
Long recalls how the USDOL replication study of the San Jose CET
(customized) model training program, which was very successful in 
the 1990s, could not find similar net impacts. Where moderate im-
pacts appeared, they were in replication sites that seemed to have more 
“faithfully implemented” the original training program. This indicates 
how difficult it is to turn highly promising, even effective training pro-
grams into large-scale franchises or regular program practice. Similar 
problems are present in education, where rarely if ever have successful 
particular program models been “scaled up” into major service sys-
tems that reproduce effects anywhere near those found in an original 
small-scale study. Moreover, the costs are great to introduce change by 
extensive scaling up, as opposed to testing changes in practice within 
the existing system where the change may be more doable, or more 
gradual expansion of a program started in one site. 
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Looking to the future of customized training, Long notes that there 
are several issues. One is the matter of curriculum, and how to know 
that customized training meets the needs of both employer and potential 
worker. He cautions that some customized training initiatives tend to 
build from past training curriculums, which presents problems if new 
business sectors are being targeted or when new skills are needed. An-
other issue is the effort that training providers or intermediaries have to 
put forth to prescreen potential trainees to make good career matches, 
as well as provide ongoing support. 
Input from the private sector and active engagement is an important 
WIA objective. The WIBs are considered the key entity that brings in 
private sector perspectives to One-Stop centers. There are also state 
WIBs, whose key responsibility is advising on the state’s performance 
standards and the policies governing eligible provider lists. The WIBs 
are supposed to bring input in from employers, business groups, and 
other stakeholders on policies and operational plans for local One-
Stop centers as well as the state. Reports are spotty and generally are 
not very convincing that WIBs have brought the strong private sector 
engagement intended. Some conclude that the WIBs have too many 
stakeholders, and that many of them are conflicted or compromised by 
WIB member associations with WIA, either as major training providers 
or contractors to WIA. 
David Heaney considers the role of the private sector in managing 
One-Stop centers in Chapter 5, “One-Stop Management and the Private 
Sector.” He notes that WIA intended private sector engagement to be 
welcomed in operating the centers, not just on the WIBs. WIA placed 
“a high premium on employer-driven strategies and integrated service 
delivery through colocating key providers under one roof . . . to effec-
tively leverage the strengths of [a] diverse set of partner organizations 
operating side by side.” Business and employers should determine the 
content of programs for preparing the workforce. 
Heaney offers a critical perspective, however, on whether the pri-
vate sector is engaged in WIA. He believes that active participation 
of the private sector has been stymied in One-Stop center operations. 
He argues that the history so far has been progressively less employer-
business input as WIA implementation progressed. Heaney notes that 
at first those serving as One-Stop center operators included a healthy 
distribution across private for-profit, nonprofit, and public sector man-
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agers. Over time, the procurement process appears to have narrowed 
the distribution, with far fewer for-profits or business entities. In fact, 
fewer entities now compete for the One-Stop center operating contracts. 
Without more effective private employer input, Heaney is con-
cerned that job seeker selections made through customer choice may be 
out of sync with the realities of the existing market, or a true employer-
driven service delivery system. Training providers do not necessarily 
adapt effectively to market realities. Heaney urges consideration of 
policies that would attract a greater number and more diverse set of 
qualified bidders from all sectors for One-Stop center management, in-
cluding allowing risk/reward tolerance levels in the pricing and design 
of contracts. He believes operators should have flexibility to refine and 
change practices much as takes place in typical company staffing opera-
tions, rather than be restricted to overly prescriptive practices that have 
unknown effectiveness (for example, caps on administration costs and 
profits discourage private sector involvement in WIA). 
Heaney agrees with the widespread criticism of WIB representation 
requirements that seem to burden these important advisory groups with 
too many interested parties and decrease WIB effectiveness. He sees 
a parallel burden or inefficiency in One-Stop centers because center 
staff attempt to handle too many interested agencies and customer calls. 
He favors giving center managers more authority to make decisions on 
performance, quality, and corrective actions. He also urges that more 
evaluation should be done, however, before attempting to change the 
performance management system. 
The overarching watchword of the WIA system is accountability: 
accountability for results but also assuring that data is fully used so 
those involved in the WIA system know what is going on, and how 
the various responsible parties are performing. In addition to the new 
performance management system established at the federal-state level, 
information that helps the clients and staff in the system make wise 
choices is essential. WIA managers also are accountable for how the 
public funds are spent on training opportunities, to assure that the most 
effective training opportunities are identified and funding goes to the 
effective trainers. This requires management review of performance 
records of training providers, and designation, based on performance 
standards, of who is eligible to receive WIA training funds through the 
ITAs. Public access to the performance records is an essential part of an 
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accountability system to assure that providers of training services make 
available performance records so customers can see the potential payoff 
in a job and earnings by previous trainees. 
In Chapter 6, “Eligible Training Provider Lists and Consumer Re-
port Cards,” Carl E. Van Horn and Aaron Fichtner report on their study 
of four states’ progress in developing performance records and publicly 
available information. They find evidence that the new accountability 
system requirements under WIA for the provision of training services 
have been implemented to some degree, thereby demonstrating that 
accountability systems that meet the 1998 WIA vision are possible. 
Therefore, they point out, what is most important is not the more lim-
ited training that some find being funded under WIA—it is the WIA
requirement that states set up new workforce systems for deciding who 
needs, receives, and provides training. Those eligible for training are re-
quired to have the opportunity to review and select from lists of training 
courses rather than be assigned to a training course by program admin-
istrators. The lists of training courses and providers appear on the state 
lists of eligible training providers—those who have verifiable records 
of results based on previous trainees that have been deemed by states as 
meeting state performance standards. The information is translated into 
state consumer report systems to disseminate the performance training 
outcomes for each provider and program, so that ITA holders and others 
can view the training options meeting the standards. 
As Van Horn and Fichtner point out, under JTPA, training services
were typically procured directly by local government agencies that 
selected the occupational concentrations and the service providers. Ba-
sically, an annual plan would select providers who would offer what 
was thought to be suitable occupational training for local populations. 
The government administrators would procure set numbers of training 
slots to be filled during the year, and then use up the slots by vari-
ous entity referrals. This system could not assure that those who would 
benefit most got training, or that the training provided was necessarily 
effective in helping the job seeker secure a new job. It was convenient 
for government administrators, but likely led to waste or inappropriate 
or ineffective training purchases. Job seekers were simply placed in 
particular training slots because the slots were already committed under 
the contract. Some believed that better outcomes were possible if job 
seekers were provided much better information on the labor market in 
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general, on the occupations (and their requirements) most likely to be 
in demand, and to have some understanding of the employment results 
that others had achieved by taking a particular provider and occupa-
tional training track. 
Van Horn and Richtner conclude that the UI records as mandated 
by WIA are being used to varying degrees to build statewide listings 
of eligible training providers and customer report cards that give sum-
maries of provider performance records. The delayed availability of UI 
records noted by others has not prevented the creation and updating of 
eligible training provider lists in some states. 
Based on their research conducting interviews in four states dur-
ing 2009, Van Horn and Richtner find progress in recent years. In the 
four states, there are provider lists and performance measures called for 
under WIA that have surprisingly deep repositories of in-depth infor-
mation. In the four states examined—Florida, New Jersey, Texas, and 
Washington State—these efforts actually began before WIA and were 
funded by the USDOL as part of their pilot initiatives prior to WIA. It 
took years of work to reach the data accumulation now available. All 
states now have online performance reporting systems in use, which is 
an achievement. These efforts required pulling together data from the 
state entities managing WIA, UI, and education and training organi-
zations, and calculating average performance levels. The information 
also encourages the training institutions to provide explicit details on 
the particular training or career certification courses available and the 
placement results obtained by their course takers. 
For New Jersey, as an example, Van Horn and Fichtner report that 
the online eligible training provider list contains more than 600 educa-
tion and training providers, offering more than 3,000 training programs. 
Performance data are not yet available on all courses, as only one-third 
of the provider files contain performance averages that are outputted to 
consumer report cards on every course and/or provider. The report cards 
have to be based on WIA-supported students, and for some courses
there are too few WIA course takers to produce an average (in these 
cases the placement information is averaged across all courses spon-
sored by a training provider). 
It is important to note that, in contrast to much earlier reports by 
others finding inability or ineffectual use of UI records by states, state 
capability has grown and the picture may be different. At least in the 
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four states reported on by Van Horn and Fichtner, and relying on their 
recent interviews, all now have state-run, fully developed ETPL sys-
tems with consumer report card systems, and all utilize UI records to 
calculate outcomes. 
Van Horn and Fichtner also report that the ITA system has stimu-
lated the large providers, such as postsecondary education institutions, 
to help WIA trainees secure other public funding sources for which they 
may be eligible, thereby adding to the ITA funding. It is quite likely that 
training choices are influenced not only by the ITA voucher value, but 
the potential to tap other sources of support for trainees that training 
institutions can provide. 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Accountability for using public funds to achieve the public ob-
jectives is widely expected. In workforce programming, being able 
to assure accountability by measuring performance appears to be a 
straightforward process, because the end result, a job and increased 
earnings, should be easily measured. Under WIA, establishing the 
benchmarks for measuring performance, with allowance for state ne-
gotiation to reflect economic conditions, brought two advances over 
the past: 1) a common set of definitions was established, permitting na-
tional assessment of overall achievements and comparisons of state and 
local assessments; and 2) full computerization of administrative records 
allowed more timely reporting of results. 
In Chapter 7, “The Challenges of Measuring Performance,” William 
S. Borden recommends establishing standardized definitions before a 
program is initiated to assure comparability across geographical and 
function units. Borden looks at WIA performance measurement issues 
as a case example of the complexities inherent in creating, maintain-
ing, and using performance systems for management. He speaks from 
his experience in helping government agencies design and implement 
performance management and data validation systems, not only for 
WIA but other programs in the USDOL and the Department of Health 
and Human Services. These performance systems are clearly necessary, 
says Borden, because “tracking and measuring customer flow, services, 
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and outcomes is inherently desirable and even necessary to managing 
any modern organization. Therefore, the question is not whether we 
should track customer flow and services and measure performance, but 
whether and how we should use the data to determine funding, incen-
tives, and sanctions.” 
Many mistakenly believe performance can be monitored through 
relatively simple systems that capture seemingly obvious goals and pro-
cesses. Alas, as Borden notes, there are “challenges that are little known 
except to the state and federal staff managing the performance systems, 
and that are often not clearly understood. There is very little that is easy 
and straightforward about measuring program performances. Seem-
ingly simple concepts . . . are actually very complex . . .” The many 
conceptual and operational issues raise significant questions about mo-
tivation, state–federal political power sharing, and the management of 
government programs. 
Borden makes clear that he agrees with others who believe that 
program evaluation and performance management derive from differ-
ent sources and motives and that keeping them as separate functions 
is warranted. WIA, he notes, “has shown that it is difficult to measure 
performance well, and that using inaccurate performance data to drive 
policy and incentives leads to misallocated resources.” Administra-
tive data are needed to accomplish both functions: to understand and 
monitor program operations, and to carry rigorous evaluations using 
randomization of applicants. 
Standardized definitions, according to Borden, are critical and must 
be established before developing system software and validation checks 
that provide information essential for program managers to keep on 
top of the complex systems. In short, definitions must be agreed to by 
those engaged in various levels of operations, enforceable, and support 
consistency checks so essential for building the performance system. 
Arriving at standardized definitions challenges programs with shared 
governance structures. Those working within the structures develop 
stakeholder interests, and are typically more concerned about meeting 
their goals than improving their results. Consequently, Borden notes, 
they tend to have “somewhat exaggerated reaction to the burdens im-
posed by performance systems.” He points out that in WIA, a diverse 
system, “forces of fragmentation and inconsistent data are so great that 
only a very strong and standardized performance management system 
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can overcome or at least neutralize” the stakeholder pressures. Despite 
the progress made in WIA in developing measurement definitions and 
performance systems, there remain the inherent tendencies by some 
program operators to resist any seemingly externally determined system 
that may challenge their perceptions of performance. Borden suggests 
a number of ways to get “buy in” from program operators to a system. 
It is very important, he says, to focus initially on building strong data 
capacity through effective performance management tools and methods 
rather than on the punitive aspects of performance management. 
Borden sees wide variation among states, grantees, and local pro-
gram operators in their level of sophistication and case management 
data they collect. Many, he says, collect far more detailed performance 
data than anything imposed by the USDOL. Federal efforts should focus 
on the key data validation component, to raise every state and grantee 
to a minimum acceptable level of data management and data reliability. 
On the issue of the impact of performance management on cus-
tomer selection, Borden finds a conundrum because barriers to success 
tend to be subjective and unreliable, and consequently very difficult to 
measure. He suggests that computing performance separately for dif-
ferent classes of customers based on barriers still provides the clearest 
information to program operators. If performance is adjusted after the 
fact using regression models, results should be similar. The problem 
with using negotiation under WIA to obtain flexibility and avoid the 
complexity of regression-based adjustments is the overall absence of 
systematic and consistent performance goals across states. 
An effective management system does have costs to establish, but 
there are also considerable costs to allowing states to administer their 
own programs and make their own rules—no usable national data can 
come from this type of devolution. In the case of WIA, where Con-
gress tried to confront an overall system that was highly fragmented and 
turn it into the One-Stop system, with seamless access for the customer, 
there are obvious challenges to building a successful reporting process. 
For example, there are still fragmented funding streams coming into the 
One-Stops, with requirements for data collection and reporting to many 
programs and agencies with varying and even conflicting definitions of 
customer characteristics. The challenge is to acknowledge that special-
ized programs may be more effective in serving difficult populations, 
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but there is still a need for reliable and consistent data across all the 
states and local areas to improve the entire performance process. 
Even more important, if program operators see performance as a 
game, not a management tool, they are tempted to manipulate report-
ing their outcomes. Borden reviews the ways outcomes are distorted in 
WIA, such as who is actually enrolled and how services are defined, 
and of course manipulating exit dates. He concludes with this summary: 
“Do not attempt to measure something you cannot define or validate, 
and make sure the calculations are reliable and well tested.” 
Borden’s main concern, echoed in other chapters as well, is that 
the accuracy of management system data is likely to be compromised 
if the performance data is used for funding decisions, and for assign-
ing financial rewards or sanctions or incentives in general.9 Incentives 
encourage program staff to pick those considered most likely to succeed 
and recruit them for services (“creaming”), a selection bias at odds with 
the program goal to get the most net benefit for costs. Distorted data 
provide inaccurate counts. Borden believes most data systems simply 
do not have the accuracy required for discerning true performance dif-
ferences. He recommends that performance management systems be 
kept out of incentive systems, and operate as they are intended: to assist 
managers in watching how their systems are operating. 
A similar view to Borden’s is presented by Burt S. Barnow in 
Chapter 8, “Lessons from the WIA Performance Measures.” Barnow 
appraises the role of performance management measures as contrasted 
with measures from impact evaluations. He notes that evaluators see 
performance management as a kind of offshoot of their process or im-
plementation studies. “Process studies document what happened while 
the program is implemented, impact evaluations assess what difference 
in outcome measures was due to the intervention, and cost-benefit anal-
yses assess whether the benefits of a program exceed the costs.” Barnow 
believes the key differences between performance management and 
evaluation activities are “matters of depth of analysis and causality.” 
Performance management relies on “easy to collect data on inputs, ac-
tivities, and outputs.” Functions important to impact evaluations are not 
included and would be too expensive and even irrelevant in any event 
within a performance measurement system. This includes evaluation 
functions such as tracking long-term outcomes, and of course establish-
ing and tracking a control group created out of the applicant pool. 
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Hence, performance management systems typically utilize some 
judgment about what a program should or could accomplish in job 
placements and earnings of participants—the program performance 
standards. These judgments at the local level are inferred from the 
placement and/or earnings of the last cycle of participants, or aver-
aged performance records for what seem to be similar programs and 
participants. These performance judgments can be reasonable or unrea-
sonable, but they are not impact evaluations. 
Another purpose of performance management systems is to es-
tablish a feedback process that gives signals back to those who are 
responsible—accountable—for obtaining results, and that applies re-
wards and sanctions on work units or individuals involved. Government 
performance management systems typically build on the bureau-
cratic system, or the bureaucratic process pipeline, as the production 
process in a program. Systems establish measures of what should be 
accomplished at various points in the pipeline, such as success rates 
in recruiting customers, proportion eligible for services who were of-
fered them, response patterns of customers, retaining customers for the 
desired time period, and status at exit. Evaluations, however, view such 
pipeline checkpoints as implementation variables whose purpose is to 
describe what the program looks like. Evaluators direct their attention 
primarily on whether program completers or exiters succeeded in some 
externally determined outcome (e.g., a job) relative to what they might 
have accomplished without the program. 
Barnow concludes there are three central issues in the debate over 
performance management and evaluation in the workforce area: 
1) Does performance management influence, indeed negatively 
distort, the service system itself in ways not intended by the 
program designers? Barnow believes there is evidence of too 
much distortion, and it is negative rather than positive. 
2) Does attaching incentive systems to performance systems bring 
the results intended? Barnow believes there should not be large 
rewards and/or sanctions, as there is not evidence that these 
have markedly changed management practices, consistent with 
conclusions in Wandner and Wiseman, as well as in Borden. 
3) Can adjustments reduce distortions created by the performance 
management system? Barnow favors adjustments more for im-
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parting “fairness” and psychologically reducing the tendencies 
to distort measures or game the system than for overall effec-
tiveness, but cites no particular studies on the question. 
Theories or explanations are plentiful regarding why one should 
expect that performance management systems can and do distort the 
behavior of agencies subject to the performance measures. Program op-
erators, Barnow notes, respond to performance management systems 
by spending resources “trying to look good rather than doing good.” 
This includes modifying the timing of entry and/or exit, or “more perni-
cious effects, as when programs engage in ‘cream skimming’ and serve 
those less in need to receive better performance scores.” 
Studies find that such service changes are identifiable as direct re-
sponses to the performance management system rather than responses 
to the clients. Barnow reviews the reasons why this happens, why man-
agers display “selection biases” in choosing or helping the customers. 
He notes that studies comparing the characteristics of WIA enrollees 
versus JTPA enrollees find that WIA enrollees shifted upward toward 
individuals with few barriers to employment. WIA also had reduced 
levels of enrollment, and researchers concluded that selective registra-
tion was the reason. 
Barnow further points out that studies comparing estimates of 
short- and long-term program impacts obtained in rigorous evaluations 
with the measured outcomes on the same program units as captured in 
the performance management system clearly show there is very little 
relationship between the two. Either the correlations are nonexistent 
or very weak. Thus, Barnow concludes that performance management 
system results are by design short term, and do not capture very strongly 
program impacts. 
Barnow also concludes that performance management systems 
should not deploy large rewards and/or sanctions, as these efforts are 
very weakly related—if at all—to program impacts and encourage data 
distortions. Program management, in short, is not nearly as important 
as sound evaluation in guiding overall policy directions, and has limited 
support as an assurance that a program is achieving the central objec-
tives of the policymakers. 
Given that performance management systems risk distortions in 
who is served away from program purposes, does adjusting perfor-
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mance standards reduce incentives to torque the program service and 
customer mix? Here there is another debate. Those who look at the wide 
differences between local populations and economic conditions con-
fronting program managers argue that programs should not be penalized 
for performance outcomes in more difficult conditions. Thus, adjust-
ments to performance standards are a reasonable approach to level the 
playing field. Those opposed to adjusting performance standards argue 
that setting lower expectations for some programs than others perpetu-
ates inequities. Barnow approves of adjusting performance standards 
to take account of particular program goals, participant characteristics, 
and environmental conditions, and thus, to judge different programs in 
different circumstances appropriately. 
Arguments in favor of adjustments to WIA performance standards 
regained momentum during the 2000–2009 decade. The GAO and oth-
ers recommended that the USDOL develop procedures that could be 
used by states and localities for making adjustments for local economic 
conditions and client characteristics. Until such adjustments are imple-
mented, it is difficult to say whether the gaming and resulting shifts 
in populations served are reduced when adjustments in performance 
standards are introduced. 
A set of adjustment techniques for WIA developed by Randall W. 
Eberts is presented in Chapter 9, “Recent Advances in Performance 
Measurement.” Eberts created the adjustment system for the USDOL, 
so his chapter is designed to help one understand what can be done in 
the WIA context, using the much richer data sources now available than 
under JTPA. Eberts’s objective is to develop procedures that can be 
used to adjust state and local WIA performance targets for factors that 
affect performance outcomes but are outside the control of state and 
local administrators. The intent is to level the playing field by making 
the targets neutral with respect to the observed characteristics of WIA
participants and of the local labor market conditions in which they seek 
employment. 
As noted earlier, the lack of adjustments in setting performance 
outcomes has been a major complaint about WIA, especially since the 
predecessor program, JTPA, had allowed particular statistical adjust-
ments (derived from regression estimates) to be employed by SDAs in 
setting their performance standards with the states. WIA, in contrast, 
called for performance outcomes or standards to be set through negoti-
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ated standards between federal and state offices, with no allowance for 
particular adjustments. 
Eberts’s techniques require two adjustment procedures to reach a 
general adjustment model: first, national performance targets are ad-
justed for changes in the unemployment rate using regression estimates, 
and second, state and local performance targets are adjusted for differ-
ences in local market conditions and personal characteristics of WIA
participants. This results in adjusting each state’s targets according to 
the extent a state’s participant and local labor market characteristics dif-
fer from those at the national level. 
The weights used to adjust the values are estimated by using data 
on outcomes of individual participants of workforce programs from the 
WIASRD rather than the aggregated local data used under JTPA ad-
justment formulas. Thus, this adjustment procedure for WIA relies on 
direct estimates of the effects of unemployment rates on performance 
measures for various programs at the local level using the data on indi-
viduals in the three programs within WIA: Adults, Dislocated Workers, 
and Youth. Further, the adjustment framework assures the targets for 
local workforce areas and state targets add up to the national target. 
The tables in Chapter 9 provide the estimating models and results. 
They present the variation in unemployment rates at the local (county) 
level nationally from January 2000 to November 2008, as well as the 
estimated relationships between participant characteristics and the five 
WIA performance measures (entered employment, retention, average 
earnings, credential, and employment). 
Eberts also demonstrates how the adjustments from the statistical 
model compare, for each state, with negotiated performance levels and 
actual performance levels, with a wider spread observed for the statis-
tical model. The results using data from 2006 (Table 9.6) reveal that 
adjusting the performance standard for a state (e.g., percent entering 
employment) could increase the difference between actual performance 
levels and the adjusted performance standard versus the prior differ-
ence between the actual and the negotiated standard. These increases 
go in different directions. For some states, the procedure brings the 
adjusted standard closer to the actual; for other states, the adjusted stan-
dard moves even higher than the unadjusted (negotiated) standard. The 
impact may not be favorable for all states; some do better without the 
adjustment of their negotiated standard. 
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Even with adjustment procedures, a performance management sys-
tem still has to incorporate how the results will be used. Will the results 
be linked to incentives or rewards in support of meeting or exceed-
ing goals, as well as penalties of some kind? In Chapter 10, “Financial 
Performance Incentives,” Stephen A. Wandner and Michael Wiseman 
review the use of incentive awards, called high performance bonuses 
(HPBs), in three major federal social programs: 1) WIA, 2) Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and 3) Food Stamps. Overall, 
they urge caution on attempting to manage through incentives, finding 
that generally field operations operate with the immediacy of decision 
making on matters that are poorly reflected in performance measures 
and goals. In the three major federal social programs, Wandner and 
Wiseman find no evidence that incentive (or bonus) schemes in public 
sector social programming matter in the ultimate public policy outcome 
because there are counterfactuals that provide a comparison. Since all 
administrative units (e.g., states) are placed under the same HPB, there 
are no counterfactuals. The authors therefore deploy case study meth-
ods to draw conclusions. 
Wandner and Wiseman describe the patterns of WIA HPB grants 
awarded from 1999 to 2004 (funding for these grants was dropped be-
ginning in 2005). They point out that these HPB awards were based on 
the negotiated agreements between states and the regional offices of the 
USDOL that set performance levels to encourage state and local setting 
of performance levels that fit with local conditions. Wandner and Wise-
man observe that federal negotiators had to measure and weigh local 
factors on their own without uniform methodology that assured equita-
ble treatment among states and regions. They conclude that the patterns 
of HPBs vary widely by state and region. Overall, during the nine years 
of WIA incentive funds, five states received 31 awards, or 25 percent 
of all awards, and nine states received no awards. “The variation is so 
great,” observe Wandner and Wiseman, “that it appears that USDOL has 
been, in part, rewarding behaviors that attempt to game the system . . .”
and that “whole regions of states garner[ed] a significant number of 
awards.” In addition, the WIA monetary incentives were very small, 
so one would not expect a strong relationship between WIA incentives 
and WIA programs. Indeed, state plans on intended uses of incentive 
grants show that states used the funds for new programs or increases in 
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services rather than individuals involved in frontline service—there has 
been no incentive for staff to provide more effective services. 
TANF provides another example, say Wandner and Wiseman, of 
“no evidence” that an HPB in a federal program affected state policy or 
program effectiveness. The size of TANF HPBs was small, averaging 
overall $200 million per year, or less than 1 percent of total outlays, 
they report. Also, in contrast to WIA, the program was voluntary for 
states (yet, most states participate in the competition), and capped at 5 
percent of a state’s TANF block grant. 
Wandner and Wiseman offer several observations on the TANF 
experience with HPBs. Since the TANF HPB program was based on 
information not available to state- and local-level program managers, 
it could not provide any real feedback to program operators. Further, 
the Department of Health and Human Services did not link or publicize 
possible best practice lessons that might have been discernable among 
states winning the top awards. Wandner and Wiseman also note that, 
as with WIA, the TANF HPB system did not allow one to decipher 
what particular performance areas drove higher rewards (too many in-
dicators were part of the process). While top state managers may have 
welcomed the public recognition of the bonus awards, they used the 
funds for special projects rather than individual staff recognition. The 
TANF HPB operated from 1998 through 2004, ceasing in 2005 in the 
TANF reauthorization. 
The third case study on financial incentive results in federal pro-
grams focuses on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), formerly called the Food Stamp Program, administered by the 
Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and 
operated locally by state governments or by county governments with 
state supervision. The HPB for SNAP, conclude Wandner and Wise-
man, is better designed and operated, but the program’s small size and 
universal availability make its impact difficult to assess. 
Wandner and Wiseman point out that the HPB application to the 
Food Stamp Program operates in a different program environment. 
Most important, the SNAP benefit is delivered by electronic benefits 
transfer into a special credit card for recipients to use to purchase food, 
with eligibility determination monthly. While this federal program has 
much larger outlays ($37.7 billion in the 2008 fiscal year) than either 
TANF ($25 billion) or WIA ($16 billion), it is an entitlement and has 
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clear eligibility rules. The policymaker issues tend to be assuring that 
those eligible are reached and that error rates are kept to some tolerable 
levels. The authors note how much attention went into quality control 
of the benefit errors prior to the 2002 initiation of performance mea-
sures and HPB payments, thereby clearly establishing the measures. 
While the HPB awards paid out under SNAP are small ($48 million 
in 2008), Wandner and Wiseman find that nationally SNAP had increas-
ing averages on performance measures. It is impossible to conclude that 
this would be due to the HPB, but it is consistent with the intended ef-
fect. Wandner and Wiseman believe that HPB may be working in SNAP
to improve performance because the HPB is based on the direct con-
nection with what is done and what should be monitored at the ground 
level. Not only is the HPB directly tied to local operations, it can be 
audited and has very good statistical inference, meaning the precision 
of the estimates is calculable, with confidence intervals around the point 
estimates. Finally, the Food and Nutrition Service has made efforts to 
link the HPB results with promising practices. 
Wandner and Wiseman also report on other studies on performance 
pay within differing agency environments and conclude that the same 
finding is repeated in each study: agency staff react by selective report-
ing; frontline staff tend to cream skim. They also point to significant 
difficulties encountered by federal agencies in managing federal–state 
performance bonus systems. Wandner and Wiseman sum it up: “High-
performance bonuses in government programs [are] an inefficient use 
of federal resources.” 
IMPACT EVALUATIONS 
Impact evaluations of federal programs are now regularly man-
dated in Congressional authorizations and appropriations. In Chapter 
11, “Ten Years of WIA Research,” Paul T. Decker summarizes the most 
influential evaluation research on workforce programming, and relates 
it to the state of evaluation knowledge that has been available so far on 
WIA. 
Decker first looks at findings from implementation studies of WIA
during the early WIA years, through 2006. He examines whether the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
26 Cottingham and Besharov 
seven key principles of WIA were fulfilled. Overall, he finds that most 
implementation studies are in agreement on which WIA program prin-
ciples seem to have worked relatively well, and which are more mixed. 
This reflects the particular new WIA operational features a study was 
designed to address. None of the implementation studies were able to 
look at what was going on across all the states; most were designed to 
look at WIA principles expected to produce problems in the early part 
of the decade within selected states. 
For service coordination, a key change sought by Congress, Decker 
finds that it generally succeeded through local One-Stop service cen-
ters, but that there have been challenges, including the fact that WIA’s 
mandatory partners have made only limited financial contributions, 
and that conflicting goals impede partnerships. Decker also cites the 
lack of common data systems. On prioritizing customer choice, Decker 
concludes that “. . . local workforce investment agencies have enthu-
siastically embraced customer choice by offering a wide range of core 
and intensive services and establishing ITAs to facilitate customer 
choice of training,” but there are weaknesses due to incomplete coop-
eration by training providers in providing information to meet the ETPL
requirements. 
Decker notes that strong positive responses are apparent over the 
decade to the universal access principle of WIA, and he marks it as 
an area of great progress. However, tensions exist between core and 
intensive services for a wide range of customers with a smaller group 
getting the more extensive training. The emphasis on performance man-
agement as a driving force for effective service delivery is marked by 
mixed success. The 17 performance goals were too numerous and com-
plex, the data used to measure performance were of uncertain reliability 
and received too late by agencies to use in managing the program, and 
local agencies tended to focus on managing the performance system to 
make the numbers. Decker finds that progress was made by the USDOL
in 2005, in response to demands for common measures. 
The WIA principle of close connections to and with the private sec-
tor is another area with mixed results. Decker points to the substantial 
local variation in how much state and local WIA agencies have con-
nected with the private sector. WIA remains a public policy area with 
examples of success and examples of disappointment in connecting 
with the private sector. Decker says that while youth programs have 
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been implemented, it is still challenging to find eligible providers, find 
and retain at-risk out-of-school youth, and establish WIA eligibility. 
Setting the stage for considering WIA evaluations, Decker briefly 
recalls the results from large-scale evaluation studies of federal em-
ployment training programs prior to 1995. He believes that the national 
study of JTPA, the predecessor to WIA, was “a critical turning point in 
the creation of evidence.” Not only did the study use random assign-
ment of applicants to a treatment group offered JTPA services or to a 
control group denied access to JTPA, but by design the study sought to 
obtain a nationally representative study sample—a first for an experi-
mental study in employment training program evaluations. The JTPA
study found that overall, men and women obtained equivalent net bene-
fits per enrollee. Subsequent longer-term follow-up analyses conducted 
by the GAO (using Social Security earnings records) looked at impacts 
five to six years later, finding sustained earnings gains among both men 
and women. 
Decker summarizes as well two experiments testing dislocated 
worker interventions that were conducted during the JTPA period. 
These tests of changes in dislocated worker programming focused on 
similar populations but had different program conditions. The conclu-
sions from both interventions were comparable and had considerable 
impact on policy. It was shown that by using job search assistance 
only treatments with dislocated workers, the workers speeded up in 
the timing of their reemployment and had increased earnings versus 
the dislocated workers who had no job search assistance offered or re-
quired. Although the impacts were short lived, the benefits outweighed 
the program costs, so taxpayer funds invested in this strategy had a 
payoff. Also, in both demonstrations, those that offered training on top 
of the job search assistance had no greater outcomes than those in the 
job-search-only group. The findings stimulated changes in state UI pro-
grams, specifically, the use of statistical recipient profiling to identify 
UI recipients likely to face long unemployment spells, and to direct UI 
recipients to mandatory reemployment services as a condition of con-
tinued benefit payments. 
Further studies of mandatory job search assistance for profiled UI 
recipients in the 1990s confirmed the earlier findings from the Texas 
and New Jersey demonstrations. Decker notes: “In contrast to the sub-
stantial body of evidence on JSA’s effects for dislocated workers, the 
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effects of more intensive classroom training or of job training have 
not been fully tested for dislocated workers using an experimental de-
sign.”
WIA replaced JTPA in 1998. The first USDOL experimental study 
of WIA impacts, now in field operations, is comparable to the JTPA
study in design and focus, and uses a nationally representative sam-
ple design. Decker reports that the study uses random assignment of 
applicants to a group that has access to all WIA services that will be 
compared to one or more groups with limited or no access, again seek-
ing a nationally representative sample. Decker explains that the only 
random assignment study of WIA prior to the new national study fo-
cused on a program implementaton issue that arose early in WIA’s 
history. This was the question of how best to provide ITAs, the vehicle 
for funding training under WIA. Due to the changes made under WIA in 
how training opportunities were accessed, it was decided to determine 
if it mattered how WIA center staff offered the ITA vouchers. The study 
compared three alternative methods of administering ITAs: guided 
customer choice, structured customer choice, and maximum customer 
choice. Decker concludes that the ITA experiment “supports the wide-
spread use of the ‘guided choice’ model by local agencies in the current 
[WIA] environment.” The study is now in a long-term follow-up phase, 
tracking outcomes six to seven years. 
Decker notes that a sequel to the ITA experiment—the personal 
reemployment account (PRA)— extends the training voucher question 
to the dislocated workers. It was designed to test vouchers offered to 
UI recipients as an alternative to participation in WIA. It took place 
in seven states in 2004. Findings echoed the ITA experiment reports. 
Finally, a third USDOL study on training vouchers began in 2006 and 
is ongoing. Career advancement accounts (CAAs) rigorously test how 
best to structure training vouchers, and test this new type of ITA by of-
fering it to spouses of military personnel in 18 military installations in 
eight states. 
These three studies—ITA, PRA, and CAA—are all rigorous, in-
depth investigations of what happens if public sector funds are funneled 
through voucher programs under WIA into support for adults seeking 
training to find a new or better job. The results will undoubtedly be use-
ful for the next decade, as the expansion of WIA as an entry point to not 
only jobs but education and training raises issues about the most cost-
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effective strategies to accelerate preparation for skill-specific needs in 
the economy and competitive positioning. Decker summarizes the find-
ings from two nonexperimental studies of WIA (see Chapters 12 and 
13) and compares them with the earlier JTPA and dislocated worker 
study findings, adjusting all earnings estimates into 2005 dollar equiva-
lents for ease in comparisons. 
Kevin Hollenbeck reports on nonexperimental estimates of WIA
impacts in Chapter 12, “Short-Term Net Impact Estimates and Rates 
of Return.” Hollenbeck utilized data from studies conducted indepen-
dently of each other in response to issues within particular states, so 
the WIA study samples were determined by particular programs or ser-
vices that were each study’s foci. As noted by Hollenbeck, the studies 
used the entire universe of program exiters in selected years in three 
states with varied time periods. Further, each study examined a slightly 
different set of workforce development programs covering different 
time periods, and thus each study selected slightly different popula-
tion groups drawn to the particular workforce programs of interest for 
the studies. In most cases, the program service population for the WIA
adult and WIA dislocated worker groups could be identified within the 
state study, and thus the findings across states for these groups could be 
combined. The results focus on the programs offered under WIA for job 
training in order to compare with JTPA impacts. 
Hollenbeck examines the earnings and employment impacts and 
hours of work and wage rate impacts from participation in WIA Adult, 
Dislocated Worker, and Youth programs, including how these key out-
comes changed over time post program. Hollenbeck also estimates the 
benefits and costs, incorporating estimates of impacts on fringe ben-
efits, tax payments, and income-conditioned transfers, to arrive at rates 
of return from the programs for the public and society as a whole, or the 
rates of return for individuals served by the programs, for state taxpay-
ers, and for society as a whole. 
Hollenbeck combines the program administrative data in the
WIASRD system with state UI records and state Employment Service 
(ES) records. Comparison groups were constructed using propensity 
scoring to statistically match individuals who had not participated in WIA
within each state to the WIA participants in the state. The matching 
relied on the administrative records available through WIA, ES, and UI 
systems. 
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The study states covered in Hollenbeck’s analysis were Washing-
ton State (two studies, one very early, 1998–2000, and the other later, 
during 2002–2004); Virginia (2004–2005); and Indiana (2005–2006). 
The state study samples were constrained in Washington State, as WIA
records did not include the date of entry, only the date of exit. There-
fore Hollenbeck conducted his impact estimations across all the study 
states using quarter of the date of exit from WIA as the starting point 
for the follow-up analysis. Hollenbeck assembled administration data 
at the individual level for the treatment and comparison group samples 
receipt of transfer income from UI benefits, Food Stamps, Medicaid, 
TANF benefits, and fringe benefits and taxes on earnings, as well as the 
employment and earnings outcomes. These allowed estimating not only 
employment and earnings during the preprogram and postprogram out-
come time periods but the ways WIA participants might have received 
both positive and negative benefits by participating in WIA, the benefits 
or costs to taxpayers, and the overall social benefit-cost estimates that 
combine both the program participant gains or losses and the taxpayers’
benefits or costs. 
Hollenbeck concludes there were strong and positive results on the 
post-WIA earnings for adult WIA populations in that all appear to have 
statistically significant earnings and employment impacts from partici-
pating in WIA although of varying magnitudes and trends over time 
depending on the state study. The point estimates of average quarterly 
earnings for the WIA Adult program show gains in earnings on aver-
age, beginning in the short-term time period (two to three full quarters 
after program exit) of $146–$711 per quarter. The WIA Adult earnings 
gains during the long-term follow-up time period (from 4 quarters to 12 
quarters after program exit) average $455–$463 per quarter. 
The results for youth in WIA are less positive. Hollenbeck esti-
mates that short-term earnings gains among youth in WIA are near zero 
and not significant. The long-term average earnings gain among WIA
youth was mixed—in one state study it was significant at $325, but in 
another state it remained not significant and near zero. It should be re-
called that under JTPA, estimates of youth earnings gains from training 
were negative and statistically significant in the short term, and near 
zero and not significant in the long term. 
For two of the state studies, Hollenbeck was also able to decompose 
the net impacts into employment, wage, and hours impacts, finding 
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positive net impacts and returns on investment for virtually all of the 
programs. He also finds very strong and positive, statistically signifi-
cant impacts on earnings for the dislocated workers who participated in 
WIA in the short term and the long term, varying between $410–$784 
and $310–$771, respectively. Because of the baseline for the studies 
at program exit, the opportunity costs or forgone earnings experienced 
by dislocated workers from entry into WIA are not incorporated in the 
short- and long-run earnings and employment estimates. 
Hollenbeck’s benefit-cost analysis estimates that the discounted net 
benefits to participants over the first 10 quarters after exit range between 
$3,500 and $5,000 over all three groups. There are important differences
between the groups. The costs to dislocated workers of participating 
in WIA (the forgone earnings) are so large that the net benefit return 
for dislocated workers is consistently negative. Hollenbeck estimates 
the losses to those entering WIA by tracking through ES and UI files 
the preprogram earnings and employment. He also projects from the 
estimates for the first 2.5 years after exit from WIA, all the private and 
public benefits and costs over the first 25 years after program exit, and 
over the working lifetime. 
These projections show that for dislocated workers and youth in 
the states studied, the private and public benefits and costs from their 
participation in WIA produced overall negative rates of return. In the 
case of dislocated workers, the main explanation of the negative rate of 
return is the loss of earnings they experience, on average, by participat-
ing in WIA, and essentially delaying reemployment and the earnings 
benefits obtained that the comparison group obtains. In addition, the 
public costs for training of dislocated workers outweigh the public ben-
efits obtained in Hollenbeck’s estimates. However, employment gains 
still exist and are strong enough so that Hollenbeck suggests consider-
ing policies, such as a stipend, for dislocated workers in the training 
programs to offset the forgone earnings. 
The youth population also has a negative social return that outweighs 
the marginal economic gains in Hollenbeck’s benefit-cost analysis. The 
earnings gains for youth were essentially zero, so the program costs 
easily exceeded the benefits of WIA serving youth, at least in the one 
state study undertaken in Washington State by Hollenbeck and Huang 
(2003). The earnings and employment gains estimated for the first 2.5 
years after the adult population exited WIA training were enough to 
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outweigh forgone earnings, and allow Hollenbeck to conclude that the 
overall social benefits were greater than the social costs. 
A national nonexperimental study of WIA impacts was undertaken 
by a team led by Carolyn J. Heinrich with Peter R. Mueser, Kenneth 
R. Troske, Kyung-Seong Jeon, and Daver C. Kahvecioglu. The study 
is summarized in Chapter 13, “A Nonexperimental Evaluation of WIA
Programs.” The objective was to reach the national WIA participant 
population in a study for the USDOL, but Heinrich and colleagues cau-
tion that they could not obtain a truly representative national sample.
Heinrich and colleagues use the point of program entry to begin the 
study observation period. The study evaluates two WIA programs: the 
Adult program, serving largely disadvantaged individuals, and the Dis-
located Worker program, serving those who have lost jobs. 
Heinrich et al. draw a number of conclusions regarding the most 
immediate or short-term (immediately after WIA entry) earnings 
impacts WIA participants obtain, contrasted with their longer-run 
patterns of gains (up to fours years after WIA entry); differences by 
gender; differences between the Adult WIA program participant gains 
and the Dislocated Worker WIA program participant gains; and pos-
sible interactions of earnings gain patterns with various selection bias 
considerations, such as measured differences (and the unobservable 
differences) between the participant and comparison study samples at 
baseline and preprogram and the variance in participation patterns in WIA. 
In discussing the conclusions on short- and long-term impacts, 
Heinrich and colleagues emphasize how different the results are for 
the Adult versus the Dislocated Worker programs. They also stress that 
by examining the likely long-term benefits of training—the benefits 
estimated for the last 11–16 quarters (generally the fourth year after 
program entry)—one obtains some gauge on whether the WIA pro-
grams pass a benefit-cost standard. 
Earnings for men and women in the WIA Adult program increased 
during quarters 11–16 after WIA entry that average annualized earn-
ings gains of 26 percent for women ($2,363) and of 15 percent for men 
($1,676). The employment rate increments estimated are 12 percent for 
both men and women, or employment rates rising by about 6.5 percent-
age points. The WIA Dislocated Worker program estimate by Heinrich 
and colleagues presents annualized earnings gains in quarters 11–16 
after program exit that are very small and not significant. Employment 
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rates, however, appear to increase by 4–5 percentage points, or 7–8 
percent gains, and are statistically significant. They point out that dislo-
cated worker populations are, on average, those who have strong work 
histories and higher wages so their entry into services such as train-
ing or extensive career counseling remove them from the successful 
job finding process evident in control groups in experimental studies of 
dislocated workers. There are diminished earnings and employment for 
dislocated workers during program participation, with about four years 
needed to recoup and return to the “normal” pattern, and eventually 
show some earnings gains. 
For the Dislocated Worker program, the earnings impacts would 
need to be long lived to exceed costs, and earnings gains for dislocated 
workers who are men are basically not discernable, meaning benefits 
do not exceed costs. The study estimates that the WIA Adult program 
clearly satisfies a benefit-cost standard for both men and women if the 
earnings impacts continue for a period of just two or three years. For the 
Dislocated Worker program, the evidence is much less clear. 
Heinrich and colleagues describe the latitude in WIA that states 
have used to structure the One-Stop system to reflect local preferences, 
under direction of the local agency, the WIB, stressing that there are 
wide variations across localities. They note that the sequential service 
mandate may cause “negative selection into training” because one must 
have been unsuccessful in obtaining employment through core and in-
tensive service sequences to be eligible for training. On the other hand, 
they also note that it has been found in most sites that “as many as a 
third of those who participate in WIA have a particular training goal 
prior to program entry (they are often referred to WIA by the training 
provider), and, in general, WIA staff make an effort to accommodate 
them.” It is also expected that the performance measures encourage 
positive selection of those perceived to be most successful in the labor 
market for WIA services. 
The authors point out how there is no simple picture of what ser-
vices a customer receives under WIA. For example, a recent study finds 
that nationwide, about one in five WIA participants received only core 
services, and about two in five were coded as receiving training services 
(Social Policy Research Associates 2006). Of those receiving training, 
up to 10 percent received on-the-job training and another 5 percent re-
ceived basic skills training, with the remainder receiving occupational 
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and other training. It is also interesting that half of all training recorded
was funded by ITAs, with two-thirds of those in training receiving 
some kind of credential. Somewhere between a half and a third of 
WIA participants exited the program in less than 26 weeks, the balance 
remaining in WIA and then exiting were in the program for at least 
a year. The impact estimates in the study could not consider how all 
these different service patterns might shift the overall average earnings 
and employment estimates per participant in the Adult or Dislocated
Worker programs, but there is considerable study discussion of how 
these patterns could be theorized to influence such estimates. 
Overall, the main conclusions are the consistent and significant 
gains obtained by women and men in the WIA Adult program, in con-
trast to the lack of such gains, in general, among those in the WIA
Dislocated Worker program, and that conclusions regarding program 
effectiveness should not be based on the very short-term recorded 
earnings and employment within the first year after program exit. To 
ignore the more significant gains for Adult program participants, which 
emerge by years three and four, misses a potential public sector invest-
ment payoff rarely found through solid, rigorous evaluations. Heinrich 
and colleagues urge investing random assignment studies that can offer 
findings that are more confirmatory. Some of the study findings appear 
consistent with the earlier random assignment study of JTPA, especially 
in the ineffectiveness of providing training as the main service for the 
Dislocated Worker population. The Heinrich team could not replicate 
the important studies of the effectiveness of incentives that encourage 
swifter reattachment to jobs, but they note that these strategies appear 
to be a more efficient approach. The Adult program findings, on the 
other hand, support those who believe job search assistance and training 
services are effective when dedicated to those with weak employment 
experience or attachment to the mainstream economy. 
FUTURE EVALUATION CHOICES 
The term evaluation encompasses many different efforts to assess 
the effects of a policy, program, or particular practice. Whatever the 
focus, central to evaluation standards is how well the counterfactual 
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produces reliable impact estimates. The next set of papers reviews the 
conditions that need to exist to implement particular evaluation designs, 
noting which conditions reduce or increase reliability. 
In Chapter 14, “Nonexperimental Impact Evaluations,” Haeil Jung 
and Maureen A. Pirog review the history of employment and training 
program evaluations, focusing on the Manpower Development and 
Training Act (MDTA), which began in 1962, and CETA, which began 
in 1973. Evaluations of CETA were nonexperimental and drew samples 
of participants from a longitudinal manpower survey that tracked par-
ticipants to compare with those not in CETA, drawn from the Current 
Population Survey. Jung and Pirog recall that these evaluations pro-
duced widely varying findings that drew serious examination of why 
the findings varied, and stimulated beginning efforts to use experi-
mental designs, which had begun to test other employability programs 
outside of the CETA system. Evaluation specialists began to compare 
findings from experiments with efforts to replicate the experiment using 
comparison groups such as one would draw from the Current Popula-
tion Survey and other sources. 
Jung and Pirog describe the outgrowth of the replication studies, 
an ongoing methodological concern with what data conditions and 
which nonexperimental methods might be the second-best fits to what 
would be obtained if an experimental study could have been under-
taken. Accompanying this were efforts to define and measure the types 
of selection bias that produced estimates from nonexperimental studies 
that did not get close to experimental estimates. They point out that, al-
though there may be logistical difficulties encountered in implementing 
a random assignment experiment, these difficulties must be weighted 
against the likelihood of giving bad advice to policymakers, the likely 
result of applying nonexperimental techniques in many situations with-
out taking account of the assumptions. 
Jung and Pirog aim their discussion to those who, it is assumed, are 
not able to use experimental methods given the constraints from pro-
gram operations such as mandatory participation and thus must choose 
among nonexperimental methods. They first observe the various types 
of questions that experimental methods address, and then discuss the 
sources of selection bias that an econometric estimator might correct 
for. Jung and Pirog point out that there are different types of selection 
bias in training programs, and the challenge is to understand how the 
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sources of the selection biases might operate in particular training pro-
gram contexts. 
Four key conditions that nonexperimental evaluations need to have 
in order to reduce the measurable sources of bias, according to Jung and 
Pirog, are 1) comparison groups drawn from the same local labor mar-
kets as the programs studied, 2) the same instrumentation used to collect 
data from the treatment and comparison groups, 3) the same range of 
values for the observed characteristics of the comparison group’s mem-
bers as for treatment group’s members, and 4) the same distributions 
of the values across the ranges of the treatment and comparison group. 
Jung and Pirog also advise caution in specifying the policy question, 
noting that the policy question addressed in intent to treat evaluations is 
different from the question addressed in treatment on treatment evalua-
tions. The former includes the applicants assigned to the program who 
may drop out after baseline and thus addresses whether the program 
overall had a desirable impact on the eligible population. Evaluations 
that focus on those who received the treatment are aimed at the effects 
for a subgroup of those eligible. Thus, these evaluations cannot capture 
the overall policy effectiveness of expenditures on treatments offered to 
a much larger group of eligible people. The authors review the model-
ing methods used to work on estimates for groups who somehow do get 
treatment (the subset of the intent to treat population), relying on the 
observables captured in data sets. These techniques include difference-
in-differences extensions on matching, regression discontinuity design, 
and the marginal treatment effect using local instrumental variables, and 
are summarized along with earlier modeling methods such as regression 
estimators, propensity score matching, and difference-in-differences. 
In Chapter 15, “Designing Reliable Impact Evaluations,” Larry L. 
Orr, Stephen H. Bell, and Jacob A. Klerman give an overview of the 
directions taken in evaluation science over the 40 years of efforts to 
evaluate job training programs, pointing out how over time the stan-
dards become more certain and focused on experimental designs. Orr, 
Bell, and Klerman note that for the first job training studies of MDTA
during the 1960s, evaluations started out with simple before-after 
methods looking at whether postprogram earnings improved over pre-
program earnings. 
Important work by economists pointed out that preprogram earn-
ings are simply a marker of the reason why one comes for job training: 
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one has lost a job so earnings are nil; then one finds a job, whether 
through a job training program or other strategies. Rebounding from 
a job loss naturally leads to most eventually finding another job. This 
Ashenfelter dip, the natural drop of earnings due to job loss–job re-
covery before one needs the services of a job training program, means 
one has to have some comparison of similar people who are also go-
ing through the job loss–job gain cycle. During the 1970s, evaluations 
focused on using data about people who looked similar in that they too 
had suffered loss of a job. 
By the 1980s, economists analyzed how well methods using such 
data sources (typically national longitudinal data) could replicate the 
findings from some of the first national experimental studies of work-
force programs, such as the Supported Work evaluation by Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation. Recognition that past, nonexper-
imental studies could not produce scientifically valid program impact 
estimates brought congressional requirements for more rigorous evalu-
ations. A prime example was the serious investment in the National 
JTPA Study, using experimental methods to assign over 20,000 appli-
cants to job training or control groups in sixteen local programs and 
study the outcomes for an extended period. Other workforce programs 
received rigorous evaluations as well. 
Orr and his colleagues stress that experimental methods (using ran-
dom assignment to allocate applicants to the program or to a control 
group) are not only scientifically accurate, but they avoid the meth-
odological debates that accompany presentations of nonexperimental 
results. The lack of comparability between nonexperimental evaluation 
methods versus the experimental method is the fact that by randomly as-
signing eligible applicants for a training program into two groups—the 
treatment group allowed to enter the program and the control group that 
is not allowed to enter the program—the two samples, due to random 
assignment, have by chance the same set of background factors repre-
sented in them. Most important, they have the same set of unobservable 
characteristics, motivations, and experiences that are unknown. If, for 
example, one were to select a comparison group of nonparticipants as 
the counterfactual, one cannot ever be assured that the factors are taken 
into account that turned them from potential application and participa-
tion into a nonparticipant. 
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The authors review efforts to improve nonexperimental methods to 
bring them closer in credibility as experimental studies. This question 
stimulated many methods studies, testing how close the results from 
these methodological developments are to those from a study done with 
experimental methods. They note that it is particularly the case in work-
force program evaluations that the nonexperimental methods are “not 
well-suited” to econometric modeling of job loss–job gain and the ac-
companying loss of earnings. Those who have come the closest have the 
benefit of data sets of large numbers of individuals that have extensive 
longitudinal data on the employment and earnings on the individuals. 
Orr, Bell, and Klerman also emphasize that a major problem with 
using nonexperimental methods is that, before a program evaluation is 
put into the field, one has no really viable rule that specifies what will 
produce the estimate closest to the estimate obtained in an experimental 
evaluation. Thus, while after an experimental study is completed, one 
may check out which nonexperimental method applied to the experi-
mental data appears to come closest, before the study one has no way of 
judging this. Design parameters are critical for estimating study costs, 
and are more indeterminant if a nonexperimental method is used. With 
an experiment, there are much stronger estimates possible of what will 
be required to conduct the study, so both the costs and the likelihood 
that the study will find significant effects if they exist are firmer and 
provide more assurance to policymakers that funds are being wisely 
applied. 
Advances have been made using experimental methods, as Orr and 
his colleagues explain. They should be recognized and their use en-
couraged, for they demonstrate that it is possible to apply experimental 
methods to a variety of program conditions. The authors provide ex-
amples, including spreading control groups over many sites, decreasing 
the allocation percentage, as well as allowing program operators to in-
crease the odds of assignment to treatment for preferred applicants or 
testing greater levels of intervention versus the standard services, and 
using administrative data instead of surveys. 
The latest plans for a national random assignment study of WIA are 
discussed in Chapter 16, titled “Neither Easy Nor Cheap,” by Sheena 
McConnell, Peter Schochet, and Alberto Martini, who are leading the 
new WIA experimental study. The authors remind us of the ways evalu-
ations have affected policy and programmatic decisions, new demands 
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on experimental studies, and how future evaluations may need to be 
tailored. 
The first evaluation of the Job Corps (which actually was nonex-
perimental in design) found it cost-effective. This was the first time 
policymakers had a major, national longitudinal study assessing a job 
program, and the findings led them to increase the funding and sustain 
the program. Job Corps has remained popular, with the longest “life” 
next to Head Start. When the JTPA evaluation findings for youth were 
released much later showing there was no significant earnings gain, and 
even hints of negative impacts for some subgroups, the response was 
major programmatic changes and reduced funding as well. One experi-
mental test of reemployment services for jobless people on UI led to 
changes in UI services, requiring worker profiling and reemployment 
services for recipients likely to exhaust benefits before finding employ-
ment, basically requiring those recipients to receive services much as 
welfare benefits are conditioned on participation. Another experimental 
study led to the creation of the Self-Employment Assistance program 
for those on unemployment compensation, to help the unemployed start 
their own small business. 
McConnell, Schochet, and Martini urge planners of future 
evaluation to pay attention to lessons learned from over 30 years of 
experiments in workforce programs. First on their list of key lessons 
is the careful development of the evaluation questions a study will 
take on. (A rigorous study can only accommodate a few questions.) 
The question dilemma first arises by confronting whether to evaluate 
the whole program or which components of a program are effective. 
The authors believe the second strategy is advantageous in workforce 
program evaluations. Whole programs these days have too much com-
plexity, too many moving parts. One may learn more by focusing on 
particular program areas aimed to help identified target groups. Target 
groups, however, need to be clearly identified in the evaluation plan, as 
they are typically broken into subgroups. One is constrained by evalu-
ation costs to a limited number of subgroups. Trying to collect a lot of 
demographic variables and then fishing around later, testing out differ-
ent subgroups, is considered “milking,” and reviewers will ask what the 
original plan was for testing the key hypotheses driving the program 
design and the subgroup characteristics specified a priori. McConnell 
and her colleagues also remind evaluation planners that the procedures 
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and data to be used to draw the counterfactual are also critical to assur-
ing that one can obtain the sample(s) needed for the questions. 
On the question of evaluation design, in situations where a “no 
service offered” control group cannot be established within the exist-
ing program, the authors urge trying an experimental design that uses 
“randomized encouragement,” in which all the eligible participants 
are assigned to services, but the random assignment sets up a lottery 
assigning an encouragement to some participants to voluntarily use 
more services. This incorporates random assignment into program op-
erations, with the assignment being to the encouraged group or to the 
regular service menu. 
McConnell, Schochet, and Martini also provide a summary of non-
experimental designs, noting the difficulties involved. They strongly 
recommend that the regression discontinuity or propensity score meth-
ods be used rather than less credible methods. They conclude that the 
regression discontinuity approach has the most promise when experi-
mental methods are not viable. The selection rule for receiving the 
treatment is fully known under the regression discontinuity approach. 
The propensity score approach has to rely on modeling using observable 
baseline data, so one cannot know for sure whether the unobservables 
are introducing substantial bias into the findings. 
The authors note the methodological efforts to use propensity score 
methods that match program participants to a comparison sample and 
appraise how successful these methods are at getting estimates that are 
stable and similar to experimental results. McConnell and colleagues 
conclude that while some estimation techniques appear more success-
ful than others in replication studies focused on particular experimental 
data sets, they believe that it is the data available that can be used for 
the comparison group that determines the validity of the estimate, rather 
than the nonexperimental technique. In other words, the things that mat-
ter are whether the data contains an extensive and good set of matching 
variables for modeling the participation decision, such as extensive pre-
program earnings histories, samples possible from the same geographic 
areas as the experimental study group, and same follow-up data sources 
available for treatment and comparison groups. 
McConnell and colleagues also summarize the issues that arise 
when using administrative records, especially the state UI data that stud-
ies on WIA have used. They point out how important it is to have data 
  
Introduction 41 
on service receipt among program participants and the control group. 
Typically the latter requires special surveys. Having data regularly col-
lected in administrative systems has been a great advantage in studying 
programs (for both experiments and nonexperimental studies). And, 
they argue, an experimental design will pay back dividends. The costs 
of conducting experiments are not nearly so high as once believed, with 
the availability of systems tracking employment and earnings that can 
be linked to the program records, and by doing the assignment within 
the workforce system, comparing different alternatives for important 
populations, policymakers have very credible estimates about whether 
more costly alternatives matter, as well as the realities of who is attracted
to these programs, who stays, and who seems to obtain real benefits. 
Turning to lessons from evaluations of U.S. workforce programs 
to the evaluation of Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs) in the 
European context, Jeffrey Smith in Chapter 17, “Improving Impact 
Evaluation in Europe,” draws on the North American experience and 
contrasts it with European practices. He makes the case for three par-
ticular features in the North American context that he believes would 
improve policymaking in the European context: 1) greater use of 
random assignment methods, 2) recognition and adoption of serious 
cost-benefit analysis, and 3) greater attention to developing and using 
evaluation industry entities such as takes place in North America. Smith 
points out that there are European practices that could or should be con-
sidered as improvements within the North American context, including 
the rich, well-maintained, and accessible administrative data and spe-
cific data elements (e.g., caseworker ratings of clients, the emphasis on 
documenting sanction regimes for benefit recipients). Further, he notes 
that European countries vary greater in their research and evaluation 
capacities being applied to ALMPs. 
In support of investing in experimental studies, Smith notes that 
the “key advantage [is] that their simple design makes them easy to ex-
plain and hard to argue with . . . giving them a policy-influencing power 
not enjoyed by even the cleanest nonexperimental designs.” Further, 
the high-quality data produced yield substantive advances in under-
standing labor markets. Smith acknowledges that there are limitations, 
including the questions that cannot be addressed through experimental 
methods. Some have difficulty understanding what use can be made of 
experimental results, noting the treatment dropouts and crossovers from 
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control groups, and the limitation on external validity, or generalization 
to people or areas that were not represented in the experiment. Social 
experiments that aim for “national representation” cost a great deal, be-
cause compliance of the scientifically drawn sample may require extra 
resources, but they satisfy those who want the most general assessment. 
There are also policymakers and program administrators who will 
express ethical objections to random assignment. Smith comments, “In 
my experience, these objections nearly always represent a cover for 
simply not wanting to know the answer.” While it is empirically the 
case that “many, maybe most, programs fail when subjected to seri-
ous evaluation,” Smith counters that this may indicate that indeed it is 
“important constituencies, such as workers and agencies or firms that 
provide the treatments” who have an interest in a program’s existence 
in the first place. He notes that these constituencies also have an inter-
est in low-quality evaluations or misleading performance measures in 
place of experimental evidence that compels others to challenge the 
program’s existence. 
In response to those who express concerns about service denial, it 
is quite possible, where resources are not constrained, to design random 
assignment so that all receive some type of service, with multiple treat-
ment arms. In cases where a program can only serve a portion of the 
presumed beneficiaries, the experimental design is an equitable way 
to allocate the scarce resources. There are also randomized encourage-
ment designs, with the assignment being to an incentive to participate, 
where no one is excluded, and the incentive provides an exogenous 
variation in treatment status. Another type of design is “randomization 
at the margin,” where the group selected for randomization are those at 
the end of the list deemed most critically in need of services. 
All in all, notes Smith, the experimental evaluations of workforce 
programming conducted in the United States have often led to policy 
changes, as he recalls a number of examples where shifts in policies 
and program funding were the results of an experimental study. He also 
explains why cost-benefit analysis is the most important contribution to 
arriving at “a direct policy conclusion.” The message is clear about the 
value of a program to the taxpayers who fund it. An important example 
is the cost-benefit analysis associated with the U.S. National Job Corps 
Study that has brought rethinking of a long-standing program. 
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Smith observes that “the modal European ALMP evaluation . . . 
contains no cost-benefit analysis at all.” While it is true that Europe-
ans stress employment as the key outcome in workforce programming 
rather than earnings (one needs earnings to have a monetary benefit 
in cost-benefit analysis), he believes that recognition that employment 
impacts typically are negative or zero, discourages serious consider-
ation of benefit-cost analysis. Smith also notes that the public sector 
in Europe does not believe it so important to cost out public services. 
Nevertheless, knowing the duration of program impacts is important as 
well, and a part of cost-benefit analysis. 
Finally, Smith considers why there are such marked differences in 
the quantity and quality of workforce evaluations across countries. He 
observes how robust the evaluation sector is in the United States, the 
variety of entities engaged, and the very large size of the evaluation sec-
tor. In contrast to the European patterns, Smith believes the centering of 
the research market, the research activity, outside of government is crit-
ical in that it encourages and supports independent, objective appraisals 
of government programs. He recommends European governments con-
sider how they might consolidate funds for evaluations, to increase the 
size of the European evaluation market, and open the market to a vari-
ety of research entities, both within Europe and from outside. 
Smith notes that parallel with the U.S. growth in the research sector 
was the broad agreement that it is best for government not to undertake 
directly the evaluation of programs it funds and manages. He concludes 
by noting the imprint of neoclassical economics as possibly influenc-
ing the agreement regarding the role of independent research, as well 
as other broader and deeper differences across countries in individual-
ism, deference to authority, the importance of social class, and average 
education. 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CONFERENCE 
WIA brought changes in the workforce training system because 
it shifted responsibilities between layers of government. States be-
came principal actors in WIA, as they were given responsibility for 
determining the funding to local entities responsible for outreach and 
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coordination and making decisions about system operations and per-
formance standards. This shifted these decisions away from the federal 
offices to local and state control. 
Performance management became the central focus of the
USDOL’s management of WIA, and for states as well. WIA offers an 
excellent example of the kinds of changes that can accompany stronger 
accountability requirements in federally funded social and educational 
programs. The act’s performance management mandates occurred at a 
time of extensive computerization of administrative records throughout 
government, and was able to take advantage of the new systems and 
efforts to link records across systems. Despite the expectations regard-
ing easy transfer of performance systems into government, however, 
the systems may not be operating with the incentives expected, due 
to confusion and manipulations possible within the systems. It is un-
clear, as well, whether the investments in closer tracking of the users 
or beneficiaries of federal programs for the purposes of performance 
management actually helped job seekers gain faster access to jobs and 
achieve higher earnings. More likely, as these data files are made avail-
able to researchers, more will be learned about how the program works 
and what services are provided. 
Implementation of WIA took time. Most states obtained waivers 
from the USDOL in the early years of the act to set up performance 
standards for the One-Stop centers, providers, and settled on the data 
requirements without operating fully the new accountability structures. 
States had to invest in large and comprehensive databases to create lists 
of effective providers deemed eligible to serve WIA applicants. New 
and better labor market and local economy information repositories 
were also created under WIA. One-Stop centers focused on encourag-
ing individual “shopping” of WIA services and training options, with 
both staff and customers of One-Stop centers welcoming the shared 
responsibility. 
Nonexperimental evaluations of WIA (at least the programs aimed 
at unemployed adults and at dislocated workers) have had mixed find-
ings. Two studies find significant positive effects for adult job seekers 
who use WIA as opposed to those who do not. The findings are very 
different for dislocated workers. Here the two studies find no positive 
effects for dislocated workers. Comparison groups appear to move 
more quickly into jobs and thus dislocated workers in WIA suffer lost 
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wages while in WIA services. Whether dislocated workers eventually 
overtake the earnings obtained by their counterparts in the comparison 
group seems to depend on the length of follow-up. Estimates of the 
average longer-term net earnings gain among the dislocated workers 
appear to be less than the average social cost estimates of the WIA pro-
gram for this group. 
All of the evidence on WIA program effects on employment and 
earnings is suggestive, rather than confirmatory. Studies that produce 
confirmatory evidence need experimental designs to establish partici-
pant and control groups. The suggestive findings are based on methods 
that are careful and clear about the limitations of the impact estimates. 
It is fortunate that the effects of WIA, as it is now operating some 12 
years after its creation, are finally being examined in new federal stud-
ies under way using randomized designs, but it will be several years 
before early results are known. 
Notes 
1. The meeting was a cross-national policy dialogue organized by the Center for 
International Policy Exchanges at the University of Maryland’s School of Public 
Policy. This dialogue, one of a series with different entities (including the Associa-
tion for Public Policy Analysis and Management), was organized by the University 
of Maryland Center and was held on November 7, 2009, in Washington DC. The 
topic, “Evaluation and Performance Management of Job Training Programs: What 
Can the European Social Fund Learn from the WIA Experience?” was developed 
in response to inquiries from the staff of the European Commission concerned 
with commission workforce programming. Patrick Tiedemann, research associ-
ate at the Center for International Policy Exchanges, assisted in organizing the 
meeting. 
2. Nearly $3 billion was added to the Adult, Dislocated Worker, and Youth programs 
under WIA in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 as a one-time 
increase to be spent by December 31, 2010. 
3. If a job seeker doesn’t get a job at tier 1, they move into tier 2, and then, again if 
no job, to tier 3. 
4. Four federal agencies retained responsibility for distributing funds under each pro-
gram to states, in most cases retaining existing formulas for distribution to the 
states, and other requirements and regulations from prior legislation, with amend-
ments in WIA to accommodate the coordinated access to services entry points. 
5. Blank, Heald, and Fagnoni report that their June 2004 GAO study report “estimat-
ed the cost of doing participant surveys, as was done under JTPA, at approximately 
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$13.25 per participant compared with the cost of automated record matching to UI 
wage records, which costs less than $0.05 per participant.” 
6. At the same time, the USDOL is working on an enhanced data reporting system 
called the Workforce Investment Streamlined Performance Reporting system, to 
consolidate reporting requirements across several other USDOL programs, and 
lead to a single reporting structure that can track an individual’s progress through 
the One-Stop system. 
7. See Chapter 9 for a description of how adjustments to the WIA performance levels 
can be carried out. 
8. The WIA training program for youth, however, is targeted for the out-of-school 
youth. 
9. See especially Chapters 3, 8, and 10. 
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Over time the U.S. workforce development system has seen incre-
mental changes in its structure, its services, and the role that federal, 
state, and local officials play in decision making. Beginning with 
MDTA of 1962 and continuing with CETA of 1973 and JTPA of 1982, 
services were largely focused on training for low-income individuals or 
those on public assistance. The array of job training programs operated 
in an uncoordinated patchwork of programs and agencies that served 
this population, often resulting in inefficiency, duplication of effort, and 
confusion for the job seeker. But, with the passage of WIA in 1998, the 
workforce development system has undergone a fundamental shift in 
the way employment and training services are provided. Comparing 
the structure of WIA to its predecessor programs, we see several key 
themes emerge in the progression of employment and training policy in 
the United States. These include 
• a decreasing focus on income eligibility as the only basis for 
accessing services; 
• a decreasing focus on job training as the primary means for 
getting a job—assessing and marketing existing skills becomes 
the service of choice; 
• an increasing focus on personal responsibility through self-
service and consumer awareness, for example, in choosing 
training options; 
• a greater focus on reducing duplication of effort—but through 
consolidating services, not programs; 
• an increasing role for the private sector in guiding policy and a 
focus on the employer as customer; and 
• a greater focus on both state and local decision making. 
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Since 2000, the GAO has issued more than 25 separate reports 
on WIA alone, many of which included recommendations regarding 
various aspects of WIA. This chapter draws on GAO work conducted 
between 2000 and 2009 in which the GAO examined the nature of the 
challenges confronting officials at all levels—federal, state, and local— 
in implementing the Workforce Investment System, what has been done 
to address them, and the challenges that remain. The first two sections 
of this chapter cover the consolidation of services in One-Stop systems 
and the structure of the three programs authorized under WIA. The third 
section focuses more explicitly on the performance accountability pro-
visions for the three WIA-funded programs. 
KEY ELEMENTS OF WIA’S APPROACH
AND HOW THEY WORK 
WIA made several important changes to the existing employment 
and training system, but two are key: 1) it consolidated services for 
most federally funded employment and training programs for adults and 
youth; and 2) it redesigned services under the largest employment and 
training program, JTPA, when it created three new funding streams— 
WIA Adult, Dislocated Workers, and Youth. States were required to 
implement these changes by July 1, 2000. 
Consolidating Services in the One-Stop System 
To create a more comprehensive workforce investment system, 
WIA required states and localities to bring together the services of 
most federally funded employment and training programs into a single 
system, called the One-Stop system. Prior to WIA, services to job seek-
ers were often provided through a patchwork of agencies and offices. 
While many of the programs shared similar goals, their services were 
rarely coordinated, creating an environment of confusion and frustra-
tion and hampering efforts to help job seekers get and keep a job. For 
about a decade before WIA was passed, states and localities had been 
experimenting with integrating some of their employment and training 
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services, but none had gone so far as to include the full range required 
under WIA. 
The USDOL has overall responsibility for administering the pro-
visions of WIA. Sixteen federally funded workforce development 
programs administered by four separate federal agencies, including the 
USDOL, are required to provide their services through the One-Stop 
system. In fiscal year 2009, Congress appropriated over $15.9 billion 
for the 16 mandatory programs, including about $3.3 billion for WIA. 
In addition, several of these programs, including all of the WIA-funded 
programs, received additional funding under the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The three WIA-funded programs in 
particular received a total of $3.2 billion in additional funding. Even 
without the additional funding, these three WIA-funded programs com-
bined currently constitute the largest federally funded employment and 
training program in the United States. (See Table 2.1.) 
Each state must have one or more designated local workforce 
investment areas, and each local area must have at least one com-
prehensive One-Stop center where core services for all mandatory 
programs are accessible. WIA allows flexibility in the way these man-
datory partners provide services through the One-Stop system, allowing 
colocation, electronic linkages, or referrals to off-site partner programs. 
While WIA requires these mandatory partners to participate, it does 
not provide additional funds to support the One-Stop system infrastruc-
ture, such as facilities or data systems. As a result, mandatory partners 
are expected to share the costs of developing and operating One-Stop 
centers. In addition to mandatory partners, One-Stop centers have the 
flexibility to include other partners in the One-Stop system to better 
meet specific state and local workforce development needs. Services 
may also be provided at affiliated sites, defined as designated locations 
that provide access to at least one employment and training program. 
While officials at all levels have generally considered the changes 
to be moving the system in the right direction, creating these One-Stop 
centers where services were consolidated across a broad range of pro-
grams was a daunting task and states and local areas encountered some 
challenges along the way. 
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Table 2.1  WIA’s Mandatory Programs and Services and Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation 
Fiscal year 2009
Federal agency and appropriation
mandatory program ($, millions) Services provided and target population 
Department of Labor 
WIA Adult 862 Assessment, counseling, job readiness skills, and occupational skills training to individ-
uals age 18 or older. Priority for intensive services and training is given to low-income 
individuals and public assistance recipients. 
WIA Dislocated Worker 1,467 Assessment, counseling, job readiness skills, and occupational skills training to workers 
age 18 or older who have lost their jobs due to plant closures or layoffs. 
WIA Youth 924 Assistance for youth ages 14–21 to complete an education program or to secure and 
hold employment. 30% of funds used on out-of-school youth. 
Employment Service 704 Assessment, counseling, job readiness and placement to any individual seeking employ-
(Wagner-Peyser) ment who is legally authorized to work in the United States. 
Trade Adjustment Assistance 958 Assistance to workers who lose their jobs due to international trade. Benefits include 
training, income support while in training, job search, relocation assistance, assistance 
with health insurance, and wage insurance for certain older workers. 
Veterans’ employment and 239 Counseling and placement services to veterans, including those with service-connected 
training programs disabilities; connections to other programs that can fund training. 
Unemployment Insurance 2,833 Income support to individuals eligible under state law, who have become unemployed 
through no fault of their own and are looking for work. 
Job Corps 1,684 A residential program that provides job training and job-readiness skills to disadvan-
taged at-risk youth ages 16 to 24. 
  
 
Senior Community Service 572 Assessment, counseling, placement assistance, occupational skills training, and part-
Employment Program time community service employment for low-income persons age 55 and over. 
Employment and training 83 Assessment, counseling, placement assistance, occupational skills training, and other 
for migrant and seasonal supportive services for economically disadvantaged migrant and seasonally employed 
farm workers farm workers. 
Employment and training for 53 Assessment, counseling, placement assistance, occupational skills training, and other 
Native Americans supportive services for Indian, Alaskan Native, and Native Hawaiian individuals. 
Department of Education 
Vocational Rehabilitation 2,975 Assessment, counseling, placement assistance, occupational skills training, and other 
Program rehabilitative services to individuals with disabilities; priority is given to those with the 
most significant disabilities. 
Adult Education and 567 Assessment and basic skills and literacy training to adults over the age of 16, not 
Literacy enrolled in school, who lack a high school diploma or the basic skills to function effec-
tively in the workplace and in their daily lives. 
Vocational Education 1,272 Improvement of vocational and technical education programs through curriculum and 
(Perkins Act) professional development, purchase of equipment, services to members of special popu-
lations, and other activities. 
Department of Health and 
Human Services 
Community Services Block 700 A wide array of assistance, including, but not limited to, employment or training to low-
Grant income families and their communities. 
Department of Housing and 
Urban Development 
HUD-administered n/a A wide range of employment- and training-related services to residents of public and 
employment and training assisted housing and other low-income persons, including the Community Development 
Block Grants. 
SOURCE: Departments of Labor, Education, HHS, and HUD. 
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Governance of the One-Stop system 
WIA called for the development of workforce investment boards to 
oversee WIA implementation at the state and local levels. At the state 
level, WIA requires, among other things, that the Workforce Investment 
Board (often called the “WIB”) assist the governor in helping to set up 
the system, establish procedures and processes for ensuring account-
ability, and designate local workforce investment areas. WIA also 
requires that boards be established within each of the local workforce 
investment areas to carry out the formal agreements developed between 
the boards and each partner, and to oversee One-Stop operations. The 
WIBs have no control over the funds for most of the mandatory partner 
programs and have only limited authority over a portion of the WIA
funds designated for adult and youth activities. 
WIA specifies the categories of members that should participate on 
the workforce investment boards, but does not prescribe a minimum or 
maximum number of members. It allows governors to select representa-
tives for the board from various segments of the workforce investment 
community, including business, education, labor, and other organiza-
tions. The specifics for local board membership are similar to those for 
the state. Private-sector leadership and involvement on these boards has 
been seen as crucial to shaping the direction of the workforce investment 
system. In that respect, WIA requires that private-sector representatives 
chair the boards and make up the majority of board members. 
WIA’s statutory requirements for the WIBs created some chal-
lenges for states and localities, at least initially. As a result of the board 
membership requirements, boards became rather large and unwieldy. In 
a 2001 report, we noted that the average number of members on state 
workforce boards often exceeded 40 and sometimes reached as high 
as 64. Local boards were just as large. By comparison, major private-
sector corporate boards often have around 12 members. Officials 
reported that the size of the boards made it difficult to recruit the nec-
essary private-sector board members and made it difficult to set up 
and conduct meetings. Some local areas experimented with different 
approaches to reduce the size of boards, including developing extensive 
committee structures (GAO 2001). Currently, the USDOL reports that 
the state and local WIBs are about the same size as they were at WIA’s 
inception. However, the department notes that well-functioning boards 
have found that dividing into subcommittees has allowed them to func-
tion more efficiently. 
  
 
 
 
An Overview of WIA  55 
One-Stop infrastructure 
In 2007, we reported that WIA’s service delivery infrastructure was 
still evolving, and between 2001 and 2007, the number of One-Stop 
centers nationwide—both comprehensive and affiliated sites—had 
declined somewhat, a fact that states most often attributed to a decrease 
in funding. At last count, there were 1,850 comprehensive One-Stops 
across the country. Services for mandatory programs were increasingly 
available through the One-Stop system in 2007, though not always on 
site. States continued to have services for two key programs—WIA
Adult and Dislocated Workers—available on site at the majority of the 
One-Stop centers. The on site availability of some other programs— 
such as Job Corps, Migrant and Seasonal Farm Workers, Senior 
Community Service and Employment Program, and Adult Education 
and Literacy—had declined slightly between 2001 and 2007. However, 
the overall availability of these programs’ services increased, largely 
because of substantial increases in access through electronic linkages 
and referrals. Despite the increased availability of some programs at 
One-Stop centers, in some local areas the linkages between key pro-
grams never really developed. In 2007, we reported that several states 
had not fully integrated all of their Wagner-Peyser-funded Employment 
Service (ES) activities into the system. Six states reported in our 2007 
survey that they operated stand-alone ES offices, all completely outside 
the One-Stop system. Another four states reported having at least some 
stand-alone offices outside the system (GAO 2007a). At that time, we 
recommended that the USDOL step up action to require all ES offices 
to be part of the One-Stop system. Labor Department officials tell us 
they remain committed to a fully integrated system and are providing 
technical assistance to state and local officials and to system partners to 
promote better integration. 
Lacking a dedicated source of funding to support infrastructure, 
most states and local areas rely heavily on one or two programs to sup-
port One-Stop costs, although some states disperse the costs among 
numerous programs. WIA and the ES were the two programs most often 
identified in our 2007 survey as funding sources used for infrastruc-
ture—the nonpersonnel costs of operating comprehensive One-Stop 
centers. Of the 48 states that were able to report on infrastructure fund-
ing for comprehensive One-Stop centers, 23 states identified WIA as 
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the top funding source and 19 states reported that Employment Service 
funds were the largest funding source. In a 2003 report on promising 
One-Stop practices, we noted that some local One-Stops were finding 
other ways to creatively increase One-Stop funds through fee-based 
services, grants, or contributions from partner programs and state or 
local governments. Managers said these additional funds allowed them 
to cover operational costs and expand services despite limited WIA
funding to support One-Stop infrastructure and restrictions on the use 
of program funds. For example, One-Stop operators in one local area 
reported that they raised $750,000 in one fiscal year through a com-
bination of fee-based business consulting, drug testing, and drivers’
education services (GAO 2003a). 
Coordinating services across programs 
WIA sought to reduce the confusion and redundancy that existed in 
workforce development programs. It did so by requiring that programs 
coordinate services—it did not consolidate the programs. To facili-
tate this coordination, WIA provided the flexibility to states and local 
areas to develop approaches for serving job seekers and employers that 
best meet local needs. This local flexibility has allowed innovation in 
streamlining services across the array of programs in the One-Stops. 
In our 2003 study, we report that states and localities found creative 
new ways to serve job seekers. In particular, a group of 14 One-Stops, 
identified as exemplary by government officials and workforce devel-
opment experts, used at least one of several different approaches to 
streamline services—they took steps to ensure that job seekers could 
readily access needed services, they cross-trained program staff on 
all of the One-Stop programs, or they consolidated case management 
and intake procedures. For example, to ensure that job seekers could 
readily access needed services, One-Stops we visited allocated staff to 
help them navigate the One-Stop system, provided support to custom-
ers with transportation barriers, and expanded services for One-Stop 
customers. They consolidated case management and intake procedures 
across programs through the use of shared service plans for customers 
and shared computer networks. 
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Focus on the employer as customer
WIA requires that the One-Stop system engage the employer as 
customer by helping employers identify and recruit skilled workers. 
Engaging employers is seen as critical to successfully connecting job 
seekers with available jobs. In our 2003 promising One-Stop practices 
study, officials at the exemplary One-Stops we visited told us they 
engaged and served employers using at least three different methods. 
Most of the One-Stops had specialized staff who conducted outreach 
to individual employers or to industry clusters and served as their pri-
mary point of contact for accessing One-Stop services. In addition to 
dedicating specialized staff, all of the One-Stops we visited worked 
with intermediaries to engage and serve employers. Intermediaries, 
such as a local Chamber of Commerce or an economic development 
entity, served as liaisons between employers and the One-Stop system, 
helping One-Stops to assess the workforce needs of employers while 
connecting employers with One-Stop services. Finally, these One-Stops 
also tailored their services to meet employers’ specific workforce needs 
by offering an array of job placement and training assistance designed 
for each employer. These services included specialized recruiting, pre-
screening, and customized training programs (GAO 2003a). 
Despite the efforts of the One-Stop centers to engage employers, 
the extent to which the One-Stop center is actually positioned to serve 
their needs has been a concern to many. In 2004 and again in 2006, 
we surveyed randomly selected small, medium, and large employers 
to determine the extent to which they were aware of, used, and were 
satisfied with the One-Stop system. We found that employers mostly 
used One-Stop centers to fill their needs for low-skilled workers. Most 
medium and large employers were aware of and used the system and 
were satisfied with its services (see Figure 2.1). Regardless of size, just 
over 70 percent of employers responding to our 2006 survey reported 
that they hired a small percentage of their employees—about 9 per-
cent—through One-Stops. Two-thirds of the workers they hired were 
low-skilled workers, in part because they thought the labor available 
from the One-Stops was mostly low-skilled. Employers told us they 
would hire more job seekers from the One-Stop labor pools if the job 
seekers had the skills they were seeking. Most employers used the cen-
ters’ job posting service, fewer made use of the One-Stops’ physical 
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Figure 2.1  Percentage of Business Establishments Aware of, Using, and 
Satisfied with One-Stops 
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SOURCE: GAO (2005a). 
space or job applicant screening services. Still, when employers did 
take advantage of services, they generally reported that they were sat-
isfied with the services and found them useful because they produced 
positive results and saved them time and money. When employers did 
not use a particular One-Stop service, in most cases they said that they 
either were not aware that the One-Stop provided the service, said they 
obtained it elsewhere, or said that they carried through on their own 
(GAO 2005a, 2006). 
The Structure of the Adult, Dislocated Worker, and Youth Programs 
Program services provided under the three new WIA funding 
streams represented a marked change from those provided under JTPA. 
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WIA combined JTPA’s year-round and summer youth programs into a 
single year-round youth program, with summer work experience as one 
component. WIA’s two adult programs provided for a broader range of 
services to the general public, no longer using income to determine eli-
gibility for all program services.1 The newly authorized WIA programs 
no longer focused exclusively on training but provided for three tiers, or 
levels, of service for adults and dislocated workers: core, intensive, and 
training. Beyond redesigning services and eligibility, WIA also man-
dated major changes in the way these programs measured success. The 
changes to the Adult and Dislocated Worker programs had a greater 
impact on the overall service structure than those made to the Youth 
program. This paper will, therefore, focus on the two adult components 
of WIA—Adults and Dislocated Workers. 
WIA-funded services to adults and dislocated workers 
WIA provided for three tiers, or levels, of service for adults and 
dislocated workers: core, intensive, and training. Core services include 
basic services such as job searches and labor market information. These 
activities may be self-service or require some staff assistance. Intensive 
services include such activities as comprehensive assessment and case 
management, as well as classes in literacy, conflict resolution, work 
skills, and those leading to a high school diploma or equivalent—activi-
ties that generally require greater staff involvement. Training services 
include such activities as occupational skills or on-the-job training. 
These tiers of WIA-funded services were to be provided sequentially, 
at least initially. That is, in order to receive intensive services, job seek-
ers had to first access core services and demonstrate that those services 
alone would not lead to getting a job that would provide self-sufficiency.
Similarly, to receive training services, a job seeker had to show that 
core and intensive services would not lead to such a job. Over time this 
requirement has been relaxed, and the USDOL no longer requires that 
job seekers access each level of service. But, through their work experi-
ence and assessments, job seekers must be able to show that core (or 
intensive) services would not lead to getting a job. 
Unlike prior systems, WIA requires that individuals eligible for 
training under the adult and dislocated worker programs receive vouch-
ers—called individual training accounts—which they can use for the 
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training provider and course offering of their choice, within certain lim-
itations. Because past systems were criticized for lacking outcome data 
on their training programs, WIA limits participants’ use of the vouchers 
to those training providers who have a track record of positive outcomes. 
Authorized training providers and their approved course offerings must 
appear on an eligible training provider list (ETPL). To be on the list, the 
providers are required to collect and report data, including completion 
rates, job placement rates, and wages at placement on all the students 
enrolled in that course. This procedure has to be repeated for any new 
course offering that training providers may want to place on the ETPL. 
To stay on the list, training providers must meet or exceed performance 
criteria established by the state. 
In our 2001 report on early implementation issues, we reported that 
training providers found these requirements overly burdensome (GAO 
2001). They questioned whether it was worthwhile to assume this 
burden because so few individuals were being referred to them under 
WIA, especially when compared to the number of students they served 
overall. Providers began limiting the number of courses they offered to 
WIA-funded students, and some providers dropped out completely. To 
help alleviate these concerns, the USDOL began issuing waivers of the 
ETPL requirement. Currently, 40 states have waivers that allow them to 
forgo this requirement. 
Despite early concerns about the amount of training under WIA, in 
a 2005 report, we found that substantial WIA funds were being used to 
fund training. Local boards used about 40 percent of the approximately 
$2.4 billion in WIA funds they had available in program year 2003 to 
provide training services to an estimated 416,000 WIA participants, pri-
marily in occupational skills.2 However, the vast majority of job seekers 
receive self-assisted core services, not training. Not everyone needs 
or wants additional training. And even when they do, they need help 
deciding what type of training would best match their skill level while 
at the same time meeting local labor market needs—help that includes 
information on job openings, comprehensive assessments, individual 
counseling, and supportive services, such as transportation and child 
care. Of the funds available in program year 2003, 60 percent was used 
to pay for these other program costs, as well as to cover the cost of 
administering the program. 
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WIA’s funding structure 
WIA’s funding structure and process are complex. Once Congress 
appropriates WIA funds, the amount of money that flows to states 
and local areas depends on a specific statutory formula that takes into 
account such factors as the unemployment rate, the number of long-
term unemployed, and the number of low-income adults and youth in 
the population. The USDOL allots 100 percent of the Adult funds and 
80 percent of the Dislocated Worker funds to states. The Secretary of 
Labor retains 20 percent of the Dislocated Worker funds in a national 
reserve account to be used for National Emergency Grants, demonstra-
tions, and technical assistance, and allots the remaining funds to each of 
the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.3 Upon receiv-
ing its allotments, each state can set aside no more than 15 percent to 
support statewide activities. These may include a variety of activities 
that benefit adults, youths, and dislocated workers statewide, such as 
providing assistance in the establishment and operation of One-Stop 
centers, developing or operating state or local management information 
systems, and disseminating lists of organizations that can provide train-
ing. In addition, each state can set aside no more than 25 percent of its 
dislocated worker funds to provide rapid response services to workers 
affected by layoffs and plant closings. The funds set aside by the states 
to provide rapid response services are intended to help dislocated work-
ers transition quickly to new employment. After states set aside funds 
for rapid response and for other statewide activities, they allocate the 
remainder of the funds—at least 60 percent—to their local workforce 
areas (see Figure 2.2). 
The formulas for distributing the funds to the states for the three 
WIA programs were left largely unchanged from those used to distribute 
funds under the predecessor program, JTPA. However, these formulas 
do not reflect the current program structure, and, as states and localities 
have implemented WIA, they have been hampered by funding issues. 
States’ funding levels are not always consistent with the actual demand 
for services, and in previous work, we identified several issues associ-
ated with the current funding formulas (GAO 2003b). First, formula 
factors used to allocate funds are not aligned with the target populations 
for these programs. For example, while long-term unemployed indi-
viduals are no longer automatically eligible for the Dislocated Worker 
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Figure 2.2  WIA Funding Streams for Adults, Youth, and Dislocated 
Workers 
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program as they were under JTPA, this factor continues to be used. Sec-
ond, allocations may not reflect current labor market conditions because 
there are time lags between when the data are collected and when the 
allocations become available to states. Third, the formula for the Dis-
located Worker program is especially problematic, because it causes 
funding levels to suffer from excessive and unwarranted volatility unre-
lated to a state’s actual layoff activity. Several aspects of the Dislocated 
Worker formula contribute to funding volatility and to the seeming lack 
of consistency between dislocation and funding. The excess unemploy-
ment factor has a threshold effect—states may or may not qualify for 
the one-third of funds allocated under this factor in a given year, based 
on whether or not they meet the threshold condition of having at least 
4.5 percent unemployment statewide. In a study we conducted in 2003, 
we compared dislocation activity and funding levels for several states. 
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In one example, funding decreased in one year while dislocation activ-
ity increased by over 40 percent (see Figure 2.3). This volatility could 
be mitigated by provisions such as “hold harmless” and “stop gain” 
constraints that limit changes in funding to within a particular range 
of each state’s prior year allocation. The Adult formula includes such 
constraints, setting the hold harmless at 90 percent and the stop gain at 
130 percent. 
In our 2007 testimony before Congress we highlighted funding 
stability as one of the key areas for focusing legislative action. We 
suggested that if Congress wished to make broader funding formula 
changes, reducing the volatility in the Dislocated Worker allocation 
by requiring the use of hold harmless and stop gain provisions in the 
formula would help stabilize funding and better foster sound financial 
practices (GAO 2007b). 
Figure 2.3  An Example of the Mismatch between Dislocated Worker
Funding Allocation and Dislocation Activity—Massachusetts 
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WIA’s Performance Accountability Provisions 
WIA was designed to provide for greater accountability than its 
predecessor program by establishing new performance measures, a new 
requirement to use UI wage data to track and report on outcomes, and 
a requirement for the USDOL to conduct at least one multisite control 
group evaluation. In general, WIA’s performance measurement system 
captures some useful information, but it suffers from shortcomings that 
may limit its usefulness in understanding the full reach of the system 
and may lead to disincentives to serve those who may most need ser-
vices. Moreover, despite WIA’s efforts to improve accountability, little 
is known about what the system is achieving. 
WIA established new measures, new data source, and some 
state flexibility 
WIA was designed to promote greater accountability in federal 
workforce programs by establishing new performance measures for the 
three WIA-funded programs—the Adult, Dislocated Worker, and Youth 
programs. In its guidance during early implementation, the USDOL
defined 17 performance measures for these programs. (See Table 2.1 
for a complete list of the WIA performance measures.) Most of the 
measures that relate to adults, dislocated workers, and older youth are 
similar to those used under JTPA, including job placement, job reten-
tion, and wage gains or replacement. New under WIA, however, are 
measures for the attainment of a credential (a degree or certification of 
skills or training completed) and the “customer satisfaction” of both job 
seekers and employers (see Table 2.2).4 
In addition, WIA sought to improve the comparability of data by 
requiring that most of the WIA performance measures rely on UI wage 
records as the primary data source for tracking employment outcomes. 
This contrasts with JTPA, which obtained data on participant outcomes 
by following up and surveying participants. The UI wage records 
provide a common yardstick for long-term comparisons across states 
because they contain wage and employment information on about 94 
percent of the working population in the United States, and all states 
collect and retain these data. In addition, researchers have found that 
wage record data are more objective and cost-effective than traditional 
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Table 2.2  Statutory Performance Measures for the Three WIA-Funded 
Programs as Defined by the USDOL at Time of Implementation 
WIA funding stream Performance measure 
Adult Entered employment rate 
Employment retention at 6 months 
Average earnings change in 6 months 
Entered employment and credential ratea 
Dislocated Worker Entered employment rate 
Employment retention at 6 months 
Earnings replacement rate in 6 months 
Entered employment and credential ratea 
Older Youth (age 19–21) Entered employment rate 
Employment retention at 6 months 
Average earnings change in 6 months 
Entered employment/education/training 
and credential ratea 
Younger Youth (age 14–18) Skill attainment rate 
Diploma or equivalent attainment 
Placement and retention rate 
Customer satisfaction Customer satisfaction for participantsa 
Customer satisfaction for employersa 
aIndicates measures new under WIA. 
SOURCE: USDOL. 
survey information. For example, in our 2004 study, we estimated that 
the cost of doing participant surveys, as was done under JTPA, was 
approximately $13.25 per participant compared with the cost of auto-
mated record matching to UI wage records, which costs less than $0.05 
per participant (GAO 2004). Furthermore, the UI wage records make 
it easier to track longer-term outcomes, such as the earnings change, 
earnings replacement, and employment retention six months after par-
ticipants leave the program. Without UI wage records, tracking these 
outcomes would require contacting or surveying former participants, 
perhaps many times after leaving the program. 
WIAis similar to JTPAin holding states accountable to performance 
goals by making incentive awards or imposing sanctions. However, 
unlike JTPA, under which the USDOL established performance goals 
  
 
 
 
 
66 Blank, Fagnoni, and Heald 
using a computer model, WIA affords states some flexibility by allow-
ing them to negotiate their performance goals with the department. 
States, in turn, negotiate performance goals with each local area. The 
law requires that these negotiations take into account differences in eco-
nomic conditions, participant characteristics, and services provided. To 
establish equitable performance goals, the Labor Department and the 
states have primarily relied on historical data to develop their estimates 
of expected performance. These performance estimates are the starting 
point for negotiations. States that meet their performance goals under 
WIA are eligible to receive incentive grants that generally range from 
$750,000 to $3 million. States that do not meet at least 80 percent of 
their WIA performance goals are subject to sanctions. If a state fails to 
meet its performance goals for one year, the USDOL provides technical 
assistance, if requested. If a state fails to meet its performance goals for 
two consecutive years, the state may receive a 5 percent reduction in its 
annual WIA formula grant. 
Performance goals can act as a deterrent to service 
A long-standing challenge in assessing the performance of job 
training programs has been how to reward successful outcomes without 
creating an incentive for program managers to help only the most prom-
ising customers. With regard to WIA, as well, our 2002 study reported 
that many states were citing performance goals as a factor in local staff 
decisions about who would receive services (GAO 2002a). In states 
we visited, moreover, some officials told us that local areas were not 
registering many people, largely due to their concerns about meeting 
performance goals in serving job seekers who may be less likely to get 
and keep a job. One state official described how local areas were care-
fully screening potential participants and holding meetings to decide 
whether to register them. As a result, individuals who were eligible 
for and might have benefited from WIA-funded services may not have 
received them. 
Measuring performance based on changes in participant earnings 
for some adults and earnings replacement for dislocated workers can 
also be a deterrent to service. In our 2002 study, state officials reported 
that local staff were reluctant to register two types of customers: already-
employed adults and dislocated workers (GAO 2002a). State and local 
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officials explained that it would be hard to increase the earnings of 
employed adults and to entirely replace the wages of dislocated work-
ers who are laid off from high-paying, low-skilled jobs or from jobs 
requiring skills that are now obsolete. Similarly, in several local areas 
we visited for our study of older worker services, officials said they 
considered performance measures a barrier to enrolling older workers 
who are seeking part-time jobs because such placements could amount 
to lower earnings and lowered program performance as measured by 
client earnings (GAO 2003c). 
Performance data has not always reflected all customers 
served at One-Stops 
Under WIA, job seekers who only receive self-service and informa-
tional services are not included in the performance measures; therefore, 
only a small proportion of job seekers who receive services at One-Stops 
are actually reflected in WIA outcome data. Since self-service custom-
ers are estimated to be the largest portion of those served under WIA
programs, it is difficult to know what the overall program is achieving. 
In a 2004 study, we reported that some estimates show only about 5 per-
cent of the job seekers who walked into a One-Stop were registered for 
WIA and tracked for outcomes (GAO 2004). Furthermore, with regard 
to employers, the WIA measure only collects general information on 
employers’ satisfaction and the data are not generally useful at the state 
and local level.5 This makes it difficult to know how well individual 
One-Stops are working with and serving their employer communities. 
GAO’s recommendation: In 2005, the GAO recommended that 
the USDOL work with states and consider ways to track all job seekers 
who use any of the One-Stop services, including self-services. Since 
then, the Labor Department has begun to require states to collect and 
report a count on all WIA participants who have used the One-Stop 
system. The department has also taken steps to increase the information 
it has about employers who use the system. Currently, it only measures 
employer satisfaction, but it has secured approval from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to collect more extensive information 
(GAO 2009). 
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Lack of clarity in federal guidance has affected comparability 
of data 
The USDOL’s guidance to states at the time of implementation 
lacked clarity in key terms and contributed to inconsistency in the way 
that data have been collected and reported. Because WIA does not 
require outcome measures for all job seekers, the Labor Department 
provided written guidance to states on who should be registered for 
WIA services and included in the performance measures. However, 
the guidance was open to interpretation. For example, it told states to 
register and track outcomes for all adults and dislocated workers who 
receive core services that require significant staff assistance, which left 
states to decide what constituted significant staff assistance. As a result, 
states and local areas have differed on whom they track and for how 
long—some starting when participants receive core services, and others 
not tracking until they receive more intensive services. In a 2005 study, 
most states reported that they provided their own guidance to help local 
areas determine which jobseekers should be registered and tracked 
under the WIA performance measures (GAO 2005b). For example, one 
state developed a list of staff-assisted services that would trigger regis-
tration under WIA. 
In addition, the lack of a definition for a credential led to perfor-
mance data that are not comparable across states for the credential 
measure. The USDOL allowed states and local areas to determine what 
constituted a credential and to develop a statewide list of approved 
credentials with input from employers. As a result, some states limit 
“credentials” to diplomas from accredited institutions, while other 
states may, for example, consider a credential completion of formal 
training as defined by education partners (GAO 2002a). Still other 
states may have expanded their criteria to include completion of job 
readiness training, on-the-job experience, and or just one workshop. 
In our study of WIA youth services, we also found that the USDOL’s 
guidance on defining skill attainment for youth was unclear and open to 
interpretation (GAO 2002b). Given the broad range of definitions states 
and localities employ, performance assessment based on the outcomes 
on the credential and skill attainment measures may be of limited value, 
even within a single state. 
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GAO’s recommendations: To help ensure that the WIA perfor-
mance measures result in more accurate and comparable data across 
states, we recommended that the USDOL establish a standard point at 
which to register participants and that it monitor states to ensure that 
they adhere to this policy. We also asked Congress to consider requir-
ing that information be collected and reported for all WIA participants, 
including those who only receive self-service and informational ser-
vices. In 2005, the USDOL issued new guidance that sought to better 
distinguish between self-service and informational activities that would 
not require participants to be registered and One-Stop services that 
require significant staff assistance and would require registration. Even 
with this additional guidance, we continue to be concerned that there 
will not be a uniform national practice for tracking registrants, which 
undermines the accuracy of performance data. 
We also recommended that the USDOL issue guidance with a clear 
definition for what constitutes a credential and skill attainment. In its 
2005 guidance, the Labor Department clearly defined credential to be a 
degree or certificate and stated that work readiness certificates will not 
be accepted. In addition, the department replaced the skill attainment 
measure with a literacy and numeracy gains measure that clearly speci-
fies the level of improvement needed and types of assessments that can 
be used. 
UI wage records have data gaps and time delays 
While UI wage records provide a more objective means to mea-
sure outcomes over time, these data also have some shortcomings. State 
wage record databases only include wage information on job seekers 
within their state; they do not track job seekers who find jobs in other 
states. To help states gain access to wage information when their clients 
move to other states, the USDOL established the Wage Record Inter-
change System (WRIS)—a clearinghouse that makes UI wage records 
available to states seeking employment and wage information on their 
WIA participants. In 2006, Labor assumed responsibility for adminis-
tering WRIS. Initially, when the department took the system over from 
a nonprofit organization, many states withdrew because of a perceived 
conflict between the department’s federal enforcement role and states’
responsibility for protecting data confidentiality. The USDOL devel-
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oped a data sharing agreement to address confidentiality. All but one 
state now participates in WRIS (GAO 2009). 
Another shortcoming is that UI wage records do not contain infor-
mation on about 6 percent of workers, such as self-employed persons, 
most independent contractors, military personnel, federal government 
workers, and postal workers. To compensate, the Labor Department 
allows states to collect data to determine employment outcomes in 
other ways, such as contacting participants after they leave the pro-
gram. In a 2004 study, 23 states reported that they would not have been 
able to show that they met minimum performance levels on at least one 
performance measure without supplemental data (GAO 2004). At that 
time, the department was considering whether to discontinue the use of 
supplemental data for filling gaps in the UI wage records, citing data 
quality concerns. 
GAO’s recommendation: We recommended that the USDOL
continue to allow the use of supplemental data for reporting outcomes, 
but develop more stringent guidance and monitoring of these data. The 
Labor Department agreed with our recommendation and has continued 
to allow the use of supplemental data. 
The ability to measure employment and earnings outcomes is sig-
nificantly delayed, given the time lapse from when an individual gets a 
job to when it appears in the UI wage records. State procedures for col-
lecting and compiling wage information from employers can be slow 
and time-consuming. Data are collected from employers only once 
every quarter and employers in most states have 30 days after the quar-
ter ends to report the data to the state. After the state receives the wage 
report, the data must be processed, which can delay the availability of 
the wage record data for reporting on outcomes for several months. The 
time lags in receiving wage data affect when outcomes are reported and 
limit the data’s usefulness for gauging current performance. 
States and localities have supplemented WIA measures
with their own 
While UI wage records are useful for tracking outcomes over time, 
we found that this information alone does little for real-time program 
management. In a 2004 study, state and local officials reported that they 
collected their own data to assess whether they are likely to meet their 
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federally required performance levels and manage their programs on a 
real-time basis (GAO 2004). States have taken an active role in helping 
local areas monitor their progress toward meeting their performance 
goals. Almost all states developed information technology systems to 
help local areas organize, track, and report WIA performance data for 
program management. At the same time, about three-fourths of local 
areas collect outcome information from other sources to help them 
assess whether they are meeting their WIA performance levels and to 
help them manage their programs. According to our 2004 study, over 75 
percent of local areas reported that they directly follow up with partici-
pants after they leave the program, collecting job placement or earnings 
information to help fill gaps until the data are available from the UI 
wage records. In addition, nearly all of the local areas reported that 
they track other types of interim indicators to manage their WIA pro-
grams. These are most often the number of registered WIA participants, 
services provided to participants, the number of participants who com-
pleted training, and the number of WIA exiters. In some cases, these 
interim indicators can help local areas predict their WIA performance 
outcomes. For example, one local official told us that knowing the num-
ber of participants who complete training helps predict the number of 
participants who will find a job. 
In addition to the WIA performance measures, states and locali-
ties also reported that they use their own indicators to gauge overall 
One-Stop performance (GAO 2004). We identified four basic types of 
indicators: 1) job seeker measures, 2) employer measures, 3) program 
partnership measures, and 4) family and community indicators. (See 
Figure 2.4.) 
Job seeker measures. Even without a federal requirement to do so, 
our survey showed that almost 90 percent of local areas gather infor-
mation on One-Stop job seekers, even if they are not registered and 
participating in any particular federal program. Most often local areas 
reported that they require the One-Stop centers to track and report the 
number of job seekers who visit the One-Stop in a single time period, 
usually through a paper and pencil or computer log. In addition, we 
found that local areas are tracking additional information on these job 
seekers such as how many program referrals they receive, how satisfied 
they are with services, and what types of outcome they achieve.5 
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Figure 2.4  Four Types of Indicators That States and Local Areas Use to 
Assess Performance of One-Stops 
Source: GAO analysis. 
Employer measures. Many local areas also track information on 
employers’ use of One-Stops to improve services to employers. About 
70 percent of local areas nationwide reported that they require One-Stop 
centers to track some type of employer measure, such as the number of 
employers that use One-Stop services, how many hire One-Stop cus-
tomers, and the type of services that employers use. For example, a 
One-Stop center we visited tracks employers that repeatedly use One-
Stop services and those who have not. It uses this information to reach 
out to employers who have not returned for services to encourage them 
to use the One-Stop again. 
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Program partnership measures. Most of the programs that pro-
vide services through the One-Stop system have their own performance 
measures, but as we have reported in the past, these outcomes cannot be 
readily summed to obtain an overall measure of One-Stop performance. 
However, one-third of the local areas told us that they combine in one 
report some of the outcomes under the key federal measures—includ-
ing wages at employment or other earning indicators—and use this 
report to assess the One-Stop system as a whole. In addition to tracking 
outcomes for the various One-Stop partners, some local areas measure 
the level of coordination among One-Stop partners, and also the range 
and quality of services they provide. 
Family and community indicators. A few local areas look beyond 
One-Stop services to individuals to assess how well One-Stops are 
meeting the needs of the family and the community. In their written 
comments to our survey, several local areas told us that they consider 
some type of community indicator, such as changes in the local unem-
ployment rate or increases in the average household income in the local 
area, to be the best way to determine the overall effectiveness of their 
One-Stop system. 
The USDOL uses WIA performance data for negotiations of 
performance goals and awarding incentives or imposing sanctions 
The USDOL compiles states’ reported performance data annually 
to develop national performance goals under the Government Perfor-
mance and Results Act.6 In addition, these national goals are used as a 
starting place to negotiate performance goals with states. While WIA
requires that the annual negotiations for performance goals take into 
account differences in economic conditions, participant characteristics, 
and services provided, these factors may not be adequately considered 
by all states or the labor department in the negotiations. In our 2004 
study, we found that state and local officials we interviewed thought 
their performance levels were set too high for economic conditions at 
that time (GAO 2004). For example, some local officials said that their 
negotiated performance goals for changes to or replacement of earnings 
were based on a stronger economy and did not reflect recent increases 
in the unemployment rate. Under JTPA, the USDOL used an adjustment 
model to account for factors beyond the control of local programs, such 
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as high unemployment. Under WIA, some states have used their own 
adjustment model or other methods in the negotiation process, but until 
recently, the department did not take steps to assure that all appropriate 
factors are taken into account and treated in the same way in negotia-
tions and that, as a result, there is consistent assessment across states. 
The GAO’s recommendation: We recommended that the USDOL
develop an adjustment model or other systematic method to consis-
tently account for different populations and local economic conditions 
when negotiating performance levels. In recent guidance for negotiat-
ing program year 2009 performance goals, the Labor Department used 
a regression model to set national performance goals. The department 
said that the goals were based on estimates developed from administra-
tive and economic data on job seekers within their local labor markets 
that it has compiled from its WIA database or other data systems 
(USDOL 2009). 
The Labor Department has expanded uniform reporting for
all its workforce programs 
In 2005, the USDOL began requiring states to implement a com-
mon set of performance measures for all employment and training 
programs under its purview, including the WIA-funded programs. 
This was at the impetus of the OMB, which in 2002 requested that 
all federal agencies with job training programs develop some common 
performance measure. In responding to the OMB initiative, the USDOL
has substituted some of its new common measure definitions for coun-
terpart measures as previously defined when first implementing WIA. 
These changes have included such measures as the entered employment 
rate, employment retention rate, and average earnings measure. While 
many federal job training programs require performance measures that 
track similar outcomes, they have varied in their terminology and in the 
way their measures are calculated. For example, the Wagner-Peyser-
funded Employment Service uses a different time period than the WIA
adult program to assess whether a participant got a job. With the com-
mon measures, both programs use the same time period to report this 
measure. 
The USDOL has also made efforts to streamline and integrate the 
performance reporting structures of all the federal programs under its 
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purview, but realization of this goal has been delayed. In 2004, the 
department had proposed a single, streamlined reporting structure that 
would have replaced reporting structures for most of its employment 
and training programs. In a 2005 study, we found that the department 
developed the concept in limited consultation with key stakeholders, 
and as a result, it underestimated the magnitude and type of changes 
required (GAO 2005c). We recommended that it consider alternative 
approaches to implementing such a structure. In response, the depart-
ment substantially modified the design and is now working toward 
implementing an enhanced data reporting system called the Workforce 
Investment Streamlined Performance Reporting (WISPR) system. If 
implemented, the new reporting structure would consolidate reporting 
requirements across several other Labor Department programs in the 
One-Stops and ultimately replace their existing reporting systems with 
a single reporting structure. Its integrated design would, for the first 
time, allow the Labor Department and states to track an individual’s 
progress through the One-Stop system. For the time being, the USDOL
has delayed its implementation to focus on new reporting for the Amer-
ican Reinvestment and Recovery Act funding. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON REAUTHORIzATION 
WIA was due to be reauthorized in 2003, but efforts thus far have 
stalled, most often due to competing demands requiring the attention of 
the authorizing committees. When bills have been forwarded, compet-
ing philosophies regarding governance and service delivery strategies 
have kept them from being passed. 
Reauthorizing WIA has never been more urgent than it is today. 
Workforce trends and the economic downturn have placed greater 
demands on the workforce investment system than ever before. At 
present, the system is stretched thin. If we as a nation are to maintain 
our competitiveness for the higher-skilled jobs, we must place more 
emphasis on training workers to keep their skills current—before they 
are threatened with layoff. We must develop better linkages between 
education and employment, and we need greater involvement of 
employers in federal, state, and local workforce development efforts. 
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Increasing labor force participation will require improving basic skills 
levels, including language skills, and greater involvement of employers 
and unions in designing education and training opportunities. But all of 
this comes at great financial cost. Large and growing federal deficits are 
constraining government spending, just as state and local budgets are 
already struggling to meet the growing needs with less revenue. In light 
of these concerns, and in the process of reauthorizing WIA, some key 
questions need to be answered. 
• How can we ensure that policymakers have the information 
they need—about what works and what doesn’t—to make criti-
cal decisions about where to place their scarce resources? 
• How might the key players in this system at all levels—federal, 
state, local, and the private sector—be brought to the table to 
participate as stakeholders and investors? 
• How can we balance flexibility and accountability without 
unintended consequences in who gets served? 
• How can we learn more about what the overall One-Stop system 
is achieving when only a small portion of One-Stop customers 
are registered and tracked in the performance measures? 
• What can be done to make the system more nimble and able to 
adapt to changing economic and budgetary conditions? 
Notes 
1. Participants are not required to meet income eligibility requirements to receive 
services; however, when funds are limited, priority for intensive services and 
training under the adult program is given to low-income individuals and public 
assistance recipients. 
2. Note that the percentage of job seekers who received training in that year may be 
somewhat lower than 40 percent due to the cost of training relative to other ser-
vices. The estimate of WIA participants may include some participants more than 
once, because some individuals may have received more than one type of training. 
3. For additional information on National Emergency Grants, see GAO (2004). 
4. Guidance from the USDOL defines a credential as a nationally recognized degree 
or certificate or a recognized state/locally defined credential. 
5. While WIA requires that all states track job seeker customer satisfaction, Labor 
does not require a sufficient sample size to be useful to each local area. 
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6. The Government Performance and Results Act is intended to focus government 
decision making, management, and accountability on the results and outcomes 
achieved by federal programs. 
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This chapter is based in part on a larger study of the implementation 
of WIA conducted with colleagues in eight states and 16 localities from 
2003 to 2005.1 After presenting background on WIA and the study, we 
present key results concerning one of the more important and contro-
versial aspects of the act: increased emphasis on market and market-like 
mechanisms in the delivery of workforce services in the United States. 
We then discuss these findings and wrap up with a series of conclusions 
and recommendations, both for informing the WIA reauthorization 
process, which is now under way, and for providing guidance to the 
European Social Fund. 
BACKGROUND 
WIA has been described as a “major overhaul” of the nation’s ap-
proach to employment and training, as a “fundamental departure” from 
previous programs, and as “the first significant attempt to retool” these 
programs in two decades (Barnow and King 2003). The act institution-
alized changes in workforce policies and practices that began to surface 
as a handful of early-implementing states (e.g., Florida, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin) 
operationalized the act’s provisions beginning in July 1999. These and 
other states had developed and implemented One-Stop Career Centers 
prior to the 1998 enactment of WIA legislation, some of them, such as 
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Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, as early as the mid-1980s. Major changes 
authorized under Title I of WIA included 
• fostering more coordinated, longer-term planning for work-
force development programs; 
• institutionalizing One-Stop Career Centers as the cornerstones 
of the local workforce delivery system; 
• sequencing job seekers’ services from core to intensive to train-
ing services; 
• implementing universal eligibility for core services via One-
Stop Career Centers; and 
• increasing reliance on market mechanisms. 
The last set of changes, market mechanisms, is the main focus of this chapter.
THE WIA STUDY
The WIA study was conducted using the field network methodol-
ogy developed over several decades for use in understanding program 
implementation.2 In each of the participating study states, a spectrum of 
workforce system actors was interviewed. Using a structured interview 
guide, elected officials (e.g., legislators), policymakers, agency officials, 
program directors, community and technical college administrators, 
business and chamber of commerce leaders, state and local Workforce 
Investment Board (WIB) directors and staff, One-Stop Career Center 
directors and staff, advocates, and workers in community-based orga-
nizations were interviewed. In addition, leaders and staff of workforce 
development, education, and related programs were engaged in discus-
sions to obtain a broad perspective of workforce development activities. 
A number of researchers have examined WIA, most focusing on 
early WIA implementation experiences across a broad range of issues. 
Employment and Training Administration staff began conducting inter-
nal implementation studies of WIA in 1998 and 1999. The Employment 
and Training Administration (ETA) also funded a two-track national 
WIA implementation study by Social Policy Research (SPR) Associates 
that featured visits to 16 states and numerous localities and One-Stop 
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Career Centers between 1999 and 2001 (D’Amico et al. 2001), as well 
as assisting the ETA with consolidating WIA implementation data for 
all 54 states and territories. Buck (2002) of Public/Private Ventures also 
studied early WIA implementation in five cities, focusing largely on 
how new market mechanisms (e.g., individual training accounts [ITAs], 
performance measures) and One-Stop requirements affected workforce 
programs and participants. Frank et al. (2003) of the Center for Law and 
Social Policy analyzed national data for the 2000–2001 period, com-
paring early participation, demographics, and services under WIA with 
similar data for the final year of JTPA. 
The ETA also funded Administrative Data Research and Evaluation 
(ADARE) project researchers from several universities and private, 
nonprofit research institutions who examined early participation and 
service patterns, and WIA performance measures (Mueser et al. 2003; 
Stevens 2003) and estimated quasi-experimental net impacts from WIA
participation on employment and earnings (Hollenbeck et al. 2005). 
Finally, O’Shea and King (2001) explored early experiences with 
WIA and related programs in three states (Tennessee, Texas, and Wash-
ington) and at least two local workforce investment areas in each as a 
pilot for the eight-state WIA study. They focused on problems and op-
portunities experienced by these states while implementing new WIA
features (e.g., eligible training provider lists [ETPLs], service sequenc-
ing) and also explored ways in which states and local areas addressed 
expanded authority under WIA in their own particular context. 
These studies, together with policy interest from the ongoing WIA
reauthorization debate and ETA discussions, helped shape the focus of 
the eight-state WIA study, which addressed the following topics, among 
others: 
• leadership and governance, including issues regarding the de-
centralization of authority and responsibility; 
• One-Stop organization and operations; 
• services and participation; 
• market mechanisms, their use and effects, including labor mar-
ket information, performance standards, and training provider 
certification; and 
• the use of information technologies. 
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The study examined the experiences of eight states, 16 local work-
force investment areas, and more than 30 One-Stop centers with the 
administration and delivery of employment and training services under 
WIA and closely related programs. Table 3.1 lists the study states and 
areas, and the field researchers. Study sites were selected using a purpo-
sive selection strategy focusing on region, urban/rural populations, the 
organizational approach of One-Stop systems, and WIA early imple-
mentation status. 
As part of the selection process, field researchers considered or-
ganizational structure, service delivery practices, implementation 
obstacles, population statistics, urban/rural mix, number of One-Stops, 
and size. Field researchers also obtained recommendations and sup-
porting information from state officials, regional ETA staff, and the 
National Governors Association. The sample—which included small 
Table 3.1  States and Local Workforce Areas Studied 
Florida First Coast (Region 8), Citrus, Levy, and Marion Counties 
(Region 10)
Researchers: Burt Barnow, Amy Buck 
Indiana Ft. Wayne (Northeast), Indianapolis/Marion County
Researchers: Patricia Billen, Richard Nathan 
Maryland Baltimore City, Frederick County
Researchers: Burt Barnow, Amy Buck 
Michigan Lansing (Capital Area), Traverse City (Northwest)
Researchers: Christopher King, Daniel O’Shea 
Missouri Kansas City and vicinity, Central Region
Researchers: Peter Meuser, Deanna Sharpe 
Oregon Marion, Polk, and Yamhill Counties (Region 3)
The Oregon Consortium/Oregon Workforce Alliance (TOC/OWA) 
Researchers: Laura Leete, Neil Bania 
Texas Austin (Capitol Area), Houston (Gulf Coast)
Researchers: Christopher King, Daniel O’Shea 
Utah Salt Lake City (Central), Moab/Price (Southeast)
Researchers: Christopher King, Daniel O’Shea 
NOTE: Utah is organized as a single, statewide workforce investment area. This is 
unusual but not unique. Other states with single workforce areas include South Da-
kota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Under prior workforce training programs (e.g., CETA), 
states such as South Carolina also were organized as single-program states. 
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and large states, and urban and rural areas with a range of organizational 
structures and service delivery approaches—was weighted to “leading-
edge” workforce development states (e.g., Florida, Michigan, Texas, 
Utah). As a group, these states had less difficulty with some of WIA’s 
new features, since they had either already begun to implement them 
on their own or, given their long-standing experience with workforce 
reform, would be expected to have an easier time doing so. The study’s 
findings were based on WIA policies and service delivery experiences 
observed during the summer and fall of 2002, when field researchers 
conducted site visits and interviewed state and local actors, as well as 
on changes that occurred subsequently. 
USE OF MARKET MECHANISMS: KEY FINDINGS 
WIA continued the trend of moving toward a market-based system 
that is results driven and determined more by customer choice. Four 
key market-based mechanisms are discussed: labor market informa-
tion (LMI), provider certification, ITAs, and performance management 
systems.3 
Labor Market Information 
While not a market mechanism per se, labor market information 
(LMI) provides customers with information about employment oppor-
tunities and promotes and facilitates the workings of the labor market. 
All states have LMI units that provide information for the state as a 
whole and for individual labor markets. In addition to producing infor-
mation about the current status of the labor market, states also produce 
labor market projections that include 10-year occupational employment 
projections. A unit in the state Employment Service usually operates 
LMI programs. LMI funding comes from several sources, including the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the USDOL, which is responsible 
for producing and coordinating employment statistics at the national 
level. Both state and national LMI is available at One-Stop Career Cen-
ters via the Internet. 
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Generally, states have made strides toward improving the quality 
and presentation of their LMI in recent years. In several study states, 
some of the WIBs expressed dissatisfaction with aspects of the state’s 
LMI program and purchased supplementary information from private 
vendors. These complaints often reflect a desire for more detailed 
vacancy data that the state cannot produce because of budgetary con-
straints. This study did not cover the states’ labor market information 
systems in sufficient depth to judge their scope and quality. However, it 
appears that state labor market information programs are aware of the 
concerns from local workforce investment areas and are trying to meet 
their needs. The transition to the Standard Occupational Code (SOC) 
system for all federal programs producing information on occupations 
and the emergence of ETA’s O*NET, the Occupational Information 
Network, also should enhance the value of labor market information. 
O*NET provides occupational skills and aptitude requirement informa-
tion and identifies occupations requiring similar skills. 
Provider Certification 
Under JTPA, the federal employment and training program that 
preceded WIA (1982–1998), vendors did not have to meet performance 
criteria to be eligible to provide training to participants. To improve 
accountability and enable customers to make more informed choices, 
WIA established the ETPL, giving the responsibility to states for estab-
lishing the ETPL application procedures. Providers on the list, whose 
eligibility is reviewed every 12–18 months, are required to furnish 
performance information to the state’s workforce agencies for WIA
customers and for all enrollees (whether a WIA customer or not) for 
each occupational training program on the list. 
Experience to date raises questions about whether, under its current 
structure, the ETPL provides sufficient valid information to justify its 
costs and inconvenience. The experiences of the study states varied, and 
while a few states found the ETPL to be useful and a minimal burden, 
in most states the providers, the state, or both complained that gathering 
the data was expensive and not worth the effort. Because results must 
be provided for each individual occupational training program rather 
than for the provider as a whole, the reports frequently covered such 
a small number of participants, particularly the results for only WIA
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participants, that there were too few enrollees to provide statistically 
meaningful results. Combining data for various occupations would re-
solve the small sample problem in some instances, but by combining 
data across offerings, prospective students would not be able to assess 
the provider’s performance for specific offerings. 
Among the states covered in this project, Florida experienced the 
fewest problems with the ETPL requirements. Florida had already es-
tablished the Florida Education and Training Placement Information 
Program (FETPIP) prior to WIA to track education and training vendor 
performance. Administered by the Florida Department of Education, 
FETPIP collects, maintains, and disseminates placement and follow-
up information on Florida education and training program participants 
by relying on linkages to UI wage and other employment and earnings 
records. 
Utah also did not experience major difficulties with these re-
quirements. The state has modified its program since it was initially 
established in early 1999. However, obtaining providers for its list 
caused some problems because the state then lacked a fully developed 
system of community and technical colleges. 
Texas experienced some problems with its ETPL process. The ini-
tial 1999 system was paper based and viewed as cumbersome, though 
improvements to the system have eased the problems. Difficulty ac-
cessing outcome data remains a challenge for institutions and the state. 
Some state officials speculated that a number of providers had let their 
listing lapse so they could reenter the system using the more lenient 
standards for new listings. 
Maryland staff at the state and local level indicated that the ETPL
created significant problems. Local officials in the two Maryland areas 
reported that the process of getting a provider on the list was time con-
suming and confusing. Providers were hesitant about putting programs 
on the list, and many programs had too few participants to yield reliable 
performance data. A state official noted, however, that the ETPL pro-
cess helped the state weed out education and training institutions that 
were operating illegally. 
Michigan did not report major problems with the ETPL system, 
but state officials noted that instituting ETPL appeared to have reduced 
WIA participation of community colleges and technical schools in the 
state. Community colleges in the state now apply for certification only 
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for those programs for which they expect to get substantial numbers of 
training referrals. 
Missouri had to modify its data collection system to accommodate 
the ETPL requirements. The Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education maintained a list of providers prior to WIA, and has estab-
lished a system to remove most of the burden of data collection from 
vendors. At the time of the study, state officials recognized that data 
matching requirements would increase as the WIA program matured, 
but the state and local areas reported only minimal problems with the 
ETPL. 
ETPL requirements presented some challenges in Oregon, but state 
officials worked hard to assure that WIA did not discourage the use of 
community colleges as training providers. The state adopted policies to 
assure that nondegree sequences would count as a “program” for WIA
ETPL purposes and assumed all responsibility for reporting training 
provider results. The state expedites the ETPL approval process when a 
participant wishes to enroll in an unlisted program, and the process can 
be completed in one week. 
Indiana officials characterized the ETPL approval process as an ad-
ministrative burden, but not prohibitively so. State officials indicated 
that training providers are reluctant to collect the required performance 
information because of the small number of expected WIA enrollees. 
The best strategy at this time may be to relax the ETPL require-
ments to allow states and local areas time to develop more economical 
tracking systems and strategies to address programs with few WIA en-
rollees. Performance-based contracting offers one approach to holding 
providers accountable for placing participants, but its track record is 
mixed.4 Other possibilities include combining data for several years for 
judging outcomes and waiving ETPL requirements for small programs. 
Individual Training Accounts 
In addition to mandating the use of One-Stops, another significant 
change instituted under WIA was the establishment of ITAs. In an ef-
fort to provide more customer choice, WIA mandated that under most 
circumstances adults and dislocated workers who were to receive train-
ing services must be provided with ITAs that let them select their own 
training provider and occupational program (subject to local workforce 
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investment agency restrictions). Exceptions to the ITA rule were made 
for customized and on-the-job training (OJT), where participant pro-
vider selection would make little sense, and when there was a training 
program of demonstrated effectiveness offered by a community-based 
or other organization in the area to serve special participant populations 
facing multiple employment barriers. 
ITAs are essentially vouchers, though not in their purest form (see 
Barnow and King [1996]). Prior to WIA there had been only limited ex-
perience with the use of vouchers in workforce development programs 
(see Barnow [2000, 2009], and Trutko and Barnow [1999]). Vouchers 
give WIA participants the freedom to select the program they believe 
would best meet their needs, but the evidence on the effectiveness of 
vouchers for disadvantaged populations has been mixed, with some 
studies showing that this group frequently overreached in selecting 
programs. 
There were other potential problems with ITAs. Local WIBs might 
have argued that it made little sense to hold vendors and programs ac-
countable for participants’ performance if participants were making the 
selection. This potential pitfall was avoided by permitting local pro-
grams to exercise latitude in limiting ITA use to programs in which 
participants were qualified and for in-demand occupations. In addition, 
the ETPL is intended to screen out programs that are ineffectual in plac-
ing participants in suitable jobs. The remaining concern is that the use 
of ITAs would provide uncertainty to providers on how many partici-
pants they might serve in a given year, making it difficult for them to 
plan and staff their offerings. 
Overall, ITAs appear to be a somewhat successful feature of WIA. 
They are popular with participants and accepted by the local WIBs as a 
useful program feature. An important aspect of this success is that local 
boards have the flexibility to set limits on the programs’ time and costs, 
and to have a “guided choice” approach to ITA use. Under the guided-
choice approach, local WIA programs provide strong guidance or re-
strict ITA use to programs they believe correspond to the participant’s 
aptitudes and abilities. The ETA conducted an experiment operated by 
Mathematica Policy Research to determine the advantages and disad-
vantages of three levels of consumer choice for ITAs (see D’Amico et 
al. [2002] and McConnell et al. [2006]). This experiment concluded 
that the three approaches to balancing consumer and WIB choice did 
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not yield strong findings favoring any one of the approaches over the 
alternatives.5 
The site visits did not provide much information on the three excep-
tions to the use of ITAs, but other evidence suggests that customized 
training and OJT are among the most effective training strategies.6 The 
exception for special populations permits local boards to make use of 
particular exemplary programs when warranted. This exception was not 
observed in the field visits, and no other evidence on this provision was 
identified, so it would be useful for the ETA to conduct research on the 
use of this provision. The ability of local WIBs to set time and dollar 
limits on the ITAs is useful because it permits local boards to determine 
the balance between the number of participants served and the cost per 
participant. Some local boards require that participants use the low-
est cost provider when there are alternatives, but others do not. A case 
could be made for requiring the lowest cost provider for a particular 
program, but it can also be argued that local boards are in a better posi-
tion to determine if the programs offered are truly equivalent. 
States in the study sample often left decisions on implementing 
ITAs to the local boards, which usually used a guided-choice approach 
for customer choice. The local boards commonly established time and 
cost limits, but there were many variations. Study results indicated that 
choice was limited either because many providers did not list their pro-
grams on the ETPL or there were a limited number of providers in the state. 
In Maryland, customer choice was limited by the reluctance of pro-
viders to sign up for the ETPL. Both local areas visited for the study 
used a guided-choice approach. Local programs used alternatives to 
ITAs. Baltimore, for example, had several customized training pro-
grams and wanted to expand their use, as they commonly had high 
placement and wage rates. 
Michigan had already implemented a consumer-oriented voucher
system for work-related education and training programs prior to WIA, 
so adaptation to the WIA requirements was not difficult for the state’s 
WIBs. Michigan’s ITA cap was determined locally, and generally 
ranged between $1,000 and $3,000 for individuals whose income was 
less than 70 percent of the lower living standard income level and who 
met certain other requirements. Staff reported that some training pro-
viders had established fees for their programs at the ITA cap for their 
local board. This phenomenon, where the ceiling becomes the floor, is 
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a potential abuse in areas where there is insufficient competition among 
providers. 
Missouri’s local boards generally limited the reimbursement 
available through their ITAs, although the state specified that train-
ing allocations had to be made on a case-by-case basis. In interviews, 
Missouri staff stressed the importance of matching participants with 
programs where they were likely to experience labor market success. 
Staff of the local boards used aptitudes and interests to guide partici-
pants into appropriate choices. 
In Florida, local boards had the option of setting dollar and time 
limits for ITAs. Local boards almost always used a guided choice ap-
proach to the ITAs. Local officials in Florida expressed concern that 
when they permitted participants to enroll in long-term training pro-
grams, some of their training funds were committed but not spent. 
Thus, it sometimes appeared that they were underspending even though 
the funds were fully allocated. These officials wanted the system modi-
fied so that they could fund programs expected to last more than one 
year by placing funds for the out years in an escrow account to assure 
continuous funding for participants. 
Texas started slowly in its use of ITAs, in part because the state 
initially interpreted WIA more as a work-first program. When the 
state shifted to a business-oriented, demand-driven system, interest in 
training and ITAs increased.7 Local workforce investment areas could 
establish their own ITA caps, which varied substantially, ranging from 
$3,500 in one local workforce investment area to $10,000 in another. 
As in Michigan, some Texas officials reported that vendors sometimes 
priced their programs at the local ITA cap. 
Utah used a guided choice approach for its ITAs. State officials 
reported that their major challenge in the use of ITAs was a lack of suf-
ficient numbers of training providers. 
Performance Standards and Incentives 
Performance management has been an important aspect of work-
force development programs for many years. CETA (1973–1982) 
included a limited performance management system in its later years 
(1980–1982), and JTPA featured a comprehensive performance man-
agement system by the mid-1980s. WIA modified JTPA’s performance 
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management system in several important ways. Under JTPA, only lo-
cal areas were subject to performance standards, but under WIA the 
states have standards as well. Under JTPA, local standards were ad-
justed by a statistically based regression equation to hold local areas 
harmless for local economic conditions and the characteristics of par-
ticipants served, but under WIA state standards are determined through 
negotiations, and adjustments are only possible if an appeal is filed and 
approved.8 Finally, under JTPA, performance was initially measured at 
the time of termination and 13 weeks after termination, but under WIA
performance is measured, based on UI wage records, 26 weeks after 
termination from the program. 
There were a total of 17 core performance measures for WIA in 
the early to mid-2000s. For adults, dislocated workers, and youth ages 
19–21, the core measures were the entered employment rate; employ-
ment retention six months after entry into employment; earnings change 
from the six months prior to entry to the six months after exit; and the 
obtained credential rate for participants who enter unsubsidized em-
ployment or, in the case of older youth, enter postsecondary education, 
advanced training, or unsubsidized employment. For youth between the 
ages of 14 and 18, the core performance measures were attainment of 
basic skills and, as appropriate, work readiness or occupational skills; 
attainment of a high school diploma or its equivalent; and placement 
and retention in postsecondary education and training, employment, or 
military service. There were also customer satisfaction measures for 
both participants and employers. 
All states and local areas in the study sample expressed concerns 
about the performance management system under WIA. Most officials 
interviewed indicated that the WIA system was a step backward from 
the approach used under JTPA. They decried the absence of a procedure 
to adjust for characteristics of participants served and local economic 
conditions; state and local officials stated that failing to adjust for dif-
ferences in these factors means that states and local areas are not placed 
on a level playing field.9 
State officials expressed concern that the ETA regional office of-
ficials did not enter into real negotiations with state officials; they all 
indicated that the federal officials did not negotiate on what the state 
standards should be, citing pressure from the federal government to 
meet its standards. They also said they were dissatisfied with the defi-
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nitions of who was considered a covered system participant and when 
participants were terminated, which they considered vague. This am-
biguity made it possible for the local workforce investment areas to 
engage in strategic decision making about whom they enrolled and 
when they considered someone an exiter in order to enhance their mea-
sured performance. Officials also expressed concern that WIA had too 
many performance measures, with 17 for adults, dislocated workers, 
and youth. 
Interestingly, more than half the states in the study sample—Florida, 
Indiana, Oregon, Texas, and Utah—actually added more performance 
measures to the mandated federal ones, which made the assertion that 
there were too many performance measures somewhat questionable. 
Often, however, these added measures were to provide state and local 
staff with either more systematic measurement of workforce perfor-
mance or more immediate information for managers regarding how 
participants were faring with program participation (O’Shea, Looney, 
and King 2003a,b). 
WIA reauthorization could provide an opportunity to improve the 
performance management system for the program.10 Lessons can be 
learned from the states’ criticisms of the current system, as well as the 
actions they have taken to enhance the WIA performance management 
system. In the interest of fairness and to avoid incentives for cream-
ing, where they serve eligible individuals more likely to do well on 
the performance measures instead of those with greater labor market 
barriers, an adjustment mechanism should be added to the system. The 
regression-based adjustment approach used under JTPA is one possibil-
ity, but even the subjectively established adjustment procedure that the 
ETA subsequently implemented in 2006 was an improvement.11 More-
over, the concept of using negotiations to set standards should not be 
precluded when an adjustment model is used. The adjustment model 
could be used to develop a starting point, followed by negotiations to 
determine the final standard. For the negotiations to be meaningful, 
however, a more systematic approach should be used so that both sides 
believe the system is fair.12 
The definitions of WIA entry and exit, as well as the boundaries 
of the different service categories, are currently too vague to form the 
basis of a nationally uniform performance management system. Sev-
eral states in the research sample have begun developing “system 
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measures,” which capture performance for entire labor market areas 
rather than for a specific program such as WIA. A few have explored 
developing measures that reflect return on investment (ROI) as well. 
Texas, through its state workforce board association, has estimated ROI 
for a broad array of workforce funding streams at the state and local 
levels from participant, taxpayer, and societal perspectives (King et al. 
2008). Although incorporating costs into performance management is 
important, work should proceed with caution because limits on follow-
up data and imperfect information can cause such measures to provide 
misleading signals. 
The appropriate follow-up period for performance measures should 
also receive renewed attention. The 26-week follow-up period in 
WIA permits the performance management system to do a better job 
of capturing longer-term program effects, but this is at the expense of 
information timeliness. Reliance on UI wage record data results in in-
formation delays of up to nine months. Thought should be given to 
ways to accelerate data collection and/or using shorter-term measures 
in addition to or instead of the longer-term measures so that more timely
feedback can be provided. 
Evidence of strategic behavior or “gaming” to improve measured 
performance was found in a majority of the states in the study sample.13 
This does not mean that these states were doing anything contrary to 
the WIA law or regulations, only that they were modifying their be-
havior to improve measured performance. Some local areas indicated 
that in response to the performance management system they took steps 
to improve their measured performance. Local areas employ creaming 
and strategic behavior when recording individuals’ enrollment and/or 
program termination. 
Maryland’s state board was concerned that the current system of 
measuring performance for individual programs did not permit the state 
to gauge performance for the state as a whole. To deal with this is-
sue, the state developed a “system report card” with nine measures that 
applied to an entire labor market area rather than a specific program:
1) the credential rate, 2) the high school dropout rate, 3) the college 
readiness rate, 4) investment per participant, 5) the self-sufficiency rate, 
6) the One-Stop Career Center usage rate, 7) customer satisfaction,
8) job openings by occupation, and board effectiveness. 
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Florida has long been a leader in exceeding performance require-
ments of federal programs. Legislation enacted in 1996 required the 
state to develop a three-tier performance management system for its 
programs. Tier three focuses on federally mandated measures; tier 
two measures are grouped by program and target group and provide 
measures appropriate for specific population subgroups. Tier one mea-
sures are broad economic measures applicable to almost all workforce 
development programs. The state also developed a “Red and Green Re-
port” that compared regions on a number of short-term performance 
indicators based on administrative data; regions in the top quarter on 
a measure are shown in green, and regions in the bottom quarter are 
marked in red.14 
Texas is another state with a strong history of performance man-
agement. When the eight-state study was completed the state had 
instituted 35 performance measures for its workforce development pro-
grams. Texas measures performance on a monthly basis, and the Texas 
Workforce Commission has a committee that meets monthly to address 
performance problems. As the eight-state WIA report was prepared, 
Texas was considering implementing a tiered performance manage-
ment system. 
Oregon was in the process of implementing a set of uniform, sys-
temwide performance measures for its workforce development system. 
These 13 measures will apply to all state agencies that are partners in 
the system. Oregon officials view the state systemwide measures as 
important for building an integrated system. As the study was being 
conducted, the state was requesting a waiver from the USDOL to use 
the state measures for reporting under WIA. 
Indiana uses three systemwide measures to award WIA incentive 
funds: customer satisfaction, earnings gains, and credentials acquired. 
Similar to Oregon, Indiana submitted a waiver request to the USDOL
to use its systemwide measures in place of the WIA performance mea-
sures; the request was denied. 
Since fieldwork was completed for the eight-state WIA study, most 
study states continued work on WIA’s market mechanisms and related 
features. Four study states—Florida, Michigan, Oregon, and Texas— 
participated in the Integrated Performance Improvement (IPI) project 
led by Washington State and convened by the National Governors As-
sociation (see Saunders and Wilson [2003] and Wilson [2005]). This 
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project, which sought to develop system-level performance measures 
for state workforce development systems, produced a draft “blueprint” 
of measures that was rolled out in a series of meetings for states. IPI’s 
blueprint has served as an alternative to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Common Measures. Florida’s efforts are showcased in 
the blueprint. Additional state updates include the following: 
•	 Indiana continued an incentive award system for local WIBs 
that began in October 2002. Each WIB was awarded $1,000 
for each of the 17 WIA performance measures that it met each 
year. Incentive awards were also being used in vocational and 
technical education areas. 
•	 Maryland put previous system standards on hold in 2005, as of-
ficials believed they might not be adequate measures of system 
performance. The administration formed a new unit to focus on 
performance. 
•	 Michigan continued to be actively involved in developing re-
gression models for adjusting performance levels for its local 
WIBs, relying on consultants from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research in Kalamazoo, and the Corporation for 
a Skilled Workforce in Ann Arbor. They developed the Value-
Added Performance-Adjustment System model (see Bartik, 
Eberts, and Kline [2009]). 
•	 Missouri’s Division of Workforce Development (DWD) evalu-
ates clients using a Self-Sufficiency Standard that’s updated 
annually and designed to indicate the level of income neces-
sary to meet basic living expenses. It serves as an important 
tool in evaluating program success. In addition, DWD also be-
gan using the Performance ScoreCard, a comprehensive system 
of measures for evaluating Missouri’s workforce development 
system. The Performance ScoreCard is composed of 10 mea-
sures, including market share, client satisfaction, employment, 
and earnings. 
•	 Texas in 2002 suspended the initial regression models used 
for WIA performance modeling due to perceived data anoma-
lies. The model had relied on JTPA data for the state, but was 
producing counterintuitive results as WIA data were utilized. 
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Additionally, as part of the effort to move from program-driven
services to employer-driven services, the Texas Workforce 
Commission instituted a series of employer-based measures for 
local boards. Texas also was one of the first states to implement 
the OMB “common measures” for its workforce programs. 
CONCLUSIONS
Market mechanisms now play a far more important role in U.S. 
workforce development programs than ever before. While they are 
likely here to stay and have been largely accepted by policymakers and 
program officials at all levels, issues regarding their appropriateness as 
well as their effectiveness should be acknowledged. 
Economists generally agree that more and better information on 
both opportunities and outcomes for customers and providers improves 
the functioning of markets. However, it remains to be seen whether 
what WIA mandates and states and local WIBS have implemented is 
the best way to accomplish this given the context within which the pro-
grams operate, i.e., federalism. Increased LMI, the ETPL certification 
lists, and performance standards are designed to help consumers make 
good choices in terms of selecting the right employment and training 
strategy to meet their needs. ITAs are the preferred mechanism for con-
sumers to exercise their choice for occupational skills training. But, 
there are conceptual and practical problems to consider. 
First, information is typically incomplete and may not be sufficiently
accurate. LMI’s shortcomings are well known. It is based largely on 
past trends that often do not support reliable projections of labor market 
opportunities 10 or even a few years into the future. In addition, there is 
a growing body of research that demonstrates that near-term outcomes 
from employment and training programs tend to be poor proxies for 
longer-term impacts. Numerous researchers have documented prob-
lems with WIA data collection and reporting systems for participation 
and performance in addition to the authors. It isn’t clear that providing 
more information to consumers actually assists them with making good 
choices unless the quality and timeliness of that information can be 
greatly improved. After a big push to enhance LMI and its accessibility 
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in the 1990s, with dwindling budgets, far fewer resources have been 
invested in recent years. At the same time, emerging evidence suggests 
that finding the right job with the right employer in the right industry 
sector makes a real difference in workers’ employment and earnings 
success (see Andersson, Holzer, and Lane [2005] and Brown, Halti-
wanger, and Lane [2006]). Being able to access and use good LMI is 
clearly necessary. 
Second, as in many markets, information for job training programs 
tends to be highly imbalanced or asymmetric, such that training provid-
ers are far better informed than prospective participants. When “sellers” 
are much better informed than “buyers,” unless added steps are taken to 
protect them, economic theory suggests that inferior goods may crowd 
out superior ones over time (the so-called lemons problem). This too is 
cause for concern. 
Third, as Barnow (2000, 2009) and Barnow and King (1996) have 
pointed out in other work, economically disadvantaged participants 
with low literacy skills and more limited knowledge of labor market 
opportunities may be ill-suited to taking full advantage of ITAs even 
with the provision of more information. 
It is worth noting that the combined effect of several factors led 
to minimal usage of ITAs under WIA. First, stronger emphasis on 
“work-first” or labor force attachment strategies under WIA served to 
deemphasize training as an option for participants. Second, the cumber-
some and costly nature, real or perceived, of the ETPL requirements 
initially created reluctance on the part of community colleges to offer 
training via ITAs for the WIA system. Third, substantial WIA budget 
reductions in recent years have cut the amount of funding available for 
training. 
Conclusions from the WIA study relevant to the use of market 
mechanisms include the following: 
States and localities in the study sample have embraced newly 
devolved authority and responsibility for workforce investment 
under WIA, giving rise to an increasingly varied workforce devel-
opment system across the country. As with welfare, health, education, 
and other policy areas, states and local areas—led by governors, may-
ors, and county executives, as well as legislators and state and local 
workforce administrators—have served as “laboratories of democ-
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racy,” experimenting with new ways of doing business in workforce 
investment. A number of the study states had been in the vanguard of 
workforce policy reform, some of them pioneering market-oriented 
mechanisms and other changes well before WIA introduced and en-
couraged such changes nationally. Among the study states, efforts in 
Florida, Michigan, Texas, and Utah stand out. 
The current approach to measuring and managing perfor-
mance under WIA does not fit well with the intergovernmental 
approach to U.S. workforce policy that has evolved in recent de-
cades. State and local officials and One-Stop center staff were nearly 
unanimous in expressing displeasure with performance measurement 
and management under WIA, often harking back to what was done un-
der earlier workforce programs like JTPA for more promising practices. 
The predominant view was that prior to WIA, program participation 
and outcome data were of higher quality, performance standards ne-
gotiations processes were more balanced between the federal and state 
governments and between the states and local WIBs, and there was 
more emphasis on managing programs for improved results as opposed 
to the achievement of what tended to be viewed as arbitrary numeric 
goals. 
One concern stems from the absence of consistent approaches to 
deciding when a customer becomes a participant or a former partic-
ipant (exiter). Another has to do with the absence of a performance 
adjustment process to hold states and areas harmless for serving harder-
to-serve populations and operating in economically distressed areas; for 
example, the JTPA regression adjustment model that was used for much 
of the 1980s and 1990s was perceived by most state and local officials 
interviewed as a good strategy to discourage creaming and to level the 
playing field between areas with different economic conditions. Most 
state and local officials also complained that relying on UI wage record 
data to capture labor market outcomes leads to delays in measuring re-
sults and to having data that are not useful for day-to-day management. 
A number of states in the sample—including Florida, Oregon, Texas, 
and Utah—are recognized leaders in the design and use of measures 
that gauge the performance of the workforce system as a whole, as well 
as more comprehensive performance management approaches.15 Three 
of these states—Florida, Oregon, and Texas—were active participants 
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in the IPI initiative led by Washington State, working with the National 
Governors Association to develop workforce system measures. 
Improvements to WIA’s data collection and reporting mechanisms 
and its approach to performance measurement and management are 
needed. Under the intergovernmental system that has evolved for work-
force investment, tightening up the accountability system goes hand in 
hand with granting governors and WIBs discretion and flexibility to 
design their own programs. Policymakers can be “loose” in allowing 
states and localities to shape their service strategies to meet what they 
perceive as the needs of their particular labor markets and target popu-
lations, but they should be “tight” in terms of specifying the measures 
and assuring that the measures capture performance in an accurate and 
timely manner. This approach is in accord with best practice in both the 
public and the private sector, as characterized by Osborne and Gaebler
(1992) and Peters and Waterman (1982). 
A number of new market mechanisms introduced by WIA, in-
cluding ITAs and, to a lesser extent, provider certification processes, 
appear to be working better than expected. Despite early difficulties 
with implementing the ITA and eligible provider certification pro-
cesses, for the most part the states and local areas studied have now 
incorporated these features into their policy frameworks and day-to-day 
operations for adult and dislocated worker programs. In part, this may 
reflect low demands for training services since WIA was implemented, 
but it may also reflect the experience that some of the sample states had 
with similar approaches before WIA. Based on the field research, lead-
ers of many local boards and One-Stop centers appear to be pursuing 
a “guided choice” approach to ITAs. More variation was found among 
the states in how well the eligible provider list requirements function. 
There is support for the concept, but the requirements for its operation 
were seen as overly rigid. 
When WIA is ultimately reauthorized, this research suggests that 
the system needs to deal with a number of challenges related to the 
implementation and use of market mechanisms. Some of these are high-
lighted below. 
Balancing accountability and flexibility under a broad-based 
federal grant-in-aid program such as WIA. In a system that is feder-
ally funded and state and locally administered, states and local areas 
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are granted the flexibility to operate the programs as they see fit to meet 
their own goals and objectives. At the same time, the federal government 
retains the responsibility for making the lower levels of government ac-
countable for their actions. The challenge is finding the right mix of 
flexibility and accountability so that an accountability system tailored 
to achieve federal goals does not thwart state and local governments 
from addressing what they see as their own needs. 
Maintaining cooperative federal-state-local relationships on an 
ongoing basis for monitoring and overseeing local WIB and One-
Stop activities. Under WIA, most of the funds flow from the federal 
government to the states to the local workforce investment areas to the 
One-Stops and finally to the service providers. There are a number of 
advantages to giving the states and localities more authority over the 
funds, but the current system requires that each level of government 
have specific authority and oversight responsibilities. The challenge is 
to find the right balance among the federal, state, and local levels of 
government to assure that the federally financed system is appropriately 
overseen. 
Assuring that reporting and performance requirements do not 
adversely affect customer selection, services provided, and out-
comes. Performance management has helped align the interests of state 
and local programs with those of the federal government, which has 
funded the programs, and enabled identification and improvement of 
low performers. Unfortunately, research indicates that performance 
management systems sometimes inadvertently lead to creaming (deny-
ing services to hard-to-place groups), undue emphasis on short-term 
services, and strategic behavior by government agencies and other or-
ganizations. An ongoing challenge is to strike the right balance in the 
performance management system so that good behavior is identified 
and rewarded while inappropriate or ineffective behavior is discour-
aged. In addition, performance management requires that timely and 
accurate data be collected. A further challenge is to balance the burden 
of data collection, timeliness, and accuracy in measuring the outcomes. 
Developing ROI measures as an important component of work-
force evaluation systems. Since JTPA referred to workforce programs 
as investments, there have been efforts to treat them as an investment 
and measure the return on support for the programs. Although this is a 
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straightforward concept, implementing ROI, even at the national level, 
is quite difficult for a number of reasons. ROI calculations require esti-
mates of the impact of the program on outcomes of interest, particularly 
earnings. This, in turn, not only requires obtaining earnings information 
for five or more years after program participation, but also estimates 
of what earnings would have been in the absence of participation. It is 
well established that the best way to obtain such information is through 
a classical experiment where eligible individuals are randomly assigned 
to receive the service or denied access. Classical experiments have been 
used successfully for evaluations of the Job Corps and JTPA, but they 
are time consuming and expensive. Texas and other states (e.g., Wash-
ington State) have pursued ROI estimation using a quasi-experimental 
method for capturing the impacts on employment, earnings, and other 
outcomes (Hollenbeck and Huang 2006; and King et al. 2008). ROI 
should be viewed as a longer-term evaluative measure of program per-
formance rather than a near-term performance indicator. 
Another complication is, ironically, that recent efforts to better 
coordinate and integrate programs have made it difficult to identify 
program costs associated with a participant. Some of the resources pro-
vided to customers at One-Stop centers are likely to have been paid for 
by other customers, and in some cases individuals are coenrolled in
other programs. Currently, WIA does not require states and local pro-
grams to track costs at the individual level, and doing so would be 
difficult or impossible without arbitrary assumptions. At the state and 
local levels, the problems are magnified. It is not clear that states and lo-
calities can afford to undertake random assignment experiments locally 
or measure costs in the detail required for a cost-benefit analysis. Thus, 
proxy measures based on national estimates and procedures might have 
to be used. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we propose recommendations for WIA reauthoriza-
tion as well as issues for the European Social Fund to consider as it 
develops and institutes more comprehensive performance measurement 
and management featuring greater use of market mechanisms. 
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WIA Reauthorization 
The following recommendations related to the use of market 
mechanisms are offered for policymakers to consider in the WIA reau-
thorization process: 
WIA should improve and substantially tighten data collection 
and reporting by states and local workforce boards systemwide. In 
the private sector that is often held up as the model for public programs 
to emulate, it is axiomatic that, if a result is important, it must be tightly 
measured. Despite the rhetoric in WIA (and related programs), this has 
not been the case. In addition to collecting more accurate data on par-
ticipation and services, outcomes should be better measured. UI wage 
records, which serve as the primary data source for measuring employ-
ment and earnings outcomes, could be enhanced to include fields for 
starting date, hours worked, and even occupation (the latter to facilitate 
gauging whether placements are training related). The Wage Record 
Interchange System that supports the WIA (and ES) performance mea-
surement could also be improved and made available for research uses 
to support better understanding of the outcomes and impacts from 
workforce services. In addition, the currently dormant effort to develop 
a systemwide management information system that would collect data 
for customers across a wide range of programs would provide an oppor-
tunity to link outcomes to the entire investment made for an individual. 
WIA should return to funding, developing, and fostering the 
use of better LMI and LMI-related tools for use by local workforce 
boards, employers, and participants, as well as state planners. If 
WIA and related services are to be delivered in a market-oriented mode, 
the entire system requires much better information, improved access to 
the information, and tools for using it. A number of states (e.g., Florida, 
Oregon, Texas, Utah) are well-established leaders in the LMI arena and, 
through their national organizations, could assist in developing plans 
and tools for such an effort. 
WIA should also do more to encourage and support the provi-
sion of skills training in growth sectors of the economy, whether
through the use of ITAs or other means. OJT and customized train-
ing are proven strategies for training, as has been noted. ITAs may be a 
useful approach if implemented well (i.e., with a guided-choice model) 
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in many workforce areas, but may not be appropriate in others, for ex-
ample, in more rural areas where few provider choices are available. 
Overreliance on ITAs should be avoided until processes such as the 
ETPL are better developed. 
Congress should broaden the ETPL process for provider
certification beyond WIA to ensure that it is more balanced and 
comprehensive, not just coming from WIA. Some of the difficul-
ties that surfaced with the ETPL process, including resistance from 
community and technical colleges, may be avoided if the process en-
compasses workforce and education programs on a more systemwide 
basis. To make good choices, consumers—both workers and employ-
ers—need systematic knowledge about the performance of all such 
programs, not just those funded by WIA. In addition, flexibility should 
be added so that states can properly balance the paperwork required 
with the information that is provided. Recent initiatives funded by the 
U.S. Department of Education and the USDOL to support development 
and implementation of linked longitudinal data systems in many states 
should make such effects much easier.16 
Congress should establish a mechanism in WIA and related 
workforce and education legislation for carefully reviewing the 
“common measures.” To date, the OMB “common measures” have 
mainly been embraced by the USDOL for its program offerings. More-
over, the IPI measures that were developed and vetted by a number of 
leading states and their local programs appear to offer somewhat better 
measures than the ones that were initially promulgated by the OMB and 
the USDOL in a mainly top-down process. If these measures are to truly 
be “common,” they require such a review and likely a better process. 
Moreover, the interest in developing common measures should not be 
pursued to the point that programs are forced to measure success only 
by how well they perform on the common measures. For some educa-
tion programs, for example, learning may be as important an outcome as 
earning. Even in some labor programs, such as the Senior Community 
Service Employment Program, postprogram employment and earnings 
may not be as important as in a more traditional training program. 
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WIA should explicitly provide for and support the development 
and use of performance adjustment models or other less complex 
but effective approaches to ensure that services to harder-to-serve 
groups are encouraged rather than discouraged. The ETA has done 
much more in the last few years along these lines, but including such 
provisions within the act would be an important statement of policy for 
the workforce system. As noted earlier, regression modeling is often 
useful for objectively taking account of differences in participant char-
acteristics and economic conditions, but other approaches, including 
negotiation, can be used to take account of factors that cannot be incor-
porated well into regression models.17 
WIA should also provide for more systematic capacity building 
across the system to foster best practices and professional develop-
ment in performance management and related areas. Market-based 
systems tend to function best when they are supported by knowledge-
able professionals and have access to accurate information and related 
assistance. It has been more than a quarter century since the regional 
network of institutional grantees—competitively procured university-
based centers that provided professional talent development, research 
and evaluation, and technical assistance to the workforce system—were 
eliminated from the federal budget. Congress and ETA should restart 
this important effort. 
WIA should continue to support evaluations using random as-
signment to treatment status in conjunction with research on less 
expensive, less intrusive quasi-or nonexperimental impact estima-
tion. Classical experiments are generally perceived as expensive and 
time consuming, but they offer the most irrefutable evidence of program 
impacts. Nonexperimental evaluations can be performed more quickly 
and at lower cost (Hollenbeck et al. 2005; Smith, King, and Schroeder 
2008), but they generally rely on very strong assumptions that can-
not be tested, e.g., the absence of unobserved variables that affect the 
outcomes of interest. There is currently vigorous debate about when 
nonexperimental approaches are adequate, but the only way the de-
bate can be resolved is to conduct studies that combine the approaches.
Indeed, much of the most important recent work on nonexperimental 
estimation techniques was built on the experimental evaluations of 
JTPA and the National Supported Work Experiment. 
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European Social Fund 
Making detailed recommendations on the use of market mecha-
nisms for the European Social Fund is premature at this point. However, 
some issues that it should consider as it proceeds with its work along 
these lines include the following: 
Context is all-important. One-size-fits-all solutions involving 
such market mechanisms are unlikely to work well. Europe’s in-
stitutions and traditions—including especially relationships between 
employers, labor, and government regarding workforce development 
programs—are dramatically different from those in the U.S. Tripartite, 
collaborative relationships, a stronger role for government in many as-
pects of society and the economy, and mediation of market forces are an 
integral part of Europe’s fabric, even if recent trends suggest movement 
more toward market approaches. Instituting a stronger role for market 
mechanisms will likely take more time and thought as to how the Euro-
pean context can and should be addressed. 
Overreliance on market mechanisms should be avoided un-
less and until labor market information and outcomes data are far
more robust and its major consumers—both job seekers and em-
ployers—and governments have ready access and are able to make 
effective use of it. LMI and reliable outcomes data are essential for 
the other market mechanisms to perform well. As indicated above, re-
lying on market forces to guide market choices and outcomes in the 
absence of such information is likely to produce poor results and do so 
inefficiently. Consumers and governments also require tools to properly 
access and use such information. 
Notes 
1. Barnow and King (2005) authored the final project report. All reports from the 
project, including a series of eight state case studies, can be found both on the 
Rockefeller Institute and USDOL/ETA Web sites: See http://www.doleta.gov/ 
reports/searcheta/occ/ or http://www.rockinst.org/quick_tour/federalism/wia.html. 
2. See Lurie (2003) for a description of the field network methodology and its 
features. 
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3. More detail on this and other topics is available in the individual state reports 
published by the USDOL and the Rockefeller Institute (Rockefeller Institute of 
Government 2004a,b). 
4. Spaulding (2001) finds that performance-based contracting was associated with 
better participant placement and wage outcomes in 1998 when JTPA was in effect, 
but the ETA identified a number of abuses of performance-based contracting in the 
1980s and discouraged its use. 
5. Barnow (2009) interprets the evidence on vouchers from a number of studies a 
bit differently, concluding that vouchers with more agency control may produce 
greater impacts for customers. 
6. See Barnow (2004) and King (2004, 2008) for a review of the evidence on the 
effectiveness of alternative training strategies. Isbell, Trutko, and Barnow (2000) 
review the evidence on customized training. 
7. This experience is borne out by unpublished figures from the Texas Workforce 
Commission and independent analysis conducted by Hollenbeck, King, and 
Schroeder (2003) for the ADARE Project. 
8. States determine how local standards are set. Most states follow the federal ap-
proach and set local standards through negotiations. 
9. Lack of adjustment for participant characteristics may increase incentives for 
workforce investment areas serving difficult populations to engage in “creaming,” 
where they serve eligible individuals more likely to do well on the performance 
measures instead of those with greater labor market barriers. 
10. Refinement of performance measures will need to take account of the common 
measures developed by the OMB for job training and employment programs. 
11. More recent ETA Training and Employment Guidance Letters on this topic are 
discussed in King (2006). 
12. John Baj at Northern Illinois University’s Center for Governmental Studies de-
vised a simpler alternative to regression-adjustment models based on comparisons 
to similar states to assist states and localities in conducting negotiations as part of 
the ongoing ADARE Project. For more information see http://www.fred-info.org. 
13. ADARE project reports by Mueser and Sharpe (2006) and Stevens and Stack 
(2006) discuss this issue and provide insights into its motivating factors and effects. 
14. Florida no longer uses the color-coded reports, but the state still produces tables 
comparing performance across local areas. 
15. See reports prepared for the National Governors Association and the ETA by 
O’Shea et al. (2003a,b). 
16. For more information on these initiatives, see http://nces.ed.gov/programs/slds 
and http://www.doleta.gov/pdf/. 
17. See Barnow and Heinrich (2010) and King (2006) for a discussion of alternative 
approaches to adjusting performance standards. 
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Customized Training 
David A. Long 
Abt Associates 
In the United States, national workforce development policy has 
steadily placed a greater emphasis on the involvement of the private 
sector in the planning and oversight of federally funded programs. 
WIA has required local workforce development planning and opera-
tions be led by boards chaired and largely composed of private sector 
leaders. However, this and other WIA provisions have not ensured the 
use of “demand-driven” skills training—that is, the provision of par-
ticular employee skills needed by specific firms in their current and 
new workers. Federal policy once shied away from such training, be-
cause it was considered the responsibility of employers to prepare their 
own workers in skills that are this job-specific. Now, however, local 
boards have the discretion to support the training they want, and there 
is increasing recognition that training tailored to the needs of specific 
employers is a vehicle both for providing good jobs to low-income and 
disadvantaged groups and for promoting economic growth in particu-
lar communities and industrial sectors. Recognizing this, the USDOL
and private foundations in the United States have funded what can be 
termed “customized” training initiatives (this type of training goes by 
several names). These initiatives typically involve local partnerships 
between firms from the private sector and training providers and inter-
mediaries from the public sector. 
This chapter answers several questions about customized training, 
beginning with the most fundamental: What is it? And, what is the ra-
tionale for this training? Then the discussion will turn to the role of 
customized training in WIA. What is that role now and what might it be 
in the future? Finally, I will address questions regarding how much we 
know about delivering customized training and, if implemented well, 
about how effective this training can be. In answering these last two 
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questions, I will rely primarily on research findings from four large-
scale demonstrations mounted by the USDOL during the last 10 years 
and from a fifth major initiative funded by the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation. 
WHAT IS CUSTOMIzED TRAINING? 
One of economist Gary Becker’s many contributions to the way we 
think about education and training is the distinction he drew between 
general and specific training. Firm-specific training is useful only to the 
individual sector firms providing it, while general education or training 
is useful to a range of firms. At the general education and training end of 
the continuum is the wide-ranging preparation—for example, in com-
munication skills and word processing functions—that is not designed 
for a particular industry, let alone a specific firm in the industry. At the 
other end is the specific, in-house skills training provided by individual 
firms to their own employees, including on-the-job learning about the 
firm’s procedures, structure, and culture. 
Becker notes that employers have little incentive to invest in gen-
eral training, because it raises the productivity of workers in other firms 
and not just their own, which then encourages competing employers 
to hire away these workers at higher wages. On the other hand, he ar-
gues that completely specific training—which can only be provided by 
the individual firm as on-the-job training in its own unique processes, 
special methods and routines, and unique uses of technologies and 
equipment—has no value to other employers and consequently does 
not bid up wages (Becker 1997). Becker’s distinction is very useful, 
although it should be noted that there are few completely firm-specific 
skills and, even where they exist, such skills may actually be quite valu-
able to competing firms. 
Along the continuum between general and specific training, cus-
tomized training occupies a place closer to the latter. By definition, 
customized training is instruction for workers and job seekers provided 
by education and training institutions working closely with employers. 
The training curriculum is developed or adapted to meet the educa-
tion and training needs of the specific firms, which often belong to a 
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particular sector. As a result, this training often has gone by the name 
of “sectoral training”—particularly in the philanthropic community. 
This term is incomprehensible to most people. In addition, the training 
to which the term refers sometimes involves well-defined jobs (such 
as a computer technician) in firms from more than a single sector, but 
located in a single geographic area. Government agencies have more 
often attached the term “demand-driven” to this type of training, want-
ing to differentiate it from supply-driven training—that is, education 
and training provided by schools and training institutions with insuffi-
cient regard for the specific needs of employers. But the demand-driven 
label tells us little about what the training is. This chapter uses “custom-
ized training” instead to emphasize its responsiveness to the needs of 
specific local employers in filling particular skilled work positions, dif-
ferentiating it from “off-the-shelf” training in various vocational fields. 
Thus, customized training is designed to meet the particular re-
quirements of an employer or group of employers. Generally speaking, 
it is conducted with a commitment by the employer to employ some or 
all successful completers of the training (or continue employing incum-
bent workers) and share the costs of the training, which usually include 
support of the training’s hands-on aspects. The training is often pro-
vided through partnerships between education and training institutions 
and groups of firms from the same region.1 In the United States, the 
institutions are often, but not always, community colleges. Typically, 
each partnership involves another important collaborator: a labor mar-
ket intermediary such as a local Workforce Investment Board (WIB) 
or a community-based organization.2 This intermediary often convenes 
the initial relationship between employers and training providers, and it 
almost always plays the role of recruiting and screening applicants for 
customized training when partner employers are looking to hire new 
skilled workers. This recruitment effort is customized in the sense that 
the partner employer’s hiring criteria are explicitly taken into account 
by the intermediaries. This role played by the intermediaries turns out 
to be crucial to the targeting of customized training programs, because 
it permits programs to give priority to low-income and disadvantaged 
groups.3 
The Biotech Workforce Network in the San Francisco Bay area, 
which trains biotech technicians, is an example of such a partnership. 
The original corporate partner was Genentech (the world’s second larg-
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est biotech firm) and more than 25 other companies have joined the 
network. Two WIBs (the local boards established by WIA) created this 
regional partnership, secured the necessary funding, developed the pro-
gram management systems and program operations procedures, and 
involved their respective One-Stop Career Centers in the recruitment, 
screening, and enrollment of participants. Two community colleges 
have developed training curricula and provided the training classes, and 
the colleges partnered with community-based organizations to recruit 
and provide supports for disadvantaged individuals entering the train-
ing programs. A consulting firm helped in recruiting corporate partners, 
developed on-the-job training models, and assisted with employer 
communications and technical assistance (Biotech Workforce Network 
2007). 
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
IN CUSTOMIzED TRAINING? 
The rationale for public support of customized training includes 
four arguments. First, changes in U.S. labor demand over the last 40 
years have favored more educated and skilled workers. This has partly 
resulted from market globalization, indicated by the rapid expansion 
of international trade.4 The growth in imports during this period is as-
sociated with a loss in employment across many low-skill occupational 
categories, reflecting the steady shift of production overseas. At the 
same time, U.S. employment in medium- and high-skill occupations 
has been supported by the nation’s increased exports.5 Changes in de-
mand also have resulted from technological advances, including the 
astonishing growth of computers and the internet. This has boosted em-
ployers’ needs for workers in higher-skill occupations. There has been 
a corresponding reduction in the demand for less-skilled labor (that is, 
for workers conducting routine tasks). 
The second argument is that, despite their growing need for skilled 
labor, employers are reluctant to invest in skills training. The growth in 
the supply of skilled labor has not kept pace with employers’ demand, 
particularly in some sectors, which has created skill shortages and ap-
plied upward pressure on wages. However, it appears that increasing 
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employee turnover has discouraged many businesses from investing 
in employee skills training, because employee departures reduce em-
ployers’ return on such investments.6 This is especially true of training 
for low-wage, entry-level workers (see, for example, Ahlstrand, Bassi, 
and McMurrer [2003]). As noted earlier, training that does not involve 
truly firm-specific skills constitutes an investment in the employee over 
which the employer has no control. Once trained, employees can leave 
a job to sell their enhanced services to another employer. While indi-
vidual firms may be reluctant to invest in skills training, it is clearly in 
the interest of businesses collectively—that is, the U.S. economy—to 
make such investments. This satisfies economists’ conditions for a mar-
ket failure and for treating such training as a public good. 
The third argument is that individuals also do not invest enough 
in skills training. The increased demand for skilled labor in the United 
States has boosted the wages paid to skilled workers relative to unskilled 
workers. For example, between 1979 and 2000, real wages of workers 
with a college degree increased 21 percent, while those with only a high 
school diploma fell 3 percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Boushey 2003). 
The acquisition of skills has consequently become ever more critical to 
both the productivity and employability of workers. Even though most 
people are aware of the premium now paid to skilled workers, a high 
proportion of the U.S. workforce lacks necessary basic and occupational
skills. Some of this skills gap is attributable to workers entering the 
labor force without first obtaining the needed skills through the educa-
tion and training system. Other sources of this problem are high dropout 
rates and poor achievement in U.S. schools, and the limited reach of 
the “second-chance education” and vocational training systems. In ad-
dition, workers who lack the skills they need for labor market success 
typically also lack both the financial resources and the know-how to 
obtain the skills on their own. 
Finally, while customized training arrangements provide a way for 
valuable workforce skill development to take place, these arrangements 
appear to develop slowly in the marketplace unless there is funding 
from government and/or private foundations to spur them on. Cus-
tomized training combines occupational instruction and firm-specific 
training into an attractive package. However, many observers have 
noted the lack of collaboration, and sometimes even communication, 
between businesses and the education and workforce development 
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systems. Community leaders have said it often is difficult to engage 
decision makers from local industries, especially small businesses lack-
ing a dedicated human resources staff. At the same time, education and 
training institutions often have lacked mechanisms to facilitate such 
engagement by small businesses, which collectively account for more 
employment in the United States than do their larger brethren. A survey 
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that while large business 
establishments heavily used community colleges as a source of skilled 
labor, particularly in some industries, a much lower proportion of small 
businesses took advantage of community college training resources.7 
These arguments have led policymakers to subsidize the develop-
ment of partnerships that deliver customized training. Both the USDOL
and private foundations have made grants to education and training 
institutions and to labor market intermediaries to create these partner-
ships. The vision is that the funding is short-term, and partnerships 
will eventually become self-supporting. The training provided by the 
partnerships may also reduce the social costs associated with unem-
ployment and provide greater employment opportunities to low-income 
and disadvantaged populations. 
WHAT ROLE DOES CUSTOMIzED TRAINING PLAY IN WIA? 
WIA has increased the role played by employers in the governance 
of the nation’s training system. It has both resulted from and helped 
produce a corresponding move toward more demand-led rather than 
supply-led systems. As indicated earlier, the former are systems that 
respond to the immediate needs of businesses, while the latter tend to 
be driven by the priorities of established training providers. Customized 
training is a logical product of a more demand-led system. 
The USDOL administers WIA, including the allocation of national 
program grants between local WIBs. The boards then are responsible 
for assessing the needs of the local economy and allocating WIA funds 
among potential service providers, which deliver different types of 
training and other services. They also oversee the One-Stop centers, 
where job seekers can obtain employment information, find out about 
available services, and be referred to the various service providers. 
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Unlike JTPA, WIA permits funds to support the training of incumbent 
workers as well as of unemployed members of the workforce. 
Local boards make different assessments of the skill sets workers 
and job seekers need and of which skills should be given highest prior-
ity in the areas they serve. At the general education end of the spectrum 
are the basic skills—that is, the literacy and numeracy skills—that are 
ideally acquired from a primary and early secondary education. Next to 
these are either occupational skills, which are acquired mainly in vo-
cational and technical schools (including specialized secondary school 
programs and community college vocational instruction), or the profes-
sional skills obtained through additional academic study in colleges and 
universities. Beyond these occupation skills are the firm-specific skills 
acquired through work experience or training gained in the context of 
employment. 
About 40 percent of the federal money given to local boards is 
spent on all types of training for adults (and many boards spend much 
less than this on training) (GAO 2005). While most WIA-funded train-
ing services involve occupational skills training, local boards also 
fund on-the-job training, an activity designed to provide firm-specific 
skills. Customized training can be viewed as packaging of an employer-
tailored version of occupational skills training with on-the-job training 
(OJT) or another form of workplace activity providing hands-on experi-
ence. Local boards are free to develop customized training programs, 
and many of them have chosen to do so, often as an adjunct to their OJT
programs. At least one WIA area in each of 32 U.S. states currently has 
a customized training program. On the other hand, this means that all 
local boards in 18 states, and many boards in the 32 states with pro-
grams, have chosen not to invest in customized training—which is their 
prerogative under WIA. 
However, the Department of Labor has encouraged local invest-
ments in customized training, particularly through four major initiatives. 
The Sectoral Employment Demonstration (SED), which operated 
between 2000 and 2003, funded 38 local boards to operate special proj-
ects, some of which involved customized training. The High Growth 
Training Initiative (HGTI) has provided funding to WIBs, community 
colleges, and other organizations in support of customized training in 
14 rapidly growing industries. The Community Based Training Ini-
tiative (CBTI) has supported similar initiatives, primarily involving 
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community colleges.8 HGTI and CBTI were funded under WIA’s dem-
onstration authority. The Workforce Innovation in Regional Economic 
Development (WIRED) Initiative entails more sweeping workforce 
development plans, with each WIRED grant calling for the creation 
of regional leadership groups, systematic assessments of regional 
economies (to identify target sectors), and the development of regional 
funding sources in advance of actually implementing skills training 
strategies. These activities have led most of the original 13 WIRED 
grantees to boost customized training (Almandsmith et al. 2008). 
Congress is currently considering WIA reauthorization. Legisla-
tion has been proposed that would amend WIA, establishing a new 
partnership funding program similar to HGTI. The “Strengthening Em-
ployment Clusters to Organize Regional Success Act of 2009” would 
provide grants both to expand existing partnerships and establish new 
partnerships to provide customized training.9 In addition, several or-
ganizations, including the National Governors Association, have urged 
Congress to make the regional workforce development promoted by 
WIRED a permanent part of WIA (see Ganzglass 2006). 
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT IMPLEMENTING
CUSTOMIzED TRAINING? 
Successful implementation of customized training programs ap-
pears to depend, not surprisingly, on many things. This section of the 
chapter focuses on five themes from the implementation findings of the 
evaluation research on customized training: 1) informed sector choice, 
2) productive partnerships, 3) recruitment and engagement of trainees, 
4) curriculum development and use, and 5) effective placement and 
support services. 
Informed Sector Choice 
The available research on sector-focused customized training in-
dicates that pertinent initiatives have consistently used three criteria to 
select sectors. One is observed sector growth or skill shortages created 
by sector growth. Sector growth has been the key criterion for sector 
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selection in the HGTI initiative, while skill shortages were the primary
factors for both the SED and the Skill Shortage Demonstration, a
smaller project funded by the USDOL and completed four years ago 
(for discussion of this project, see Public Policy Associates [2005]). 
The rationale behind these related criteria is that, as discussed earlier, 
rapid growth in a given sector produces skill gaps when the supply of 
skilled labor does not keep up with growing demand. Filling such gaps 
serves the needs of employers, potential and existing employees, and 
the overall economy. 
Nothing from the research evidence calls this criterion into ques-
tion, but some of it underscores the need for up-to-date information on 
sector growth, and project responsiveness to changes in economic con-
ditions. The need for current information results from the rapid changes 
in labor markets, and the studies reviewed in this chapter provide no 
revelations regarding the assessment of this information. The findings 
of the SED evaluation, as well as of the evaluation of the Sectoral Em-
ployment Initiative (SEI) funded by the Mott Foundation, emphasized 
the second point, noting that site programs needed to make appropriate 
responses when economic downturns occurred.10 Given current eco-
nomic conditions, this lesson is apropos. 
Another consistent selection criterion has been the extent and con-
centration of local demand for specific skills. This was an important 
consideration for successful grantees in all the projects reviewed, largely
for practical and strategic reasons. It is hard to think about capacity 
building—such as a new occupational training program at a community 
college—without reaching some threshold of skill demand. 
Third, virtually all initiatives have put a priority on sectors with 
satisfactory wage levels and fringe benefits. Some of the grantees in 
the SED and Skill Shortage Demonstration had difficulty achieving 
their wage goals. However, it is noteworthy that the SEI sites judged 
most successful based on early results, and subsequently found to pro-
duce positive impacts on employment and earnings (described below), 
placed a high priority on participants obtaining high wages. This find-
ing is consistent with the results of some other evaluations of workforce 
development programs, such as the findings for the Portland (Oregon) 
site in the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies.11 
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Productive Partnerships 
The heart of each successful customized training project has been 
a partnership between an education and training institution, or institu-
tions, and an engaged group of employers in the targeted sector. The 
partnerships have taken different forms, and have often involved ad-
ditional organizations, but the ones judged to be successful have always 
had high employer involvement in multiple program activities. There 
has been variation in the level of employer involvement in particular 
activities, notably recruitment and screening; and, particularly in the 
SED, there was variation in the level of interaction among participating 
partners. There has been consistent employer involvement in curricu-
lum development in programs providing specific training, although it 
has been more limited in some programs (for example, several of the 
HGTI and CBTI sites that have implemented traditional nursing pro-
grams with relatively little customization to meet the needs of particular 
health care providers). 
The individual projects in the various customized training initiatives 
mentioned in this chapter have involved many types of partnerships. 
They typically have involved the workforce development system, lo-
cal community colleges and other training institutions, employers, and 
other agencies or organizations within the region. There does not ap-
pear to be a single template for a successful partnership. Indeed, one 
of the conclusions of the SED evaluation, a demonstration in which 
all partnerships were led by local WIBs, was that there was no “best” 
project structure even in cases where the boards were always in the 
leadership position. 
However, the research evidence suggests that communities are wise 
to build on the institutional relationships that are already in place. One 
of the important conclusions from the WIRED evaluation is that many 
of the strongest partnerships were already well under way before the 
grants were awarded. In these cases planning and goal setting had been 
completed, and the needed institutional relationships had been estab-
lished, so the grants were used to expand preexisting projects. This also 
was clearly true of successful projects such as the Portland site men-
tioned above. 
While it is sensible to build on existing collaborations, many grant-
ees in all of the USDOL initiatives developed new partnerships. Indeed, 
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two-thirds of the SED grantees formed new stakeholder groups that in-
cluded employers, community colleges, and community organizations 
and/or unions and industry associations. The SED evaluators from the 
Urban Institute reported that, based on the metrics used in the study, 
most of these partnerships successfully engaged employers and other 
organizations in developing training (Pindus et al. 2004). Also, many of 
the grantees leveraged additional resources beyond the SED funding to 
support their implementation plans. 
In developing new partnerships, labor market intermediaries appear 
to have played a crucial role in convening and facilitating collaboration. 
In some cases, this role has been played by local WIBs and their staff. 
This was the case, for example, in the Biotech Workforce Network de-
scribed earlier. In other cases, this role has gone to a variety of private 
organizations, such as the ones that led projects in the SEI. 
Recruitment, Screening, and Engagement 
Success in recruiting and enrolling participants must be achieved in 
order to reach customized training initiatives’ goals, namely 
• meeting employers’ needs—that is, increasing their supply of 
qualified workers and improving the skill levels of new and 
incumbent workers; 
• meeting worker needs—identifying those needs and improving 
their employability and ability to advance in the labor market; and 
• building the capacity of training partnerships to sustain them-
selves—that is, to continue to reliably identify and enroll 
qualified, motivated students for customized training after gov-
ernment or foundation funding is gone. 
The findings of both the SED and the foundation-funded SEI initia-
tive show that success in recruitment and enrollment has been a major 
challenge. The evaluations of both these multisite projects indicate that 
recruitment success has required collaboration between employers and 
training programs to ensure that employers’ specific enrollment quali-
fications are met. The recruitment of disadvantaged and low-income 
workers has been especially challenging, leading evaluators in the Work 
Advancement and Support Center Demonstration (WASC) to conclude 
that it requires substantial staff and funding resources.12 
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Keeping participants engaged, especially disadvantaged and low-
income workers, also has been challenging for training programs. Many 
successful programs, such as the Center for Employment Training 
(CET), have required a commitment from trainees to remain engaged 
throughout training. Retaining participants who needed income to sup-
port themselves and their families during training presents obvious 
difficulties. Indeed, WASC evaluators have suggested that tangible in-
centives are a potentially effective way to maintain engagement. 
Curriculum Development and Use 
Similarly, success in developing and using an appropriate sector-
driven training curriculum is necessary for meeting employer needs 
(increased skilled worker supply and improved skill levels) as well 
as the needs of workers (to improve their employability and chances 
for advancement). Past research suggests the potential for consider-
able success on this important task, although this potential success is 
qualified by the fact that most SED, SEI, and other initiatives built on 
past training efforts in the same sectors, making only modest curricular 
modifications based on employers’ input. In such cases, the curriculum 
also can draw on national standards and established academic materi-
als. Success is less assured when new sectors are targeted or when new 
skills within a given sector are taught, and substantial collaboration be-
tween employers and training programs may be needed in these cases. 
Another issue regarding curriculum is the extent to which basic 
skills instruction should be integrated into the training. This is a com-
mon element to the three SEI sites shown to have produced significant 
impacts on employment and earnings. It also is one of the notable 
components of the CET model, which achieved noteworthy success in 
preparing low-income participants for jobs with partnering employers.13 
Placement and Support Services 
Another key task if programs are to be successful is supporting par-
ticipants during and after training. During training, this may involve 
tutoring and/or supplemental instruction (provided in most interven-
tions described in earlier sections of this paper), providing counseling, 
mentoring, and/or coaching (as in the WASC project), and providing 
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assistance with transportation, child care, books and supplies, and other 
participant needs (as in most projects described earlier). Often, too, 
counselors or advisors in strong programs have worked with partici-
pants to develop plans specifying participation expectations along with 
the supports that programs will provide. 
After training, it is crucial to program success to get participants 
into appropriate jobs that utilize the training they have received. Par-
ticular sites in the various programs discussed in this paper used a range 
of specific approaches to achieving this objective. For example, one 
SEI site (in Milwaukee) often did not start particular training classes 
until employers made firm hiring commitments, so the movement of 
trainees into specific jobs was predetermined. In the welfare-to-work 
site in Portland, a highly effective job placement effort was used to 
reach this goal. 
Ideally, the efforts to complete each of these three tasks should 
involve sufficient stakeholder collaboration to ensure that employers’
needs are met and the improvements in training capabilities can be 
sustained. 
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF CUSTOMIzED TRAINING? 
Customized training is intended to have three types of effects: 
impacts on current and new employees, employers, and the broader 
economy (beyond those on immediately affected employees and em-
ployers). The available evidence on these types of effectiveness is 
discussed in turn. 
Current and New Employees 
Finding that individuals who have participated in customized 
training programs have improved their skills, or have experienced in-
creased employment or earnings, does not necessarily indicate that the 
programs were effective. Changes in these outcomes are determined 
by more factors than training programs or even job skills, including 
the labor market conditions in the places where training programs are 
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implemented. Over time, the earnings of individuals tend to increase 
without special training programs as a result of inflation, job experience, 
and other developments. Thus, as indicated in Figure 4.1, outcomes for 
training program participants—especially employment and earnings— 
must be compared to what these outcomes would have been without the 
training. The impacts are estimated as the differences between partici-
pants’ earnings (and other outcomes) and those of a control group or a 
comparison group, which provide the counterfactual (or baseline) for 
impact measurement. 
Until recently, none of the evaluations of customized training pro-
grams had assessed the impacts on individual outcomes. Indeed, many 
Figure 4.1  Factors Determining Effects of Customized Training 
on Employees 
Customized Training Programs 
•	 Targeted sectors 
•	 Features of the programs 
•	 Components of the programs 
•	 Program Implementation 
Context for the Programs 
•	 Labor market conditions 
•	 Trainee characteristics 
•	 Local government policies and rules 
•	 Community characteristics 
Experience of Employees 
•	 Skills of trained employees 
•	 Earnings and fringe benefits of 
trained employees 
•	 Other income and services received 
•	 Taxes paid 
Counterfactual 
•	 Skills without training 
•	 Earnings and fringe benefits without 
training 
•	 Income and services without training 
•	 Taxes paid without training 
Experience of Employees 
Differences between employee 
experience and counterfactual 
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of the evaluations focused on implementation issues and did not mea-
sure individual outcomes over an extended period of time. Earlier this 
year, however, Public/Private Ventures released interim impact findings 
for individuals who participated in customized training offered by three 
project sites in the Sectoral Employment Initiative (SEI). In examin-
ing these results, it is important to remember that there are two forces 
that determine the impacts of any training programs on individuals. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, these are the external context for the training 
programs and the targeting, features, and implementation of the pro-
grams themselves. The characteristics and operational success of the 
programs ultimately determine whether they have impacts given their 
context—that is, the extent to which skills, employment, and earnings 
rise above what they would have been without the programs (indicated 
by the “counterfactual” box in the figure). However, the contextual fac-
tors are important in interpreting those impacts. 
SEI was started in 1998, when nine organizations were formed 
to lead collaborative efforts in workforce development. Six of them 
concentrated on skills training for participants (in the health care, 
manufacturing, paralegal, and information technology industrial sec-
tors) and three engaged in other enterprises. The final report on the SEI 
initiative, which was published last year, contributed to the customized 
training program implementation lessons summarized above (Roder, 
Clymer, and Wyckoff 2008). In 2003, three of the original nine SEI sites 
were selected to be part of the Sectoral Employment Impact Study, also 
funded by the Mott Foundation. The sites are operated by the Jewish 
Vocational Service, a community-based nonprofit in Boston; Per Scho-
las, a social venture in New York City; and the Wisconsin Regional 
Training Partnership, an association of employers and unions based in 
Milwaukee. Each organization has continued to operate its own cus-
tomized training program. While the three sites have not followed a 
common program model, their programs are said to have shared several 
key elements. 
• Employer focus. The programs all have focused on a sector 
or a small set of sectors, have maintained one-to-one contact 
regarding individual firms’ training needs, and have used ad-
ditional strategies to engage the employers. One site used an 
employer/union membership association to organize a group of 
employers from targeted sectors to define common skills needs. 
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• Participant/job matching. Throughout their recruitment, 
screening, and intake processes, the programs have encour-
aged appropriate career matches by participants. They have 
identified individuals with interest in and aptitude for particular 
sectors, and then ensured that these people had the basic skills 
needed for training and met the occupation-specific require-
ments for particular positions (e.g., had a driver’s license for a 
construction job). 
• Skills training. Programs have provided training on the full 
range of skills needed for particular jobs, including technical 
job-specific training, job-readiness workshops geared to par-
ticular industry settings, and basic training in English and math 
skills. The three programs have made all training accessible 
(whether they provided the components themselves or con-
tracted part of the training to other agencies). 
• Encouraging training completion and job success. In addi-
tion to providing training to participants, the programs offered 
supports such as child care, transportation, housing and fi-
nancial assistance, and tutoring. Again, the programs either 
provided these services directly or in partnership with outside 
public or private agencies. 
• Adjusting to changing conditions. All three programs have 
shown flexibility by making changes in occupational or indus-
try focus, their curriculum, the mix of services they provide, 
and/or their collaborations (due to changes in partner agencies 
or funding). 
The evaluation has used an experimental research design to measure 
program impacts on the employment, earnings, and other outcomes for 
participants. (The description and results of the impact study discussed 
in this section come from Maguire et al. [2009]). 
The three programs recruited 1,285 people who met their eligibil-
ity criteria, and the recruits were randomly assigned to the treatment 
group, which could participate in the programs, or to a control group 
that could not receive services from the sites for two years but were 
free to seek services from other programs. Thirty-two percent of control 
group members indeed received other training services. 
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The population served by these programs appears to be at least as 
disadvantaged as that of WIA training programs. Sixty percent of the 
treatment and control group members were African American and 21 
percent were Hispanic. On average, the sample members had worked 
seven months in the year before random assignment and about a third 
were employed at the time of assignment. Nearly 40 percent of the sam-
ple had received public assistance, including a quarter on welfare at the 
time of enrollment, and 5 percent had experienced homelessness in the 
last year. More than a quarter of the sample was under the age of 24 (the 
median participant age was 30). Three-quarters of sample members had 
a high school diploma or a GED, 8 percent had an associate’s degree, 
and 9 percent had a bachelor’s degree. Although there were differences 
across sites, the overall sample included approximately equal numbers 
of women and men. 
Participants in sector-focused training earned 18 percent (about 
$4,500) more than controls during the two-year period covered by the 
study. The positive effect on earnings started in the eighth month fol-
lowing random assignment and continued through the end of the two 
years. Most of the increase in earnings occurred during the second 
year, which is not surprising given that the training was received in the 
first year, limiting participants’ availability for work. The participants 
earned 29 percent more than the controls during the second year (about 
$4,000). 
Part of the observed earnings gain is due to the training interven-
tion’s impact on employment—that is, program participants were more 
likely to find work and worked more consistently. During the two years 
over which they were followed, participants were significantly more 
likely to be employed, and worked on average 1.3 more months than 
controls. In the first several months of the follow-up period, while most 
treatment group members were in training, control group members 
were more likely to be employed. However, by month eight, after most 
participants had finished training, treatment group members were more 
likely to be employed than controls through the remainder of the two-
year period. Employment rates hovered around 70 percent for treatment 
group members in the second year—about 10 percentage points higher 
than the rates for control group members. In addition, participants were 
significantly more likely to work all 12 months in the second year, indi-
cating that the training helped them find steadier employment. 
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As valuable as these new findings are, it is worth noting two of 
their limitations. First, while the features of the three programs seem 
consistent with those of other well-implemented programs in other 
demonstrations, the impact results still cover only three urban programs 
serving only new employees and operating during a period when the 
economy was expanding (2004–2008). Thus, it is not clear whether 
comparable programs would have comparable impacts under differ-
ent external conditions. Second, the impact study has only measured 
the effects of the training treatment as a whole. Thus, the value added 
by particular program components, such as the career-matching focus, 
cannot be established by the impact results. Other information must be 
taken into account in trying to draw inferences about the factors deter-
mining program impacts. 
Employers 
Customized training’s effects on employers include increased out-
put, improved flexibility and team performance, and a better pipeline of 
skilled employees. The boost in output can be generated by improved 
work quality, reduced time per task, improved ability to use new tech-
nology, reduced error rates and waste in production, improved coping 
skills, reduced absenteeism, and other results of the training. The training 
may also increase the task flexibility and team performance of employ-
ees, leading to potential productivity gains beyond those produced by 
the trained worker per se. Training programs that recruit and screen 
potential employees, as well as train them, provide a source of skilled 
employees that reduces a firm’s need to either carry out these tasks on its 
own or to pay a human resources contractor to carry them out. 
For incumbent workers who go through training, improved em-
ployee outcomes—in terms of skills, wages, performance ratings, 
absentee rates, and promotions—provide a reasonable, if imperfect, 
basis for judging the boost in output and profitability of the firms who 
provide the training. The available evidence indicates that this boost is 
substantial, far exceeding the increase in the wages they paid trained 
workers (Lowenstein and Spletzer 1999). Taking account of both this 
productivity gain and the effect of the training on employment (new 
hires and reduced layoffs), Hollenbeck (2008) has estimated that the 
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total return to firms on their investments in incumbent worker training 
is at least 17 percent. 
For new workers, however, the task is harder. In principle, the per-
formance of new workers from customized training programs should 
be compared to the workers who would have been recruited and hired
in the absence of the programs, as shown in Figure 4.2. This is virtually 
impossible to estimate with confidence, however, creating the need to 
use statistical modeling to isolate the value added by training interven-
tions. Also, beyond the productivity and employment gains generated 
for incumbent workers, customized training leads to reduced recruit-
Figure 4.2  Factors Determining Effects of Customized Training
on Employers 
Customized Training Programs 
•	 Targeted sectors 
•	 Features of the programs 
•	 Components of the programs 
•	 Program Implementation 
Context for the Programs 
•	 Labor market conditions 
•	 Trainee characteristics 
•	 Local government policies and rules 
•	 Community characteristics 
Experience of Employers 
•	 Output of trained employees 
•	 Flexibility, safety, and team 
performance of trained employees 
•	 Resources devoted to training, 
screening, and recruitment 
Counterfactual 
•	 Output of untrained employees 
•	 Flexibility, safety, and team 
performance of untrained employees 
•	 Resources that would have gone to 
training, screening, and recruitment 
Effects 
Differences between employer 
experience and counterfactual 
  
132 Long 
ment, screening, and hiring costs for new workers, as well as improved 
performance of the teams to which trained workers are assigned. 
Probably the best available research evidence of the potential value 
of customized training to employers comes from studies of the value of 
in-house training provided by the employers themselves to new employ-
ees—in effect, perfectly customized training. For example, economist 
Lisa Lynch conducted a study almost 20 years ago on the impact of 
private sector training (Lynch 1992). She used data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey youth cohort to determine how individual charac-
teristics, including employment histories, determine the probability of 
receiving training in the private sector; and, in turn, the effect of this 
training on wages and wage growth in young workers. Thus, the trainee 
experience came from survey sample members who had received train-
ing, and the counterfactual was estimated based on outcomes of sample 
members who had not received training and the characteristics of both 
trainees and sample members who had not received training. 
The training studied by Lynch was employer-provided job-specific 
training. Lynch found that this training had a significant impact both on 
wage determination and on the career patterns of individuals. Indeed, 
she found that a year of formal private-sector training had as much ef-
fect on non-college youths (in the form of increased earnings) as did 
a year of college. The return to employers was even greater than the 
return to their employees, because employers and employees shared the 
gains from improved productivity due to training. 
Economist Ann Bartel carried out a study of the relationship among 
training provided by a business to employees, the employees’ subse-
quent wages and job performance, and the full return on investment to 
the company (Bartel 1995). The data came from the personnel records 
of a large manufacturing firm, and covered training provided in 1986– 
1990. The company spent about $1,950 on formal training per employee 
during 1990, which was more than five times the average for U.S. firms 
at that time. The study’s sample included 19,000 observations of the 
firm’s professional employees (about 3,800 per year). The occupations 
were distributed across finance, engineering, manufacturing, marketing 
and sales, information systems, research and development, staff ser-
vices, and support services. The training itself fell into a range of core, 
employee development, and technical categories. The average sample 
member was older, more educated, and had more work experience than 
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most of the individuals who have received the customized training de-
scribed in this chapter.14 
The study’s main findings were that training led to improvements 
in job performance (as measured by performance rating scores), had a 
positive and significant effect on wage growth, and produced a posi-
tive rate of return for the firm. The training significantly increased the 
probability of improved job performance scores in the year following 
training and significantly reduced the probability of score declines. The 
measured effects of training on wage growth were particularly large for 
the employee development and technical training categories, the types 
of training provided to employees who were more comparable to those 
who participated in the demand-led training initiatives discussed in the 
last section of this chapter. Finally, Bartel estimated the short-term rates 
of return to the firm under alternative assumptions about the deprecia-
tion of job skills over time. The estimated return on dollars invested in 
employee development training ranged from 20 to 50 percent, and the 
return for technical training was between 21 and 52 percent. 
Economy 
Finally, customized training is thought to have additional effects on 
the broader economy. The effects of skills training programs on market-
place functioning are important, but hard to measure. The importance 
of skills acquired from schools, colleges and universities, training pro-
grams, and other sources is well documented. The pertinent economics 
literature shows, among other things, that differences in labor force 
skills explain most of the variance in economic growth among countries 
(Hanushek and Woessmann 2008). However, isolating the specific con-
tribution of training programs—in particular, customized programs—is 
more difficult.15 Economist David Ellwood assessed the potential ef-
fects as part of a project for the Aspen Institute (Ellwood 2003). He 
argues that the U.S. economy faces a future skilled labor shortage of 
dramatic proportions, and that the United States should address the is-
sue head-on rather than being overtaken by it. Ellwood notes that skills 
training encourages economic growth and that customized training en-
courages particularly rapid growth because it speeds the match between 
the appropriately trained worker and the firm that needs the worker. 
Moreover, he makes the case that neither businesses nor individuals, 
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by themselves, could undertake the job-specific training that is needed. 
Ellwood’s prescription was demand-driven training involving govern-
ment-supported partnerships within specific industries. 
WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL UNANSWERED qUESTIONS? 
This review of what is known about customized training indicates 
that a good deal has been learned from recent research on pertinent 
initiatives, but also that key questions remain both about such train-
ing’s value and about how the training should best be structured. This 
concluding section lists three of the most critical open questions about 
customized training. 
What is the return on investment in customized training? 
As indicated earlier, the direct costs of customized training are 
shared by institutions in the public sector and firms in the private sector. 
Indirect costs are also borne by participants in training, who often must 
forgo employment or other activities while they are enrolled, as well as 
by private firms. A key question, therefore, is: What is the return on the 
investments made by these groups? Ultimately, this is the calculation 
that each group must make in deciding whether customized training is 
a good idea. 
Rigorously measuring the impacts of customized training on earn-
ings, as the SEI study has recently done, provides a good start. Much 
of the value of the training to participants, as well as its opportunity 
costs to them, is captured by these impacts. Also, part of the return 
on investments by public institutions is driven by the program impacts 
on earnings. However, these impacts tell us little about the return on 
investment to employers. As indicated in this chapter, the best current 
evidence on the potential return to employers comes from research on 
the return on training by employers themselves. Evidence regarding the 
actual return to employers would be much better. 
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What is the relationship between program effectiveness
and economic conditions? 
It is important to gain a better understanding of the extent to which 
the effectiveness of customized training depends on local and national 
economic conditions. One way to do this would be to assess customized 
training program impacts in sites facing a range of unemployment levels 
and local labor market circumstances, and to assess the impacts during 
all phases of the business cycle. Another way would be to conduct a 
more systematic assessment of program flexibility and responsiveness 
to changing economic conditions—that is, the ability of programs to 
make appropriate changes in occupational and sector focus, curriculum, 
and services as needed. 
Can effective customized programs be replicated? 
If we find an approach to customized training that is determined to 
be cost-effective, and is effective in a variety of conditions, then it will 
be important to determine whether the training model can be success-
fully replicated. This will be a challenge, as illustrated by the USDOL’s 
experience in trying to replicate the success of CET. Despite receiving 
technical assistance, most sites in the CET replication project were un-
able to establish programs that met several operational criteria; and the 
sites that could not duplicate the CET model were found to produce 
no impacts on employment or earnings. However, if customized train-
ing does prove to be effective, this is undoubtedly a challenge that the
Labor Department, as well as policymakers in other countries, would 
be happy to take on. 
Notes 
1. Because of the increased use of distance learning, there are more and more ex-
amples of partnerships where the training providers and partner firms are not in 
the same geographic area. 
2. Labor market intermediaries serve dual customers: businesses (seeking qualified 
workers) and potential and current workers (seeking jobs or career advancement). 
In addition to local board and community organizations, intermediaries include 
business associations, chambers of commerce, staffing and temporary agencies, 
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community colleges and other educational institutions, and labor unions. For dis-
cussion, see Soukamneuth and Harvey (2008). 
3. A recent survey of more than 200 workforce development organizations in the 
United States provides an overview of the kinds of partnerships and programs that 
currently deliver customized training. The programs targeted approximately 20 
industries (Conway et al. 2007). 
4. By the last quarter of 2008, total trade (exports plus imports) reached 31 percent of 
estimated GDP, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This 
fraction is about three times what it was in 1970. News releases by the BEA can be 
accessed at www.bea.gov/newsreleases.htm. 
5. For example, the BEA has reported that exports of education, financial services, 
telecommunications, professional, and business and technical services grew to 
$224 billion in 2007, more than 50 percent larger than the imports of $144 billion 
in these same service categories during the same year (Koncz and Flatness 2008). 
6. While the average tenure in workers’ longest job rose from 22 years in the late 
1960s to 24 years in the late seventies, it has declined ever since (Stevens 2005). 
7. The survey covered 1,062 establishments with more than 50 employees. Among 
establishments with 500 or more employees, 57 percent had used community col-
leges for training during the last 12 months. For establishments with 100–499 
employees, the figure was 35 percent, while 27 percent of businesses with 50–99 
employees used the colleges (Dougherty 2003). 
8. The Urban Institute and Johns Hopkins University are evaluating this initiative. 
For discussion of the project and its implementation, see Nightingale et al. (2008). 
9. Further details are available at www.workforcealliance.org. 
10. This finding comes from the evaluation of the original initiative, which involved 
nine sites and focused on program implementation and participant outcomes (see 
Roder, Clymer, and Wyckoff [2008]). Based on interim results, three of the origi-
nal sites were chosen to be part of a controlled experiment, which has produced the 
impact results described later in the chapter. 
11. The Portland site in this evaluation, which used an experimental research design, 
achieved substantially larger impacts than the other sites. The program’s educa-
tion, training, and placement services were explicitly designed to generate jobs 
with satisfactory wages, fringe benefits, and good career prospects (see Scrivener 
et al. [1998]). 
12. This was one of the early lessons from the demonstration (see Anderson, Kato, 
and Riccio [2006]). 
13. CET, which stresses hands-on training and maintains close relationships with em-
ployers in the San Jose area, had substantially greater impacts on employment and 
earnings than other sites of two major evaluations (Burghardt et al. 1992; Cave et 
al. 1993). Later, in a 12-site demonstration that sought to replicate CET in other lo-
cations, moderate success was achieved in sites that faithfully implemented CET’s 
model, and no impacts were found in sites that were unable to carry out the model 
(Miller et al. 2005). 
14. For example, the average age of sample members in the SEI impact study was 30, 
compared to 36 in Bartel’s study. Only 18 percent of the SEI sample had education 
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beyond high school, whereas the average sample member in Bartel’s study had 
4.5 years of schooling beyond high school. The SEI sample was made up of new 
employees, while the average sample member in Bartel’s study had worked seven 
years with the firm (Bartel 1995; Maguire et al. 2009). 
15. It is clear that additional vocational education or training—measured in months 
or credentials received—increases the productivity of workers (measured by earn-
ings) (Bailey, Kienzl, and Marcotte 2004). Distinguishing the value added by par-
ticular types of vocational training is empirically difficult. 
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One-Stop Management and
the Private Sector
David Heaney 
MAXIMUS, Inc. 
The implementation of WIA fostered the development of a wide 
range of solutions to address the problems of unemployment and/or un-
deremployment among selected demographic groups including youth, 
adults, dislocated (redundant) workers, the disabled, older adults, veter-
ans, and, in some cases, those families receiving public assistance under 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Many 
of the employment programs operating through One-Stop Career Cen-
ters have enjoyed considerable success. Their success, at least in part, 
appears owing to operational designs based on certain foundational
principles set out in WIA. The principles place a high premium on 
employer-driven strategies and integrated service delivery through co-
locating key providers under one roof. The act envisioned a nationwide 
network of One-Stop Career Centers where job seekers and employers 
could access all required resources in a single location. A key feature of 
successful programs has been their capacity to effectively leverage the 
strengths of this diverse set of partner organizations operating side by 
side. Still, while many achieved impressive outcomes under this design, 
many others found the new model unwieldy, difficult to manage, and 
driven by a disproportionate focus on business. 
The foundational principles embodied in the legislation are intend-
ed to be institutionalized in the overall design of all program operations. 
A key differentiator between WIA and its predecessors is the role that 
business is intended to play in both the creation and ongoing man-
agement of the One-Stop delivery system. The One-Stop system was 
intended to be and is often described as “employer driven.” Employ-
ers, it is reasoned, understand a community’s existing and emerging 
labor market conditions, occupational needs, and skill sets required 
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for in-demand jobs. The employer is, after all, the consumer who hires 
well-equipped job seekers. Employer need should, therefore, define 
and determine the content of education and training programs to pre-
pare and equip the workforce. By designing a system around employer 
needs, WIA intended to create a business-friendly system. 
Under the current operating model, the management of One-Stop 
centers may be competitively procured, which has spawned the growth 
of a new, albeit small, industry of One-Stop operators. These manage-
ment entities are responsible for organizing and managing 12 mandated 
and colocated partners, together with various voluntary partners into a 
seamless employment service system, which will meet specific perfor-
mance levels established by the Workforce Investment Board (WIB). 
Managing entities come from the private for-profit, nonprofit, and 
public sectors. After some 10 years, the number of private, for-profit 
companies competing for One-Stop management opportunities has no-
ticeably dwindled to a relatively small group. Managing entities, for 
the most part, appear to remain the same from procurement to procure-
ment. The reasons for this vary and will be discussed in this chapter. 
However, the impact of this withdrawal has limited competition, and 
perhaps innovative and more effective approaches to achieving better 
employment outcomes in more efficient and cost-effective ways. 
The impact of minimal competition on service delivery arguably 
encourages maintenance of the status quo and stimulates little in the 
way of novel approaches. I personally have spoken with executives 
from some of the nation’s largest WIBs, who express concern about the 
diminishing number of qualified bidders competing in their procure-
ments. Some critics of the workforce investment system have called for 
the elimination of competitive procurements altogether as a means to 
acquire workforce services. 
The discussion presented in this chapter assumes that open and fair 
competition between a diverse set of qualified bidders supports con-
tinuous improvement, high performance, and increased transparency. 
Whether limited participation by the private sector has, in fact, inhibited 
the creation of more effective programs cannot be established without 
careful evaluation of empirical data. Overall, this paper aims to encour-
age the development of policies which facilitate procurement processes 
and operational models designed to attract a greater number and more 
diverse set of qualified bidders from all sectors. With this in mind, I 
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have attempted to identify some of the factors contributing to the pri-
vate sector’s ambivalence toward the WIA market in the United States. 
The aim here is to identify several significant practices that discour-
age private sector participation in procurements to manage One-Stop 
centers and to briefly comment on what this has meant to the industry. 
Finally, I will discuss alternative approaches which WIA reauthoriza-
tion will need to address to support the engagement and retention of a 
diverse network of providers. 
The perspective offered here is one derived principally from ob-
servation of many existing WIA-funded One-Stop operations, as well 
as discussions with a wide range of leaders from the field over the past 
decade. The perspective I bring is that of an executive from a large for-
profit organization that views the current WIA market as one fraught 
with risk, and in this regard, not viable from a business perspective. 
Therefore, I have identified selected changes to the current WIA system 
that could increase market desirability, support increased achievement 
of performance outcomes, and promote greater efforts to economize 
through efficiency. 
PRIVATE SECTOR, THIRD SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR:
THE CHALLENGE OF STEREOTYPES
Right or wrong, there exists in every community a tension between 
business and government. Generally, business wants as little gov-
ernment interference in its affairs as possible. “Why would I go to a 
government agency for help with my business when their interference 
always makes my life more difficult?” one business owner asked in a 
discussion regarding WIA employer services. Again, right or wrong, 
third-sector (nonprofit) organizations are commonly perceived as indif-
ferent to the “bottom line” and more focused on job seeker services than 
employer hiring needs. And finally, the private, for-profit sector is often 
viewed as indifferent to everything but the bottom line. 
The overall aim of keeping the private sector engaged is to sup-
port competition that improves quality of service while creating greater 
economies and efficiencies for the government and taxpayer. The same, 
of course, might be argued in favor of retaining third-sector, organized 
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labor, and public sector approaches—all of which bring unique solu-
tions that offer varying degrees of value. Setting aside stereotypes and 
promoting policies that encourage a diverse pool of bidders supports 
the government’s goal of obtaining “best value.” 
WHO DRIVES THE SYSTEM? 
Under WIA, emphasis has been directed toward creating and oper-
ating an employer-driven system. The thinking is based on the notion 
that business leaders best understand the unique emerging labor market 
needs of the communities in which they operate. Many WIBs appear 
to have been unclear, or had only a vague sense of what “employer 
driven” meant and the changes it was intended to facilitate that dif-
ferentiated WIA from its predecessor, the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA). Following the passage of WIA, some WIBs actively engaged 
employers to help reshape their service delivery models, while others 
argued that greater emphasis should be placed on job seeker needs. 
A broad look at the changes in the workforce delivery system sug-
gests that relatively few WIBs have truly created an employer-driven 
service delivery system, instead doing what long-time providers have 
frequently done—build a service-rich environment to meet job seeker 
desires even when these are at odds with the realities of the existing 
market. A recent conversation with the labor commissioner from a Mid-
west state illustrated the challenge of supporting an employer-driven 
system. She explained that WIA’s promotion of customer choice as a 
guiding principle has unintentionally created an opportunity for un-
necessarily expensive training providers to exploit job seeker interests 
while turning a blind eye to employer hiring needs. Job seekers are en-
couraged to assert their right to choose, too often selecting trainers with 
the best television commercial but poor employment placement rates. 
Visits to scores of major One-Stops further illustrate this point; 
while job seeker resource centers appear consistently active, many 
newly created Employer Services Business Centers, designed to serve 
employers, remain underutilized. It is true that some employers have 
taken advantage of One-Stop hiring assistance, but it is also true that 
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many WIA industry observers worry that such employers often offer 
unsustainable employment. 
Striking a balance between employer- and job-seeker-focused ser-
vice delivery models seems obvious but has proven difficult to achieve. 
Such a balance requires the right mix of stakeholder partners engaged in 
service delivery. To be useful to a broader range of employers, the One-
Stop Employer Services function may require a level of sophistication 
on par with services provided by human resources, outplacement, staff-
ing, and consulting firms. This perhaps means better resourcing and 
significantly greater efforts to reach the large number of employers 
who do not use and indeed remain unaware of the services and benefits 
offered by the nation’s One-Stop Career Center network. Policies to sup-
port business participation, such as requiring the board to be weighted
in favor of business leadership, have done relatively little to promote 
greater interest in the One-Stops’ capacity to help build and effectively 
serve their labor force. 
As it stands, to portray the current workforce system as employer 
driven appears inaccurate. WIA policy needs to underscore the inter-
dependent relationship between employer and job seeker. While WIA
policy should clearly reflect a commitment to both job seeker and em-
ployer interests, to meet the needs of both groups, it too should facilitate 
the creation of service models to capture the interests of a wider range 
of providers who possess the appropriate expertise to meet the needs of 
the community’s business leadership. 
FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS: ADMINISTRATIVE
AND PROFIT CAPS
The inclusion of private for-profits in the management of any 
public program inevitably raises concerns about whether profit is ap-
propriate when using public monies and, if it is, what constitutes a fair 
and reasonable profit. The ambivalence felt by many WIBs is expressed 
in policies that include profit caps, holdbacks, administrative caps, and 
disproportionate risk and reward ratios. 
Administrative costs are typically capped at what are often per-
ceived to be unrealistic levels, forcing many organizations to broaden 
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the interpretation of what can be classified as a program cost. In some 
ways related to stereotyping, local policy restrictions placed on a One-Stop 
operator’s ability to earn profit and the imposition of administrative 
caps reflect a fundamental and pervasive ambivalence regarding the 
private sector’s role in the workforce delivery system. On the one hand, 
WIA legislation was intended to engage the private sector in a leader-
ship role, mandating that the majority of WIB members be from the 
private sector. On the other hand, policies that cap both profit and ad-
ministrative costs can, and do, discourage private sector interest in WIA
opportunities. 
Caps on profit and administrative costs are intended to protect the 
public’s interest by requiring contractors to allocate a specified per-
centage of the total contract value to direct service. However, when 
profit rules are viewed within the context of the growing demand for 
outcome-based, pay-for-performance contracting, risk and reward are 
generally disproportionate. In other words, if profit is capped at 6–8 
percent (which it commonly is) and is contingent upon meeting all per-
formance targets, then failure to meet targets should, too, be capped at 
6–8 percent, instead of not compensating a provider at all. 
Alternatively, if the contracting agency is concerned with not sim-
ply achieving but exceeding specific outcomes, creating a much broader 
upside-downside spread is likely to drive greater innovation and better 
outcomes. There is no reason to believe that highly prescriptive rules 
regarding administrative and profit limits have led to better outcomes. 
Instead, such restrictions may have limited competition and squelched 
innovative approaches by shrinking the pool of potential providers. 
Unrealistically low administrative caps force bidders to “back into” 
their solutions. Instead of allocating time and necessary resources based 
on the best solution to meet contract targets, solutions must be tailored 
to conform to the required allocation formula. Artificial allocation for-
mulas result in decreased transparency and accountability. 
It also seems appropriate to ask what end is actually served by im-
posing caps. When an organization purchases, say, computer hardware 
through a competitive procurement, “best value” is generally tied to 
some combination of best product and best price. A government agency 
does not make a decision to buy 100 personal computers on the basis of 
administrative costs and profit margins associated with the production 
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of those 100 PCs. Rather, the decision is based on the quality of the 
product, available funding, and the price. 
If performance measures are carefully constructed, risk and profit 
limits can both be more expansive. Allowing bidding organizations to 
design and price their proposals based on their risk/reward tolerance 
levels should be explored. Such freedom creates a more diverse col-
lection of bidders. At one end of the spectrum are entrepreneurs and 
risk takers whose solutions are designed to exceed targets, and at the 
other are those whose tolerance for risk is low but whose performance 
is deemed adequate to meet performance targets. 
WIA rules might better reflect a commitment to both business and 
job seeker by seeking providers who will raise the bar for performance, 
quality, economy, and efficiency. The good news is these improvements 
can be accomplished without additional funds, but simply with fewer 
prescriptive accounting rules. Transparency and accountability are not 
compromised when actual administrative costs are reported, and profit 
earned is a consequence of performance against targets. 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT
The diverse array of WIA partners creates significant challenges. 
The composition of the local WIBs requires participation by represen-
tatives from a wide range of stakeholder groups, including business, 
labor, education, economic development, each of the One-Stops, and 
community-based organizations. At least 51 percent of the board must 
be comprised of representatives from the business community. Addi-
tionally, the board chair must be from the business community. There 
are, of course, trade-offs inherent in such broad representation. Pre-
dictably, the ability to make decisions on urgent matters is frequently 
achieved through consensus and compromises that ultimately please no 
one. Critics complain WIA representation requirements create an un-
necessarily large, unwieldy, and ineffective board. The ideal of broad 
representation, collaborative program design, and consensus-driven 
leadership has created still more unintended consequences that impact 
participation, especially among those who derive no clear return on 
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their investment of time and energy. This is particularly important at the 
local level where local board decisions directly impact service delivery. 
The managing entity responsible for day-to-day oversight of the 
local One-Stop Career Center struggles with the same challenges posed 
by the broad participation requirements at the WIB level. The require-
ment for colocation of different agencies and organizations serving the 
same customer is intended to promote better service through easy ac-
cess to services. However, both strategic and day-to-day operational 
management is a complicated affair where building consensus among 
mandated partners can make even relatively simple organizational deci-
sions difficult. Without clear lines of authority, especially as they relate 
to uniform standards for quality, customer service, and performance 
management, the managing partner absorbs all risk without a defined 
path for mitigation. This is a particular challenge to for-profits where 
some portion of total revenue may be tied to the achievement of targets. 
The degree to which One-Stop partners organize around common 
goals with a clear management structure directly impacts the capacity to 
generate revenue. Still, disparity in compensation schemes, work hours, 
and organizational cultures cannot all be resolved by institutionalizing 
the managing partner’s authority. Generally, because risks and rewards 
tied to revenue cannot be flowed down to all partner organizations, the 
managing partner, whose earnings and profits are tied to performance, 
bears the brunt of responsibility. Failure or success regarding target 
achievement simply does not drive performance with the same degree 
of urgency as when targets are tied to revenues. The policy challenge 
here is daunting. How, or should, policy align the interests of all par-
ticipating partner organizations so that risks and rewards are genuinely 
shared? How, for example, can incentive and bonus programs, generally 
an integral component of successful for-profit approaches, be equitably 
implemented across multiple organizations providing integrated ser-
vices under one roof? How does a One-Stop offer extended hours (often 
a contractual requirement) when labor contracts and organizational pol-
icies make it difficult, if not impossible, to meet this obligation? 
While current policy has created challenges for both WIBs and 
comprehensive One-Stops, failure to preserve broad representation at 
the state, local, and One-Stop levels would be regressive and coun-
terproductive. Clarification of the One-Stop managing entity’s role as 
managing partner with authority to make decisions regarding perfor-
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mance, quality, and corrective actions would facilitate the development 
of a more seamless service delivery model as was envisioned by the 
WIA legislation. Additionally, identification of best practices regarding 
effective governance and management models, including targeted tech-
nical assistance for new managing partners, will help generalize more 
successful approaches. 
PROGRAM SEqUENCE
Rules that leave the provider with little discretionary authority un-
dermine creative engagement of both job seekers and employers. The 
WIA requirement of sequencing movement through the “core, inten-
sive, individual training account” tiers frustrates all parties who may 
clearly discern a path that leads to a desired outcome. Policies that offer 
providers greater discretionary authority regarding the level of service 
appropriate to an individual customer will improve the pace of reem-
ployment by allowing direct service providers to route customers in a 
timely fashion to the best resource(s) available. Limitations on discre-
tion and the corresponding development of prescriptive procedure is 
designed to ensure that services are fairly, equitably, and consistently 
provided. If the provider and the customer’s interests are aligned, allow-
ing greater levels of discretion supports seeking the most direct route 
to most favorable outcome. Limitations on discretion in favor of highly 
prescribed program sequences are generally most critical when a pro-
vider is able to achieve some benefit by acting in a manner not in accord 
with the customer’s best interest. As long as both parties’ interests are 
aligned, allowing greater discretionary authority encourages providers 
to redesign cumbersome business processes to offer improved customer 
service and capture greater efficiencies and cost savings. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Performance measures are designed to reflect whether a job seeker
has succeeded in upgrading skills, securing employment, retaining a 
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job, and progressing satisfactorily along a determined career track. 
Many critics have described these performance measures as burden-
some, arguing they should be streamlined. From the perspective of 
managing operations, timely availability of performance data is most 
critical. Major gaps between a key event and the provider’s ability to 
track that event have dramatic performance implications. The stakes 
are still greater where provider payments are tied to measures that are 
reported months after the fact. When a provider is unable to obtain in-
formation required to manage the achievement of successful outcomes 
tied to payment, the program is fatally flawed. Reexamining the model 
to determine where the fix must be applied needs to be embodied in pol-
icy change, the performance measure, how the data element is captured, 
who captures the data element, or the means for reporting critical data. 
An equally formidable challenge pertains to vaguely defined rules 
that apply to program enrollment. Provider performance is measured 
against those whom the provider enters into the performance denomina-
tor. It is well-known that the “gatekeeper” role played by the One-Stop 
managing entity is essential to meeting targets. Program designs that 
keep those with more complex needs out of the denominator undermine 
the overall purpose of the One-Stop. On the other hand, an employer 
driven approach is clearly at odds with enrolling ill-equipped job seekers. 
Performance measures need to reflect enrollment in distinct service-
level tracks. Additionally, policies should establish standardized assess-
ment tools designed to help determine the most appropriate service-
level track for job seeker customers. The Australian Department of 
Education, Employment, and Workplace Relations, which administers 
similar employment programs, has devised such a tool and deployed 
it nationwide. The level of service is determined by an independently 
administered assessment. Providers are paid according to a payment 
schedule designed to reflect the level of effort. An appeals process 
allows the provider to present evidence to demonstrate that the initial 
level of service determination may have been inadequate. The adoption 
of a similar approach would both support better service and offer more 
useful data. It also may help better define the role of certain upfront 
services as distinct and independent from postenrollment activities. 
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ConClusion 
The foundational principles upon which the workforce delivery 
system in the United States is built are sound, but large-scale efforts 
to operationalize them are flawed. There is a significant disconnect be-
tween the aim of creating a business-driven One-Stop system and a 
procurement process and service delivery model that creates an envi-
ronment in which it is difficult to be even marginally successful. Subtle 
prejudices are played out in ways that inhibit a more successful inte-
gration of mandated and voluntary partners. Fiscal rules and practices 
frustrate participation by for-profits and perpetuate the problems cre-
ated by a limited pool of qualified bidders. Governance, management, 
and operations in general are heavily prescriptive and at odds with the 
common practice adopted by most government agencies over the past 
decade of paying for performance and tying profit to target achieve-
ments. Having said that, pay for performance schemes should be linked 
to outcomes only where operators have the flexibility to refine existing 
approaches as they go and change out those that simply do not work in 
favor of more effective practices. Performance measures need to take 
account of the entire population requiring service and provide meaning-
ful information for continuous improvement. 
While there exist many challenges to keeping the private sector en-
gaged in ongoing One-Stop center management procurements, a major 
redesign would be significantly less productive than relatively minor 
changes to existing program rules. WIA included language requiring 
a comprehensive evaluation by 2005. Regrettably, this did not happen. 
The result is that relatively little information exists on what employment 
and training services really work and for whom. Reauthorization of 
WIA, therefore, should proceed with some degree of caution. Proposals 
that call for dismantling or radically redesigning the workforce delivery 
system without such an evaluation appear reckless and conflict with 
the current administration’s promotion of evidence-based practices.
Rather, continuous improvement practices (a concept that lies at the 
heart of WIA approaches) suggest the opportunity still exists to review 
the evidence we have, to highlight best (and worst) practices, to create 
additional forums such as this conference for the exchange of ideas, and 
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to make an intentional effort to reengage the business community at all 
levels through easily improved policies derived from the right princi-
ples that support the evolution of a stronger workforce delivery system. 
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Billions of public and private funds support short-term education 
and training for millions of Americans seeking jobs or advancement 
in positions they already hold. These training programs, delivered by 
thousands of nonprofit and for-profit education and training institutions 
throughout the United States, are critical components of the nation’s 
workforce development system and especially for services funded by WIA. 
WIA customers who receive individual training account (ITA) 
credit to pay for short-term occupational training are given wide lati-
tude in choosing training providers. WIA requires that states develop a 
process for identifying qualified providers who are eligible to provide 
training to these job seekers, based on the employment experiences of 
past students. Despite the obvious appeal of such policies, most states 
and communities have struggled to implement performance reporting 
systems. 
While a nationwide system of disseminating training outcomes is 
yet to be achieved, several states have successfully implemented ro-
bust reporting systems. This chapter examines the experiences of these 
states as well as the barriers to wider adoption of a more transparent 
and reliable reporting system. It also offers observations and recom-
mendations for improving outcome reporting on education and training 
programs that are applicable to the management and assessment of 
training programs. 
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THE VALUE OF OUTCOME REPORTING ON
JOB TRAINING PROGRAMS
In the United States, short-term occupational training for un-
employed and underemployed job seekers is delivered through a 
decentralized and wide array of education and training institutions, 
including two- and four-year colleges, vocational schools, community-
based nonprofits, and for-profit/proprietary schools. It is estimated that 
more than 667,000 credentials are awarded each year by thousands of 
trainers who offer thousands of courses in occupations ranging from 
commercial truck driver training to home heath care aides (National 
Center for Education Statistics n.d.). 
The costs of occupational training are paid by students with their 
own money, by federal student loan programs, by employers, and by 
government programs, such as WIA, that furnish grants or vouchers 
individuals may use to obtain training. Many of these same institutions 
also deliver longer-term education and training programs for students 
and adult workers who desire or need new skills and credentials in order 
to obtain jobs or be promoted to a new position. 
Oversight of publicly funded education and training institutions is 
handled by dozens of federal and state government agencies. One of 
their principal responsibilities is to protect students from fraud, such as 
when providers offer poor training. To meet their responsibilities, state 
governments, which shoulder the greatest burden for oversight, have 
relied on licensing training suppliers. These processes typically involve 
an assessment or self-assessment of the provider’s capabilities, includ-
ing their financial statements, and a review of their facilities and the 
intructors’ credentials. After receiving approval to accept public funds, 
education and training institutions usually have limited reporting ob-
ligations to public agencies. Students or employers may subsequently 
lodge complaints with the regulators, but enforcement actions, such as 
revocation of a license or denial of public funds, are rare. 
Licensing and accreditation procedures seldom consider the ef-
fectiveness of the training delivered by those organizations. A school 
might, for example, continue training truck drivers, cooks, or nurses’
aides for years, even if few graduates obtain jobs in those or other oc-
cupations. Moreover, when information on program outcomes, such as 
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job placements or wages earned, is made available, it is supplied by 
the training organization rather than by an independent organization or 
government agency. 
WIA contained several provisions that, if implemented, would have 
begun to address these obvious deficiencies. While it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to provide a full explanation for the failure by fed-
eral and state officials to implement these provisions, it is clear that the 
goals of a more transparent and accountable workforce development 
system were never achieved. Education and training establishments and 
their trade organizations marshaled opposition to performance report-
ing and undermined or quashed implementation throughout the country. 
Nevertheless, several state governments, profiled in this chapter, 
forged ahead and developed comprehensive outcome reporting sys-
tems. While the specific outcome reporting schemes varied, these states 
typically were able to disseminate detailed information at the program 
and institutional level on the following three measures: 
1) Program completion, including the percentage of students who 
complete the program, the costs per completion, and the aver-
age amount of time to completion; 
2) Educational outcomes, including the percentage of individuals 
who obtain an industry-certified credential, certificate, license, 
or other indicator of job readiness; and 
3) Employment outcomes, including the percentage of completers 
who obtain employment, who obtain employment in a related 
field of work, and the average wages earned by completers. 
These states envisioned benefits for four key audiences: 1) resource 
allocators, 2) regulators, 3) individuals in need of training, and 4) em-
ployers who hire graduates and often purchase training services for 
their employees. Regulators could use outcome reports when making li-
censing decisions, ensuring that only those suppliers with proven track 
records would be permitted to continue to provide training. Policymak-
ers could use outcome data when deciding which training providers 
should receive government funding and for which training programs. 
Individuals seeking training to obtain a job or get a better one could 
benefit by knowing how well institutions delivered training and the ex-
tent to which graduates succeeded in the labor market. Informed about 
program outcomes, individuals would also be better able to determine 
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whether their investment of time and money would be worthwhile. Fi-
nally, performance information on trainers could be used by employers 
to inform hiring decisions or decide where to invest funds for upgrading 
the skills of their workforces. 
ELIGIBLE TRAINING PROVIDER PROVISIONS OF WIA 
WIA provided $2 billion in funding in program year 2008 to states 
to help unemployed and underemployed adults find jobs. The law also 
encourages state and local governments managing WIA to fund training 
programs for qualified individuals who need additional skills to obtain 
jobs. In program year 2007, 147,000 adults obtained such services un-
der WIA. 
Another of WIA’s principal goals was to increase customer choice 
for individuals seeking training. Under the law’s predecessor, JTPA, 
training services were typically obtained directly by local government 
agencies that selected both occupational concentrations and service 
providers. Each year, local workforce program managers would esti-
mate demand for categories of training and select a provider to offer 
those services. Local government administrators purchased a set num-
ber of training slots and throughout the year referred individuals to 
those programs. Often these arrangements led to overconsumption of 
some training and lack of flexibility for funders, students, and employ-
ers. Consumer protection—and common sense—demanded that job 
seekers and program managers be afforded more flexibility and better 
information when choosing training options. 
WIA placed greater emphasis on informed customer choice. In-
dividuals who qualified for financial assistance for training (usually 
long-term unemployed and/or low-income applicants) may receive an 
ITA to purchase short-term occupational training. Moreover, ITA re-
cipients are given wide latitude in selecting training providers. WIA, 
therefore, required that states, in partnership with local workforce ar-
eas, develop a process for identifying organizations that are qualified to 
offer training, based on the past performance. WIA also required that 
performance information be collected and calculated in a standardized 
manner so as to produce accurate and verifiable information. 
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The creation of a state eligible training provider list (ETPL) in-
troduced the potential for greater accountability by ensuring that ITA
recipients could choose a provider that met or exceeded minimum stan-
dards. The law required that performance outcomes would be calculated 
for individual training programs, recognizing that some providers may 
offer some high-quality programs as well as some of lesser quality. 
WIA mandated that states use past performance information to de-
termine if providers and their individual programs should be included 
on and remain on the ETPL. WIA further required that states and lo-
cal workforce areas include six outcome measures when determining 
which programs and providers would remain on the list (see Table 6.1). 
Three outcome measures must be calculated for those students who re-
ceive training accounts. The other measures were to be calculated for 
all students enrolled in training in any program on the list, regardless of 
the funding source. 
States were also directed to establish a consumer report card (CRC) 
system to disseminate the ETPL to ITA recipients and other interested 
stakeholders, such as Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) that over-
see the state and local programs. States were supposed to report on 
training outcomes (by provider and program) in the CRC system so that 
Table 6.1  Required Measures for the ETPL 
Outcome measures to
be calculated Outcome measures to 
for all students also be calculated for 
Measures regardless of funding ITA recipients only 
Program completion rate Required Required 
Employment at placement Required Required 
Wages at placement Required Required 
Retention in employment
at six months 
Optional Required 
Wages at six months Optional Required 
Rates of licensure or 
certification, attainment 
Optional Required 
of academic degrees or 
equivalents, attainment of 
other measures industry-
recognized of skills 
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individuals who receive an ITA could make an informed choice about 
training providers. 
Initial eligibility. States were expected to collaborate with adminis-
trators of local workforce boards to establish the process for creating the 
initial ETPL. Typically, training providers would submit applications 
to local administrators who would then decide if a provider (and their 
programs) met minimum eligibility requirements. WIA mandated that 
providers submit an “appropriate portion” of the required performance 
measures and that they meet “appropriate levels of performance.” If the 
provider and the program met these requirements, they were included 
on the state’s ETPL. 
Subsequent eligibility. WIA mandated that states create a process 
for determining if providers and their programs should remain on the 
ETPL. However, local WIBs were also permitted to set their own stan-
dards, which were not to be lower than the state’s standards. States and 
local WIBs were given significant latitude in developing and imple-
menting these standards. 
Obtaining Performance Data 
WIA did not specify how training providers, states, or local work-
force areas would obtain the needed performance information on 
training providers and programs. USDOL regulations governing WIA
merely said that performance data must be verifiable and reliable. How-
ever, the regulations noted that that states could either require providers 
to calculate outcomes themselves (through surveys and follow-up tele-
phone calls to past students) or utilize administrative data, such as 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records. 
Self-reported data from providers. One option for collecting in-
formation was to require training providers to assemble it. Some 
information, such as completion rates, may be available to providers. 
Often education and training institutions help place students into jobs 
and gather information on entering wages or salaries. However, most 
trainers have little or no contact with students after they are placed in 
their first jobs. As a result, providers would have to contact students by 
telephone, e-mail, or mail to inquire about postprogram employment 
and wages. 
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Use of administrative data. States could also use administrative 
data to calculate outcomes for providers and programs. States routinely 
collect quarterly earnings information for employed individuals when 
their employers pay their UI payroll taxes. Data collected by a state’s 
UI Wage Record Interchange System (WRIS) provide employment 
and earnings data of all individuals employed in the 90 percent of jobs 
covered by UI. By matching the Social Security numbers in the WRIS 
with the Social Security numbers of program participants, this method 
can be used to calculate performance outcomes for government-funded 
workforce services. States and local WIBs are also required by WIA
to use UI wage records in the calculation of employment outcomes for 
performance measures for overall WIA services delivered within a state 
or workforce development jurisdiction such as a large city or county. 
UI wage records, however, were not required for use in the ETPLs 
because they cannot be used unless individual student or participant 
records with Social Security numbers are available. Participant records 
and corresponding Social Security numbers are collected for individu-
als receiving WIA services. However, individual student records are 
not readily available for all training providers. For example, as detailed 
below, some schools either do not collect Social Security numbers from 
program enrollees or are prohibited from sharing them outside their 
agencies. 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
State and local WIBs struggled to implement ETPL and consumer 
report provisions of WIA. In fact, more than 35 states requested and 
received waivers from the Employment and Training Administration. 
These waivers either permitted them to implement only a portion of 
the ETPL requirements or allotted additional time to implement the 
provisions. In the early years of WIA, the USDOL offered technical 
assistance to states to encourage the deployment of effective ETPL sys-
tems, but support from Washington, DC, evaporated during the Bush 
administration. 
The challenges encountered by state agencies responsible for WIA
fell into six broad categories. 
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1) Lack of cooperation of training providers. Training providers 
complained about what they regarded as the onerous and ex-
pensive costs associated with collecting program outcome data. 
Schools claimed that the benefits of being on the ETPL (in po-
tentially increased students and revenue) might not outweigh 
the costs of providing the necessary information to states and 
local WIBs. It is impossible to know if these fears were justi-
fied or if they were just arguments used to stall and frustrate 
implementation. However, some policymakers were persuaded 
that the ETPL provisions would limit choice by restricting the 
number of training options available to individuals. 
2) Problems of using self-reported data. Several states required 
training providers to collect performance information on em-
ployment outcomes through follow-up surveys. This method 
placed heavy financial and administrative burdens on provid-
ers, particularly for those measures that applied to all students, 
regardless of funding source. State and local workforce pro-
gram managers also found it difficult to verify the accuracy 
of reported outcomes from training providers and to ensure 
that every provider collected reliable information from their 
graduates. 
3) Challenges in using administrative data. Other states, including 
those profiled in this chapter, opted to match program partici-
pant data with UI wage records to calculate outcomes. States 
already collect data on students who attend and graduate from 
public colleges and universities and from public vocational 
programs. States also obtain data on individuals funded by 
WIA. Because these datasets usually contain Social Security 
numbers, they can be matched with UI wage records to ob-
tain employment outcomes. However, states do not routinely 
collect student records from for-profit proprietary schools, 
nonprofit organizations, and for noncredit programs at pub-
lic colleges. As a result, states that use administrative data to 
calculate outcomes must require training providers to submit 
student records, including Social Security numbers, to the state, 
so that a match with the UI wage records can be performed.
Some providers, however, are reluctant to report student re-
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cords due to concerns about collecting Social Security numbers 
from students who are worried about data security and privacy. 
In several states, trainers mobilized political supporters to help 
them block the reporting requirements. 
4) Barriers to cooperation of multiple state agencies. Using 
administrative data to calculate outcomes involves shar-
ing administrative data across state departments of labor 
and workforce development, state departments of educa-
tion, and state departments or agencies that oversee higher 
education. Such data sharing can be difficult to accomplish 
given the differing policies and priorities of these agencies.
In addition, the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) limits sharing student data from educational institu-
tions by state education departments. FERPA has also been 
interpreted in some states as prohibiting educational institu-
tions from collecting Social Security numbers from students. 
A number of states have overcome these FERPA restrictions. 
5) Barriers to cooperation between local WIBs and states. The 
WIA legislation and regulations issued by the USDOL identify 
conflicting roles for states and for local boards. For example, 
providers must apply to a local WIB that decides if the pro-
gram meets its minimum standards. If the provider meets these 
standards, it is placed on the statewide ETPL. Training provid-
ers could apply to multiple local boards in the state to be on a 
statewide list that applies to all local boards, thus negating any 
substantive role played by the local WIB. 
6) Comparing programs and providers that serve different labor 
markets and different students. A chief complaint from train-
ing providers is that programs throughout a state often serve 
very different students and labor markets. They argue that these 
differences may profoundly affect employment outcomes. Pro-
grams serving a local area with high unemployment rates may 
have lower employment outcomes than programs serving areas 
with low unemployment. In addition, programs serving students 
with low levels of formal education and limited work histories 
may be less successful than those enrolling people with higher 
levels of formal education and significant work histories. WIA
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required that local WIBs take such factors into account when 
creating the ETPL. However, WIA did not specify the meth-
odologies to be used and the USDOL did not provide further 
guidance or technical assistance to states and local WIBs. 
PROMISING STATE STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING
ETPLS AND CRCS
Despite these challenges, several states, including New Jersey, 
Texas, Washington, and Florida, successfully implemented effective 
ETPL and CRC systems. There is considerable evidence that these 
states and in some cases their local WIBs are using the information to 
guide individuals seeking training as well as state and local officials 
making resource allocation decisions. None of these states have fully 
implemented all of the ETPL provisions of WIA. In fact, Texas has re-
ceived a waiver from the ETA, and New Jersey has recently applied for 
such a waiver to give the state more time to fully implement the ETPL
provisions. 
Nevertheless, states that successfully applied performance report-
ing principles, coupled with the evidence from states that either did not 
try or were less successful, provide valuable lessons for revisions of 
WIA. (See Table 6.2 for an overview of ETPL procedures in the four 
profiled states.) 
Profile of Four State Strategies 
Washington 
The state of Washington has had a commitment to setting perfor-
mance standards for workforce development and training programs 
since 1991, when the state’s Workforce Training and Education Co-
ordinating Board launched a comprehensive planning process that 
included state and local policymakers, education and training provid-
ers, and other stakeholders. In 1996, the state reached agreement with 
all stakeholders that training providers would be held accountable for 
key performance measures, including student completion and employ-
ment outcomes, before the passage of WIA in 1998. 
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As of 2010, Washington State has a fully developed ETPL system 
and set performance standards (see Washington State Workforce Train-
ing and Education Coordinating Board 2007, 2010). More than 400 
training providers and more than 5,000 training programs were on the 
state’s list. 
Washington has made a strong commitment to assisting training 
providers with the ETPL process. The state has created an online system 
that allows training providers to apply to be on the ETPL electronically. 
The state has a designated staff member who assists training providers 
with the Web site and approval process. 
Washington State has also created the Career Bridge Web site 
(www.careerbridge.wa.gov) as the primary online career guidance re-
source in the state. The site, which is heavily marketed by state staff, 
also functions as the state’s CRC system, allowing job training con-
sumers to search for training providers that meet their needs. The Web 
site attracts nearly 9,000 users each month. State officials report that 
training providers value the ability to reach potential students through 
Career Bridge. 
As with New Jersey, Washington State relies exclusively on UI 
wage records for the calculation of outcomes. Community and technical 
colleges submit student records to the State Board for Community and 
Technical Colleges. All other providers, regardless of funding source, 
must submit student records to the state WIB. The state WIB then com-
bines these student record data sets and calculates employment and 
earnings outcomes for providers. 
The state calculates performance outcomes for providers once per 
year. The state has set minimum performance levels for completion 
rate, employment rate, and earnings and uses these levels to determine 
subsequent eligibility. These standards include 
• Completion rate: 20 percent
• Employment rate: 50 percent 
• Earnings: $3,643 in a quarter, or $9.67 per hour. 
To avoid the administration of an additional complex system, local 
WIBs have agreed to allow the state to manage the implementation of 
the ETPL in Washington. Training providers apply to the state WIB for 
inclusion on the ETPL, bypassing the local WIBs. The state sets the 
minimum standards for providers and is responsible for the calculation 
  
 
 
 
 
164
 
Table 6.2  ETPL Procedures in the Four Profiled States 
Source of data for
performance measures Source of student records Application process 
Setting of 
performance standards 
Florida UI wage records Student records reported by 
providers for use in the ETPL. 
Local WIBs accept and review 
all applications from training 
providers. 
State delegates responsibility 
for setting minimum 
standards to local WIBs. 
New Jersey UI wage records Existing student record 
systems for public colleges 
and universities and adult 
vocational schools 
State accepts and reviews 
all applications from training 
providers. 
State has not set standards. 
and 
Student records reported by 
other providers for sole use in 
the ETPL. 
(Local WIBs’ role is limited to 
providing input on state ETPL
procedures.) 
Texas Self-reported data from 
training providers 
or 
Student records voluntarily 
reported by providers that 
choose to use the UI wage 
record match. 
Local WIBs accept and review 
all applications from training 
providers. 
State has set minimum 
standards. 
Local WIBs can establish 
higher standards. 
UI wage records 
Washington UI wage records Existing student record 
systems for community and 
technical colleges 
and 
State WIB accepts and reviews 
all applications from training 
providers. 
State has set minimum 
standards. 
Local WIBs can establish 
higher standards. 
Student records reported by 
other providers for sole use in 
the ETPL. 
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of all outcome measures. Local WIBs can set higher standards for pro-
viders but have chosen not to do so. 
New Jersey 
Since 1998, New Jersey has implemented a robust ETPL and CRC 
system that includes more than 600 education and training providers 
who offer more than 3,000 training programs (see New Jersey Depart-
ment of Labor and Workforce Development n.d.; New Jersey State 
Employment and Training Commission 2009). New Jersey utilizes an 
online application system that enables providers to submit required data 
to the state and facilitates state-level reviews. If approved, the submit-
ted information is immediately uploaded to the state’s CRC system 
(www.njtrainingsystems.org). 
Approved providers are required to cooperate in the calculation of 
employment outcomes for their approved programs. The state uses UI 
wage records as the only means for calculating performance outcomes. 
The John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development at Rutgers 
University calculates measures on a quarterly basis. UI wage records 
from New Jersey are supplemented with UI wage records from other 
states using the WRIS maintained by the USDOL. Only those indi-
viduals who are self-employed or work for religious organizations are 
excluded from these data sets. The Heldrich Center estimates that well 
over 95 percent of training participants are captured using this method. 
New Jersey relies on administrative data from the state’s Com-
mission on Higher Education and Department of Education to gather 
student records from public colleges and universities and from adult 
vocational schools. The state also uses WIA administrative data to sup-
plement these two data sources. Providers that do not already submit 
student records to the state are required to do so through a secure, on-
line reporting system established for the purpose of the ETPL. These 
providers include private, proprietary schools, noncredit programs at 
public colleges, and nonprofit organizations. 
The use of Rutgers University for the matching of student records 
enabled the state to comply with FERPA. Rutgers functions as an agent 
of the state Department of Education and student record data are not 
shared with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, or 
with any other entity. 
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In 2005, New Jersey enacted a law that strengthens the ETPL sys-
tem in the state and expressly requires that all training providers that 
receive state or federal workforce funds must participate in the list 
process and submit required student records to the state. The state De-
partment of Labor and Workforce Development will issue regulations 
in the next few months and plans to fully enforce the provisions of the 
law in the coming year. 
Currently, the state disseminates performance information on ap-
proximately one-third of all training programs on the ETPL, primarily 
due to the lack of the reporting of student records by some providers 
and by the inclusion on the list of some relatively new programs. The 
state plans to aggressively enforce the list regulations in the coming 
year and plans to remove those providers from the list that do not report 
their student records. The state also plans to set performance standards 
for providers and programs. 
In New Jersey, the ETPL process is managed centrally by the State 
Employment and Training Commission (the state WIB) and by the De-
partment of Labor and Workforce Development. Local WIBs provide 
input into the development and implementation of the ETPL but have 
no formal role in its implementation. 
New Jersey has made a significant investment in the creation of the 
ETPL and CRC systems, spending more than $1.5 million over an 11-
year period on the design, implementation, and hosting of the CRC and 
on the calculation of performance measures. The CRC Web site (www 
.njtrainingsystems.org) is a prominent part of the online career guid-
ance and workforce services made available by the state Department of 
Labor and Workforce Development. Current accurate counts and analy-
sis of usage are not available. However, the Web site is widely used in 
the state’s One-Stop Career Centers by individuals who receive an ITA
and by their career counselors. 
Texas 
Texas has also implemented an ETPL system, but unlike New Jer-
sey and Washington, local WIBs play a greater role in the process (Texas 
Workforce Commission n.d., 2009). Trainers apply to local WIBs for 
inclusion on the statewide ETPL using an online application system that 
enables providers to submit required information and facilitates local 
and state level reviews. 
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Local WIBs are allowed to set their own performance standards for 
training providers, as long as they exceed the minimum standards set 
by the state. The state set minimum performance standards for all the 
measures required by WIA. These standards include 
• Completion rate: 60 percent 
• Entered employment rate: 60 percent 
• Average hourly wage at placement: Average entry level wage for 
occupation(s) for which training is provided 
• Average quarterly wage for WIA participants: Average entry
level wage for occupation(s) for which training is provided. 
Unlike New Jersey and Washington, Texas requires that per-
formance data be used to determine if a provider should be included 
initially on the ETPL. As specified by WIA, all higher education in-
stitutions are exempt from the performance requirements during this 
determination of initial eligibility. In Texas, performance measures are 
not used to determine if a provider should remain on the list and the 
state received a waiver from the USDOL to permit this approach. Once 
a provider has been placed on the ETPL, it is not required to submit 
performance information. 
Texas’s trainers may follow two routes for inclusion in the per-
formance requirements of the ETPL. Providers can submit their own 
performance statistics and a description of the methodology used to 
collect the data on the employment and wage information of gradu-
ates. School records, attendance sheets, exit interviews, and follow-up 
letters/calls to graduates and/or employers may be used. Providers that 
are not interested or unable to collect such data can send their student 
records to the state and the state will perform a match with UI wage 
records for a modest fee. The fee structure uses a sliding scale based on 
the quantity of students. This scale begins at a cost of $100 for 150–300 
student records. Local WIBs are responsible to ensure that applications 
submitted are complete and accurate and this includes reported perfor-
mance data. 
When setting performance standards, local WIBs are required to 
take into account local labor market conditions and the characteristics 
of the students served by the program when making final eligibility 
decisions. Workforce boards are expected to ensure center staff provide 
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information to WIA customers on local labor market conditions and oc-
cupations in demand, along with the statewide ETPL, which contains 
relevant information they should use in making their choice of a train-
ing provider. 
Florida 
Florida’s ETPL procedures are built on the infrastructure of the 
Florida Education and Training Placement Information Program
(FETPIP) system (see Agency for Workforce Innovation n.d., 2009). 
The state established the FETPIP system in the early 1990s to produce 
employment outcome information for a wide variety of secondary and 
postsecondary educational institutions in the state. When WIA was 
passed in 1998, the state already had significant experience in using UI 
wage records and student-record data. 
Regional Workforce Boards (Florida’s name for local WIBs) set the 
procedures for initial and subsequent eligibility. However, all Regional 
Workforce Boards must require that training providers participate in 
the FETPIP system. Public education institutions submit their student 
records to the State Department of Education. Private training providers 
must submit their student records to the Commission for Independent 
Education, which regulates these education and training providers. The 
state does not set performance standards and delegates to the Regional 
Workforce Boards the responsibility for setting such standards and for 
removing poor performing providers from the ETPL. 
Factors That Contributed to Implementation of the ETPL 
Washington, New Jersey, Texas, and Florida share several common 
features and provide important lessons for other states, for potential 
revisions to WIA and its regulations. 
1) Administrative data should be used to improve the quality 
and lower the cost of reporting. These four states have a long-
standing commitment to measuring employment outcomes us-
ing UI wage records. Washington and Florida also received 
funding from the USDOL in the late 1990s that assisted them to 
build longitudinal data systems. New Jersey, prior to the passage 
of WIA, had begun the initial steps to create information on the 
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employment outcomes of individuals in training programs. The 
application of UI wage records is an efficient strategy for cal-
culating employment outcomes. Such a strategy minimizes the 
burden on providers, helps ensure that employment outcomes 
are collected and calculated in a standard manner, and limits the 
ability of training providers to manipulate outcomes. 
2) Cooperation/involvement of multiple state agencies with 
strong state leadership. The four profiled states also involved 
multiple agencies in building their ETPL systems. New Jersey, 
for example, uses data from the Department of Education and 
the Commission on Higher Education to calculate employment 
outcomes. In Washington, the State Board for Community and 
Technical Colleges provides student record data to the Depart-
ment of Labor for use in performance outcome calculation. In 
each of these states, a state department or agency plays a cen-
tral role in implementing the ETPL system. Local WIBs are 
given a clearly defined role but the systems are state run and 
largely implemented by the state. 
3) Serving public needs. All four states created user-friendly CRC 
Web sites that enable individuals to explore training options 
and easily identify training programs that meet their needs. 
Washington’s state ETPL is a prominent part of the Career 
Bridge Web site (www.careerbridge.wa.gov), which is the 
state’s primary portal for assisting unemployed individuals and 
state residents to make education and training decisions. The 
New Jersey CRC (www.njtrainingsystems.org) is a prominent 
part of the state’s Department of Labor and Workforce Devel-
opment’s suite of online tools for state residents. 
New Jersey state law also requires that all training providers re-
ceiving state or federal workforce funds be included on the ETPL. By 
expanding the system beyond WIA, the state increased the incentive for 
training providers to participate. 
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IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The experiences of the four profiled states (Washington, New Jer-
sey, Texas, and Florida) demonstrate that the ETPL and CRC provisions 
of WIA can be implemented in a cost-effective manner and yield ben-
efits to various audiences, including regulators, resource allocators, 
students, and employers. As federal officials consider amendments to 
WIA and other programs funding education and training programs, sev-
eral recommendations should be carefully considered. 
1) Broaden ETPL and CRC requirements beyond WIA and apply 
them to One-Stop partner programs, or at least to other pro-
grams administered by the ETA. WIA represents a significant 
investment in training resources, but other One-Stop partner 
programs, such as Trade Adjustment Assistance, also spend 
significant funds to support training. To broaden the incentive 
to providers to participate in the ETPL process, the ETPL sys-
tem should at least apply to all training funding overseen by 
the ETA. 
2) Assign a stronger role to states in developing the ETPLs and 
CRCs. Given the complexity in implementing such systems, 
states must play a central coordinating role in developing and 
implementing performance reporting. In addition, training pro-
viders rarely serve only one local workforce area. Multiple 
processes for each local area only increase the burden on train-
ing providers. 
3) Connect ETPLs to state efforts to build longitudinal data systems 
for education. The U.S. Department of Education is providing 
significant funding to states through the American Reinvest-
ment and Recovery Act to expand longitudinal data systems 
for education. A competitive solicitation, with applications due 
in November 2009, placed a new emphasis on connecting sec-
ondary education data with postsecondary education data and 
employment outcomes. The Department of Labor should work 
with the Department of Education to assist states that secure 
funding to connect these efforts to ETPL systems. 
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4) Provide clear federal guidance to states on the application of 
FERPA through a collaboration of the Departments of Labor 
and Education. FERPA has hindered the ability of several states 
to implement ETPL systems. In some cases, it has been inter-
preted as prohibiting state education departments and individual 
providers from sharing student record data for the calculations 
of outcomes for the ETPL. Some states have developed proce-
dures to share data that they believe meet their interpretation of 
the requirements of FERPA.  
5) Offer competitive funding for states to develop the infrastructure 
to build robust ETPL systems and CRC systems. The USDOL
should consider providing funding to states on a competitive 
basis to assist them to develop ETPL systems. In the early years 
of WIA implementation, the Labor Department funded the ITA/ 
ETPL demonstration, which provided funds of up to $500,000 
on a competitive basis to six local WIBs and to seven states to 
assist in the development of these systems. These grants were 
the subject of an evaluation report completed in 2004 (Social 
Policy Research Associates 2004). 
6) Provide technical assistance to states. The USDOL provided 
technical assistance to states on ETPL issues in the first few 
years following the enactment of WIA. Technical assistance is 
needed to fully develop ETPL systems. 
7) Governance issues in structure of accountability. As currently 
structured, state and local WIBs include significant representa-
tion from training agencies that may thwart the collection and 
dissemination of performance outcome data. In the revisions to 
WIA, Congress should consider eliminating them from mem-
bership on boards that influence resource allocation and ETPL
and CRC policies. Alternatively, Congress might require that 
the ETPLs and CRCs be developed and implemented by in-
dependent agencies, in the same manner that many state and 
federal programs require independent financial audits. 
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The Challenges of
Measuring Performance 
William S. Borden 
Mathematica Policy Research 
Both the WIA reauthorization process and the planning efforts 
of the European Social Fund (ESF) would benefit from a review of 
the recent experiences of performance management of employment 
training programs in the United States. This chapter presents an op-
erational perspective on how performance systems are designed and 
implemented. It also discusses the challenges to effective performance 
management—challenges that are little known except to the state and 
federal staff managing the performance systems, and that are often not 
clearly understood. There is very little that is easy and straightforward 
about measuring program performance. Seemingly simple concepts 
such as enrollment, exit, employment, earnings, and whom and when 
to count must be defined very precisely for performance results to have 
meaning. This chapter assumes that the reader is familiar with WIA and 
its performance measures. 
The design and implementation of effective performance manage-
ment involve many conceptual and operational issues. This analysis 
briefly touches on many of them to illustrate how involved the process 
is and to alert program managers to the areas that they need to address. 
Each of these issues requires more extensive discussion than the scope 
of this chapter allows. Performance management raises interesting and 
significant questions about organizational and human motivation, the 
dynamics of state-federal political power sharing, and the management 
of government programs. Policymakers tend to underestimate the chal-
lenges they face and sometimes lack the commitment necessary to make 
performance management processes as effective as they should be. The 
Employment and Training Administration (ETA) has corrected some of 
the problems that occurred early on, but there are still some operational 
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aspects that need improvement. The pursuit of effective and fair perfor-
mance management inevitably encounters challenges for which there 
are no easy solutions. 
Research on employment and training programs focuses primarily 
on evaluations of the impact of public investment in job training ser-
vices, but there are other factors to consider when analyzing the WIA
performance management system; there is a clear dichotomy between 
its program management objectives and its evaluative objectives. This 
analysis argues that some form of performance tracking and data val-
idation is necessary for managing a complex national system of job 
training programs, even if the outcome data were not used to determine 
funding. Despite the great value of effective performance management, 
there are limits to using performance management data to drive funding 
decisions. 
It is also important to look beyond WIA and take a comprehen-
sive approach to assessing performance management of job training 
services by examining the programs that serve special populations. 
Policymakers need to consider how to provide efficient and effective 
service to everyone, but especially people with disabilities, veterans, 
youth, and older workers, since the costs to serve them greatly exceed 
those of serving job seekers in general. This broader perspective also 
helps inform the debate about consolidating services under a universal 
program like WIA and provides the most useful information for the Eu-
ropean Commission as it looks at performance management and service 
delivery alternatives. Choices must be made about whether to manage 
services under a more unified governance structure or as independent 
governance structures. In the United States, there is a somewhat confus-
ing mix of approaches, with WIA and the Employment Service (ES) at 
the core and considerable fragmentation and overlap beyond that. 
This analysis will draw broadly on lessons learned from imple-
menting performance measurement systems for WIA, the ES, the 
Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP), and the 
Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program at the Department of Educa-
tion, among others.1 
We begin the chapter with a conceptual framework for analyzing 
performance management issues. This includes discussion of the goals 
of performance systems, the limitations on measuring government pro-
  
 
The Challenges of Measuring Performance 179 
gram performance, and how measures are designed and defined. These 
concepts form the building blocks for designing a performance system. 
The next section of the chapter then discusses the distinction be-
tween using informal processes to manage performance and effective 
performance management. It covers the importance of implementing 
rigorous standardization, validation, and monitoring processes for ef-
fective performance management, and looks at the ETA’s great progress 
in this area despite continuing problems. 
The following section examines the challenges and benefits of 
involving stakeholders in the design and implementation of the perfor-
mance measures. It analyzes the problems that occur when stakeholders 
are more concerned about meeting their goals than improving their re-
sults, as well as their somewhat exaggerated reaction to the burdens 
imposed by performance systems. 
The final section discusses key aspects of the WIA performance 
management experience to date, including how the measures have 
evolved and the use of wage records to measure outcomes. 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYzING
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Performance Management versus Program Evaluation 
As Barnow and Smith (2004) point out, program evaluation and per-
formance management derive from different sources and motives and 
have deeply committed adherents. This analysis takes the position that 
managing very large-scale and far-flung programs involving thousands 
of staff, millions of customers, and billions of dollars requires compre-
hensive management information systems. In other words, tracking and 
measuring customer flow, services, and outcomes is inherently desirable 
and even necessary to managing any modern organization. Therefore, 
the question is not whether we should track customer flow and services 
and measure performance, but whether and how we should use the data 
to determine funding, incentives, and sanctions. 
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Some in the evaluation community argue that there are risks in draw-
ing conclusions from administrative performance data; this concern is 
supported by a detailed understanding of data quality and measurement 
validity issues (Barnow and Smith 2004). The ETA’s experience in im-
plementing performance management systems over the 10 years since 
the passage of WIA has shown that it is difficult to measure perfor-
mance well, and that using inaccurate performance data to drive policy 
and incentives leads to misallocated resources. Putting more emphasis 
on using results to reward and sanction states than on ensuring that the 
results are valid and meaningful also leads to understandable yet often 
undesirable behavior by program operators. 
Performance management systems and research evaluation meth-
ods both have their strengths and weaknesses. Performance data are 
much more efficient, systematic, comprehensive (they are produced for 
all customers), and timely, but they are somewhat crude and imprecise 
tools for measuring program impacts. Effective performance manage-
ment systems, however, are essential to good evaluation, particularly 
since performance management is the main reason that reliable data are 
available on programs. Some research efforts are abandoned because 
of incomplete and flawed data sets, while other research projects draw 
erroneous conclusions because of bad administrative data. There is an 
increasing tendency to leverage the efficiency of analyzing administra-
tive data versus more expensive experimental designs. In fact, both are 
needed. Even selecting stratified samples of participants for random-
ization requires clean and complete participant data sets with accurate 
enrollment and exit dates and customer characteristics. 
Underlying Premises of Performance Management 
First, we need to define precisely what the goals of a government 
program performance management system are and what constitutes a 
performance measure. We must also examine the motives and roles of 
the various actors in such politically and technically complex systems. 
Two premises underlie the increasing emphasis on accountability 
in government performance. The first is that public funds must be spent 
wisely and produce a return on taxpayer investment. The second is that 
measuring the effectiveness of a business process is critical to manag-
ing a modern organization. 
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Behind the first premise is the implicit assumption that govern-
ment agencies must be under pressure to perform just as in private 
enterprise—where profit and loss determine success, rewards, and even 
survival. This underlying “Darwinian” notion that competition is good 
and that programs should demonstrate results to justify their existence 
is accepted by both major political parties. The Bush administration 
greatly advanced this approach to federal management and reflected 
the program management approaches used in Texas and Florida, the 
most advanced states in using performance outcomes to drive funding 
decisions. 
But the notion that measuring the performance of a government 
program can substitute for the competitive pressures of the market-
place has many limitations. In the extreme, this idea takes the form 
of performance-based budgeting, where funding is directly correlated 
to performance, and programs can be totally defunded based on mea-
sured outcomes. In theory this makes sense, if there are valid measures 
and accurate performance data. The reality, however, is that measures 
frequently do not accurately reflect underlying program performance, 
and even more often the data are inaccurate and inconsistent across 
operational entities. Accounting for all the factors affecting WIA per-
formance is impossible to do with great precision. We must control for 
variations both in the type of barriers to employment in the popula-
tion served and in the employment opportunities available in an area, 
and then we must implement rigorous data validation methods. Without 
such steps, cutting budgets or defunding programs or operational en-
tities based on program performance would be irrational and unfair. 
Such extreme approaches to using performance outcomes would also 
encourage program operators to engage in creaming: developing too-
easily-reached goals and underserving the target population by focusing 
on those most likely to be deemed a success, instead of serving those 
most in need of services yet less likely to succeed. 
Monopolies, Competition, and Privatization 
There is another flaw in the application of the competitive ap-
proach: some programs enjoy natural monopolies. For example, one 
might conclude that if Ohio’s program was ineffective and Michigan’s 
was effective, people in Ohio should seek services from Michigan 
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or Michigan staff should replace Ohio staff. Obviously, the Darwin-
ian “perform or die” theory breaks down in this application. So, if we 
cannot put the Ohio program out of business, how do we act on our 
performance data? Do we provide increased funding to Michigan as a 
reward (presumably not needed), or do we cut Ohio’s funding as a pen-
alty (and probably damage their performance further)? We are left with 
the industrial quality control concept that we have used performance 
management to identify superior and unacceptable performance. Using 
the performance information, we can now intervene to provide techni-
cal assistance to Ohio and transplant best practices and methods from 
Michigan to Ohio. Finally, we must continue to track Ohio’s improve-
ment until its performance becomes acceptable. This is an appropriate 
application of performance management in a government setting. 
There are two situations in which the monopoly problem does 
not interfere with applying market forces to government performance 
management. First, programs that provide similar services to the same 
population can compete against each other. Since there are many over-
lapping job training programs, this is possible and indeed has been 
discussed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as we shall 
soon see. Every Bush administration budget since 2000 contained no 
funding for the National Farmworker Jobs Program (NFJP) and main-
tained that WIA should be the vehicle to provide these services.2 All the 
programs for special populations are mandatory One-Stop partners, but 
there is a wide diversity in the integration of these programs into the one-
stop setting. Most operators of programs for hard-to-serve populations 
believe that their clients would not be well served by WIA. This senti-
ment derives partly from the instinct for self-preservation and partly 
from the common belief among social workers that the population they 
serve is unique and cannot be well served by a more general program. 
It is true that a One-Stop operator might choose to prioritize services 
to customers that are more likely to gain employment unless counter-
balancing incentives are built into the system. The VR program, man-
aged by the Department of Education, operates very differently from 
the labor programs and has not adopted common employment measures 
or data validation activities. 
Second, services can be privatized and the public entity defunded. 
Some states have done this with large programs, and it is a common fea-
ture at the local level.3 So the ultimate application of market principles 
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is to privatize services and make all provider payments contingent on 
performance. This was used to some degree with performance-based 
contracting of training providers and is a feature of the Pathways to 
Work program in the United Kingdom. However, this approach puts 
tremendous pressure on the providers to manipulate their performance 
rates and puts unrealistic expectations on the ability of the oversight 
agency to act on high-quality data that fairly measure performance. If 
effective performance management methods are used, performance-
based budgeting would be an effective incentive in some settings. 
The second premise underlying performance management systems 
is that measuring the effectiveness of a business process (job training 
and placement services) is critical to managing a modern organization. 
Performance management techniques derive from industrial qual-
ity control techniques that measure the rate of defects in an industrial 
process (as popularized by W.E. Deming). The quality movement is 
based on the notion that processes that are measured work better than 
processes that are not measured (Blalock and Barnow 2001). Perfor-
mance data are a vital tool for program managers at all levels to identify 
successful processes and methods, determine what works, share best 
practices, identify areas in need of improvement through technical as-
sistance, and forecast future customer flows and costs. It is common 
sense that program managers at all levels should have data on customer 
flow, services, and outcomes. The complexity and cost associated with 
collecting and analyzing high-quality program data, however, leads too 
many state and federal officials to avoid these challenges and instead 
put minimal effort into performance data. 
Both objectives of prudent public investment and improved service 
provisions have implications for understanding the potential limita-
tions of measuring the performance of government programs. We can 
place performance management objectives on a continuum ranging 
from tracking and performance data solely for better management to 
the other extreme of basing all funding decisions solely on performance 
outcomes. Finding the middle ground is appropriate. Although there are 
limits to how much a performance management system can tell decision 
makers about program costs and benefits, there are compelling reasons 
to track enrollments, services, and outcomes carefully. Doing so pro-
vides valuable information to managers at all levels of the system, from 
Congress and the OMB through the federal agency, and to the state 
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and the local area or grantee. In large, diverse systems like WIA and 
the other programs under discussion, the forces of fragmentation and 
inconsistent data are so great that only a very strong and standardized 
performance management system can overcome or at least neutralize 
them. We can thus see that it is more useful to think of performance data 
primarily as a management tool and secondarily as an evaluation tool. 
Defining a Performance Measure 
To serve the second premise—identifying relatively good or bad 
performance and measuring improved or decreased performance—a 
measure must produce a rate of success and not simply a count of ac-
tivities. Thus, a measure can be used to distinguish better and worse 
performance in meeting program objectives of a single operating entity 
(One-Stop, Workforce Investment Board [WIB], state, program) over 
time, and also compare performance between operating entities at all 
levels. Standards that identify minimally acceptable performance must 
be associated with measures. Failure to meet these standards would 
trigger remedial steps, such as technical assistance, and even punitive 
actions, such as sanctions. Standards for superior performance could 
trigger rewards such as incentives and documentation of best practices. 
A performance measure that does not produce a rate of success cannot 
accomplish these essential functions.4 
Programs should set standards for minimum acceptable perfor-
mance by analyzing the range of outcomes across reporting entities 
(states, in the case of WIA). One simple axiom is that the minimum ac-
ceptable level is what 85 percent of states achieve; the theory being that 
if the bulk of states can achieve this performance, then it is a practical 
goal, and the trailing 15 percent should strive to improve. For example, 
the UI program sets performance goals based on the actual distribution 
of state performance rates. Another approach is to set different goals 
for different sets of customers based on their barriers to employment. 
Separate performance calculations should be produced anyway for sig-
nificant customer groups such as low literacy, people with disabilities, 
and those with poor work histories. As we will discuss later, however, 
absolute performance outcomes should be adjusted to account for dif-
ferences in customers and labor markets. This approach makes data 
validation even more essential as program operators have incentives 
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to exaggerate their customers’ barriers. The ETA has adopted a nego-
tiation approach to setting standards and has moved away from using 
national performance means and standardized adjustment mechanisms. 
Measuring Processes, Outputs, and Outcomes 
Another aspect of performance management is whether to mea-
sure processes or outcomes. Process measures are very indirect and are 
therefore usually unreliable for assessing actual performance. Process 
measurement operates on the assumption that adhering to good pro-
cesses will produce a better result, but execution of the process can be 
highly variable. Many of the process measurement approaches popular 
two decades ago have resulted in a checklist approach: items are checked 
off when manuals are written or staff are given various responsibilities. 
These continuous-improvement approaches are good means to an end, 
but they cannot substitute for measuring actual program results. 
Measuring intermediate outcomes, sometimes referred to as pro-
gram outputs, can be useful and can resemble process measures. For 
example, measuring program attendance, grade advancement, test 
scores, customer satisfaction, and the timeliness and quality of customer 
services provides prompt feedback to program managers and helps pre-
dict actual outcomes. These intermediate outcomes or program outputs 
should be secondary to actual program outcomes (such as long-term 
employment and earnings). 
Another school of thought focuses on societal rather than individ-
ual outcomes. This approach would use poverty levels and measures 
of community well-being to evaluate program effectiveness. This is a 
laudable objective and should be a component of an overall evaluation 
strategy, but it does not fit well within the performance management 
paradigm. Performance management relies on reasonably direct feed-
back to program operators at all levels about the effectiveness of service 
delivery strategies on customer outcomes in order to improve manage-
ment decisions. Societal outcomes result in too broad a range of sources 
to provide direct feedback to management, but they should be taken 
into account when determining long-term policy direction. 
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The Impact of Performance Management on Customer Selection 
The general intent of the programs is to channel scarce funds to 
those who need services most because they have the most or the highest 
barriers to employment. Performance outcomes, however, are based on 
success, which is least likely for those with the highest barriers. How 
does the program operator respond to this dilemma? Clearly it would be 
rational to choose to serve the people most likely to succeed. This could 
be considered a socially useful impact of performance management 
on program behavior if the operator is selecting between two people 
to serve: one with barriers but whose success is feasible and one with 
more barriers whose success is unlikely. Society may benefit more if the 
operator chooses to serve the person with the highest chance of success. 
In VR, for example, states are instructed not to serve people consid-
ered “too significantly disabled” to become employed. If the choice is 
between someone with barriers where success is feasible and someone 
with relatively few barriers where the service would not be a significant 
factor in employment, then society would not benefit from the incentive 
to serve the least-needy customers. 
The correct means to rectify this potentially bad incentive is to 
adjust performance outcomes to provide more credit for achieving suc-
cess with a customer with higher barriers. This leads us back to the 
conundrum that measuring barriers can be subjective and unreliable. It 
also raises the question of how we perform the adjustment. Computing 
performance separately for different classes of customers based on bar-
riers provides the clearest information to program operators. Or we can 
adjust performance after the fact, based on regression models. Either 
approach, if done well, would produce the same results, though there 
are other adjustment factors to consider. 
Adjusting Performance Outcomes 
An effective performance management system must produce ob-
jective and systematic results. The system must account for the high 
degree of variability in both customers served and in labor markets. 
So the system must adjust performance results to provide credit for 
serving those with the most barriers and for variations in labor market 
conditions across geographic areas. Here some type of objective re-
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gression model is necessary. In 1998, the ETA decided to abandon the 
JTPA regression model, whose complexity had made it unpopular at 
both the state and the federal levels, in favor of a negotiation process. 
Negotiation provides flexibility, but it does not allow for systematic and 
consistent performance goals across states. Instead, the outcome of the 
process is a function more of the toughness of the negotiator than of 
a method for developing consistent, reasonable performance goals. In 
addition, states could also try to manipulate the negotiation process by 
using various approaches to developing JTPA baseline data that would 
produce the lowest performance, thus ensuring that they could easily 
meet WIA improvement targets. The weakness of the negotiation ap-
proach was illustrated when the ETA chose to train regional staff on 
negotiation skills rather than on how to interpret state baseline perfor-
mance estimates so that initial WIA goals were set more accurately. 
EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND ITS COSTS 
Effective Performance Management Methods 
There is a significant difference between collecting and calculating 
performance data using informal methods and using formal perfor-
mance management methods to ensure that performance results are 
meaningful and usable. Federal performance management processes 
should emulate management information systems approaches used to 
manage large business enterprises. The software development industry 
has developed formal methods to ensure that systems function prop-
erly from the original source of the data to the distribution of results 
to end users. Rarely are federal performance systems designed with 
understanding of the risks to data quality and the methods needed to 
overcome them. Each time a system is set up, the same long process of 
finding out what does not work takes place over several years before 
usable performance data are obtained. Sixteen years after the passage of 
the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA), the technical state 
of federal performance management is still dismal. 
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The contrast between ineffective and effective performance man-
agement can best be illustrated by SCSEP. Attempts to draw samples 
for customer satisfaction surveys for SCSEP failed because there were 
few usable case management data on who the customers were. This and 
other deficiencies in the performance reporting system led the SCSEP
program to develop a sophisticated national case management system. 
The SCSEP system contains real-time data on all customers, services, 
and outcomes, and has robust analytical and reporting functions. The 
availability of these detailed, individual-level performance manage-
ment data enabled the SCSEP program to smoothly transfer 12,000 
participants (as a result of the national grantee competition of 2006), to 
develop timely and comprehensive management reports for all levels of 
the system, and to report on participants funded by the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act in real time with virtually no additional 
effort. Prior to this investment, most SCSEP performance data reports 
were aggregated essentially by hand at local offices and then reaggre-
gated at the state level before being submitted to the ETA. There was no 
audit trail and thus no way to determine or support the reliability of the 
data. Through the use of thorough and effective performance manage-
ment methods, SCSEP has gone from having few reliable performance 
data at all to having among the best data of all federal programs. 
However, this drastic progress in SCSEP (and to a lesser extent in 
other ETA programs using less extensive methods) has come with sig-
nificant expense at the federal level. Federal managers at all levels find 
it difficult to justify the costs of high-quality data systems for several 
reasons. First, they view performance management narrowly as a re-
porting function and not a performance enhancement process. Second, 
they tend to focus only on the costs to the federal agency budget rather 
than the overall cost of the program to the taxpayers. This is a fund-
ing allocation issue that Congress should address. Finally, it is hard 
to convey the complex technical risks and complexities of collecting 
data from such a large and highly fragmented system, where there are 
incentives to interpret data rules in such a way as to optimize program 
performance outcomes. Investments in standardized data processing 
technology are the only means to develop high-quality data sets and 
result in considerable cost savings overall. 
Performance management is a much simpler and more efficient 
process for federally run programs than for state-run programs because 
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there are fewer operational entities. Therefore, there are considerable 
costs involved in allowing states to administer their own programs— 
even make their own rules in some cases (such as UI, Medicaid, and 
SNAP)—and in trying to achieve usable national data. It is possible to 
map or translate state variations to a federal data template to make the 
data more consistent, but this requires significant effort and expense. 
Given the high turnover in state staff, getting all states to understand 
and operate using consistent data rules is a never-ending task. This task 
would seem to be even more challenging for Europe. 
The large number of Congressional committees that have control 
of sources of employment program funding cause the overall system 
to be highly fragmented, with considerable overlapping services and 
more costly reporting processes. The One-Stop system is intended to 
be seamless to the customer but certainly not to the program managers, 
accountants, or performance and reporting staff. The fragmented fund-
ing streams result in higher implementation costs because One-Stops 
have to collect data to report to many programs and agencies with vary-
ing and even conflicting definitions of customer characteristics (such as 
multiple definitions of veteran). Thus it is necessary to step back and 
look at the whole range of programs serving the population needing 
employment supports while acknowledging that specialized programs 
may be more effective in serving difficult populations. 
Having consistent and reliable data across all states and local work-
force areas is essential to using the data to manage programs. Without 
reliable and consistent data, the entire performance process is at best a 
waste of effort and at worst a source of bad policy (rewarding inferior 
and punishing superior performance). Most program operators at the 
state and local levels are diligent and honest, but there are some who see 
performance as a game, not a management tool, and find clever ways to 
manipulate their performance outcomes. The most fundamental chal-
lenges to obtaining reliable and consistent performance data are lack of 
precision and clarity in data requirements and lack of standardized and 
sophisticated data processing and calculation tools. 
Defining Data Elements 
The risks to reliable and consistent data are twofold: 1) casework-
ers will interpret and thus enter information into the case management 
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systems very differently, and 2) the data will be processed very differ-
ently by software developed separately by every state or grantee. Some 
of the WIA measures were ill defined early on, but in 2001 ETA did 
launch an ambitious data validation effort that has resulted in data that 
are considerably more reliable. 
The first step in obtaining reliable data is to write clear, objective 
definitions and to define precise source documentation to verify the va-
lidity of a data element. This is much more difficult than one would 
think. When asked to validate data, we have responded by asking poli-
cymakers for the criteria to use to distinguish valid from invalid data 
and what source documentation we can use to make the determination. 
Policymakers are often stumped by these very difficult questions. Mea-
sures and their component data elements should not be used if they 
cannot be defined and validated. 
There were some definitional problems in the original WIA youth 
measures for credential and skill attainment. The skill attainment mea-
sure was intended to give credit for youth that advanced in a skill area 
over a one-year period. The first operational step was to limit the num-
ber of possible skills attained to a maximum of three per youth per 
year. This put a cap on local areas setting large numbers of easily at-
tained goals for a single customer. The next step was to define a skill 
attainment. Some felt that this was too difficult because of the wide 
variation in capabilities of the youth being served. An easy skill for one 
youth might be a huge challenge for another. This is obviously true, 
so ETA decided to provide flexible parameters for what constituted a 
skill attainment. Case managers used this flexibility to decide subjec-
tively, on a case-by-case basis, what constituted a skill attainment and, 
in so doing, created inconsistent definitions of skill attainments across 
states and WIBs. Thus, from the first day it was difficult to compare 
the skill attainment results across reporting entities. Considerable effort 
was made to program the calculations, to train the states and local ar-
eas, and to collect all the required data and discuss what it all meant. In 
fact, such vaguely specified measures end up costing more than clearly 
defined ones, because there is never any closure to the discussions on 
how to calculate the measures and what to make of the results. This is 
an example of how effort and resources can be wasted if performance 
measures are vaguely defined or performance data are inconsistent and 
unreliable. 
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The credential attainment measure met a similar fate. The first prob-
lem was that some decision makers believed they needed to show strong 
results early in the implementation of WIA in order to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the program. This view led to a loose definition of cre-
dentials, which encouraged states to define them so as to ensure that 
most customers would attain them. One state manager said it was “like 
a license to print our own money.” Needless to say, the measure pro-
duced unreliable data. 
Fortunately, the advent of common-measures discussions by the 
OMB in 2003 allowed ETA to correct these definitional problems. Partly
based upon the lessons of the skill attainment and credential rates, 
the OMB and the ETA decided to develop new measures that would 
overcome some of the deficiencies of the original ones. They defined 
credential more strictly by eliminating work readiness credentials and 
focusing more on credentials and certificates that reward improvement 
in occupational skills. They also merged the credential rate with the 
diploma rate, which led to the new attainment of a degree or certificate 
rate. In addition, they replaced the skill attainment rate with a literacy 
and numeracy gains measure that required that states use U.S. Depart-
ment of Education–approved standardized tests to determine whether 
or not an individual youth had improved his/her skills. This change cre-
ated a well-defined measure but presented a complex challenge to write 
detailed specifications for calculating the measure accurately, given 
the almost infinite number of possible sequences of test scores and ex-
ceptions. Once the programming was done, testing the accuracy of the 
calculations consumed hundreds of hours of staff time. 
Manipulating Performance 
Performance outcomes can be manipulated during the enrollment 
and exit processes. A casual observer would not see how difficult it is to 
define enrollment date and exit date, which drive all performance calcu-
lations. Some states’ first reaction to the launch of WIA was to impose 
more restrictive criteria on enrollment. They did not want to be held 
accountable for outcomes for customers who received very inexpensive 
services. The lower enrollment did not reflect the number of people 
being served, just the number for which the state was accountable in 
the performance system. This was done by redefining “staff-assisted
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services.” Because WIA and ES are universal-access programs with 
a broad range of services, from self-service only (e.g., using the job-
seeking aids on Web sites or at One-Stops without assistance) to 
staff-assisted training, there was significant discussion early on about 
at what point in the continuum of services a customer should be for-
mally included in the performance system. The ETA instructed states 
to include customers when they received significant staff-assisted
services. Some states, however, defined staff-assisted services very 
broadly, while others defined them very narrowly. Enrollment numbers 
fell sharply in some areas. It is not clear whether particular types of 
customers (such as incumbent workers, where earnings gains would be 
most difficult to achieve) were more likely to be left out of the report-
ing system or not. Measuring performance outcomes for customers who 
received little or no staff-assisted service and may have never visited a 
One-Stop is problematic. On the other hand, there has been very sig-
nificant public investment in self-service facilities, so it is appropriate 
to determine whether the investment has led to better outcomes. Self-
service utilization measures might be good complements to outcome 
measures for this customer group. 
Another, more direct way of distorting outcomes was to manipulate 
exit dates. One dilemma states faced when they converted from JTPA
to WIA was what to do with hundreds of thousands of JTPA customers 
who had never exited from JTPA but were no longer receiving services.
The records of these customers had gone to the “data graveyard,”
never to be included in performance outcomes. States were instructed 
to purge these unmeasured customers from the system to allow WIA to 
start with a clean slate, and the concept of “soft exit” was developed to 
prevent a reoccurrence of the problem. States were instructed to gener-
ate an exit date for any customer who had not received a service for 90 
days. There was much discussion about whether the exit date would 
be the last date of service or 90 days later, and also about how to avoid 
exiting customers in long-term training programs. The obvious means 
of manipulating performance is to avoid exiting customers until they 
have been placed in jobs. It is impossible to enforce rigorous standards 
or consistency across states for these issues because there is no way to 
tell from the case management files whether there were real continuing 
services provided or if the customer was being “held” in the system 
until job placement. 
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Defining Employment and Earnings 
Defining employment and retention and earnings is not straight-
forward. Traditionally programs using manual follow-up methods have 
used fairly rigorous definitions. For example, SCSEP required exited 
customers to be employed for 60 of the first 90 days after exit to be 
counted as placed. Other programs set minimum levels of hours per 
week to exclude very partial employment or looked at average hourly 
wage and even whether the employment was related to the training pro-
vided. The universal use of wage record data under WIA raised a new 
set of issues. Wage records were quite thorough (all wages reported 
from multiple employers could be easily captured and aggregated) but 
did not provide details on employment and only reported quarterly to-
tals. The number of hours worked, the hourly wage, and the occupation 
were generally not available, and it was not known if someone worked 
one day in the quarter or 90 days. Therefore, it was decided that the total 
earnings in the quarter after exit would define “entered employment.” 
The threshold for total dollars required was discussed, and finally the 
ETA determined that any amount would qualify, making a very low 
barrier for placement. 
The wage record system does not operate to serve employment pro-
gram research or performance assessment, but to determine employer 
UI tax rates. It would be useful but difficult to obtain more detail on 
employment from employers, but given the high degree of automation 
of payroll systems, especially for larger employers, it may be feasible 
at some point in the future. 
The earnings gain measure raised a host of additional definitional 
and technical problems. States had considerable concern about how 
enrolling laid-off, high-wage manufacturing sector workers would pro-
duce sharp earnings decreases after services when they were placed 
in lower-paying service industries. Some initial analyses of dislocated 
worker earnings replacement rates, however, showed earnings gains of 
over 300 percent.These spectacular results derived from customers who 
had already received services for a year or more prior to enrollment 
in WIA and thus had zero preprogram earnings. Defining the dates to 
use to calculate preprogram earnings, determining the actual disloca-
tion date, and then collecting the correct quarters of wage record data 
proved to be very problematic. States approached these issues in vari-
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ous ways and with various levels of success, leading to inconsistent 
results. 
A related issue involved measuring earnings gains from the first 
quarter after exit to the third quarter after exit. This did not seem to 
be a meaningful measure because it only measured earnings increases
over a very short period when raises would not likely be provided. This 
measure was supported by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program, where there were by definition no preprogram earn-
ings. Ultimately the ETA abandoned pre- and postprogram earnings 
measures and now reports only average postprogram earnings. 
The lessons from the early implementation of WIA are clear: do not 
attempt to measure something you cannot define or validate, and make 
sure the calculations are reliable and well tested. 
Reporting and Validating Performance Data 
The ETA has been in the forefront of federal performance manage-
ment and data validation efforts since the 1970s for two reasons. First, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1969 that the USDOL had to ensure 
that UI claimants received payments on time, and this required mea-
suring the timeliness of UI activities. Second, it was discovered that 
the allocation of administrative funds to state UI agencies was inequi-
table because of inconsistencies in how states counted their activities. 
UI conducted a significant upgrade to its performance management and 
data validation systems in the 1990s and set the model for the rest of the 
federal government to follow, which generated a healthy culture of data 
quality and standardization in the state workforce agencies. 
With the passage of WIA, the ETA sought to bring standardized 
reporting and data validation to the workforce programs, and such sys-
tems were gradually put in place starting in 2002. The data validation 
process asks whether the data used to calculate performance are correct 
and whether the performance measures were calculated correctly. This 
process led to much more rigorous definitions of data elements, as well 
as the development of standardized reporting software that states could 
use to edit files, perform reporting and performance calculations, and 
receive immediate feedback on data problems and performance. It also 
served to enhance the quality of program data and greatly speed the 
availability of performance data to the ETA, the OMB, Congress, and 
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the research community. In addition, the reporting and data validation 
software provided basic analytical functionality so that states could ex-
plain in detail the changes in performance over time. Some states made 
extensive use of the analytical capabilities of the software to educate 
their local areas about how the measures worked. 
Performance calculations are highly complex, and extensive testing 
is required to ensure their accuracy.5 Before the use of standardized data 
calculations at a federal level, each state calculated its own performance 
at considerable expense and with inconsistent methods and results. Ini-
tially, the ETA was committed to the standardized reporting and data 
validation methods and processes, especially in light of USDOL Of-
fice of Inspector General (OIG) reports on deficiencies in ETA data 
(see OIG 2001a,b; 2002a,b; 2003; 2005). The standardized software 
required continued investment to maintain because of the large number 
of changes in the performance measures and because the software had 
to be enhanced to meet growing state analytical and diagnostic needs. 
States embraced the concept of accurate and consistent performance 
calculations and data edits and liked the immediate feedback they re-
ceived on their data quality and performance.6 Further, the total cost of 
using standardized software was far less overall than the cost of having 
each state program its own calculations, not to mention that the sepa-
rately calculated performance data would be unreliable.7 
In addition to editing files, calculating performance, and provid-
ing basic analytical functionality for states, the data validation software 
samples customer records for validation of data elements. In the valida-
tion process, state monitoring staff review a small sample of records 
against supporting documentation maintained at the local area. The 
software contains sampling algorithms that make the state monitoring 
process as efficient as possible for creating estimates of errors for each 
data element by state. State staff generally found the data validation 
process to be very helpful and efficient for monitoring data quality at 
the local level. Unfortunately, the software does not yet compute the 
standard error rate for each data element, so the ETA cannot set or en-
force data accuracy standards.8 
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Federal Performance Monitoring 
The ETA’s regional offices have always monitored state programs. 
There are two basic forms of monitoring: 1) process monitoring con-
sists of reviews of required state functions to ensure that they meet 
federal standards, and 2) data monitoring involves reviewing samples 
of records against source documentation and is thus identical to the 
data validation effort conducted by states. In 2006, the ETA designed 
a process by which federal regional monitoring staff would review 
a subsample of the records reviewed by the state staff to ensure that 
states were applying the data validation rules consistently. The federal 
staff would enter their results for the subsample into the data valida-
tion software, which would then generate a report to ETA on the state’s 
accuracy. This monitoring process has not yet been implemented. The 
recent OIG report (2009) concluded that “without an effective monitor-
ing process, ETA has no assurance that data validation is operating as 
designed so that the data can be relied upon for accurately reporting 
performance results” (p. 11). 
Some ETA regional office staff developed their own data-
monitoring processes, but they are implemented inconsistently, and not 
all regions monitor data systematically. Therefore, there is no systematic 
check on whether the states are performing the data element validation 
consistently and correctly. With no data accuracy standards, no precise 
calculations of state error rates, and no check that states are perform-
ing the validation correctly, the reliability of WIA data is still not clear.
This is unfortunate because states still incur the full burden to perform 
annual data validation. This annual validation exercise does allow state 
staff to conduct effective data monitoring of local areas and thus facili-
tates the detection of data problems and discussion of remedies. 
THE CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS OF
STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
The process of designing performance measures starts with the 
funding legislation. Congress requires that recipients of funding sub-
mit certain performance outcomes to justify continued funding. Statutes 
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also normally contain some language about remedial or punitive steps 
that will be taken if programs fall short of performance goals. Of course, 
Congress does not operate in a vacuum, and the legislation reflects in-
put from the executive branch (the OMB and agencies) as well as from 
lobbyists for the state agencies and population-specific interest groups.9 
Statutory language about measures is usually very general, so agen-
cies must add further levels of detail to “operationalize” the measures, 
including the specific data elements that must be reported and how the 
measures are to be calculated. Effective performance measurement re-
quires strong leadership from the federal government both in defining 
the measures and objectives and in providing the definitional structure 
and necessary performance management tools. In some programs with 
immature performance management processes, program operators are 
given the latitude to define or choose their own measures. This approach 
may be politically popular, but it rarely produces any usable results and 
does not lead to program improvement. States and grantees look to the 
federal partner for leadership and structure but still want input on the 
operational details. 
Soliciting Feedback and Consulting Program Operators 
Both aspects of the dual rationale for measuring performance—ac-
countability and program improvement—make it desirable that program 
operators “buy in” to the system. Obviously, the program management 
and program improvement rationale for measuring performance is ad-
vanced when program operators find the results meaningful and helpful. 
Even the program accountability rationale works best when operators 
find the measures to be legitimate. Therefore, the programs discussed in 
this chapter have sought extensive consultation from program operators 
(states, local areas, and grantees) during the design process and during 
the phase of the process when the measures are being operationalized. 
At the end of 1998, the ETA produced an initial draft of the ap-
proach to measuring WIA, but it did not contain clear and well-defined 
measures, and thus was not well received by the states. Therefore, dur-
ing the spring of 1999 there ensued a series of consultative meetings 
attended by federal and state staff. Six early adaptor states launched 
WIA on July 1, 1999, and representatives of these states met with fed-
eral staff over a series of months to hammer out the details. The first 
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complete set of technical performance specifications was published in 
March 2000, before the other states implemented WIA on July 1, 2000. 
Input from state staff was very helpful in operationalizing the measures 
because of their rich knowledge of program operations and workforce 
data. Feedback on the technical aspects of the measures continued to 
be received during conferences and meetings for the next two years. 
Other programs had similar if less extensive consultations. All the ETA
programs relating to WIA established performance workgroups to seek 
input from state and grantee staff.10 
Fear of Performance Management 
The performance measures were seen by some states, local areas, 
and grantees primarily as a threat rather than as a management tool. 
This perception greatly influenced their input on how the measures 
should be designed. It is logical that those at risk of sanctions from mea-
sured poor performance would become defensive and try to reduce the 
effectiveness of the measurement system itself. This defensive impulse 
leads to actions to evade the implications of the measures and to resist 
measurement in a number of ways. As mentioned in the data validation 
discussion above, state WIA staff play a dual role in the performance 
system and are sometimes defensive because they are being measured 
as states and sometimes supportive of effective performance methods 
because they oversee local areas. 
The essence of the resistance to effective federal performance meth-
ods was documented in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report (2005) on WIA, which said that “collecting uniform performance 
data at the national level [and] giving states and localities the flexibility 
they need to implement programs” are “competing objectives” (p. 1). 
This is based on a misunderstanding actively pushed by people who 
resist performance processes to muddy the true role of performance 
management techniques in improving government services. 
We must distinguish clearly between service delivery and program 
management. Performance management systems track common events 
such as enrollment date, customer characteristics, limited service dates, 
exit date, and outcomes. Performance management systems do not 
specify how services are delivered. Therefore, there is no inherent con-
flict between allowing program operators creativity and flexibility in 
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customer outreach and providing services and tracking customer char-
acteristics and flow through the system and measuring outcomes. Local 
program operators and grantees are fond of saying that they can either 
serve people or enter case management data, but they cannot do both. 
This is all too often a defensive reaction to fear of being measured and 
a reflection of inadequate management capacity. That is why it is so 
important to focus initially on building strong data capacity through ef-
fective performance management tools and methods rather than on the 
punitive aspects of performance management. 
The Relative Burden of Federal Performance Requirements 
Despite the complaints about the burden of federal data require-
ments, many states collect far more detailed performance data and 
invest in more sophisticated performance management systems than 
anything imposed by the ETA. There is wide variation among states, 
grantees, and local program operators in their level of sophistication 
and the level of case management data they collect. The goal of the fed-
eral performance management system, including the key data validation 
component, should be to raise every state and grantee to a minimum 
acceptable level of data management and data reliability. There will 
always be states with more sophisticated performance systems than are 
practical for the federal partner to develop. 
Tracking participants, services, and outcomes is essential to any 
effective program management at all levels of the system and would be 
done for the most part in the absence of any federal performance and 
data validation initiatives. From having overseen the development of 
the Paperwork Reduction Act requests for performance and data val-
idation for many years, it has become clear that little information is 
collected solely for performance purposes, and that none of it constrains 
program operators from employing innovative and diverse service de-
livery methods. 
Once we accept that program operators must know whom they are 
serving and what services they are providing, the only aspect of perfor-
mance management that is a true burden is collecting outcome data. It 
is less important to the basic management of the program to track ex-
tended outcomes as required by WIA retention rates than to track 
customers and services. But if those long-term outcome data can be 
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collected efficiently through wage records or some other form of al-
ready existing high-quality administrative data, then measuring even 
long-term outcomes becomes very cost-effective. There is also a strong 
argument to be made that long-term follow-up services are an expensive 
but essential part of an effective service delivery strategy, especially for 
the hardest-to-serve populations. The WIA Youth program and SCSEP
both require long-term follow-up to support customers after exit, but 
this is resisted in the VR program even though the need for long-term 
support is evident in that population. 
Another source of resistance to performance management is the 
concern that the population served is too varied and complex to permit 
effective measurement of the actual performance of a program operator. 
This becomes a problem when the emphasis is on incentives and sanc-
tions and not program management, because program operators do not 
trust that the measures are fair. This notion is reinforced by the “social 
worker” mindset that is especially pervasive in programs serving spe-
cial hard-to-serve populations. Many staff in these programs assert that 
all programs must be run well and must be effective because program 
staff are sympathetic to the population being served. There are thus 
three complementary threads to the resistance to effective performance 
management: 1) collecting data is a burden, 2) performance measures 
cannot accurately reflect the quality of services rendered, and 3) staff 
are well intentioned and therefore must be left alone to perform their 
work. 
To be fair, local program operators and grantees often operate under 
stressful conditions. They serve very difficult populations with inad-
equate and declining funding levels and operate under the weight of 
threatening and somewhat crude performance measures. It is therefore 
critical that the performance system be sold primarily as a means to 
achieving better management and analysis capacity. 
There is one critical area of performance management in which 
program operators are forced to bear a true burden for which no relief is 
likely to be found. That burden comes with requirements to collect data 
validation documentation from the most difficult-to-serve populations, 
such as homeless youth, people with disabilities, very low-income older 
workers, and non-English-speaking customers. Collecting such docu-
mentation is important to program integrity, not only because these are 
important program eligibility criteria, but also because programs are 
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given extra credit for serving these people. SCSEP measures, for ex-
ample, give credit to the grantees for specific categories of customers 
(disabled, homeless, low literacy skills, and frail), and in the VR pro-
gram the category of “severely disabled” is critical to program intake 
and performance outcomes. In addition, programs allow performance 
outcome exemptions for medical conditions and even for medical con-
ditions of family members; this is a major issue for the integrity of 
performance outcome data for SCSEP, which serves many people over 
age 70. It is very convenient to avoid a negative performance outcome 
by classifying the customer as excluded from performance. 
Collecting documentation to show that customers meet criteria for 
extensive barriers to employment or exclusion from performance rep-
resents a true burden for case managers. Medical conditions, disability, 
homelessness, homeless youth, and family income are all very difficult 
areas to document. For example, how do you prove you are homeless? 
The only approach that we have found is to allow—in lieu of actual 
evidence—“self-attestation” in the form of documents the customers 
sign testifying as to their conditions. This will continue to be a chal-
lenge to effective performance management for the foreseeable future. 
Measuring Accountability 
Once we get past the “data are a burden” argument, we find a more 
subtle and valid tension between simplicity and clarity in measures and 
determining the program’s actual accountability for outcomes. With a 
defensive mentality, program operators view performance measures as 
directly measuring their accountability or their effort in serving each 
individual customer. In fact, it is impossible to design measures that can 
account for all the factors bearing on success with a single customer. 
Performance management is a statistical process that assumes that mea-
sures of a sufficient number of outcomes can distinguish between more 
successful and less successful processes and methods. 
Not understanding how performance management works, program 
operators seek direct measures of their accountability and thus want the 
measures to be designed to account for every exception. One state staff 
person argued that their state should not be held accountable when a 
customer failed to show up for services and had a negative outcome. I 
responded with two questions: 1) Why would more people fail to show 
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up for services in your state than in other states? 2) If customers did 
tend to show up less in your state than in other states, was that not a 
valid finding about the quality of your services? Performance goals are 
always set well below 100 percent so that the system accounts for such 
“failures” that cannot be directly attributable to a program operator’s 
deficiencies. 
The impulse to design measures that account for individual cus-
tomer circumstances leads to exponential increases in complexity. Each 
additional factor that a measure must consider to define success, such 
as excluding outcomes where customers became ill, doubles the num-
ber of possible outcomes. Some accountability factors are significant 
enough to incorporate into the measure design, and more sophisticated 
measures are practical if standard automated tools are used to perform 
data analysis and calculate measures. But ironically, once program op-
erators have succeeded in adding factors to better measure what they 
are directly accountable for, they often complain that the measures 
have become too complex to understand or to explain to their local 
stakeholders. So, there is a tricky balance between designing detailed 
measures of actual accountability and designing measures that are easy 
to understand and explain. 
THE WIA PERFORMANCE SYSTEM 
The Evolution of WIA Measures 
Stakeholder concerns had a direct and significant impact on the 
early WIA measures, where there was significant input from states and 
local areas. The initial WIA measures were very simple, but within a 
year they had become much more complex. One example of a change 
that added complexity but greatly strengthened the measure was in the 
treatment of youth who were placed in postsecondary education but not 
in employment. Originally, since it was considered that the Department 
of Labor could not reward an educational placement, the postsecondary 
education placement without employment was classified as a nega-
tive outcome. In other words, placing a youth in Harvard was bad, but 
placing him at McDonald’s was good. After further discussion it was 
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decided that postsecondary placement without employment would be-
come a “neutral outcome,” where the record was excluded from the 
placement calculation completely. 
In 2003, the OMB launched a common-measures initiative for 
federal employment programs to try to standardize performance calcu-
lations across the many federal job training programs. This effort was 
prompted by the breakdown of the competitive approach to program 
funding. The Bush administration sought to use program outcome data 
to determine which programs were effective and which were ineffective 
and should be defunded or folded into more effective programs. This 
attempt was confounded by the lack of comparability of performance 
data across the data sets. For example, SCSEP defined a successful 
placement as 30 days of continuous employment within the first 90 days 
after exit, while WIA defined it as any earnings at all in the quarter after 
exit. The disparate definitions of success and performance goals across 
programs made it an even greater challenge to control for differences in 
the populations served. 
The ETA embraced the OMB initiative and launched a second 
round of state-federal discussions over how to implement the new com-
mon measures. Other programs within ETA, including VR and even 
SCSEP, resisted the common measures, arguing that their populations 
were special and that they could not be expected to achieve results 
comparable to those of the mainstream programs. SCSEP has since
adopted the common measures, but VR has still not implemented them. 
The common measures are a good step toward effective performance 
management at the national level across training programs and do not 
constrain programs from using other performance management tools. 
The Use of Wage Records 
In the absence of a good source of data on postprogram earnings 
like the UI wage record system, it would be very difficult to develop 
an efficient and effective performance management system, especially 
for such large-scale programs as WIA and ES. UI wage records are 
reasonably reliable because they are official tax records and are subject 
to some audit controls. They are not perfect, however, for a number of 
reasons, including uncovered employment, failure to report by employ-
ers, and errors in reporting that prevent matches of wages to participant 
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records, but they do supply the vast majority of the data needed to 
measure outcomes. The ETA must continue to allow states to collect 
“supplemental” earnings data collected directly from program custom-
ers to compensate for the gaps in wage record data. This is particularly 
important, because the need for supplemental data varies widely by re-
gion. Wage record data are significantly less complete in agricultural 
areas; areas with a larger “underground economy” (such as Hawaii and 
Puerto Rico, where employment in tourist-related industries is more 
informal); and in areas with a high concentration of contract labor, 
such as the movie and software industries. Another critical issue is pro-
viding states with access to wage data collected by other states. Until 
recently, the ETA had experienced mixed success in establishing such 
a system, but privacy and legal concerns have rendered interstate wage 
data useless for performance management purposes. States can send 
files of Social Security numbers and receive aggregate rates of matches 
with a national wage file (including federal and military employment) 
to obtain more accurate entered employment, retention, and earnings 
data; however, this data is not provided at the customer level and is 
useless for analyzing and improving performance. Many states have 
had bilateral wage-record-sharing agreements since WIA began and can 
continue to use these more detailed data to analyze their performance 
at the customer level. 
Not all employment and training programs can access the state 
wage record file; this is either because some are nongovernmental enti-
ties or because it is too cumbersome to negotiate access with the UI 
agency. SCSEP, for example, still conducts manual follow-up with each 
exiter up to three times to obtain postexit earnings data, which must be 
carefully documented for data validation. This additional burden can 
be seen as adding value because it allows grantees to provide follow-
up employment support services. The Pathways to Work project in the 
United Kingdom planned to conduct extensive provider follow-up be-
cause there were no available earnings data equivalent to the UI data in 
the United States. 
One of the major problems with reliance on wage data for per-
formance management is that the files are not complete and available 
until about six to nine months after entry into the employment activity 
being measured. This prevents timely feedback to program operators, 
but it is still a far more cost-effective approach than expensive and un-
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reliable informal follow-up data as gathered under JTPA. The six- to 
nine-month lag in the availability of complete employment outcome 
data is an unfortunate reality and does limit the benefits of the analytical 
feedback loop to program operators, which is a key aspect of an effec-
tive performance management system. 
Although outcome data are the primary source for performance 
management, additional data are helpful for some programs where cus-
tomers receive services over a long period of time. This is especially 
an issue in the WIA younger youth program where customers may be 
enrolled for five years or more and to some degree in SCSEP and VR as 
well. These programs would benefit from intermediary progress mea-
sures to provide more timely feedback to program operators on their 
performance. The literacy and numeracy gain measure in the WIA
Youth program is an ideal measure not only because it is well-defined 
but also because it provides continuous feedback on youth progress to 
program operators. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced some of the challenges of effective per-
formance management. We can conclude that top priority should be 
placed on establishing a solid foundation of collecting and processing 
data consistently and accurately to help Congress, program managers, 
and local One-Stop administrators to understand who is being served 
and what their outcomes are. There are many technical aspects to de-
veloping this foundation, and this chapter has only touched on them. An 
effective performance management system requires enlightened federal 
leadership with a sound understanding of the potential and limitations 
of performance system and a commitment to effective performance 
management. Federal staff must take the lead in promoting the value of 
performance management to the other levels of the system and firmly 
enforce performance objectives. 
Only when the foundation for effective performance management 
is securely in place should policymakers take punitive action on the 
findings. They should concentrate initially on identifying superior and 
inferior performers, analyzing which processes and methods produce 
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the best results, and providing technical assistance to the poor perform-
ers. The least emphasis should be on rewards and sanctions. These 
motivational devices can be useful but are often rushed into play before 
the data are reliable or well understood and thus engender resistance 
to performance management and inappropriate behavior by program 
operators. 
Notes 
1. The Performance Management Group at Mathematica Policy Research has been 
involved in designing and implementing performance management and data 
validation systems for WIA, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, the Labor 
Exchange (or the ES), the National Farmworker Jobs Program, the Senior Com-
munity Service Employment Program, the Unemployment Insurance Program, 
and the Vocational Rehabilitation Program. The group also works on TANF and 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) performance reporting and 
on assessing performance for Medicaid and Education Department grants. 
2. Congress always restored NFJP funding. 
3. WIA requires the local boards to contract the operation of the One-Stop centers, 
although public entities often hold the contracts. 
4. Counts are sometimes used as performance measures, for example, if there is no 
real process to measure, such as program outcomes after a spell of services, or 
if the designer of the measures just wants to demonstrate results by adding up 
events that are considered to have social value. In these situations, the counts are 
not really performance measures in a technical sense and should not be confused 
with actual performance data. Such counts can be converted to rates if they reflect 
underlying performance and not increases in funding. 
5. The data reporting and validation software calculates over 1,600 individual cells 
on various WIA and ES reports, as well as tens of thousands of additional cal-
culations needed for other reporting, validation, and analytical functions. These 
calculations, reports, and functionality are documented in more than 500 pages 
of specifications and high-level requirements. The software also applies roughly 
300 edit checks to the data. Extensive testing is done to ensure that the calculated 
results are correct for every state regardless of numerous variations in data files 
submitted by the states. 
6. The feedback was immediate when states loaded their customer files (e.g., the 
WIASRD) into the software, but was still constrained by data lags associated with 
wage records. 
7. Many states have invested in performance software and use the federal validation 
software for testing and to validate their performance reports. Even if the state cal-
culations are determined to be incorrect by the data validation software, the ETA
uses data from the state calculations and not the validated calculations in its report 
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to Congress. Approximately 20–25 states use the federal software to generate their 
performance reports. Given budget cuts and the focus on other priorities, the ETA
reduced the funding for the maintenance of the reporting and data validation soft-
ware for WIA and ES. The functionality for states has diminished since 2005, and 
many of the suggestions states made for enhancing the software have not been im-
plemented. The Office of Inspector General (2009) concluded that “with the lack 
of software upgrades, the effectiveness and efficiency of using the data validation 
software as a tool to improve the accuracy and reliability of WIA performance data 
has been compromised” (pp. 3, 11). 
8. The UI data validation program does have data accuracy standards and computes 
reliable estimates of error, taking sampling error into account. 
9. The National Association of State Workforce Agencies represents the state 
agencies that administer WIA and most related programs. The VR program is rep-
resented by the Council of State Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation. 
10. SCSEP, ES, NFJP, and the Division of Indian and Native American Programs all 
convened performance workgroups in 2000 and 2001. 
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Lessons from the WIA
Performance Measures 
Burt S. Barnow 
George Washington University 
Since the late 1970s, major federal workforce development pro-
grams in the United States have included performance management 
systems that assess how well the programs are performing at the na-
tional, state, and local levels. The use of performance management in 
workforce programs predates the more general congressionally man-
dated performance requirements of the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA). This chapter draws on the previous work of the 
author and others in assessing the lessons of the past 30 years of experi-
ence with performance management in workforce programs. Although 
the chapter focuses on the U.S. system, the lessons should apply to 
programs in other countries as well. 
The chapter first discusses what performance management is in the 
context of workforce programs. Next, performance management is con-
trasted and compared with program evaluations. Policy officials would 
like to implement performance measures that are based on program im-
pact; the next section describes why that is generally not possible to 
do and presents empirical findings on the success of such efforts. The 
following section describes how the performance management system 
used for U.S. workforce programs can lead to unintended results and 
summarizes some of the research on this topic. This is followed by a 
discussion of whether standards should be absolute or adjusted for fac-
tors such as participant characteristics and economic conditions. The 
final section presents lessons for countries that are considering estab-
lishing a performance management system. 
Although related, the concepts of performance measurement and 
evaluation are distinct and serve different purposes (see Blalock and 
Barnow [2001]). Performance measurement is a management tool that 
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is used to monitor implementation on a real-time basis. Performance 
measures may track data that indicate fidelity in program implemen-
tation, inputs (such as participant characteristics) that are considered 
important to the program’s purpose, process measures (e.g., use of “best 
practices”), outputs expected from the program, and sometimes short-
term gross outcome measures. Program evaluation, on the other hand, is 
intended to answer specific questions about programs. Process studies 
document what happened while the program was implemented, impact 
evaluations assess what difference in outcome measures was due to the 
intervention, and cost-benefit analyses assess whether the benefits of a 
program exceed the costs. 
If the program has limited capacity, participant characteristics may 
be a useful performance measure, and one or more measures could be 
established to track the characteristics of customers served.1 Process 
measures rather than output or outcome measures are sometimes used. 
For example, if particular practices are known to be more effective or 
less expensive than the alternatives, a case can be made for including 
process measures of performance. In the current health care reform de-
bate in the United States, some advocates argue that costs can be driven 
down by requiring providers to use best practices or by providing fi-
nancial incentives to do so; similar arguments can be raised in setting 
standards for education. In the past, however, some in the workforce 
field have argued that so long as the grant recipients are held account-
able for the desired results, they should be free to adopt the approach 
they believe is best rather than relying on processes prescribed by the 
federal government.2 A reasonable approach might be to monitor use of 
best practices and provide technical assistance, rewards, and sanctions 
only when an organization fails to achieve satisfactory outcomes. 
In a system characterized by delegation of authority from the central 
government to lower levels of government (state and local government 
for many U.S. programs, but the concepts apply to a system of grantees 
or for-profit contractors as well), the goals of the level of government 
providing the funds may not be aligned with the goals of the level of 
government providing the services. By instituting a performance man-
agement system that provides rewards and sanctions based on how well 
the lower level of government meets the goals of the funding agency, 
the so-called principal-agent problem can be (in theory) resolved. 
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The differences between performance measurement and evalua-
tion often are matters of depth of analysis and causality. Because of the 
need for rapid feedback, performance measurement activities generally 
track easy-to-collect data on inputs, activities, and outputs. Data for 
performance measurement generally come from management infor-
mation systems maintained by the programs and from administrative 
data collected for other purposes.3 Evaluations are usually conducted 
less often and with greater resources; a process study, for example, can 
make use of extensive interviews to document program implementa-
tion. Performance management activities cannot usually afford the time 
and resources required for tracking long-term outcomes and establish-
ing and tracking a control group or comparison group, so performance 
measures are usually based on gross postprogram measures (such as 
earnings during a postprogram period), while evaluations can estimate 
program impact (by, for example, comparing earnings of participants af-
ter participation with earnings of a control group of applicants that was 
excluded from the program through random assignment). For example, 
performance measures for a vocational training program can include 
placement rates, wages at placement, and perhaps short-term follow-up 
measures of employment and earnings for participants, but an impact 
evaluation will focus on the change in employment and earnings due 
to the program, usually for a significantly longer period. Both types of 
activities are important for management and policy development, but, 
as discussed below, one should avoid reading more into performance 
results than is actually there. 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT FOR U.S. WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
In the United States, implementation of GPRA has led various 
programs to embrace alternative concepts of why performance man-
agement is useful. According to the statute, GPRA was designed to hold 
“federal agencies accountable for achieving program results.” In partic-
ular, GPRA requires that agencies develop performance measures and 
standards for the programs they administer, as well as strategic plans to 
achieve their goals. 
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Aperformance management system must include three components: 
1) measures of performance, 2) standards for acceptable performance, 
and 3) feedback on performance. As discussed below, measures for 
U.S. workforce programs have attempted to focus on program impacts, 
but that need not be the case. 
The USDOL established performance measures long before such 
measures were mandated under GPRA. Performance measures were 
first established in the late 1970s for CETA. JTPA, which was the major 
national workforce program in the 1980s and 1990s, had statutory pro-
visions calling for measuring performance as the impact of the program 
on employment and earnings relative to program cost.4 Specifically, 
Section 106 of JTPA, which provided the requirements for performance 
standards, stated 
The Congress recognizes that job training is an investment in hu-
man capital and not an expense. In order to determine whether that 
investment has been productive, Congress finds that it is essential 
that criteria for measuring the return on this investment be devel-
oped; and that the basic return on investment is to be measured by 
long-term economic self-sufficiency, increased employment and 
earnings, reductions in welfare dependency, and increased educa-
tional attainment and occupational skills. 
The JTPA statute suggested but did not require that measures for 
adults include the employment rate in unsubsidized employment, em-
ployment retention for six months, an increase in earnings and/or the 
wage rate, a reduction in welfare dependency, and acquisition of skills. 
In practice, the performance measures used for JTPA were primarily 
program outcomes that, at best, served as proxies for program impact. 
Initially, the measures focused on the status of participants at the time of 
exit from the program or shortly thereafter, but by the time the program 
was replaced by WIA, a follow-up period of 13 weeks was used for 
most measures. The statute originally also called for cost measures, but 
as described below, this requirement was repealed in 1992.5 
Under WIA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
advocated that all programs with a workforce goal have “common mea-
sures,” but agencies other than the USDOL have resisted adopting the 
common measures. Currently, the common measures for adults and dis-
located workers are: 
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• Entered employment rate: Of those not employed at the date of 
participation, the number of participants who are employed in 
the first quarter after the exit quarter divided by the number of 
participants who exited during the quarter. 
• Employment retention rate: Of those who are employed in the 
first quarter after the exit quarter, the number of participants who 
are employed in both the second and third quarters after the exit 
quarter divided by the number of participants who exited during 
the quarter. 
• Average earnings: Of those participants who are employed in 
the first, second, and third quarters after the exit quarter, total 
earnings in the second quarter plus total earnings in the third 
quarter divided by the number of participants who exited during 
the quarter.6 
For Youth programs, the common measures use a broader concept 
of a successful outcome by including training and education, and the 
measures include attainment of a certificate or degree and literacy and 
numeracy gains. 
ADJUSTMENTS TO PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
U.S. workforce investment programs have varied in their approach 
to adjusting performance standards, both among programs and over 
time. This section first describes how performance standards have been 
adjusted for major U.S. workforce investment programs and then sum-
marizes the pros and cons of adjusting standards.7 
For the primary workforce investment programs administered by 
the USDOL, JTPA in the 1980s and 1990s, and WIA beginning in 2000, 
state and local area standards were subject to adjustment, but the ap-
proach has varied greatly. Initially under JTPA, governors had three 
options for adjusting standards for the service delivery areas (SDAs) 
within their jurisdiction: using the national standards established by 
the Secretary of Labor, using regression models developed by the
USDOL to adjust standards for variation in participant characteristics 
and economic conditions, or developing their own adjustment system. 
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The legislation was later amended to make it relatively difficult for gov-
ernors to use any adjustment mechanism other than the national model. 
Under WIA, standards were established at the state level through nego-
tiations, although some have commented that USDOL officials imposed 
standards on the states with no opportunity to truly negotiate; states can 
determine local workforce area standards in any manner they choose.8 
Although many public programs, including all that are administered 
by federal agencies, are required to establish performance standards, 
there are few cases where adjustments to performance standards have 
been considered, and even fewer where they have actually been applied. 
The concepts of fairness and equity have been set forth to argue both 
for and against the use of performance adjustments. The most oft-cited 
reason for adjusting standards is to “level the playing field,” or to make 
performance management systems as fair as possible by establishing 
expectations that take account of different demographic, economic, and 
other conditions or circumstances outside of public managers’ control 
that influence performance. It has also been argued, however, that it is 
not acceptable to set lower expectations for some programs than others, 
even if they serve more disadvantaged populations or operate in more 
difficult circumstances. For example, do we perpetuate inequities in ed-
ucation if less rigorous standards for reading and math performance are 
established for schools serving poorer children? Or if a single standard 
is set for all, could governments instead direct more resources to those 
programs that face more difficult conditions or disadvantaged popula-
tions to help put them on a more level playing field? 
Another argument of those advocating adjustments to performance 
standards is that they better approximate the value added of programs 
(rather than gross outcome levels or change). For policymakers or pro-
gram managers, having a better understanding of the contributions of 
program activities to performance (net of factors that are not influenced 
by the production or service processes) may contribute to more effective 
use of the performance information to improve program operations and 
management. The use of adjusted performance measures is also more 
likely to discourage (if not eliminate) “gaming” responses, in which 
program managers attempt to influence measured performance in ways 
that do not increase impacts (e.g., by altering who is served and how).
A system that adjusts for population characteristics and other such fac-
tors will reduce the efficacy of these gaming strategies and the misspent 
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effort and resources associated with them. As described below, there is 
ample evidence that workforce investment programs have responded to 
performance management systems by cream skimming from the pool 
of eligible individuals. 
Of course, these benefits may be contingent on program managers 
understanding and having confidence in the adjustment mechanisms. 
Regression-based performance adjustment models have been criticized 
for having low explanatory power (as measured by R2) and flawed 
specifications, suggesting that sometimes adjustments may be biased 
or unreliable. The argument that a low R2 implies that the statistical 
model is not useful is in most cases false. A low R2 means that there is 
a lot of noise in predicting the overall level of the dependent variable, 
not necessarily that the estimates of the effects of specific explanatory 
variables are unreliable. Indeed, one may obtain statistically significant 
coefficients for the adjustment factors even with a low R2, implying that 
there are important factors that have a strong effect on predicted perfor-
mance and should be accounted for in measuring performance. 
While there are merits in the arguments both for and against the 
use of performance adjustments, few public programs appear to even 
consider or attempt to develop adjustments for performance standards. 
Until more experimentation with performance adjustments takes place 
in public programs, we will continue to be limited in our ability to 
understand not only whether they have the potential to improve the ac-
curacy of our performance assessments, but also if they contribute to 
improved performance over time as public managers receive more use-
ful feedback about their programs’ achievements (or failures) and what 
contributes to them. 
In their assessment of adjusting performance standards, Barnow 
and Heinrich (2010) conclude with the following recommendations.
First, policymakers and program managers should, at a minimum, give 
more consideration to the concept of adjusting performance standards.
Specifically, programs should ask if they can make a strong case for 
having the same standard for all jurisdictions or entities regardless of 
the context or circumstances in which they operate. Second, statistical 
modeling should be viewed as one tool in the adjustment process (and 
not the only technique to be applied). There is no single approach to sta-
tistical modeling or to combining statistical analysis with other methods 
such as negotiation or subgroup performance analysis that will work 
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best for all programs. In fact, Barnow and Heinrich (2010) suggest that 
statistical modeling should be viewed as a complement rather than a 
substitute for negotiating performance standards. In Washington State, 
for example, statistical models are a starting point for negotiations of 
local WIA performance standards, and at the national level, the USDOL
is now providing guidance on how changes in circumstances (such as 
the unemployment rate) can affect outcomes. Likewise, if regression 
models produce counterintuitive findings or findings that are contrary 
to other policies of interest, the models, data, and time frame should be 
investigated and refined accordingly or discarded. Finally, the use of 
statistical modeling for performance adjustments does not negate the 
use of other incentives for guiding program managers or the incorpora-
tion of other performance management system features or requirements 
such as “continuous performance improvement.” 
EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT IN WORKFORCE INVESTMENT PROGRAMS 
The ETA has had substantial experience with performance stan-
dards, and a number of studies have been conducted on the impacts of 
performance management on participants served, activities, costs, and 
program impacts. While most analysts note the strong rationale for de-
veloping performance measures for government programs, there has 
been considerable controversy in the literature regarding the benefits 
of performance management systems, particularly as they have been 
applied since enactment of the GPRA in 1993. This section of the re-
port reviews the literature on performance standards for workforce 
programs; most of the research was conducted on the performance stan-
dards system used under JTPA, WIA’s predecessor.9 Although much of 
the literature on performance management points to its salutary effects, 
there is little doubt from the literature that instituting performance stan-
dards can have a strong impact on program behavior, and not always in 
the desired direction. This section summarizes the literature on perfor-
mance standards in employment and training programs in five key areas: 
1) the impact of performance standards on who is served, 2) the impact 
of performance standards on the services provided, 3) the relationship 
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between performance measures and program impacts, 4) strategic re-
sponses by state and local programs to performance standards, and
5) lessons learned by the ETA and states/localities on the use and effects 
of efficiency measures/standards. 
The Impact of Performance Standards on Who Is Served 
The majority of the employment and training literature on perfor-
mance incentives addresses the question of their effect on who gets 
served. Under JTPA, local SDAs had strong incentives to serve persons 
likely to have good labor market outcomes, regardless of whether those 
outcomes were due to JTPA because the performance measures used 
focused on postprogram levels of employment and earnings. Similar 
incentives guide the WIA program. In fact, the absence of a regression 
model to adjust standards for serving individuals with labor market bar-
riers should make these incentives stronger under WIA than they were 
under JTPA. 
The literature divides this issue into two parts. First, do SDAs 
(called WIBs under WIA) respond to these incentives by differentially 
serving persons likely to have good outcomes, whether or not those 
good outcomes result from the effects of the program? This is the litera-
ture on “cream skimming.” Second, if there is cream skimming, what 
are its impact effects? Taking the best among the eligible could be eco-
nomically efficient if the types of services offered by these programs 
have their largest net impacts for this group. In what follows, the litera-
ture on each of these two questions is reviewed. 
Do employment and training programs cream skim? 
Several papers examine whether or not JTPA program staff cream 
skimmed in response to the incentives provided by the JTPA perfor-
mance system. The key issue in this literature is the counterfactual: to 
what group of nonparticipants should the participants be compared in 
order to determine whether or not cream skimming has occurred? In 
all cases, the studies proceed by comparing observable characteristics 
correlated with outcomes, such as education levels or participation in 
transfer programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. A finding that 
participants have “better” characteristics relative to nonparticipants in 
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the form of higher mean years of schooling or lower average prepro-
gram transfer receipt, is interpreted as evidence of cream skimming. 
Anderson et al. (1992) and Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond 
(1993) compare the characteristics of JTPA enrollees in Tennessee in 
1987 with the characteristics of a sample of individuals eligible for 
JTPA in the same state with data constructed from the Current Popu-
lation Survey. The literature suggests that less than 5 percent of the 
eligible population participated in JTPA in each year (see the discus-
sion in Heckman and Smith 1999), which allows wide scope for cream 
skimming. Both papers find modest evidence of cream skimming. In 
particular, the Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993) analysis of 
program participation and postprogram job placement suggests that if 
eligible persons participated at random, the placement rate would have 
been 61.6 percent rather than 70.7 percent, a fall of 9.1 percentage 
points. 
Heckman and Smith (2004) address the issue of self-selection 
versus selection by program staff using data from the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation on JTPA eligibles combined with data 
from the National JTPA Study. They break the participation process 
for JTPA into a series of stages—eligibility, awareness, application and 
acceptance, and participation—and look at the observed determinants 
of going from each stage to the next. They find that some differences 
between program eligibles and participants result primarily from self-
selection at stages of the participation process, such as awareness, over 
which program staff have little or no control. The evidence in Heck-
man and Smith (2004) suggests that while cream skimming may be 
empirically relevant, comparing the eligible population as a whole to 
participants likely overstates its extent, and misses a lot of substantive 
and policy-relevant detail. 
The paper by Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) presents a con-
trasting view. They use data from the Corpus Christi, Texas, SDA, the 
only SDA in the National JTPA Study for which reliable data on all 
program applicants are available for the period during the experiment. 
In their empirical work, they examine whether those applicants who 
reach random assignment (i.e., were selected to participate in the pro-
gram) differ from those who do not in terms of both predicted outcome 
levels (earnings in the 18 months after random assignment) and pre-
dicted program impacts (projected into the future and discounted). The 
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authors find strong evidence of negative selection on levels combined 
with weak evidence for positive selection on impacts. They attribute 
the former to a strong “social worker mentality” toward helping the 
hard-to-serve among the eligible that was evident in interactions with 
program staff at the Corpus Christi site. WIA offers an interesting 
contrast to JTPA because the WIA performance standards are not ad-
justed by a regression model, and they therefore do not hold programs 
harmless for the characteristics of their participants. Because programs 
now have stronger incentives to enroll individuals with few barriers to 
employment, we would expect to observe enrollment shift toward this 
group. An internal (USDOL 2002) study finds that this is precisely what 
appears to be occurring, at least in the area scrutinized: 
A brief survey of States by our Chicago Regional Office indicated 
that WIA registrations were occurring at only half the level of en-
rollment achieved by JTPA. While some of this may be due to start 
up issues, there are indications that the reduced registration levels 
are due to a reluctance in local areas to officially register people in 
WIA because of concerns about their ability to meet performance 
goals, especially the “earnings gain” measure. It appears that local 
areas in these States are selective in whom they will be account-
able for. Some local areas are basing their decisions to register a 
person on the likelihood of success, rather than on an individual’s 
need for services. 
A study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO 
2002) confirms these problems. The GAO report, based on a survey 
of 50 states, indicated “many states reported that the need to meet per-
formance levels may be the driving factor in deciding who receives 
WIA-funded services at the local level.” 
Overall, the literature provides modest evidence that program staff 
responded to the incentives provided by the JTPA performance stan-
dards system to choose participants likely to improve their measured 
performance whether or not they benefited from program services, and 
studies of the implementation of WIA indicate that, if anything, the sit-
uation has been exacerbated by the performance management system 
used for WIA. At the same time, the evidence from the Corpus Christi 
SDA indicates that staff concerns about serving the hard-to-serve could 
trump the performance incentives in some contexts. 
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What are the impact implications of cream skimming? 
A number of studies have examined the efficiency implications of 
cream skimming by estimating the correlation between performance 
measures and program impacts. Barnow and Smith (2004) summarize 
the evidence from the seven studies that comprise this literature. The 
seven papers examine a variety of different programs, ranging from the 
MDTA program of the 1960s to the Job Corps program of today. Most 
rely on experimental data for their impact estimates. With one excep-
tion (Zornitsky et al. 1988), the findings are negative or mixed regarding 
the relationship between outcome-based performance measures of the 
type typically used in employment and training programs and program 
impacts. The Zornitsky et al. findings refer to a program, the AFDC 
Homemaker–Home Health Aide Demonstration, which differs from 
programs such as JTPA and WIA in that it provided a homogeneous 
treatment to a relatively homogeneous population. Taken together, the 
literature clearly indicates that, in the context of employment and train-
ing programs, commonly used performance measures do not improve 
program impact by inducing service to those who will benefit most. At 
the same time, the literature indicates that cream skimming likely has a 
very small effect, if any, on program earnings impact. 
Effects of Performance Incentives on Services Provided 
At least two papers examine the effect of performance incentives on 
the types and duration of services offered in an employment and train-
ing program, holding constant the characteristics of persons served.10 
Marschke’s (2002) analysis uses the variation in performance incen-
tives facing the training centers in the National JTPA Study to identify 
the effects of performance incentives on the types of services received 
by JTPA participants. Marschke (2002) finds evidence that changes in 
the performance measures employed in JTPA led SDAs to alter the mix 
of services provided in ways that would improve their performance rel-
ative to the altered incentives they faced. In some cases, these changes
led to increases in efficiency, but in others they did not. Marschke 
(2002) interprets his evidence as indicating that SDAs’ service choices 
are responsive at the margin, but that existing performance measures 
do a poor job of capturing program goals such as maximizing the (net) 
impacts of the services provided. 
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More recently, Courty and Marschke (2004) demonstrate that the 
JTPA performance management system affects the duration of train-
ing for some participants because program managers manipulate the 
duration of services for some participants in order to be able to count 
them on their performance measures for a specific program year. Courty 
and Marschke (2004) find that these manipulations reduced the over-
all mean impact of the employment and training services provided by 
JTPA. 
Relationship between Performance Measures and Program Impact 
Performance measures for a program may be of intrinsic interest, 
or they may be a proxy for some underlying factor of interest that is not 
easy to measure in a relatively quick and inexpensive manner. For ex-
ample, Blalock and Barnow (2001) note that programs may wish to use 
program impact as a performance measure, but accurately measuring 
impact requires many years and the presence of a randomly assigned 
control group or a carefully selected comparison group. Because this is 
not generally compatible with obtaining quick, inexpensive measures, 
programs often rely on proxy measures such as postprogram earnings 
or the pre-post change in earnings. If the goal is to have performance 
measures serve as a proxy for impact, then it is necessary to assess how 
well the types of measures that are practical and have been used for the 
JTPA and WIA programs correspond with program impact. 
Two studies have explored this issue for JTPA in recent years, and 
another study looked at the Job Corps. Barnow (2000) and Heckman, 
Heinrich, and Smith (2002) both made use of the fact that the National 
JTPA Study provided experimental impact findings in 16 local areas and 
included the data needed to construct performance measures similar to 
those used by ETA. However, the approach used to measure perfor-
mance does not include a control group or even a comparison group, 
so it is not surprising that the performance measures used are at best 
weakly correlated with program impact.11 
The recent evaluation of the Job Corps that was based on a classical 
experimental design provided Schochet and Burghardt (2008) with an 
opportunity to analyze how closely the Job Corps’s performance stan-
dards track the program’s impacts. Job Corps is a primarily residential 
program for highly disadvantaged out-of-school youth. Schochet and 
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Burghardt indicate that during the evaluation period, program years 
1994 through 1996, the performance measures included eight mea-
sures in three broad areas: 1) program achievement (reading and math 
gains, GED attainment rate, and vocational completion rate); 2) place-
ment measures (placement rate, average wage at placement, and the 
percentage of placements related to training); and 3) quality/compli-
ance measures (ratings of federal monitors). Because of the random 
assignment used to assign treatment status, impact can be estimated 
as the difference between treatment and control group values on the 
outcome measures. Schochet and Burghardt (2008) compare program 
impacts for Job Corps centers ranked in each third of the performance 
distribution. They conclude, “Our results indicate that at the time of the 
National Job Corps Study, measured center performance was not asso-
ciated with impacts on key education, crime, and earnings outcomes.” 
Strategic Responses to Performance Incentives 
In addition to the substantive responses to performance incentives 
considered above, in which local programs changed what they actually 
did, local programs can also attempt to change their measured perfor-
mance without changing their actual performance. This behavior is 
referred to as a strategic response, or as “gaming” the performance sys-
tem. Regardless of their differing goals, all types of organizations have 
an incentive to respond strategically to performance incentives, pro-
vided the cost is low, as doing so yields additional resources to further 
their own goals. The literature provides clear evidence of such gaming 
behavior under JTPA. 
One important form of strategic behavior under JTPA was the ma-
nipulation of whether or not participants were formally enrolled. Under 
the JTPA incentive system (and WIA as well), only persons formally
enrolled counted toward site performance. In addition, for the first 
decade of JTPA’s existence, local programs had substantial flexibility 
in regard to when someone became formally enrolled. Clever SDAs 
improved their performance by basing enrollments on job placements 
rather than the initiation of services. For example, some SDAs boosted 
performance by providing job search assistance without formally en-
rolling those receiving it in the program. Then, if an individual found 
a job, the person would be enrolled, counted as a placement, and ter-
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minated, all in quick succession. Similarly, SDAs would send potential 
trainees to employers to see if the employer would approve them for an 
on-the-job training slot; enrollment would not take place until a willing 
employer was found. 
There are several pieces of evidence regarding the empirical impor-
tance of this phenomenon. The first is indirect, and consists of the fact 
that USDOL found it enough of a problem to change the regulations. 
Specifically, in 1992, the USDOL required that individuals become en-
rolled once they received objective assessment and that they count as a 
participant for performance standards purposes once they received any 
substantive service, including job search assistance. 
Other evidence comes from the National JTPA Study. As part of 
their process analysis of the treatments provided at the 16 SDAs in the 
study, Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993) conducted interviews of 
nonenrolled members of the experimental treatment group at 12 of the 
16 sites. These results (available in Table 3.2 of their report) show that 
53 percent of nonenrolled treatment group members received services, 
most often referrals to employers for possible on-the-job training (36 
percent of all nonenrollees) and job search assistance (20 percent of all 
nonenrollees). They report that “. . . most of the study sites enrolled in-
dividuals in classroom training when they attended their first class or in 
OJT when they worked their first day.” There is also evidence that this 
type of behavior has continued under WIA. The U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office (2002, p. 14) notes that “all the states we visited told 
us that local areas are not registering many WIA participants, largely at-
tributing the low number of WIA participants to concerns by local staff 
about meeting performance levels.” 
The flexibility of JTPA also allowed strategic manipulation of the 
termination decision. Because performance standards in JTPA were 
based on exiters, SDAs had no incentive to terminate individuals from 
the program who were not successfully placed in a job. By keeping 
them on the rolls, the person’s lack of success would never be recog-
nized and used against the SDA in measuring its performance. As the 
USDOL explains in one of its guidance letters, “Without some policy 
on termination, performance standards create strong incentives for local 
programs to avoid terminating failures even when individuals no longer 
have any contact with the program.”12 
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Problems with local programs retaining participants on the rolls 
long after they stopped receiving services go back to the days of JTPA’s
predecessor, CETA. In one of their guidance letters, the USDOL
observed that “monitors and auditors found that some participants con-
tinued to be carried in an ‘active’ or ‘inactive’ status for two or three 
years after last contact with these programs.” For Title II-A of JTPA, 
the USDOL limited the period of inactivity to 90 days, although some 
commentators suggested periods of 180 days or more.13 
The ETA’s Experience with Efficiency Measures 
The ETA also has previous experience with efficiency standards un-
der JTPA. Under the original JTPA statute, Section 106(b)(4) required 
that efficiency measures be prescribed for the JTPA Adult Program and 
that the efficiency measures be related to the outcome measures used. 
The National Commission for Employment Policy (NCEP) commis-
sioned an evaluation of the effects of JTPA performance standards on 
participants, services, and costs (see Dickinson et al. [1988]). The study 
included quantitative statistical analysis of JTPA Annual Status Report 
data linked to data on the characteristics of local program areas, as well 
as qualitative analysis based on interviews with 30 local programs and 
87 service providers in eight states. 
For the most part, the study found that the JTPA performance 
standards had the desired effects of holding programs harmless for dif-
ferences in participant characteristics and local economic conditions. 
However, the study found that the cost standards had intrinsic problems 
and created some undesirable effects on participants served: 
This evaluation found that the federal standards for the entered 
employment rate and wage rate for adults generally did not have 
unintended effects on clients or services . . . The federal cost stan-
dards, however, had the most unintended effects and were the 
least comparably measured of all the federal performance mea-
sures. The evaluation found that SDAs in states that placed more 
weight on the federal cost standard tended to serve fewer hard-
to-serve clients and that [local areas] concerned about exceeding 
the cost standards tended to design less intensive services. At the 
same time, this evaluation found serious measurement problems 
with the cost standards. We found large differences in the extent 
to which [local programs] were leveraging JTPA funds, either by 
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using funds from other programs to help fund JTPA Title II-A pro-
grams or by using service providers that had alternative funding 
sources. As a result, it is difficult to compare the cost of services 
received by JTPA participants across local programs. (p. 5) 
Based on their findings from both the quantitative and qualitative 
components of the study, the authors recommended that alternatives 
to the cost measures be explored. The authors note that as a result of 
concern about the unintended impacts of the cost standards, the ETA
set more lenient cost standards in PY 1988, but they conclude that this 
policy change would not eliminate the disincentive problems in states 
that emphasize exceeding rather than meeting standards. In response to 
the research findings, the NCEP made a number of recommendations 
for changing the statutory provisions of JTPA dealing with performance 
standards. Taking note of the study’s findings regarding the undesir-
able incentives and comparability of cost issues, the commission’s first 
recommendation was that “. . . Section 106(b)(4), which requires the 
Secretary [of Labor] to prescribe performance standards relating gross 
program expenditures to various performance measures, be amended to 
direct that cost-efficiency be monitored by states.” 
In August 1992, the JTPA statute was amended, and the amend-
ments repealed the federal requirement for efficiency standards and 
prohibited governors from using efficiency standards in making awards 
to local areas. WIA has no prohibitions against the use of cost stan-
dards, and in response to requests by the OMB, the USDOL currently 
has a contractor exploring the use of cost measures for 11 workforce 
programs administered by the ETA. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
This final section presents conclusions based on the research and 
lessons I suggest for countries about to introduce a performance mea-
surement system for its workforce investment programs. 
Do not confuse performance measurement with program eval-
uation. Performance measurement is used as a management tool, and it 
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cannot and should not be expected to serve as a substitute for program 
evaluation. Performance must be monitored on a continuous basis to 
assess whether key elements of the program are being implemented as 
planned and if immediate program outcomes are consistent with the 
long-term results expected. As a management tool, performance mea-
surement should provide quick feedback on the operation of a program, 
but in most cases, performance measures cannot and do not measure 
program impacts. 
There are often good reasons to adjust performance standards 
to take account of program goals, participant characteristics, and 
environmental conditions. Performance is generally a function of 
many factors, so it is likely that programs in different locations will vary 
in important ways that can affect their performance. U.S. programs that 
use adjustment mechanisms refer to the adjustments as “leveling the 
playing field”—an effort to judge programs in different circumstances 
appropriately. When WIA abandoned the statistically based adjustment 
procedures used for the predecessor JTPA program, the states and local 
governments indicated strong dissatisfaction with the new approach. 
Programs need not have the same performance measures or
standards. In the United States, the OMB has attempted to impose 
common measures on all programs with a workforce orientation. 
The programs often differ, however, in significant ways, and there is 
no reason why programs with different participants, activities, and/or 
economic conditions should necessarily have identical measures. For 
example, the Senior Community Service Employment Program, some-
times referred to as the Older Worker program, provides community 
service opportunities to poor older individuals who would like to work. 
It can be debated whether placement in an unsubsidized job is a good 
measure of performance for the program, but it is very unlikely that 
if the entered employment rate is used as a measure that the standard 
should be the same for programs serving customers with fewer barriers 
to employment. 
Be cautious in establishing performance measures with large 
rewards and/or sanctions. This is an extremely important lesson from 
the literature on U.S. workforce investment program performance man-
agement research. The literature on performance management for U.S. 
workforce programs clearly indicates that the measures are sometimes 
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only weakly related to outcomes of interest such as program impact and 
that state and local programs can manipulate their data to raise their 
measured performance without actually increasing the value of what 
they do—in short, they spend resources trying to look good instead of 
doing good. Worse, there is strong evidence that programs sometimes 
engage in cream skimming and reduce their services to those most in 
need. Thus, for workforce programs it is wise to avoid “high stakes” 
performance measures if the programs can behave strategically to affect 
their measured performance. 
The U.S. experience indicates that too much emphasis on ef-
ficiency can lead to programs avoiding customers who require 
expensive service strategies and to too much emphasis on less ex-
pensive service strategies. Research on the use of cost measures for 
U.S. workforce investment programs indicates that in the past there 
was widespread agreement that cost measures led to deleterious con-
sequences. Efficiency is, however, a very important goal, particularly 
when past studies have indicated that only a small fraction of those 
eligible for workforce programs can be served at current budget levels. 
Thus, the current concern about taking cost into consideration when 
measuring the performance of workforce programs is appropriate. The 
question is how best to balance the need to use resources efficiently 
with the knowledge that placing too much emphasis on cost issues can 
lead to providing the wrong mix of services. I would recommend moni-
toring and discussing efficiency with those who perform poorly on such 
measures, but given the negative experiences with the use of cost mea-
sures for workforce programs in the United States, I would recommend 
against establishing formal efficiency measures. 
Performance management is still in a formative stage; legisla-
tion should not be overly prescriptive on the measures, standards, 
and incentives. Deliberations on the structure of the performance 
management system should include input by all the relevant stake-
holders. When performance management was first introduced in the 
U.S. workforce investment system, meetings involving representatives 
of states, localities, training providers, academics, and others were held 
over the course of several years before a formal system with rewards 
and sanctions was implemented. This process paved the way for statis-
tical models to be used to adjust for variations across states and local 
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areas. Over time, these work groups explored changes, such as using 
longer-term measures and using administrative data rather than sur-
vey data. The inclusionary process helped lead those involved to have 
a voice in the system and led them to support the resulting system. 
In contrast, when the performance management system was changed 
significantly for the implementation of the WIA program with little if 
any discussion with stakeholders, there was a strong rejection of the 
new system. Performance measures are much less likely to drive per-
formance in the manner intended if those being graded consider the 
system grossly unfair. 
Notes 
1. The performance management system for JTPA required local programs to 
classify at least 65 percent of participants served as “hard to serve” to qualify for 
performance bonuses. 
2. The JTPA Advisory Committee explicitly rejected the idea of dictating process 
to state and local governments: “In the business world, it is now widely accepted 
that the excellent companies define their expected results explicitly, and tightly 
measure performance against them, while allowing their producers to have 
discretion in how they attain those results. We suggest that JTPA emulate this 
model” (JTPA Advisory Committee 1989, p. 27). 
3. In the United States, data on employment and earnings for workforce programs 
come from administrative data maintained by states to determine eligibility and 
benefit levels for unemployment insurance. Such data are not perfect, though, 
as self-employment earnings and off-the-books employment (and sometimes 
employment in other states or for government) are not covered. It is inexpensive 
to use relative to conducting a survey, and it avoids recall issues. 
4. During this period the Work Incentive Program (WIN), which provided 
employment and training services to welfare recipients, also had a performance 
management system that distributed some of the funding to states based on their 
success on measures such as welfare grant reductions, the entered employment 
rate, wage rates of WIN participants who obtained jobs, and job retention. See 
U.S. GAO (1982). 
5. For a discussion of the JTPA performance management system in its later years, 
see Social Policy Research Associates (1999). 
6. See Training and Employment Guidance Letter 17-05, Attachment A. Available 
at http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEGL17-05_AttachA.pdf (accessed on 
October 24, 2009). 
7. This section is based on Barnow and Heinrich (2010). 
8. See Social Policy Research Associates (2004) and Barnow and King (2005) for a 
discussion of state and local perceptions of performance management under WIA. 
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9. For a more in-depth review of the literature on performance standards in workforce 
programs, see Barnow and Smith (2004); most of this section is based on Barnow 
and Smith (2004). For a critical review of the performance management movement, 
see Radin (2006). 
10. The effects of cost standards on services are covered in a later section. 
11. A related problem is that performance measures must use short-term postprogram 
earnings to measure performance, but the impact of a program is best measured 
over a longer period. Barnow and Smith (2004) review the literature on the 
relationship between short-term earnings impacts and long-term impacts, and they 
find that most studies find a very weak relationship between the two. 
12. SeeTEIN,5-93,availableat:http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.cfm?DOCN=770. 
13. Pascal Courty and Gerald Marschke conducted several studies that verify gaming 
behavior by local programs participating in the National JTPA Study. See Barnow 
and Smith (2004) for a review of these studies. 
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Recent Advances in Performance 
Measurement of Federal Workforce 
Development Programs 
Randall W. Eberts 
Timothy J. Bartik 
Wei-Jang Huang 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
The purpose of performance measurement is to enable federal, state, 
and local workforce agencies to track the progress of program partici-
pants in achieving the core goals of programs under WIA: finding a job, 
retaining a job, and receiving adequate earnings. Performance measures 
are also used to hold management accountable for the effectiveness of 
the services delivered to help participants achieve those goals. The ETA
has established three measures to capture these three goals for adult and 
youth programs: 1) entered employment, 2) job retention, and 3) earn-
ings levels. Each state negotiates with the USDOL to set state targets, 
and the states in turn negotiate with each of the roughly 600 local Work-
force Investment Boards (WIBs) to determine local performance targets.
As this practice of setting standards evolved over the past decade, 
states and WIBs increasingly found that negotiations were not taking 
into account factors that affected their performance but were beyond 
their control and not related to the services they provided. These fac-
tors include the conditions of the local labor market and the personal 
characteristics and work history of participants in their programs. With-
out accounting for differences in these factors across states and across 
WIBs, those entities with more favorable labor market conditions or 
more capable participants are likely to have higher outcomes, and those 
for which these factors are unfavorable can expect lower outcomes. 
Differences in these outcomes are not the result of how well service 
providers have met the needs of their customers, but of factors outside 
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their control and extraneous to the effectiveness of their service deliv-
ery. Therefore, the measures are not fulfilling their intent of measuring 
the value added of the workforce system, and may even distort deci-
sions by administrators of whom to enroll in workforce programs. 
In response to these concerns about the measurement and setting of 
performance goals, the ETA has contracted with the W.E. Upjohn Insti-
tute for Employment Research to adjust national performance targets 
for differences (actual and forecasted) in unemployment rates. To make 
adjustments, the Institute estimated the relationship between individual 
participants’ performance outcomes and local unemployment rates. 
These adjustments are incorporated in President Obama’s annual bud-
get request and the national performance targets.1 
In addition, the ETA, through the help of the Upjohn Institute, is 
exploring procedures to adjust state and local WIA performance targets 
for factors that affect performance outcomes but are outside the control 
of state and local administrators. This procedure provides a system-
atic, transparent, and objective method to set WIA performance targets; 
it helps to level the playing field by making the targets neutral with 
respect to the observed characteristics of WIA participants and of the 
local labor market conditions in which they seek employment. It also 
provides a more accurate measure of the value added of WIA programs 
at both state and local levels by controlling for observed factors that 
affect outcomes but are unrelated to the services provided by the work-
force development system. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the two procedures of 
adjusting performance targets for economic conditions and personal 
characteristics. The first procedure adjusts the national performance 
targets for changes in unemployment rate, and the second adjusts state 
and local performance targets for differences in local market conditions 
and personal characteristics. The contribution of both sets of factors is 
estimated using one general model that relates performance outcomes 
(the common measures) to unemployment rates and personal attributes. 
The chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part describes the 
general methodology and then provides estimates of these effects for 
each of the common measures for each of the three WIA programs. The 
second part demonstrates how these estimates can be used to adjust 
performance outcomes at the national and state levels for differences 
in these factors. 
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ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENCES IN LABOR MARKET
CONDITIONS AND PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES 
Adjusting for differences in labor market conditions and personal 
characteristics is not new for the workforce system programs. WIA’s 
immediate predecessor, JTPA, used statistical analysis to adjust per-
formance targets for a list of factors which were deemed outside the 
control of administrators. The adjustment procedure that the ETA has 
adopted to adjust national performance measures and that the ETA is 
considering to adjust state and local performance targets is similar in 
many respects to what was followed under JTPA.2 For each program 
and performance measure, a state’s targets are set according to the 
extent to which the values of participant characteristics and of local 
labor market measures at the state level differ from those at the national 
level. The difference for each factor is weighted by each factor’s con-
tribution to the respective performance outcome. The summation of 
the weighted differences constitutes the adjustment factor. Adding the 
adjustment factor to the national target yields the adjusted performance 
target for each state. Consequently, under this procedure, a state serv-
ing a hard-to-serve population would be given a lower performance 
standard than a state serving a less hard-to-serve population, all else 
the same. Although the targets for these two states are set at different 
levels, it presumably takes the same level of effort on the part of each 
state to meet their respective standards. Thus, local administrators are 
not penalized for serving a harder-to-employ group of participants. The 
major differences between this procedure and that used under JTPA are 
the way in which the weights are estimated and the consistent frame-
work that allows the local workforce investment areas (LWIAs) and 
state targets to add up to the national target. JTPA adjustments were 
based on data aggregated at the local workforce board level; the current 
procedure is based initially on the outcomes of individual participants 
of the workforce programs, as they search for employment within their 
local labor markets. 
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METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
The study derives direct estimates of the effects of unemployment 
rates on performance measures for various programs using detailed data 
of WIA participants.3 As a result, the estimates capture actual relation-
ships between changes in unemployment rates and performance. Esti-
mates are based on the experience of individual participants in the local 
labor markets in which they are searching for employment. Using data 
at the local level provides a much stronger correspondence between 
the labor market outcomes of program participants and the economic 
conditions they are facing. As data become more aggregated, such as 
at the state or national level, the alignment weakens, since the eco-
nomic conditions of local labor markets vary widely from the state and 
national averages. The conditions faced by individuals looking for work 
in Detroit, Michigan, are much different from those seeking employ-
ment in Grand Rapids, Michigan, just as the conditions are much differ-
ent, on average, for individuals in Illinois versus those in Texas. Using 
individual participant data also provides the ability to control for dif-
ferences in the demographic characteristics of individuals. To isolate 
the effects of unemployment rates on performance, it would be ideal 
to place an identical person in each of the labor markets to observe 
his or her outcomes. Controlling for differences in educational attain-
ment, prior employment history, and perceived barriers to employment 
through statistical means moves the analysis closer to that ideal situa-
tion. The data used to estimate these relationships are obtained from the 
WIA Standardized Record Data (WIASRD). Data are obtained quar-
terly from the years 2000–2008. The exact length of time depends upon 
the program and performance measure. 
Estimation methodology 
Separate estimates are obtained for the following programs within 
WIA: Adult, Dislocated Worker, and Youth. Estimates of the effect 
of unemployment rates on performance measures are robust across 
the various programs and appear reasonable in the magnitude of their 
impact. Results reveal a negative relationship between unemployment 
rates and both entered employment rate and retention rate, which are 
statistically significant. For these two performance measures, estimates 
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range from a reduction of 1.0 percentage point to a reduction of 1.8 
percentage points for an increase of a 1.0-percentage-point change in 
unemployment rates. This can be interpreted in the following way: an 
estimate of −1.8 means that a 1.0-percentage-point change in the unem-
ployment rate, say, from 6 percent to 7 percent, is expected to reduce 
the entered employment rate by 1.8 percentage points. If the entered 
employment rate was 70 percent at an unemployment rate of 6 percent, 
then an increase in the unemployment rate from 6 to 7 percent would 
lower the expected entered employment rate from 70.0 percent to 68.2 
percent.4 
Estimates of the relationship between program outcomes and busi-
ness cycles were conducted at the local labor market level, as defined by 
the Workforce Investment Board (WIB) service area. A separate model 
is estimated for each performance measure in each program. The esti-
mation equation is written generally as 
(9.1) = B
0
 + B
1
 + B
2
*D  + error term,Y
isq 
*X
isq sq 
where Y is the outcome variable for individual i in WIBs (counties) in 
year-quarter q, X denotes the person’s individual attributes, and D is the 
local unemployment rate in WIBs (counties) during year-quarter q. B
represents the estimated coefficients. 
Of specific interest is the estimated coefficient B
2
, which shows 
the statistical relationship between unemployment rates (D) and the 
performance-related outcomes (Y). In order to account for the possibil-
ity that the effects are not contemporaneous, we tested several lag struc-
tures. We settled on a lag structure that enters the unemployment rates 
in the quarter in which the performance target is recorded. For example, 
retention rate is measured the second and third quarter after exit. There-
fore, for the estimation of the effect of unemployment rates on reten-
tion rates, we entered the unemployment rates that corresponded with 
the second and third quarters after exit for each individual. In addition, 
since retention represents a change in status from holding a job to not 
holding one, we used the change in unemployment rates from quarter 
to quarter to reflect the changing labor market conditions on keeping a 
job. For the average earnings measure, which is defined as the earnings 
in the second and third quarters after exit, the unemployment rates are 
entered for those two quarters plus the first quarter after exit, since the 
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participant had to be employed the first quarter to be counted in this 
measure.5 For the “credentials and employment” performance measure, 
the effects over four quarters (from the quarter of exit through the third 
quarter after exit) are used to estimate the effect of unemployment rates. 
Therefore, for performance measures that span more than one quarter, 
the full effect of unemployment rates on the measure is computed by 
adding the coefficients on the unemployment rates for each relevant 
quarter. The statistical significance is estimated using a t-test for the 
combined effects of the relevant coefficients.6 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if the outcome is achieved and 0 if not. For example, entered 
employment is defined as having positive earnings in the first quar-
ter after exit. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 for individu-
als for whom positive earnings are observed in their wage record for 
that quarter, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the samples include two types of 
outcomes—1 or 0—and not a continuous range of percentages. There-
fore, the effect of unemployment rates on entered employment is esti-
mated as the effect of unemployment rates on the probability of finding 
employment (e.g., achieving a 1). Aggregating the effects across the 
sample of individuals included in the analysis translates the results from 
the effect on the probability of getting a job to the effect on the percent-
age of people entering employment, which is the performance measure 
for the WIA system. 
In addition to the unemployment rate as an explanatory variable 
in the estimation equation, individual characteristics of participants, as 
denoted by the Xs, are also included in the equation. These variables 
include measures of education, age, race/ethnicity, disability, gender, 
and employment history prior to registration. Most of these variables 
are entered as categorical variables. Since characteristics affect the per-
formance measures and these characteristics may change over a busi-
ness cycle, it is important to control for these variables in order to iso-
late the net effect of business cycles on performance. 
For simplicity and ease of computation, the models are estimated 
using linear probability models, even when the dependent variable is 
a 0-1 variable.7 Logit and probit estimation techniques are generally 
recommended for estimating equations with 0-1 dependent variables. 
However, using logit or probit makes it more difficult to interpret 
results and creates some complexities in calculating adjustments. For 
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example, because logit and probit are nonlinear models, the adjustment 
factor cannot be calculated using sample means of local areas but rather 
requires calculating probabilities for all observations using the full 
set of data. Econometricians have shown that the drawbacks of linear 
probability models, compared with logit and probit techniques, may be 
minimal.8 A fixed-effects model is estimated by including 0-1 variables 
for each of the WIBs. The fixed-effects model controls for idiosyncratic 
differences between each of the units (e.g., WIBs or states). By includ-
ing these 0-1 variables, the estimation captures the response of program 
participants to changes in unemployment rates over time and not the 
long-run differences across local labor markets (as represented by WIB 
service areas or states). This response to short-run changes in unem-
ployment rates over time is the response we are trying to predict during 
the next few years, as the economy moves through this business cycle. 
Zero-one variables indicating the year and quarter are also included 
to control for national time trends. Zero-one variables indicating the 
quarter (regardless of year) are entered to capture seasonal variation 
in the performance measures that may be due to regular occurrences 
throughout the year, such as shopping patterns and plant closings to 
retool for new products.9 
Although the database includes tens of thousands of participants 
(generating variation in the dependent variable), the unemployment rate 
varies only at the WIB level. Therefore, in all cases, more than one indi-
vidual participant experiences the same unemployment rate at the same 
time in the same local labor market. In addition, because these indi-
viduals are within one labor market (one grouping of individuals), there 
may be intragroup correlation. With the possible presence of intragroup 
correlation and fewer relevant observations (than the total), the typical 
computation of standard errors of the coefficients may be biased. To cor-
rect for this we use cluster sandwich estimators, a standard procedure 
in the statistical analysis package that we employ.10 However, we do 
not take into consideration the possibility of spatial correlation between 
the geographical units, which could arise from interregional linkages of 
industries (supply chains) and household commuting patterns. 
Data sources and variable definitions 
For the WIA programs, participant outcomes and attributes are 
derived from the WIASRD. This allows us to consider the program 
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outcomes from the third quarter of 2000 (which is the beginning of 
PY2001) to the most recent data available, third quarter 2007. 
The variable definitions, taken directly from WIASRD, are dis-
played in Appendix 9A (see Social Policy Research Associates [2008]). 
WIASRD includes for each WIA participant a host of personal charac-
teristics, employment outcomes, and educational outcomes (e.g., cre-
dentials and attainment of degree or certification). It also includes a 
selected set of services received through the workforce programs and 
participation in other non-WIA programs, such as cash assistance and 
unemployment insurance. 
Unemployment rates were collected monthly at either the WIB 
level or the county level from the first quarter of 2000 to the first quar-
ter of 2008. During that time, the national unemployment rates varied 
from 4.0 (2000) to 6.0 (2003) on an annual basis and from 3.6 (Octo-
ber 2000) to 6.5 (January and June 2003) on a seasonally unadjusted 
monthly basis. It was not until December 2008 that the monthly season-
ally unadjusted unemployment rate exceeded the rates posted during 
2003. However, this variation at the national level does not reflect the 
breadth of experience in local labor conditions across the thousands 
of counties and the hundreds of WIBs. During that time, unemploy-
ment rates among counties with total employment of more than 100,000 
ranged from 1.1 to 14.9 percent, as shown in Figure 9.1.11 Therefore, 
despite the relatively tight band of unemployment rates at the national 
level, the estimates of the effect of unemployment rates on labor market 
outcomes of program participants are based on a broad range of unem-
ployment rates and occur at levels that are more than double what we 
experienced in the recent deep recession. 
ESTIMATION 
Each performance measure for each WIA program was estimated 
by separate regressions. The equations are similar with respect to the 
explanatory variables included, except for the way in which the unem-
ployment variables are entered. The full results are reported by major 
program. For the sake of brevity, the results for the WIAAdult program 
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Figure 9.1  Range of Unemployment Rates for All U.S. Counties, 2000– 
2008 quarterly 
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NOTE: The bold dot is the median unemployment rate for all counties for each quarter. 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years. 
are explained in detail and the results from the other two programs are 
displayed in Appendix 9B.12 
Four performance measures are included in the analysis for the WIA
Adult worker program. The means and standard deviations of the vari-
ables are displayed in Table 9.1 for each of the performance measures. 
The reason for the slight difference in sample statistics is that the per-
formance measure definitions do not include the same participants. This 
is due to the number of quarters of earnings required to construct the 
performance measure, and to the definitions themselves. For example, 
entered employment and retention are computed from different groups 
of individuals, for several reasons. Entered employment requires that 
the participant not have worked at the time of registration; retention 
includes both those who worked and those who did not work. Retention 
requires wage record information for two quarters after exit; entered 
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Table 9.1  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in WIA
Adult Estimation 
WIA Adult 
Entered Average Credential and 
employment Retention earnings employment 
Dependent 
variable 
female 
black_female 
age20 
age21 
age26_35 
age36_45 
age46_55 
age56_65 
agegt65 
hispanic 
asian 
black 
hi_pacific 
indian 
multi 
lths 
ba 
beyondba 
0.762 
(0.426) 
0.554 
(0.497) 
0.191 
(0.393) 
0.288 
(0.453) 
0.249 
(0.432) 
0.158 
(0.365) 
0.049 
(0.217) 
0.007 
(0.083) 
0.229 
(0.420) 
0.036 
(0.186) 
0.342 
(0.475) 
0.003 
(0.052) 
0.006 
(0.080) 
0.015 
(0.123) 
0.178 
(0.382) 
0.067 
(0.250) 
0.016 
(0.126) 
0.838 11,643 0.534 
(0.369) (8,306) (0.499) 
0.573 0.586 0.571 
(0.495) (0.493) (0.495) 
0.188 0.190 0.193 
(0.391) (0.392) (0.394) 
0.300 0.303 0.300 
(0.458) (0.459) (0.458) 
0.245 0.245 0.244 
(0.430) (0.430) (0.430) 
0.147 0.148 0.143 
(0.354) (0.355) (0.350) 
0.043 0.041 0.043 
(0.202) (0.199) (0.202) 
0.005 0.004 0.005 
(0.068) (0.063) (0.073) 
0.224 0.226 0.215 
(0.417) (0.418) (0.411) 
0.035 0.037 0.037 
(0.184) (0.188) (0.188) 
0.317 0.308 0.326 
(0.465) (0.462) (0.469) 
0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) 
0.007 0.006 0.008 
(0.081) (0.079) (0.088) 
0.013 0.013 0.008 
(0.114) (0.113) (0.088) 
0.150 0.137 0.159 
(0.357) (0.343) (0.366) 
0.070 0.073 0.063 
(0.254) (0.260) (0.243) 
0.016 0.016 0.015 
(0.125) (0.126) (0.120) 
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Table 9.1  (continued) 
WIA Adult 
Entered Average Credential and 
employment Retention earnings employment 
somecoll 
ged 
cert 
otherpostdegcert 
assoc 
disabled 
veteran 
empreg11 
empreg10 
empreg01 
wp 
exit_wib_ur 
f1_wib_ur 
f2_wib_ur 
f3_wib_ur 
diff12 
diff23 
N 
0.176 
(0.381) 
0.064 
(0.245) 
0.000 
(0.019) 
0.008 
(0.088) 
0.013 
(0.115) 
0.118 
(0.323) 
0.071 
(0.256) 
0.452 
(0.498) 
0.076 
(0.264) 
0.091 
(0.288) 
0.363 
(0.481) 
6.182 
1.989 
429,329 
0.193 
(0.395) 
0.061 
(0.240) 
0.000 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.081) 
0.011 
(0.103) 
0.118 
(0.323) 
0.064 
(0.245) 
0.550 
(0.498) 
0.074 
(0.261) 
0.081 
(0.273) 
0.343 
(0.475) 
0.000 
(0.819) 
–0.034 
(0.794) 
400,523 
0.200 
(0.400) 
0.057 
(0.232) 
0.000 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.083) 
0.012 
(0.107) 
0.115 
(0.319) 
0.062 
(0.241) 
0.586 
(0.493) 
0.070 
(0.256) 
0.078 
(0.268) 
0.349 
(0.477) 
6.052 
(1.951) 
6.045 
(1.974) 
6.009 
(1.985) 
310,066 
0.180 
(0.384) 
0.065 
(0.247) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.053) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
0.095 
(0.294) 
0.062 
(0.242) 
0.513 
(0.500) 
0.073 
(0.260) 
0.082 
(0.274) 
0.261 
(0.439) 
6.294 
(2.096) 
6.360 
(2.085) 
395,240 
SOURCE: WIASRD and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
  
 
244 Eberts, Bartik, and Huang 
employment requires such information for only one quarter after exit. 
Thus, retention cannot be computed at the same time as entered employ-
ment for the same set of individuals, since the second-quarter earnings 
have not yet been determined. 
Estimates of the factors that are expected to affect the four perfor-
mance measures are displayed in Table 9.2. Most of the coefficients 
are statistically significant and have the expected sign, including the 
unemployment rates. For example, the estimated relationship between 
entered employment and unemployment rates is −0.018. An estimate 
of −0.018 means that a 1.0-percentage-point change in the unemploy-
ment rate—say, from 6 percent to 7 percent—is expected to reduce the 
entered employment rate by 0.018 percentage points. If the entered 
employment rate was 0.70 (the dependent variable is measured as a rate 
[0.70], not as a percentage [70.0 percent]) at an unemployment rate of 6 
percent, then an increase of the unemployment rate from 6 to 7 percent 
would lower the expected entered employment rate from 0.70 to 0.682. 
If the unemployment rate doubled, then the entered employment rate 
would fall by −0.036 points (2 × −0.018). 
A similar relationship is found for retention. In this case the unem-
ployment rate is entered as a change from one quarter to the next, as 
indicated by the variables diff12, the change in unemployment rates 
from the first quarter after exit to the second quarter after exit, and 
diff23, the change in unemployment rates from the second quarter after 
exit to the third quarter after exit. Since the performance measure for 
retention spans two quarters, the full effect of unemployment rates is 
estimated by adding together the two coefficients. The sum of the two 
coefficients is shown at the bottom of the table along with the t-test 
result that the combined estimate is different from zero. For retention, 
unemployment rates have a negative and statistically significant effect, 
reducing the retention rate by nearly one point. 
For average earnings, the effect of unemployment rates is derived 
by adding the coefficients associated with the three quarters of unem-
ployment rates, f1_wib_ur, f2_wib_ur, and f3_wib_ur. The total effect 
is a reduction of $266 on an average base of $11,643. The estimate is 
statistically significant. 
The credentials and employment performance measure follows a 
similar pattern but exhibits a larger effect from an increase in unemploy-
ment rates than was found for the other performance measures. In this 
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Table 9.2  Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Rates and Other
Factors on the WIA Adult Program Performance Measures 
(1) (3) (4) 
Entered (2) Average Credential and 
employment Retention earnings employment 
female 0.000542 0.0167*** −2653.4*** −0.0218*** 
(0.25) (9.22) (−23.27) (−6.95) 
black_female 0.0157*** 0.0252*** 1484.3*** 0.0184*** 
(4.65) (7.29) (19.04) (3.95) 
age26_35 −0.00345 0.00948*** 1456.8*** 0.0116*** 
(−1.53) (5.53) (34.75) (4.29) 
age36_45 0.0137*** 0.00743*** 1744.9*** 0.00128 
(−5.13) (3.60) (26.52) (0.33) 
age46_55 −0.0330*** 0.00619* 1605.6*** −0.0140** 
(−10.54) (2.20) (13.53) (−3.00) 
age56_65 −0.0854*** −0.0194*** 513.9** −0.0447*** 
(−19.55) (−4.95) (2.86) (−6.29) 
agegt65 −0.202*** −0.0806*** −3229.4*** −0.0832*** 
(−18.28) (−7.45) (−13.43) (−5.59) 
hispanic 0.0205*** 0.0136*** −1312.7*** −0.0289*** 
(8.22) (6.05) (−15.44) (−4.62) 
asian 0.0193** 0.0388*** −608.7*** 0.0266* 
(3.24) (10.33) (−4.47) (2.27) 
black −0.0283*** −0.0394*** −3344.9*** −0.0657*** 
(−9.15) (−12.81) (−33.34) (−10.47) 
hi_pacific 0.0267* 0.0263* −401.6 0.0120 
(2.03) (2.39) (−1.42) (0.85) 
indian −0.0491*** −0.0274*** −712.7*** −0.0350*** 
(−5.67) (−3.62) (−3.84) (−3.71) 
multi −0.0130* −0.0167** −1942.5*** −0.00650 
(−2.04) (−2.65) (−10.42) (−0.56) 
lths −0.0488*** −0.0505*** −1483.8*** −0.0436*** 
(−12.09) (−21.96) (−26.86) (−13.40) 
ba 0.0218*** 0.0258*** 4164.5*** −0.0153 
(6.37) (10.19) (34.74) (−1.63) 
beyondba 0.0123* 0.0113* 6665.3*** −0.0348*** 
(2.06) (2.29) (18.76) (−4.31) 
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Table 9.2  (continued) 
(1) (3) (4) 
Entered (2) Average Credential and 
employment Retention earnings employment 
somecoll 0.0130*** 0.0139*** 1675.5*** 0.00334 
(5.55) (8.53) (29.57) (1.05) 
ged −0.0195*** −0.0398*** −877.9*** −0.0153** 
(−6.41) (−14.97) (−11.47) (−2.94) 
cert −0.0239 −0.0436 −1412.7 0.000824 
(−0.62) (−0.90) (−1.86) (0.02) 
otherpostdegcert −0.0282* 0.0174* 3159.2*** 0.0428 
(−2.10) (2.55) (10.03) (0.85) 
assoc 0.00414 0.0191** 1516.7*** −0.0699*** 
(0.62) (3.23) (8.06) (-5.29) 
disabled −0.0960*** −0.0291*** −1918.2*** −0.0351*** 
(−17.39) (−8.24) (−20.71) (−5.99) 
veteran −0.00735 −0.0139*** 155.6 0.00302 
(−1.80) (−4.15) (1.06) (0.60) 
empreg11 0.140*** 0.0868*** 1563.6*** 0.0322*** 
(44.64) (46.36) (31.33) (11.04) 
empreg10 0.0740*** 0.0226*** −160.2** −0.00419 
(23.43) (8.57) (−3.02) (−1.34) 
empreg01 0.0690*** 0.0260*** 263.2*** 0.00622* 
(23.42) (10.26) (4.19) (1.96) 
wp 0.00671 0.00510 −72.24 −0.0232*** 
(1.57) (1.66) (−0.71) (−3.52) 
exit_wib_ur −0.000246 
(−0.05) 
f1_wib_ur −0.0180*** −111.0 −0.0114 
(−5.75) (−1.71) (−1.90) 
f2_wib_ur −104.2 −0.00645 
(−1.63) (−1.11) 
f3_wib_ur −50.41 −0.0170** 
(−0.83) (−2.81) 
diff12 −0.00417** 
(−3.22) 
diff23 −0.00347** 
(−2.81) 
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Table 9.2  (continued) 
(1) (3) (4) 
Entered (2) Average Credential and 
employment Retention earnings employment 
_cons 0.860*** 0.760*** 11,108.5*** 0.687*** 
(31.43) (30.88) (19.99) (10.83) 
N 429,329 400,523 310,066 395,240 
adj. R2 0.073 0.035 0.198 0.275 
Combined −0.0180*** −0.008** −265.7** −0.352*** 
unemployment 
rate 
Effect (−5.75) (−3.98) (3.16) (−4.51) 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance in which 
p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), and p < 0.001 (***). Year-quarter time dummy variables, 
quarter time dummy variables, and WIB dummy variables are also included in the 
estimation, but, to conserve space, the coefficient estimates are not shown. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of WIASRD data and Bureau of Labor Statistics unem-
ployment rates. 
case, a 1.0-percentage-point increase in unemployment rates reduces 
the rate of attaining credentials and employment by 0.036 points. The 
estimate is obtained by summing the coefficients over four quarters: 
exit_wib_ur (the quarter of exit) through f3_wib_ur (the third quarter 
after exit). The estimate of the combined effect is statistically signifi-
cant. With the mean rate of credentialing and employment at 0.53, this 
effect results in a 6.6 percent reduction in that performance measure. 
The estimated relationships between participant characteristics and 
performance measures offer a broad perspective on the ability of partic-
ipants with different backgrounds and employment barriers to achieve 
the outcomes defined by the performance measures. For example, the 
results suggest that participants who are black, older, disabled, have 
less than a high school education, and have an inconsistent work his-
tory are less likely to find and retain employment. For those who do find 
work, they earn less and find it more difficult to attain credentials and 
employment. The single largest positive effect on all four performance 
measures is a person’s past employment history. Individuals who have 
positive earnings for both quarters before registration are much more 
successful in finding and retaining a job and in obtaining higher earn-
ings than those with no prior employment during that period. For exam-
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ple, a person with prior employment in those two quarters experienced 
an entered employment rate that was 0.14 points higher than someone 
without employment during that same period, holding all other char-
acteristics constant. If the entered employment rate is 0.70 for those 
without prior employment, the rate for those with prior employment is 
0.84—a sizable difference. Furthermore, we find that 45 percent of the 
participants in the entered employment group have two quarters of prior 
employment. 
The largest negative effect relates to older workers. Participants 
older than 65 are far less likely to find a job than those in the 18–25 age 
range. However, very few participants fall into the over-65 age range. 
PERFORMANCE ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURES 
Adjusting National Performance Targets 
Using the estimates reported in the previous section, performance 
targets for each of these programs are adjusted by the estimated effects 
of the change in unemployment rate from year to year. The unemploy-
ment rate assumptions of the President’s FY 2010 Budget Request are 
used in the calculations. The calculations start in PY 2007 (FY 2007 for 
Trade Adjustment Assistance [TAA]) and extend through PY 2014. The 
actual performance rate was used as the base in PY 2007. The adjusted 
target for the following year was calculated by multiplying the previous 
year’s performance target by the change in unemployment rates times 
the appropriate estimate of the effect of the unemployment rate change 
on the performance measure. This adjustment factor is then added to the 
previous target. 
Using the WIA Adult entered employment rate as an example, the 
calculation for PY 2008 is 
×(−1.8/76.2)×(UR
PY 2008 
).EER
(PY 2008) 
= EER
(PY 2007) 
+ EER
(PY 2007) 
− UR
PY 2007 
The estimated effects are converted into percentage changes (−1.8/76.2 
in this case) so that their effect is proportional to the magnitude of the 
target, which varies by program. Repeating this procedure each year 
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thereafter yields the entered employment performance targets for the 
WIAAdult program, as shown in Table 9.3. This procedure is also used 
to adjust performance targets for retention and earnings levels. 
Displaying the adjusted performance targets along with the unem-
ployment rate assumptions, Figure 9.2 shows how the targets adjust with 
changes in the unemployment rates. As the unemployment rate assump-
tions increase from PY 2007 to PY 2008, the adjusted target declines, 
reflecting the experience (as estimated in the analysis) that it is more 
difficult to find a job in tougher economic times. As the unemployment 
rate assumptions begin to fall after PY 2009, the performance targets 
gradually increase but do not return to their PY 2007 levels because the 
unemployment rate assumption remains slightly higher in PY 2014 than 
in the base period of PY 2007. Notice that the GPRA targets are consid-
erably higher than the adjusted targets throughout this period. 
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 show similar patterns for the other two adjusted 
performance measures because they are all driven by the unemploy-
ment rate assumptions. The only difference among the three measures 
in the change from year to year is related to the weights derived from 
the estimates, which are different for each performance measure. 
Adjusting State Performance Targets 
The second step uses the national adjusted target as the departure 
point for setting state performance targets. A state’s ability to meet the 
national target depends upon the effectiveness of its services as well as 
the characteristics of its participants and the labor market conditions, 
both relative to the national average. Therefore, a state’s target should 
be adjusted by the weighted difference in participant characteristics and 
labor market conditions. The weights are the contribution of each fac-
tor to participant outcomes. States with participants who have charac-
teristics more favorable to finding and retaining jobs will be expected 
to achieve higher rates of entered employment and retention, and the 
adjustment procedure raises the targets for these measures accordingly. 
Such characteristics that lead to higher performance levels are higher 
educational attainment, more work experience, and younger in age, to 
name a few. States whose participants are less likely to have these attri-
butes will be less likely to achieve such high performance levels and the 
procedure lowers targets accordingly. 
  
 
  
Table 9.3  Example of Adjustment Procedure for WIA Adult Program 
Program year 
WIA Adult program 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
UR assumptions (%) 4.9 7.2 8.1 7.6 6.6 5.5 5.0 5.0 
Entered employment (%) 
GPRA target 70 70 70 71 72 73 
Unemployment rate 70.0 66.2 64.8 65.6 67.1 68.8 69.7 69.7 
adjusted target 
Retention rate (%) 
GPRA target 84.0 84.0 84.0 85.0 86.0 87.0 
Unemployment rate 84.0 81.7 80.8 81.3 82.3 83.3 83.8 83.8 
adjusted target 
Earnings ($) 
GPRA target 13,575 13,575 13,575 13,914 14,262 14,619 
Unemployment rate 13,575 12,862 12,597 12,741 13,032 13,360 13,512 13,512 
adjusted target 
250 
NOTE: GPRA = Government Performance and Results Act. 
SOURCE: Unemployment rate assumptions are from the President’s FY 2010 Budget Request, GPRA targets are based on published guid-
ance from the Office of Management and Budget, and unemployment rate–adjusted targets are derived from the analysis. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Recent Advances in Performance Measurement  251 
Figure 9.2  WIA Adult Entered Employment Performance Adjustment 
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SOURCE: Unemployment rate assumptions are from the President’s FY 2010 Budget 
Request, GRPA targets are based on published guidance from the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, and unemployment rate–adjusted targets are derived from the 
analysis. 
Thus, using the adjusted target rather than an unadjusted target 
offers a better measure of the value added of a state’s WIA program. 
Without the adjustment, a state may be credited with higher value added 
when in fact the difference between actual performance and the unad-
justed target was due to factors that were outside the control of the 
state and local administrators and so happened to be favorable to the 
outcomes. Conversely, state performance outcomes may fall short of 
their targets not because of their value added but because of the unfa-
vorable attributes or local labor market conditions that they have expe-
rienced. To emphasize the point, it is conceivable that two states with 
identical value added, in terms of the effectiveness of their programs to 
the participants they serve, may have entirely different outcomes rela-
tive to an unadjusted target for the reasons just described. Adjusting 
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Figure 9.3  WIA Adult Retention Rate Performance Adjustment 
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SOURCE: Unemployment rate assumptions are from the President’s FY 2010 Budget 
Request, GPRA targets are based on published guidance from the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, and unemployment rate–adjusted targets are derived from the 
analysis. 
the targets reduces this misrepresentation of a state’s performance and 
provides a more systematic, objective way to scrutinize the reasons for 
the differences. 
The key elements for computing state performance targets are dis-
played in the worksheet in Table 9.4. To illustrate the steps required 
to calculate the adjusted performance targets, only a few of the fac-
tors actually used to calculate performance targets are displayed in the 
table. The full set of variables is listed in Appendix 9B. Adjusting state 
performance targets requires three elements: 1) the state value for each 
factor (column A); 2) the national value for each factor (column B); and 
3) the estimated weights for each factor (column D). The difference in 
the national and state values (column C) is multiplied by the weight 
(column E). The weighted differences are summed and added to the 
national adjusted target. 
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Figure 9.4  WIA Adult Earnings Level Performance Adjustment 
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SOURCE: Unemployment rate assumptions are from the President’s FY 2010 Budget 
Request, GPRA targets are based on published guidance from the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, and unemployment rate–adjusted targets are derived from the 
analysis. 
To fill out the worksheet, the state will need information about each 
characteristic for the program year at both the state level and the national 
level. Obviously, the characteristics of the exiters are not available prior 
to the beginning of the program year. The most recent data can be used 
when they become available. At the beginning of the program year, the 
most recent data are from the previous program year. The actual date 
of availability depends upon the performance measure. Table 9.5 sum-
marizes the data availability from the WIASRD as of May 2009. Using 
WIASRD has the advantage of a consistent data set for all three levels: 
nation, state, and LWIA. To avoid surprises, the adjustments should be 
updated whenever new data are available. This was the method used 
under JTPA. Under that program, the actual end-of-year performance 
standards were not computed until the end-of-year data were finally 
available. 
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Table 9.4  Hypothetical Example of Computing Adjusted Performance 
Target for State A 
WIA Adult entered Difference Effect 
Adjustment: 
weighted 
difference 
employment (%) State A National (A−B) on EE (C × D) 
Unemployment rates 12.6 8.3 +4.3 −1.8 −7.74 
High school dropout 10.3 4.6 +5.7 −0.049 −0.279 
BA degree 7.6 1.8 +5.8 +0.022 +0.128 
Disabled 6.4 4.9 +1.5 −0.096 −0.144 
Work experience 39.0 64.0 −25.0 +0.14 −3.50 
Total adjustment 
(add column E) 
−11.5% 
Adjusted national 
EE rate 
64.8% 
Adjusted performance 
target for State A 
53.3% 
NOTE: For purposes of illustration, only a few of the many factors included in the 
estimation are displayed in the table. The actual state adjustments shown in Table 9.6 
include all variables used in the regressions. 
Table 9.5  Data Requirements and Availability as of May 2009 
PY07 PY08 PY09 
(7/1/07–6/30/08) (7/1/08–6/30/09) (7/1/09–6/30/10) 
Unemployment National Actual Actual (3 qtrs.) Assumed 
rates State Actual Actual (3 qtrs.) N/A: S/N Diff  
WIB Actual Actual (3 qtrs.) N/A: W/S Diff 
Personal National W07 (1st qtr.) N/A: W07 N/A: W07 
characteristics State W07 (1st qtr.) N/A: W07 N/A: S/N Diff 
WIB W07 (1st qtr.) N/A: W07 N/A: S/N Diff 
NOTE: W07 denotes PY 2007 data from WIASRD; N/A indicates that current data are 
not available for that program year; the data source after the N/A indicates the sug-
gested source; S/N Diff indicates that historical differences between a state and the 
nation will be used; W/S Diff indicates that historical differences between a WIB and 
its state nation will be used. 
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Table 9.6 displays the actual, negotiated, and adjusted performance 
measures for entered employment for the Adult WIA program for
PY 2006. PY 2006 is the latest year for which complete data are avail-
able from WIASRD. The adjusted performance targets are calculated 
using the characteristics displayed in Table 9A.1. We find that the dif-
ference between the actual level and the adjusted performance target 
has a wider spread between the maximum difference and the minimum 
than the difference between the negotiated target and the actual per-
formance level. However, the number of states in which the target is 
greater or less than the actual level is the same for the negotiated level 
and the adjusted level. 
Adjusting Performance Targets at the Local WIB Level 
The third step follows the same procedure as the second, except 
that it is for each local WIB instead of each state. The reference point is 
the state and the differences in characteristics are between the state and 
each local WIB. The same weights are used for local WIB performance 
target calculations as for the state performance target calculations. By 
using the same weights for each approach and the same weights as for 
the state and national performance adjustments, all targets from the 
WIB to the state to the nation easily add up. If the data come from dif-
ferent data sources, for whatever reason, then targets will not add up. 
Also, if different weights are estimated for each state (or even for each 
ETA administrative region), the targets will not add up. 
SUMMARY 
The procedure for adjusting performance targets at the national, 
state, and local levels provides a systematic, transparent, and objective 
way to set national, state, and WIB performance targets for WIA pro-
grams. Using the same information that is collected and compiled for 
WIA performance monitoring along with measures of local labor mar-
ket conditions, targets can be adjusted for factors that are outside the 
control of state and local administrators. The adjustment factors, since 
they relate to factors that are familiar and understandable to administra-
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Table 9.6  Comparison of Actual, Negotiated, and Adjusted Performance 
Measures for Entered Employment in the Adult WIA Program, 
PY 2006 
ETA report Negotiated Adjusted 
Negotiated Actual minus Adjusted target minus 
State level level actual target actual 
Nation 79.2 70.2 9.0 79.2 9.0 
Alabama 73.0 71.3 1.7 79.6 8.3 
Alaska 74.0 72.2 1.8 74.7 2.5 
Arkansas 89.0 92.0 −3.0 80.2 −11.8 
Arizona 76.0 81.6 −5.6 79.2 −2.4 
California 74.0 79.3 −5.3 76.6 −2.7 
Colorado 82.0 82.6 −0.6 78.6 −4.0 
Connecticut 79.0 80.5 −1.5 79.5 −1.0 
DC 68.5 77.5 −9.0 66.4 −11.1 
Delaware 82.0 82.4 −0.4 81.3 −1.1 
Florida 71.0 82.9 −11.9 83.3 0.4 
Georgia 84.0 76.1 7.9 78.6 2.5 
Hawaii 76.0 71.9 4.1 84.2 12.3 
Idaho 87.0 96.5 −9.5 81.5 −15.0 
Iowa 83.0 79.0 4.0 78.7 −0.3 
Illinois 75.0 77.3 −2.3 77.0 −0.3 
Indiana 82.0 86.8 −4.8 79.5 −7.3 
Kansas 76.0 82.1 −6.1 81.4 −0.7 
Kentucky 78.0 88.7 −10.7 77.4 −11.3 
Louisiana 82.0 67.4 14.6 77.1 9.7 
Maine 88.0 72.2 15.8 80.2 8.0 
Maryland 91.0 78.3 12.7 81.5 3.2 
Massachusetts 79.0 79.7 −0.7 77.5 −2.2 
Michigan 85.0 86.2 −1.2 74.8 −11.4 
Minnesota 86.0 87.5 −1.5 80.6 −6.9 
Missouri 80.0 88.6 −8.6 78.7 −9.9 
Mississippi 77.0 62.4 14.6 74.9 12.5 
Montana 82.0 85.6 −3.6 82.4 −3.2 
Nebraska 86.0 78.2 7.8 81.2 3.0 
Nevada 76.0 77.5 −1.5 79.1 1.6 
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Table 9.6  (continued) 
ETA report Negotiated Adjusted 
Negotiated Actual minus Adjusted target minus 
State level level actual target actual 
New Hampshire 80.0 69.2 10.8 80.8 11.6 
New Jersey 82.0 83.7 −1.7 80.6 −3.1 
New Mexico 78.0 84.5 −6.5 80.4 −4.1 
New York 65.0 62.1 2.9 80.2 18.1 
North Carolina 80.0 75.9 4.1 78.5 2.6 
North Dakota 74.5 75.8 −1.3 80.2 4.4 
Ohio 75.0 79.4 −4.4 77.5 −1.9 
Oklahoma 85.0 71.1 13.9 82.3 11.2 
Oregon 83.0 85.6 −2.6 79.5 −6.1 
Pennsylvania 82.5 76.3 6.2 80.1 3.8 
Puerto Rico 78.0 91.0 −13.0 66.2 −24.8 
Rhode Island 82.0 81.7 0.3 78.1 −3.6 
South Carolina 83.0 80.4 2.6 76.6 −3.8 
South Dakota 78.0 80.6 −2.6 79.8 −0.8 
Tennessee 83.0 84.2 −1.2 80.9 −3.3 
Texas 82.0 75.1 6.9 80.2 5.1 
Utah 66.0 66.6 −0.6 80.2 13.6 
Vermont 83.0 77.3 5.7 75.2 −2.1 
Virginia 77.5 78.0 −0.5 80.6 2.6 
Washington 81.8 81.5 0.3 78.9 −2.6 
West Virginia 80.0 72.2 7.8 80.2 8.0 
Wisconsin 74.0 76.8 −2.8 78.8 2.0 
Wyoming 89.0 81.7 7.3 77.8 −3.9 
min −13.0 −24.8 
max 15.8 18.1 
mean 0.7 −0.1 
#Target>Actual 23 23 
#Target<Actual 30 30 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations and ETA annual performance reports. 
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tors, can be easily scrutinized by all parties in order to better understand 
how they affect their programs’outcomes and what might happen if they 
change. For example, the effects on performance of a mass layoff event 
triggering a spike in a WIB’s unemployment rate or an influx of disad-
vantaged workers with lower educational attainment can be assessed by 
using this procedure. The adjusted performance targets also provide a 
more accurate measure of the value added of the WIA programs. 
Notes 
The first part of this chapter was extracted from Bartik, Eberts, and Huang (2009). The 
assistance of Wei-Jang Huang and Phyllis Molhoek is greatly appreciated. 
1. The USDOL’s Employment and Training Administration issued Training and 
Employment Guidance Letter 09-08 Change 1 on June 5, 2009. This guidance let-
ter revises the Government Performance and Results Act performance measures 
for federal workforce development programs to take into account the effect of the 
recession on participants’ labor market and educational outcomes. As described in 
the guidance letter, the performance targets of the various workforce development 
programs have been developed for use for the years PY 2008 through PY 2010. 
They are intended to be used for PY 2009 performance target negotiations and are 
included in the President’s Budget Request for FY 2010. 
2. For a detailed description of the JTPA adjustment procedures, see Social Policy 
Research Associates (1999). 
3. Adjustments in performance targets were estimated and computed for all 13 fed-
eral workforce development programs, including WIA, Wagner-Peyser Employ-
ment Service, and Trade Adjustment Assistance programs. 
4. For the analysis, the performance measures are expressed as rates, not percent-
ages. That means that instead of entered employment being expressed as 70 
percent, for example, we express it as 0.70. The explanatory variables are also 
expressed as rates. However, for the performance adjustment calculations, we fol-
low the standard approach of the USDOL and describe the performance targets in 
percentage terms. 
5. Retention rate is also contingent on being employed the first quarter after exit, but 
since it is capturing the ability to retain a job, we looked at the change from quarter 
to quarter, encompassing the first three quarters after exit. 
6. We also explored whether or not the unemployment rate exerts different effects 
on performance measures depending upon the magnitude of the unemployment 
rate. That is, we addressed the possibility that unemployment rates might have 
a nonlinear effect on performance measures. We introduced this possibility by 
specifying unemployment rates in two different ways. First, we entered unem-
ployment rates as a quadratic, and second, we entered unemployment rates as 
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a set of categorical variables, each capturing different ranges of unemployment 
rates. In both cases, we could not reject the fact that unemployment rates have a 
linear effect on performance measures. Therefore, a 1.0-percentage-point change 
in unemployment rates produces the same point change in performance measures 
(or dollar change in earnings) no matter the level of unemployment rates. 
7. Two problems associated with the linear probability model are heteroscedasticity 
and the predicted values extending beyond the limits of 0 and 1. 
8. Wooldridge (2002) states in his textbook that the linear probability model “often 
seems to give good estimates of the partial effects on the response probability near 
the center of the distribution of x” (p. 455). He adds that “if the main purpose is to 
estimate the partial effect of x on the response probability, averaged across the dis-
tribution of x, then the fact that some predicted values are outside the unit interval 
may not be very important” (p. 455). In order to test the sensitivity in the estimates 
when using a linear probability model instead of the preferred logit estimation 
technique, we ran both techniques for entered employment and retention perfor-
mance measures for the WIAAdult program. Our particular focus was on the coef-
ficient estimates related to unemployment rates. We found that the two techniques 
yielded virtually identical estimates. Using the linear probability model, the esti-
mated coefficient on the unemployment rate for entered employment was −0.018 
with a t-statistic of −5.75; using the logit technique, the estimated coefficient was 
−0.0178 with a z-statistic of −5.66. For the retention rate, the combined estimated 
coefficient on the unemployment rates was −0.0076 using the linear probability 
technique and −0.0075 using the logit technique. Therefore, these results help to 
assuage concerns about the linear probability approach yielding biased estimates, 
and they are consistent with the position expressed by Wooldridge and others. 
9. A reviewer of the draft suggested that we consider the possibility of spatial depen-
dence in the estimation. This could arise for several reasons and as a consequence 
may bias the estimate or affect the statistical significance of the coefficient esti-
mates. Spatial dependence basically recognizes that some local labor markets may 
be interdependent because of linkages among regions. These linkages could be 
due to commuting patterns, commodity flows, or similarity in industrial or occu-
pational mix in that they compete regionally or nationally for workers with simi-
lar qualifications. Spatial dependence is a complex issue with no straightforward 
approach, since different regions across the country may be related in different 
ways. Therefore, we do not attempt to address this issue in the analysis and have 
no clear intuition whether it may bias the estimates or by how much. 
10. We use STATA to estimate the model. The procedure to calculate standard errors 
is found in Rogers (1993). 
11. In our sample, 102 counties had total employment that surpassed 100,000 at any 
time during the period considered in the analysis. 
12. The estimates described in this section and in Appendix 9B are derived from a 
sample of 11 of the largest U.S. states. These estimates were used to adjust national
targets, which were included in the President’s 2010 Budget Request. A sample of 
states was used because of the need to derive estimates quickly in order to meet 
the deadline of submitting the president’s budget. Since then, we have reestimated 
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the models including all states and Puerto Rico. The results are qualitatively the 
same, and these estimates are used for the state target adjustments, shown in the 
next section. 
 Appendix 9A 
Variable Definitions 
Table 9A.1  Dependent Variable Description 
Dependent variable Description of coding 
Entered employment = 1 if participant is employed (positive earnings) 
in the first quarter after exit and was not 
employed at registration 
Retention = 1 if participant is employed (positive earnings) 
in the first quarter after exit and in both the 
second and third quarters after exit 
Average earnings Summation of earnings in the second and third 
quarter after exit for those employed in those 
quarters plus the first quarter 
Credential and employment = 1 if attained a credential after exit and 
(adult) employment in the first quarter after exit 
Credential or employment = 1 if participant entered postsecondary 
(youth) education, advanced training, military service, 
or a qualified apprenticeship or entered 
employment the first quarter after exit 
Attainment of degree or = 1 if participant entered postsecondary 
certificate education, advanced training, or military service 
on or before the third quarter after exit 
Literacy and numeracy = 1 if there is at least one posttest with a 
gain (youth) functioning level greater than the corresponding 
pretest function level and the pretest function 
level was between 0 and 6 
SOURCE: Definition of variables as described in WIASRD public use document, 
selected years. 
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Table 9A.2  Explanatory Variable Definitions 
Explanatory 
variables Description of coding 
female = 1 if participant is female, 0 otherwise. 
black_female = 1 if participant is female and black. 
age26_35 = 1 if participant is between the ages of 26 and 35. 
age36_45 = 1 if participant is between the ages of 36 and 45. 
age46_55 = 1 if participant is between the ages of 46 and 55. 
age56_65 = 1 if participant is between the ages of 56 and 65. 
agegt65 = 1 if participant is over the age of 65. 
hispanic = 1 if participant indicates that he/she is a person of Cuban, 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or 
other Spanish culture in origin, regardless of race. 
asian = 1 if participant’s origin is any of the original peoples of 
the Far East, Southeast Asia, India, etc. 
black = 1 if participant indicates that he/she is a person having 
origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa. 
hi_pacific = 1 if participant indicates that he/she is a person having 
origins in any of the original peoples of Hawaii or other 
Pacific Islands. 
indian = 1 if participant indicates that he/she is a person having 
origins in any of the original peoples of North and South 
America and who maintains cultural identification 
through tribal affiliation or community recognition. 
multi-racial = 1 if participant indicates more than one ethnic/race 
category, except Hispanic. 
white = 1 if participant indicates that he/she is a person having 
origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the 
Middle East, or North Africa. 
lths = 1 if participant completed no or some elementary/ 
secondary school grades and did not receive a high school 
diploma or GED. 
highschool = 1 if participant indicates that he/she attained a high school 
diploma. 
ba = 1 if participant indicates that he/she received a bachelor’s 
degree or equivalent. 
beyondba = 1 if participant indicates that he/she received a degree 
beyond a bachelor’s degree, such as a master’s, PhD, or 
professional degree. 
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Table 9A.2  (continued) 
Explanatory 
variables Description of coding 
somecoll = 1 if participant indicates the he/she completed some 
college but did not receive a degree. 
ged = 1 if participant indicates that he/she attained a GED or 
equivalent. 
cert = 1 if participant indicates that he/she attained a certificate 
of completion or attendance. 
otherpostdegcert = 1 if participant indicates that he/she attained other 
postsecondary degree or certification. 
assoc = 1 if participant indicates that he/she attained an associate’s 
diploma or degree. 
disabled = 1 if participant indicates that he/she has any disability, 
such as a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the person’s life activities, as 
defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
veteran = 1 if participant served in the active U.S. military and was 
released with other than a dishonorable discharge, or if 
participant was a spouse of any U.S. military personnel 
who died or is missing in action, was forcibly detained, or 
has a total permanent disability. 
empreg11 = 1 if participant is employed (positive wage record 
quarterly earnings) in both the second and third quarters 
before registration. 
wp = 1 if participant is coenrolled in ES (for those in WIA
programs). 
empreg10 = 1 if participant is employed (positive wage record 
quarterly earnings) in second quarter but not third quarter 
before registration. 
empreg01 = 1 if participant is employed (positive wage record 
quarterly earnings) in the third but not the second quarter 
before registration. 
unemp The unemployment rate by WIB or county by quarter    
entered as a percentage (e.g., 6.5). 
SOURCE: Definition of variables as described in WIASRD public use document, 
selected years, and as defined and derived by the authors using the WIASRD vari-
ables. 

  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9B 
Estimation Results for WIA Dislocated 
Workers and Youth Programs 
DISLOCATED WORKER PROGRAM 
The results for the WIA Dislocated Worker program, shown in Table 9B.2, 
yield patterns of effects similar to those found for the Adult WIA program, 
shown in Table 9.2. Unemployment rates have a negative and statistically sig-
nificant effect on all four performance measures. The magnitude of the effects 
is slightly smaller than that found for the WIA Adult program participants but 
is in the same general range. For example, a 1.0-percentage-point increase 
in unemployment rates lowers the entered employment rate by 0.008 points, 
compared with 0.018 points for the Adult WIA program participants. As seen 
in Table 9.6, which displays the mean characteristics of the Dislocated Worker 
participants, dislocated workers are better educated and more strongly attached 
to the workforce. These traits may explain their ability to weather economic 
downturns a little better. As with the WIA Adult program, prior employment 
and age exhibited the largest effects on the performance measures. 
Older Youth 
Results for the WIA Older Youth program are in the range of estimates 
established by the two previously described programs. The means and stan-
dard deviations of the variables used in the estimation are displayed in Table 
9B.3. Unemployment rates negatively affect the four performance measures, 
but they are found to be statistically significant only for entered employment, 
as shown in Table 9B.4. As with the two adult programs, prior employment 
history has the largest effect on the four performance measures, increasing sig-
nificantly the likelihood of finding and retaining a job and of holding a job with 
higher earnings. Unlike the two adult programs, age is not a large factor, but 
education is important. Those without a high school degree—nearly half the 
participants—are at a significant disadvantage in their employment prospects. 
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Table 9B.1  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in the 
Estimation of WIA Dislocated Worker Program 
WIA Dislocated Worker 
Entered Average Employment 
employment Retention earnings and credential 
Dependent variable 
female 
black_female 
age20 
age21 
age26_35 
age36_45 
age46_55 
age56_65 
agegt65 
hispanic 
asian 
black 
hi_pacific 
indian 
multi 
lths 
ba 
beyondba 
0.822 
(0.383) 
0.514 
(0.500) 
0.119 
(0.323) 
0.232 
(0.422) 
0.319 
(0.466) 
0.277 
(0.447) 
0.090 
(0.286) 
0.007 
(0.085) 
0.207 
(0.405) 
0.048 
(0.213) 
0.205 
(0.403) 
0.002 
(0.049) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.009 
(0.096) 
0.109 
(0.312) 
0.120 
(0.325) 
0.033 
(0.180) 
0.887 14,328 0.563 
(0.317) (9434) (0.496) 
0.513 0.518 0.505 
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
0.117 0.119 0.115 
(0.322) (0.323) (0.320) 
0.240 0.242 0.243 
(0.427) (0.428) (0.429) 
0.326 0.329 0.327 
(0.469) (0.470) (0.469) 
0.275 0.274 0.267 
(0.446) (0.446) (0.443) 
0.077 0.073 0.080 
(0.267) (0.261) (0.271) 
0.004 0.004 0.006 
(0.066) (0.060) (0.076) 
0.206 0.206 0.196 
(0.404) (0.405) (0.397) 
0.045 0.045 0.050 
(0.207) (0.207) (0.219) 
0.200 0.200 0.201 
(0.400) (0.400) (0.401) 
0.002 0.002 0.003 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.050) 
0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.072) 
0.009 0.009 0.006 
(0.095) (0.094) (0.076) 
0.105 0.101 0.102 
(0.306) (0.302) (0.303) 
0.117 0.116 0.118 
(0.321) (0.321) (0.323) 
0.031 0.030 0.033 
(0.172) (0.170) (0.178) 
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Table 9B.1  (continued) 
WIA Dislocated Worker 
Entered Average Employment 
employment Retention earnings and credential 
somecoll 
ged 
cert 
otherpostdegcert 
assoc 
disabled 
veteran 
empreg11 
empreg10 
empreg01 
wp 
exit_wib_ur 
f1_wib_ur 
f2_wib_ur 
f3_wib_ur 
diff12 
diff23 
N 
0.229 
(0.420) 
0.043 
(0.203) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.071) 
0.015 
(0.123) 
0.101 
(0.302) 
0.086 
(0.281) 
0.742 
(0.437) 
0.039 
(0.193) 
0.067 
(0.251) 
0.348 
(0.476) 
5.970 
(1.863) 
408,234 
0.231 
(0.422) 
0.044 
(0.204) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.071) 
0.014 
(0.116) 
0.110 
(0.313) 
0.086 
(0.281) 
0.755 
(0.430) 
0.039 
(0.193) 
0.064 
(0.244) 
0.340 
(0.474) 
0.021 
(0.804) 
−0.026 
(0.802) 
322,098 
0.232 
(0.422) 
0.043 
(0.204) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.072) 
0.014 
(0.116) 
0.109 
(0.312) 
0.084 
(0.278) 
0.767 
(0.423) 
0.037 
(0.188) 
0.062 
(0.241) 
0.342 
(0.474) 
5.953 
(1.816) 
5.969 
(1.824) 
5.942 
(1.835) 
266,915 
0.235 
(0.424) 
0.044 
(0.205) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.050) 
0.007 
(0.086) 
0.083 
(0.276) 
0.088 
(0.283) 
0.736 
(0.441) 
0.037 
(0.190) 
0.068 
(0.253) 
0.259 
(0.438) 
6.119 
(1.924) 
6.160 
(1.919) 
311,452 
SOURCE: WIASRD and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Table 9B.2  Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Rates and Other
Factors on the WIA Dislocated Worker Program Performance 
Measures 
(1) (3) (4) 
Entered (2) Average Credentials/ 
employment Retention earnings employment 
female −0.00392* 0.00634*** −3861.5*** −0.0352*** 
(−2.25) (4.76) (−65.96) (−15.05) 
black_female 0.0189*** 0.0118*** 1649.4*** −0.00344 
(5.31) (4.04) (19.73) (−0.78) 
age26_35 0.000243 0.0119*** 1707.8*** 0.0187*** 
(0.10) (4.97) (30.08) (4.61) 
age36_45 −0.00823** 0.0137*** 2154.0*** 0.0106* 
(−3.13) (5.86) (35.81) (2.51) 
age46_55 −0.0224*** 0.00710** 1622.9*** −0.00374 
(−8.12) (2.91) (24.73) (−0.82) 
age56_65 −0.108*** −0.0227*** 13.06 −0.0311*** 
(−28.92) (−6.86) (0.14) (−5.86) 
agegt65 −0.277*** −0.110*** −4181.1*** −0.0712*** 
(−26.83) (−9.41) (−15.90) (−6.30) 
hispanic 0.0213*** 0.00549** −1572.8*** −0.0160*** 
(9.60) (2.66) (−22.69) (−4.19) 
asian −0.0258*** 0.00709* −540.2*** 0.0164* 
(−7.29) (2.16) (−4.30) (2.15) 
black −0.00603* −0.0179*** −3526.8*** −0.0253*** 
(−1.98) (−7.09) (−38.06) (−5.26) 
hi_pacific −0.00205 0.0146 −671.8 −0.0281 
(−0.18) (1.20) (−1.85) (−1.78) 
indian −0.0341*** −0.0112 −1004.8*** −0.0271* 
(−3.72) (−1.31) (−4.38) (−2.11) 
multi 0.00438 −0.0139 −1770.1*** −0.00960 
(0.48) (−1.87) (−9.24) (−0.83) 
lths −0.0323*** −0.0252*** −1618.0*** −0.0381*** 
(−13.08) (−10.52) (−31.68) (−9.11) 
ba −0.00127 0.0000558 5115.2*** −0.0222*** 
(−0.58) (0.03) (58.41) (−4.83) 
beyondba −0.0261*** −0.0120** 9812.3*** −0.0308*** 
(−6.70) (−3.26) (41.70) (−3.93) 
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Table 9B.2  (continued) 
(1) (3) (4) 
Entered (2) Average Credentials/ 
employment Retention earnings employment 
somecoll −0.00249 −0.00144 1440.9*** −0.00821** 
(−1.65) (−1.02) (33.68) (−3.17) 
ged −0.00297 −0.0159*** −517.3*** −0.000521 
(−0.92) (−5.60) (−7.39) (−0.09) 
cert −0.0413 0.0437 −496.2 −0.0369 
(−0.86) (1.06) (−0.56) (−0.34) 
otherpostdegcert −0.0119 0.00390 3429.9*** 0.00300 
(−1.40) (0.45) (9.35) (0.11) 
assoc −0.0265*** −0.00393 2086.3*** −0.0357** 
(−4.27) (−0.73) (7.96) (−3.25) 
disabled −0.0532*** −0.0281*** −1332.8*** −0.0412*** 
(−11.74) (−6.93) (−10.80) (−4.85) 
veteran −0.0103*** −0.0114*** 181.8* −0.00298 
(−4.42) (−5.20) (2.57) (−0.92) 
empreg11 0.0743*** 0.0434*** 745.4*** 0.0145*** 
(24.08) (20.43) (12.92) (3.68) 
empreg10 0.0560*** 0.00356 −107.2 0.00791 
(13.19) (0.95) (−0.99) (1.41) 
empreg01 0.0293*** 0.0110*** −4.378 −0.00896 
(7.68) (3.49) (−0.05) (−1.79) 
wp 0.0142*** −0.000527 −74.17 0.0155** 
(3.86) (−0.26) (−0.89) (2.72) 
exit_wib_ur −0.00169 
(−0.37) 
f1_wib_ur −0.00983*** 28.42 −0.00484 
(−3.63) (0.48) (−0.89) 
f2_wib_ur −166.7* −0.00391 
(−2.33) (−0.76) 
f3_wib_ur 14.97 −0.00643 
(0.29) (−1.13) 
diff12 −0.00582*** 
(−4.65) 
diff23 −0.00429*** 
(−3.39) 
(continued) 
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Table 9B.2  (continued) 
_cons 
(1) 
Entered 
employment 
0.876*** 
(27.17) 
(2) 
Retention 
0.806*** 
(34.71) 
(3) 
Average 
earnings 
14682.2*** 
(25.92) 
(4) 
Credentials/ 
employment 
0.668*** 
(9.55) 
N 
adj. R2 
408,234 
0.058 
322,098 
0.019 
266,915 
0.196 
311,452 
0.210 
Combined UR 
Effect 
−0.00983*** 
(−3.63) 
−0.010*** 
(−5.16) 
−123.33** 
(−2.34) 
−0.017** 
(−2.55) 
NOTE: Asterisks indicate statistical significance in which p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), 
and p < 0.001 (***). Year-quarter time dummy variables, quarter time dummy vari-
ables, and WIB dummy variables are also included in the estimation, but, to conserve 
space, the coefficient estimates are not shown. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of WIASRD data and BLS unemployment rates. 
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Table 9B.3  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables used in the 
Estimation of the WIA Older Youth Program 
Older Youth 
Entered Average Employment 
employment Retention earnings and credential 
Dependent variable 
female 
black_female 
age20 
age21 
hispanic 
asian 
black 
hi_pacific 
indian 
multi 
lths 
ba 
beyondba 
somecoll 
ged 
cert 
0.727 
(0.445) 
0.591 
(0.492) 
0.252 
(0.434) 
0.320 
(0.467) 
0.227 
(0.419) 
0.306 
(0.461) 
0.026 
(0.159) 
0.416 
(0.493) 
0.003 
(0.058) 
0.006 
(0.080) 
0.010 
(0.100) 
0.472 
(0.499) 
0.001 
(0.037) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
0.044 
(0.205) 
0.037 
(0.189) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
0.811 
(0.392) 
0.603 
(0.489) 
0.247 
(0.432) 
0.324 
(0.468) 
0.237 
(0.425) 
0.311 
(0.463) 
0.024 
(0.152) 
0.392 
(0.488) 
0.003 
(0.057) 
0.006 
(0.076) 
0.010 
(0.100) 
0.409 
(0.492) 
0.002 
(0.042) 
0.001 
(0.024) 
0.058 
(0.234) 
0.041 
(0.197) 
0.001 
(0.036) 
6970 
(5,300) 
0.618 
(0.486) 
0.246 
(0.431) 
0.322 
(0.467) 
0.243 
(0.429) 
0.330 
(0.470) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
0.377 
(0.485) 
0.004 
(0.060) 
0.005 
(0.074) 
0.009 
(0.096) 
0.366 
(0.482) 
0.002 
(0.044) 
0.000 
(0.022) 
0.068 
(0.251) 
0.039 
(0.194) 
0.001 
(0.036) 
0.582 
(0.493) 
0.593 
(0.491) 
0.247 
(0.431) 
0.320 
(0.467) 
0.228 
(0.420) 
0.298 
(0.457) 
0.028 
(0.164) 
0.405 
(0.491) 
0.004 
(0.060) 
0.007 
(0.081) 
0.009 
(0.096) 
0.457 
(0.498) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
0.001 
(0.023) 
0.046 
(0.210) 
0.036 
(0.187) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
(continued) 
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Table 9B.3  (continued) 
Older Youth 
Entered Average Employment 
employment Retention earnings and credential 
otherpostdegcert 
assoc 
disabled 
veteran 
empreg11 
empreg10 
empreg01 
wp 
exit_wib_ur 
f1_wib_ur 
f2_wib_ur 
f3_wib_ur 
diff12 
diff23 
N 
0.001 
(0.032) 
0.000 
(0.020) 
0.165 
(0.371) 
0.004 
(0.064) 
0.323 
(0.467) 
0.104 
(0.305) 
0.108 
(0.310) 
0.292 
(0.455) 
6.386 
(2.171) 
73,488 
0.002 
(0.042) 
0.001 
(0.027) 
0.160 
(0.367) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.407 
(0.491) 
0.108 
(0.310) 
0.104 
(0.305) 
0.288 
(0.453) 
0.012 
(0.858) 
−0.019 
(0.853) 
57,610 
0.002 
(0.048) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
0.155 
(0.362) 
0.005 
(0.073) 
0.454 
(0.498) 
0.106 
(0.308) 
0.102 
(0.303) 
0.297 
(0.457) 
6.306 
(2.166) 
6.313 
(2.195) 
6.293 
(2.209) 
38,657 
0.000 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.165 
(0.371) 
0.005 
(0.068) 
0.350 
(0.477) 
0.104 
(0.305) 
0.103 
(0.304) 
0.260 
(0.438) 
6.392 
(2.195) 
6.428 
(2.200) 
80,326 
SOURCE: WIASRD and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Table 9B.4  Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Rates and Other
Factors on WIA Older Youth Program Performance Measures 
(1) (3) (4) 
Entered (2) Average Credentials/ 
employment Retention earnings employment 
female −0.0269*** −0.00582 −839.3*** 0.0268*** 
(−6.15) (−1.40) (−10.98) (5.43) 
black_female 0.0470*** 0.0173* 314.6** −0.00203 
(6.86) (2.44) (2.73) (−0.27) 
age20 −0.000806 −0.00692 330.4*** −0.00224 
(−0.21) (−1.84) (5.57) (−0.59) 
age21 0.000126 −0.00230 724.6*** 0.00518 
(0.03) (−0.57) (10.44) (1.20) 
hispanic 0.0325*** 0.0268*** 271.8** −0.00751 
(5.66) (4.75) (3.08) (−1.17) 
asian 0.00519 0.0251 −108.6 −0.00640 
(0.35) (1.94) (−0.58) (−0.47) 
black −0.0468*** −0.0327*** −1155.0*** −0.0553*** 
(−6.71) (−4.75) (−10.52) (−7.46) 
hi_pacific 0.000369 0.0168 −134.6 −0.00589 
(0.01) (0.56) (−0.39) (−0.19) 
indian −0.0239 −0.0139 −281.7 −0.0561* 
(−1.11) (−0.60) (−0.62) (−2.50) 
multi −0.0252 −0.0278 −550.0* −0.0289 
(−1.64) (−1.57) (−2.28) (−1.66) 
lths −0.100*** −0.0776*** −1,138.1*** −0.0203*** 
(−24.61) (−19.38) (−17.56) (−4.25) 
ba −0.00655 0.000401 3629.0*** 0.0147 
(−0.19) (0.01) (4.23) (0.49) 
beyondba 0.0566 0.0215 3530.3* −0.0000878 
(0.93) (0.39) (2.42) (−0.00) 
somecoll 0.0451*** 0.0305*** 1,273.4*** 0.0327*** 
(6.05) (4.90) (9.87) (3.50) 
ged −0.0393*** −0.0442*** −708.0*** −0.0330*** 
(−4.59) (−5.34) (−5.54) (−3.32) 
cert −0.149** −0.0510 −2384.9*** −0.0908* 
(−3.06) (−0.93) (−5.87) (−2.03) 
otherpostdegcert 0.0599 0.0712** 1700.5* 0.0303 
(1.64) (3.12) (2.06) (0.34) 
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Table 9B.4  (continued) 
(1) (3) (4) 
Entered (2) Average Credentials/ 
employment Retention earnings employment 
assoc 0.0420 −0.0510 6731.1* −0.0141 
(0.75) (−0.80) (2.23) (−0.13) 
disabled −0.0740*** −0.000386 −1,291.5*** 0.00578 
(−9.10) (−0.06) (−13.86) (0.74) 
veteran 0.0315 0.0356 512.6 −0.0156 
(1.33) (1.82) (1.37) (−0.63) 
empreg11 0.146*** 0.0791*** 833.1*** 0.0170*** 
(35.31) (21.78) (13.57) (4.39) 
empreg10 0.0872*** 0.0275*** 33.25 −0.00903 
(15.42) (4.63) (0.38) (−1.64) 
empreg01 0.0754*** 0.0246*** 50.53 0.00129 
(13.28) (4.30) (0.65) (0.23) 
wp 0.0394*** −0.0103* −272.4** 0.0346*** 
(5.66) (−1.96) (−3.04) (3.67) 
exit_wib_ur −0.0231** 
(−2.85) 
f1_wib_ur −0.0174*** −50.38 0.00893 
(−4.91) (−1.07) (1.12) 
f2_wib_ur −43.49 −0.00977 
(−0.84) (−1.24) 
f3_wib_ur −7.105 0.00902 
(−0.15) (1.14) 
diff12 −0.00400 
(−1.57) 
diff23 −0.00213 
(−0.87) 
_cons 0.732*** 0.774*** 7453.1*** 0.398*** 
(19.94) (28.53) (12.64) (3.79) 
N 73,488 57,610 38,657 80,326 
adj. R2 0.088 0.039 0.092 0.164 
Combined UR −0.0174*** −0.006 −101 −0.0142 
Effect (−4.91) (−1.64) (−1.87) (−1.86) 
NOTE: Asterisks indicate statistical significance in which p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), 
and p < 0.001 (***). Year-quarter time dummy variables, quarter time dummy vari-
ables, and WIB dummy variables are also included in the estimation, but, to conserve 
space, the coefficient estimates are not shown. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of WIASRD data and BLS unemployment rates. 
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Financial Performance Incentives 
Stephen A. Wandner
Urban Institute 
Michael Wiseman
George Washington University 
High performance incentive grants were incorporated into a num-
ber of domestic federal programs in the 1990s. Section 503 of WIA
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to award incentive grants to states 
that exceed performance levels for programs authorized by Title I of 
WIA, the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), and the 
Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act (Perkins). The 
WIA incentive process was designed with the intent to reward “good” 
performance by state government programs implementing workforce 
investment, adult literacy, and vocational education programs. 
Financial incentives based on program performance also appeared 
in a number of other federal government programs around the same 
time. Domestic social programs such as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP, since the 
beginning of the 2009 fiscal year called Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program, or SNAP) have also used financial incentives to attempt 
to improve program performance. However, there is growing evidence 
that incentives may in some instances actually harm performance by 
rewarding behaviors that result from programs being more focused on 
receiving the reward than improving program design, delivery, and out-
comes. Incentive programs raise many issues, including choice of how 
large funding should be and possible conflict between the use of bo-
nuses and the ethos of public service. 
This chapter examines high performance bonuses (HPBs) in WIA, 
TANF, and FSP/SNAP. It examines the design of the HPB programs, 
the issues that they raise, and lessons that have been learned from the 
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experience of implementing and operating them. The chapter concludes 
that the HPBs have not worked as intended and that a different ap-
proach improving program performance should be used in the future for 
both the WIA program and TANF. On balance, the FSP/SNAP program 
looks better, but the objectives of the program make it easier to conduct. 
WIA HPBs 
WIA is a federal–state program.1 The federal government provides 
grants to states to operate the programs, and the states pass most of 
these funds to local workforce investment boards. Workforce services 
are provided by about 3,000 One-Stop Career Centers that are located 
throughout the country. WIA programs provide core, intensive, and 
training services. Services may include job matching, labor market in-
formation, assessment and counseling, and other job search services, as 
well as training services. While all workers can receive core services, 
state workforce agencies determine which workers to serve beyond the 
core services and the mix of services target groups are to receive. 
The WIA program was enacted for five years and expired in 2003. 
Since that time the program has been continued by Congress through 
the appropriation process. Unsuccessful proposals to reauthorize the 
program were introduced in 2003, 2005, and 2007. The program seems 
unlikely to be reauthorized before 2011 or 2012. 
The Program 
HPBs have been offered since the inception of the WIA system. 
States can receive bonuses for amounts between $750,000 and $3 mil-
lion per year if they meet the WIA HPB criteria, depending on fund 
availability. The potential bonuses are of the same amount, regardless 
of the size of the state. To receive an HPB, a state must achieve at least 
80 percent of the annual negotiated target for each of the 17 WIA per-
formance measures that are specified by statute. They must also achieve 
an average of at least 100 percent of the negotiated performance targets 
for the major performance measures groupings for adult, dislocated 
worker, youth, and customer satisfaction measures. 
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The WIA program makes financial incentives available as a way 
to reward performance that exceeds the expected level of negotiated 
performance for participants in Title 1B of the WIA Adult, Dislocated 
Worker, and Youth programs. WIA law authorizes the states to use their 
incentive bonuses to carry out an innovative program consistent with 
the requirements of any one or more of the programs within Title I of 
WIA, the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act, or the Perkins Act. 
These provisions allow states great flexibility in using these funds, and 
the governors and state agencies are not limited to only one type of in-
novative program. States find this money attractive because it not only 
recognizes them for exceeding negotiated performance goals but also 
provides funds for special projects that might not otherwise be imple-
mented due to budget limitations. 
WIA financial incentives are complicated because they are a reward 
for meeting conditions for three separate programs. The annual awards 
are determined on the basis of WIA program performance in conjunc-
tion with performance for the Adult Education and Family Literacy 
Act and the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act 
programs. States must meet the criteria established by each individual 
program before they are deemed eligible to apply for a grant. A state 
may demonstrate outstanding performance under WIA requirements 
but be removed from consideration for an award because it falls short 
with respect to program performance for literacy and/or Perkins educa-
tion programs. 
WIA HPBs are given for exceeding performance targets, which 
are set by negotiations led by USDOL regional office staff in the six 
USDOL regional offices for the USDOL national office. Regional staff 
members negotiate targets with the states based on factors that are con-
sidered to be under their control. If a state has higher unemployment 
levels or serves a more disadvantaged population, however, its perfor-
mance targets should be adjusted downward to accommodate for these 
factors outside of their control. The negotiation process is intended to 
“level the playing field” between states, so that adjustments are made 
for differences between states with respect to anticipated economic and 
demographic characteristics. 
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Issues 
Experience with the WIA HPB has drawn attention to a number of 
issues. 
Behavioral issues in responding to WIA performance targets. 
Barnow and Smith (2004) review the incentives to state workforce 
agencies and local WIBs to take actions that can improve their WIA
performance measurement results. Barnow and Smith examine four 
substantive behavioral measures that the WIA system can take: 
1) selection of participants who are likely to have good perfor-
mance outcomes (cream skimming), 
2) selection of services and service mix provided to improve 
performance, 
3) encouragement of workforce agency employees to work harder 
and smarter, and 
4) provision of incentives to contractors and subcontractors pro-
viding services. 
In addition, state workforce agencies can make strategic decisions 
about how to improve performance by “gaming” the system. In particu-
lar, under both JTPA and WIA, local and state performance outcomes 
could be improved by making determinations about who is formally 
enrolled in the program, and how and when enrollees are exited out 
of the program. For example, formal enrollment can be delayed until 
workers are placed in jobs or become employed. Exiting workers out 
of the program can be accelerated or delayed to maximize performance 
outcomes (Barnow and Smith 2004). 
Jacobson (2009) documents the high cost of retaining WIA pro-
gram participants in some localities until a time when their exiting is 
most beneficial for workforce agency performance measurement pur-
poses. The cost of this extended retention of participants is the time 
it takes program staff to maintain periodic telephone contact with the 
WIA participants rather than providing them with additional employ-
ment services and, secondarily, that this behavior continues solely to 
improve measured program performance outcomes. 
Thus, it appears that state workforce agencies have many tools at 
their disposal to improve their measured WIA program performance, if 
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they wish to make use of them. A number of state workforce agencies 
and local WIBs do make use of these techniques. 
Incentives for states. While the WIA HPBs are a small proportion 
of total WIA resources available to states, the incentive for states varies 
greatly because each state is eligible for the same bonus amount. Small 
states will find the HPB to be much larger in proportion to their state 
WIA formula grant than is the case for larger states. 
Accuracy of the HPB data. Heinrich (2007) assesses whether the 
current HPBs work by looking at two questions. First, she examines the 
accuracy of the data used for the measures. Second, she assesses whether
the performance award system properly recognizes and rewards high 
performing states. With respect to the first issue, her answer is affirma-
tive: she finds that the data used by the system are reasonably accurate. 
Does the HPB properly reward high performing states? With 
respect to the issue of whether the system properly recognizes high per-
formers, Heinrich (2007) provides a negative answer for a number of 
reasons. As we saw above, a core factor in establishing an objective 
WIA performance targeting system is that the targets need to be set to 
establish a level playing field between states. Not surprisingly, she finds 
that the negotiation process—determined by USDOL regional staff 
without an objective methodology—does not properly take into con-
sideration economic and demographic characteristics and service mix 
as they differ between states. In particular, she finds no adjustment to 
performance targets for differences with respect to education and race. 
Heinrich finds that the negotiation process between regional and 
state staff establishes the bonus threshold and therefore plays a key role 
in the outcomes of HPBs. States that negotiate higher performance tar-
gets relative to other states are less likely to receive the bonuses. Thus, 
the negotiation process is crucial to success in obtaining an HPB. 
Heinrich also looks at whether there has been a relationship between 
performance and the size of the bonus awarded. She again reaches a 
negative conclusion. She finds that some states not receiving a bonus 
appear to have performed better than those that did. States receiving 
higher bonuses did not necessarily perform better than those receiving 
low bonuses. 
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Declining Funding of WIA Incentive Grants, 1999–2007 
The statutory provisions for the WIA HPB have not changed over 
time, so the HPB program specifications have been unchanged for over 
a decade. The only change in the program has been its funding amount. 
Because the USDOL has not sought appropriations for the HPB begin-
ning in federal FY 2004 for federal PY 2003, funding availability has 
declined and has derived only from the Adult Education and Family 
Literacy Act and the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Educa-
tion Act programs. 
The USDOL started awarding incentive grants in 1999. The size of 
the grant awards is determined by WIA Section 503(c)(1), which sets 
the range of incentive grant awards from $750,000 to $3 million, de-
pending upon the amount of appropriated funds available. If the amount 
available for grants is insufficient to award the minimum grant to each 
eligible state, the minimum and maximum grant amounts are adjusted 
by a uniform percentage as required by WIA Section 503(c)(2). For 
PY 1999 through PY 2002, the Department of Labor requested and re-
ceived funding for the incentive grants, and state workforce agencies 
received funding from the department. 
In its FY 2004 budget request, the USDOL did not request funds 
for WIA incentives. The Bush administration proposed revisions to 
the incentive grant process as part of its unsuccessful WIA reautho-
rization proposal of 2003. Had they been enacted, the new incentive 
grants awarded by the secretary would have been based on performance 
for statewide and local workforce programs authorized by Title I-B of 
WIA. The secretary would base the award on performance of states 
with respect to the performance measures, and/or the performance of 
the state in serving special populations (which could include the level 
of service and the outcomes and other appropriate factors). 
In its FY 2005 budget submission, the USDOL requested $12
million to be awarded to states that successfully addressed barriers to 
employment of special populations (e.g., those with disabilities, individ-
uals with limited English proficiency, homeless individuals, veterans, 
older Americans, and participants transitioning from welfare to work) 
and placed these individuals into good jobs. The department, however, 
did not propose a quantifiable way to measure delivery of services to 
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these populations. The OMB denied the request for FY 2005 funds, and 
the USDOL has not requested incentive funds since then. 
For PY 2006 only the Adult Education program provided funds for 
incentives. However, states were still required to meet the criteria es-
tablished by all three programs in order to qualify. Thus, the amount of 
money available for incentives has been drastically reduced from a high 
of $29.8 million in 2001 to $9.8 million in FY 2007. The amount of the 
incentive grant for the PY 2006 performance awards was based on the 
size of the state’s programs, as measured by the state’s relative share of 
the combined Title I, AEFLA, and Perkins III formula grants awarded 
to that state. 
For PY 2007, the Adult Education program was again the sole con-
tributor to state incentive grants amid some changes to performance 
management and at a slightly lower funding level. In 2007, the Labor 
Department revised performance measurement requirements for deter-
mining eligibility of states for receiving incentive grants. In addition to 
changes to WIA performance reporting, the 2007 reauthorization of the 
Perkins Act removed the requirement that funds be reserved for WIA
performance bonuses. Therefore, the Department of Education no lon-
ger sets aside Perkins Act funds for the purpose of funding incentive 
grants to states. The remaining funding is provided only by the Adult 
Education program, and 11 states were awarded incentive grants for a 
total of $9.76 million in 2007. 
For PY 2008, USDOL guidance was issued based on state-
negotiated performance levels that would have had an impact on states’
eligibility to qualify for incentive grants. The Labor Department con-
tinued to facilitate the grant review and award process, and the Office 
of Adult Vocational Education within the Department of Education 
continued to fund these grants. In PY 2008, 10 states were awarded 
incentive grants, for a total of $9.76 million. 
Variation in State and Regional Receipt of the WIA HPBs 
The receipt of WIA financial incentives varies widely by state and 
by region (see Table 10.1). The variation is so great that it points toward 
exogenous influences on program performance such as fluctuations in 
economic conditions or changes in the demographics of state and lo-
cal participants. These wide swings in program performance relative to 
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Table 10.1  WIA High Performance Bonuses: Eligible States and Funding Levels, PY 1999–2008 
Program year/number 
of states eligible 
Amount of incentive
money available Bonus range Eligible states 
1999/6 $10,084,000 
$2M from the USDOL 
$843,351–$2,645,125 Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont 
$8.1M from the Dept. of 
Education 
2000/12 $27,580,600 
$12M from the USDOL 
$15.5 M from the Dept. of 
Education 
$750,000–$3,000,000 Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, North Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin 
2001/16 $29,760,422 
$13.2M from the USDOL 
$16.5 M from the Dept. of 
Education 
$750,000–$3,000,000 Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington, Wyoming 
2002/23 $24,422,000 
$7.9M from the Dept. of 
Education 
$16.9M from the Dept. of 
Education 
$750,000–$3,000,000 Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas 
  
 
2003/19 $16,247,000 
Funded by Dept. of 
Education (AEFLA
& Perkins) 
$772,770–$1,076,445 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, 
Iowa, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina 
2004/23 $16,605,048 $646,569–$941,250 
From the Dept. of Education 
(AEFLA & Perkins) 
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin 
2005/10 $16,353,187 $912,966–$3,000,000 
From the Dept. of Education 
Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington 
2006/8 $9,968,489 
Funded by AEFLA only 
$821,995–$2,148,397 Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Missouri, 
Montana, Ohio, South Carolina, South 
Dakota 
2007/11 $9,760,451 $761,088–$1,099,410 
Funded by AEFLA only—
no longer funded through the 
Carl D. Perkins Act 
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota 
2008/10 $9,760,450 
Funded by AEFLA only 
$784,251–$1,405,909 Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New York, Tennessee 
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annual targets could be minimized through objective methods of target 
setting accounting for external factors. 
There has been a strong concentration in the distribution of incen-
tive grants by state and region during the PY 1999 through PY 2007 
period. During those nine years, states have been eligible for incentive 
awards 125 times. Five states in three regions were eligible for (and 
received) an incentive award five or more times since PY 1999 (see 
Table 10.2). 
Thus, these 5 states have collectively received 31 awards, or nearly 
25 percent of all awards. On the other hand, 9 states received no awards 
(Alaska, Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island), and 12 states 
have received only one award (Idaho, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, 
Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming) through 2007. 
There have been large differences among USDOL regions with 
respect to award eligibility. The 9 states in Region 1 (Connecticut, Mas-
sachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Puerto 
Rico, Rhode Island, and Vermont) were eligible to receive 10 awards, 
or about 8 percent of all of the awards. At the other extreme, in Region 
5 (Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Ohio, and Wisconsin), the 10 states were eligible for 37 awards, 
or about 30 percent of the total awards. 
These regional variances, with awards concentrated heavily in some 
regions and not in others, suggest that there might be greater incentives 
or pressure in some regions for states to obtain awards than in others. 
As previously stated, there is no uniform method in place to adjust for 
differences among state economic and labor market environments, so 
when regions of states consistently achieve a significantly higher num-
ber of awards, there is a likelihood of strategic behavior in pursuit of 
these monetary awards. 
Consequences 
While establishing monetary incentive strategies was popular at the 
outset of the WIA program, this strategy has not proved to be an ef-
fective way to encourage exemplary performance. In fact, it may have 
resulted in reduced services to populations most in need. 
  
 
 
 
Financial Performance Incentives 287 
Table 10.2  States Receiving the Largest Number of WIA High
Performance Bonuses, 1999–2008 
Region State Number of awards 
5 Illinois 9 
3 Kentucky 8 
3 Florida 6 
5 Iowa 6 
4 North Dakota 5 
Since the core performance measures of WIA are based on the ratio 
of the numbers of program participants who exit the program (“ex-
iters”) who obtain and retain employment to those exiters who do not, 
the temptation to reduce the numbers of exiters who do not successfully 
gain employment is high. The risk of using a monetary bonus based on 
performance results is, therefore, that states will engage in manipulative 
reporting, or “gaming,” or even elect to serve those individuals with a 
high likelihood of success (creaming). 
The relationship between WIA monetary incentives and the main-
line WIA programs is weak. State plans providing information on the 
intended use of received bonuses indicate that incentive grant awards 
go toward new programs or increases in services rather than to individ-
uals involved in frontline service. This proposed usage does not provide 
a direct incentive to individual frontline employees for providing exem-
plary or increasingly effective services, since these individuals do not 
receive any monetary return on their investment in improving services. 
Thus, it is very possible that individual level service might be 
negatively impacted by offering monetary incentives for achieving per-
formance goals. Providing monetary services without adjusting for the 
characteristics of the population served reduces the incentive to serve 
disadvantaged populations, whether measured by education, disability, 
or race/ethnicity. 
As can be seen in Table 10.1, the annual awards have been declin-
ing over time. The number of states eligible for the awards has declined 
in recent years. The overall annual award amount also has been steadily 
diminishing since the beginning of the WIA program, and funding for 
these incentives has ceased altogether from the USDOL. 
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The WIA HPB continues despite lack of support from the Labor 
Department because the Adult Education Program continues to provide 
HPB funding. Though there has been no department funding since FY
2004, the USDOL continued to participate in the HPB process because 
of statutory requirements. 
TANF HPB 
The TANF program provides a minimum income for families with 
children. TANF was established in 1996 by the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) as a successor 
to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The 
1996 legislation identified one TANF goal as ending “the dependence 
of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job prepara-
tion, work, and marriage.” To promote attainment of this end, the law 
authorized payment of bonuses to “high performing states based on 
a formula to be established by the Department of Health and Human 
Services” (DHHS) in consultation with the National Governors Associ-
ation, the American Public Welfare Association (an organization largely 
representing state social service agency directors that is now called the 
American Public Human Services Association), and other interested 
parties. These HPBs were distributed by the DHHS to states for accom-
plishments from federal fiscal year 1998 through 2004. Funding for the 
program ceased in 2005. 
Experience with the HPB offers a case study of a policy intended 
to provide positive incentives for local program operators to improve 
performance in pursuit of public objectives. The purpose of case studies 
is generally to gain insight into the myriad details that bedevil imple-
mentation of policy and to offer lessons of experience. To this end we 
provide an overview of the program and identify issues and lessons. 
Our conclusion is that the indicators upon which the TANF HPB 
was based have numerous shortcomings and, possibly as a result, there 
is no evidence that the TANF HPB affected state policy or program ef-
fectiveness. However, the program leaves an institutional legacy that, 
while difficult to replicate elsewhere, may prove valuable as the current 
administration attempts to renew interest in social policy innovation. 
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The Program and Its Evolution 
To understand the HPB, it is important to understand the federal 
context. TANF is a joint federal–state venture in which states design 
and operate their assistance programs under broad federal guidelines. 
Benefit levels are determined by states, as are many other eligibility con-
ditions and compliance requirements. Funding is from a combination 
of a state’s own revenues and a fixed federal contribution determined
largely by the amount the state received for AFDC during that pro-
gram’s last years. In FY 2004 combined expenditure of federal and state 
funds for TANF amounted to $25.8 billion, of which $14.4 billion came 
from the federal government. Forty-seven percent of the total went for 
income support; the remainder was spent on services, including work 
supports for cash recipients and others meeting TANF-related need 
standards. 
The HPB fiscal stakes were small. The bonuses averaged about 
$200 million per year, less than 1 percent of total outlays. The pro-
gram was voluntary, and no state was allowed to receive in any year an 
amount greater than 5 percent of its TANF block grant. Nevertheless, 
the program was evidently viewed by states as worth the effort required 
to compete. In the first year of competition, 46 states competed; 49 and 
50 participated for FY 1999 and FY 2000, respectively, and thereafter 
generally 50 of the 51 states engaged. 
As required by PRWORA, the HPB criteria were developed in con-
sultation with the National Governors Association, the American Public 
Human Services Association, and a variety of other interested parties 
(DHHS 1999). The bonus awards for FYs 1998, 1999, and 2000 were 
based on four work measures: Job Entry, Success in the Labor Force 
(a measure based on employment retention and earnings gains), and 
improvement from the prior fiscal year in each of these measures. For 
each, the 10 states with the highest performance received awards. It was 
unusual for states to gain awards in all four categories, and therefore it 
was possible for more than 10 states to receive recognition on at least 
one dimension. The awards for FY 1998 went to 27 states (more than 
half of states entering the competition). Twenty-eight states won bo-
nuses for performance in FY 1999, and 27 states did so in for FY 2000. 
States were not obligated to compete on all performance measures, but 
eventually most states chose to do so. 
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Over time, the program evolved. In 1999, the DHHS began efforts 
to expand the criteria used for awarding the HPB to include measures 
of state success in raising participation in support programs for work-
ing families and in promoting family formation and stability (DHHS 
1999, p. 68202), which caused an increase in the numbers of indicators 
used. Beginning with the awards made for performance in FY 2001 and 
continuing through FY 2004, the bonus criteria included, in addition to 
the four employment-related measures, indicators for 1) participation 
of low-income working families in the FSP, 2) participation of former 
TANF recipients in the Medicaid program or in the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 3) a child care subsidy measure, 
and 4) a family formation and stability measure. Additionally, a quality 
component was added to the child care subsidy measure beginning in 
FY 2003. 
Initially, states competing on work measures were required to 
collect, compile, and submit quarterly performance reports derived 
from earnings data reported by employers to state workforce agencies 
(SWAs) as part of the Unemployment Insurance system. SWA data 
cover only quarterly earnings and do not include hours of work, wage 
rates, or information on the monthly pattern of work within a quarter. 
Measures of Job Entry and the two components of Success in the Labor 
Force (job retention and earnings gain) were constructed from these 
data. Methods clearly varied, and the performance results submitted by 
states to the DHHS were not audited. The consequence was uncertainty 
about the reliability of state-reported achievements, which was further 
undermined by some exceptional accomplishments. One state won $6 
million in the initial round for achieving a job entry rate in FY 1998 of 
88.4 percent, 3.4 standard deviations above the participating state mean 
of 42.6 percent. Significantly, the greatest variance in state performance 
was associated with the Job Entry rate, the measure that offered under 
DHHS instructions the greatest opportunity for variation in state inter-
pretation, data sources, and computation procedures. 
Beginning with FY 2001, federal policy changed. Instead of car-
rying out computations themselves, competing states were required 
to submit monthly lists of adult TANF recipients, identified only by 
their Social Security number. These data were then matched against the 
National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) maintained by the DHHS. 
The NDNH is also based on employer wage reports. NDNH data is 
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broader than what is available from state systems in that it includes 
federal employment and provides information on jobs held in one state 
by residents of another (in general state SWA data do not). Use of the 
NDNH leveled the information and computational playing field for the 
HPB employment measures. 
Addition of the new performance categories required changes in the 
allocation of the $200 million annual bonus among measures. However, 
the employment measures continued to account for about 70 percent 
of all bonus funds distributed. The additional categories increased 
the number of opportunities for winning a bonus from 4 to 10. When 
awards for FY 2001 and FY 2002 were announced in late September 
2003, 46 states won some amount of bonus money. In the last report 
(for FY 2004), 42 states gained recognition in some category; 24 were 
recognized in 2 or more. The awards for FY 2004, the last performance 
year for awards, are summarized in Table 10.3. 
The TANF program itself was reauthorized by the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 2005, but this legislation eliminated funding for the TANF 
HPB program. During the reauthorization debate, virtually no effort 
was made by either the states or the Bush administration to see the 
HPB program extended. Somewhat oddly, the DHHS is still required 
to calculate the basic HPB employment, Food Stamp, and employment 
measures for states that submit the necessary data. The child care and 
Medicaid measures have been dropped (although indicators for these 
programs have been developed in other contexts). 
Issues 
Implementation and operation of the HPB raised a number of issues 
common to all performance measure programs, including those coupled 
with fiscal incentives. 
What to measure. At least at first blush, the HPB performance 
measures sound appropriate—surely job entry, success in the labor 
force, and family formation and stability sound like good things. How-
ever, as often happens, the details pose problems. Consider the Job 
Entry rate. Nominally this would seem to refer to the rate at which 
adults receiving TANF moved in some time period from unemployment 
to some standard of employment. Since the NDNH data record only 
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Table 10.3  TANF High Performance Bonus Categories and Awards, FY 2004 
U.S. Best performing Best state Award Total awards
Component Indicator definition Source average (%) state score ($, millions) ($, millions) 
Success in the
labor force 
2004 levels 
Job entry 
Job retention 
Earnings gain 
Success in
labor force 
2003–2004 change 
Job entry 
Job retention 
Earnings gain 
Success in labor 
force 
Ratio of measure of recipients NDNHa 34.9 Virginia 46.7% 7.3 48.1 
entering employment to total 
unemployed recipients (%) 
Proportion of currently NDNH 59.0 Hawaii 72.2% n/ab n/a 
employed recipients with 
earnings in first and second 
subsequent quarters (%) 
Increase in aggregate earnings NDNH 36.9 South Dakota 81.4% n/a n/a 
between current, second 
following quarter, currently 
employed recipients (%) 
Average rank on job retention Calculated n/a Wyoming  1(rank) 0.4 36.9 
and earnings gain measures 
Change in Job entry rate (Δ%) Calculated 1.2 Virginia 8.2% 0.7 29.5 
Change in Job Retention Rate Calculated −0.5 Louisiana 12.4% n/a n/a 
(Δ%) 
Change in Earnings Gain Rate Calculated 4.3 Georgia 31.4% n/a n/a 
(Δ%) 
Change in average rank on Job n/a Georgia  1(rank) 4.0 22.2 
Retention and Earnings Gain 
measures 
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Supporting services 
2004 levels 
Medicaid/SCHIP
enrollment 
Food Stamps 
Child care 
subsidies 
2003–2004 change 
Medicaid/SCHIP
enrollment 
Food Stamps 
Family formation 
and stability 
Children living 
with both 
(married) 
parents 
Proportion of TANF leavers 
who retain enrollment in 
Medicaid/SCHIP for at least 
four months (%) 
Proportion of low-income 
working households with 
children under 18 participating 
in Food Stamp Program (%) 
Measure (with quality 
adjustment) of proportion of 
eligible children served under 
state’s federally funded child 
care program (%) 
Change in Medicaid/SCHIP
Enrollment Rate (Δ%) 
Change in FSP Participation 
Rate (Δ%) 
Change in proportion of 
children under 18 residing in 
married family couple groups 
(Δ%) 
State
reports 
Census 
Bureau 
State 
reports 
Calculated 
Census 
Bureau 
Census
Bureau 
77.5 Pennsylvania 96.0% 4.7 6.3 
37.4 Maine 61.7% 3.0 6.3 
n/a Rhode Island  1(rank) 0.2 10.6 
n/a New Hampshire 7.3% 1.1 14.8 
2.3 Delaware 12.6% 0.3 14.8 
−0.1 Arizona 5.1% 0.3 10.6 
(continued) 
    
 
        
         
Table 10.3  (continued) 
U.S. Best performing Best state Award Total awards
Component Indicator definition Source average (%) state score ($, millions) ($, millions) 
Family formation 
and stability 
Total high 200.0 
performance 
bonus 
($, millions) 
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NOTES: aNational Directory of New Hires. bn/a = Measure not applicable. 
SOURCE: Administration for Children and Families (2009), Appendix 5. Indicator descriptions are paraphrased and corrected for errors 
in the source.
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quarterly earnings, identification of a job entry using the NDNH must 
be completed on the basis of variation in quarterly earnings. The Job 
Entry rate is a measure of the percentage of the number of unduplicated 
unemployed adult recipients who entered employment for the first time 
during the performance year (i.e., job entries). An adult is considered 
to have entered employment for the first time in a calendar quarter if 
he/she had no earnings in any of the prior quarters of the performance 
year (Administration for Children and Families 2009, Table 5.1). The 
formula is2
 Sum of job entries in quarters 1–4 
× 100.
Unduplicated number of unemployed 
adult recipients in performance year 
It is easy to come up with scenarios in which people lose jobs, take 
up TANF, and are helped to find new employment, but never count in 
the data as a job entry using this formula. On the other end of the list 
of awarded outcomes (see Table 10.3), the measure actually used for 
“family formation and stability” was simply an estimate of the number 
of children under 18 residing in “married family couple groups” as a 
percentage of all children resident in a state. It is unclear why states 
should receive a TANF “high performance” bonus on this measure 
when TANF typically involves less than 5 percent of children at any 
point during the year.3 
Control for context. No adjustment is made in any of the perfor-
mance measures for variation in state economic and social environment. 
In particular, it seems likely that the ability of states to move unem-
ployed recipients into jobs will be affected by local unemployment 
rates as well as the skills, education, and experience of the caseload. 
The DHHS initially argued that its own analysis suggested that “these 
specific factors do not determine entry rate to any significant degree” 
(DHHS 2000, p. 52843). Subsequent analysis, using NDNH data, sug-
gests otherwise (Wiseman 2006). 
At times, the DHHS argued that inclusion of measures of change 
compensated states in part that were disadvantaged by economic or so-
cial factors. Even when states could not outcompete others on levels of 
achievement, they presumably had a better chance in accomplishing 
improvement. The problem with change measures is that any year’s set 
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of changes is likely in part the consequence of random factors and, over 
time, some regression to the mean can be expected. The larger the state, 
the more likely it is that such factors cancel out and that year-over-year 
change includes less “noise.” Something of this phenomenon may be 
observed in the data: Winning states in the change-in-job-entry category
tend to be smaller than those winning on the basis of current rates. 
What is welfare about? Historically, social assistance systems 
have generally been intended first and foremost to alleviate need. Fed-
eral law does not set benefit levels, and as a result, there is exceptional 
interstate variation in the amount of TANF benefits. In 2004, a TANF 
recipient family of three received a monthly grant of $786 in California 
and $288 in Indiana. (About 30 percent of this disparity was offset by 
variation in Food Stamp benefits.) Yet both states received roughly the 
same HPB amount, and California received no credit for lifting depen-
dent recipients much closer to the national poverty standard. Over the 
life of the HPB, the median state TANF benefit declined by 10 percent 
in real terms. It seems reasonable to argue that performance in employ-
ment promotion and across other dimensions should be evaluated in 
light of income support accomplishments. 
Source of data. A virtue of the NDNH data is that they cover all 
adults and the universe of jobs outside of the shadow economy. There 
are no problems of statistical inference. The data for Medicaid/SCHIP
come from the states’ own management information systems and also 
present no problems of statistical inference. However, the data on FSP
participation, participation in subsidized child care, and children’s fam-
ily environment are derived from sample surveys, notably the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). For all but the largest states the CPS sample 
is too small for reliable estimates of these measures, and the problems 
were compounded in estimation of year-to-year changes. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the DHHS summary tables for measure achievement by 
state on these dimensions never include estimated standard errors or 
cautionary notation. 
Both the NDNH and census-based data take a long time to accu-
mulate. Typically, awards were announced almost a year after the last 
quarter included in the performance data. (The awards for FY 2004 
were announced in October 2005.) The result is a substantial temporal 
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disconnect between the performance that was being rewarded and its 
actual identification. 
How to respond. The nature of the TANF HPB indicators made it 
difficult for states to deliberately target the outcomes measured. How-
ever, some policies taken for other purposes appear to have influenced 
the HPB outcomes. The original TANF legislation included a federal 
requirement that states achieve certain target rates of participation of re-
cipient adults in work-related activities. The impact of these targets was 
diminished because they were reduced in response to caseload decline 
and, for a variety of reasons, the total number of TANF cases fell by 
over 50 percent between FY 1996 and 2004. Nevertheless, some states 
took precautionary steps to reduce the challenge posed by the participa-
tion requirement. One strategy, sanctioned by regulations, was to create 
a Separate State Program (SSP) outside of TANF and wholly funded 
from state revenues. Persons difficult to engage in work because of dis-
ability or other problems were then served through these programs, and 
such expenditures were included in assessing state compliance with 
federal “maintenance of effort” regulations intended to sustain state 
contributions to the public assistance effort. Despite this selection, the 
TANF participation rate was calculated only for participants in feder-
ally subsidized TANF. Given that employability was generally a cri-
terion for moving people to SSPs, introduction of such programs 
probably raised performance as measured by the employment-related 
indicators. In 2004, 32 states had SSPs, accounting for about 12.6 per-
cent of all adult recipients. Wiseman (2006) presents evidence that, other 
things equal, states with SSPs had higher rates of job entry, suggesting 
some prizes were won by artful selection. However, the selection ap-
pears to have been motivated by the participation requirement, not the 
HPB competition. 
Missing feedback. Performance assessment programs are gen-
erally intended not only to identify exceptional achievement but to 
provide feedback from assessment to improvement. The feedback oc-
curs in at least three ways. The first is that the systems are generally 
intended to enhance the information available to operators. The TANF 
HPB program, based as it was on information not available to state and 
local-level program managers, did not do this for the key employment 
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indicators. The second is that such systems provide points of reference 
for judging accomplishment by comparison to peers. Given lack of ad-
justment in the HPB measures for factors likely to influence outcomes 
regardless of management strategy, caution would be essential in mak-
ing cross-state comparisons using HPB data. 
A third feedback dimension occurs at the national management
level and is notably absent from later years of HPB operation. This is 
use of the data and experience to make improvements in the indica-
tors and to seek better practice in TANF employment policy. After the 
shift to use of the NDNH and census data for performance assessment 
after 2000, no significant changes occurred in the choice of indicators 
or methods of measurement. Moreover, no systematic attempt was 
launched to determine the basis for success as flagged by the bonuses 
awarded. If policymakers believed that the HPB bonus system uncov-
ered genuine managerial accomplishment, then it would have been 
reasonable to investigate what it was that the states flagged as “top 10” 
were doing that led to this accomplishment and whether and how the 
technique(s) might be transferred. No such efforts were mounted. 
Consequences 
Analysts have made no attempt to assess the effect of the pres-
ence of the HPB on the trajectory of TANF policy at the state level. 
There simply is no reasonable control against which performance and 
response to the HPB stimulus might be assessed. Managers appreciated 
the public acknowledgment that award announcement occasioned, and 
coming outside of state budget cycles, the prizes themselves in many 
cases provided flexible resources for special projects. But the reality 
was that bonuses were spread across 10 indicators, even the DHHS 
seemed confused about how they were defined (see Note 2), and pay-
ments turned not only on what any state accomplished, but also on 
unknown developments elsewhere. Under these circumstances, altering 
policy for the coming year in pursuit of a small award to be obtained 
more than two years in the future made little sense. The absence of 
evidence of effectiveness contributed to lack of enthusiasm for continu-
ation beyond FY 2004. 
What seems clear in both the case of the WIA and TANF perfor-
mance incentive bonus is that they are sought after, and in some cases 
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they appear to be the cause of selective behavior either by states (in the 
case of TANF SSPs) or the programs within a state (creaming and gam-
ing in the case of WIA). For both WIA and TANF, employing a method 
of setting performance targets that could essentially level the playing 
field with respect to economic conditions and program participant char-
acteristics would go a long way in making the HPB a more successful 
incentive to improve instead of alter program performance.4 
Additionally, the effectiveness of both the TANF and WIA HPB 
programs has suffered due to a weak causal relationship; the perfor-
mance indicator used to measure TANF program success has been a 
moving target, and there is no correlation between statewide program 
performance and the size of the HPB in WIA. Lacking a distinctive 
connection between cause (high program performance) and effect 
(bonus award), the HPB tactic, while it in many cases does reward well-
functioning programs, does not appear for either TANF or WIA to be 
eliciting the purely motivated and zealous program behavior it was de-
signed to. On a positive note, these are not insurmountable problems to 
fix. Clearing up the muddiness of TANF performance metrics and the 
arbitrariness of WIA HPB award amounts could increase the effective-
ness of the HPB approach. 
FOOD STAMP/SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM HPB 
SNAP is the most important means-tested income support pro-
gram in the United States. It is administered nationally by the Food and 
Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
operated locally by state governments or by county governments with 
state supervision. Before October 2008, SNAP was called the Food 
Stamp Program (FSP). The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
2002 (“The Farm Bill”) included provision for an HPB for states exhib-
iting exemplary administrative performance. This section summarizes 
the architecture and operation of the FSP/SNAP HPB and compares it 
to its inspiration, the HPB introduced for the TANF program in 1996. 
The conclusion is that, in part because of certain programmatic advan-
tages, the FSP/SNAP HPB is the better designed and operated, but the 
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program’s small size and universal availability make its impact difficult 
to assess. 
Background 
The SNAP benefit is delivered by electronic benefits transfer and 
collected when recipients use a special debit card to purchase food. In 
FY 2008, state and federal outlays on (then) FSP benefits and adminis-
tration totaled $37.7 billion; in contrast state and federal expenditures 
on TANF benefits amounted to just $25 billion, and only about half of 
this was for income support. At any time, slightly less than 10 percent 
of the U.S. population resides in a SNAP-recipient household; because 
of turnover (eligibility is determined on a monthly basis), a larger pro-
portion of the population receives benefits at some time during the year. 
SNAP’s importance lies in its universality: The program lacks most of 
the categorical restrictions imposed for eligibility on other forms of in-
come support. 
SNAP is an entitlement, meaning that all persons who meet federal 
eligibility standards have a legal right to benefits. Accordingly, fund-
ing responds to meet demand. The federal government pays all benefit 
costs, but the costs of administration are shared roughly equally be-
tween the federal and state governments. This arrangement invites lax 
administration. Since state governments pay a substantial fraction of 
administrative costs but no share of benefits costs, without other incen-
tives they have little motivation for excellence, save an institutional 
adherence to eligibility rules. This incentive problem is addressed by a 
well-developed, sample-based quality control system that provides both 
data on characteristics of SNAP recipients and information on accuracy 
of eligibility and payments determination. States are liable for the costs 
of errors made, including both costs that accrue to the federal govern-
ment and the cost to participants of being paid less than the benefits to 
which they are entitled. Sanctions are assessed against states with error 
rates that are persistently high relative to the national average. 
States and advocates have long argued that the Food Stamp quality 
control system reduced the incentive for states to promote access to food 
stamps by households whose circumstances raised the likelihood of eli-
gibility and computation errors. In particular, households with earnings 
are more likely to experience income fluctuation and to create difficul-
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ties for benefit calculation. While households with earnings might be 
administratively problematic, the “working poor” were considered an 
important target for FSP (and, more recently, SNAP) outreach, since 
USDA take-up estimates suggested that the rate of program participa-
tion was particularly low among eligible working households (Leftin 
and Wolkwitz 2009). In 2002 Congress attempted to address some of 
these issues, both by modifying benefit computational requirements to 
reduce the likelihood of error and by shifting the focus of administrative 
assessment from errors to outreach and achievement. The FSP/SNAP
HPB is part of that effort. 
THE HPBs 
The 2002 Farm Bill authorized the Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) to “establish performance measures relating to actions taken 
to correct errors, reduce rates of error, improve eligibility determina-
tions, and other indicators of effective administration; measure states’
performance against these performance measures; and award perfor-
mance bonus payments totaling $48 million for each fiscal year to state 
agencies that show high or most improved performance relating to the 
performance measures” (FNS 2005, p. 6314). 
The FNS responded with four bonus categories. Three catego-
ries—best payment accuracy, best negative error rate, and application 
processing timeliness—cover administrative matters. The fourth, pro-
gram access, involves outreach. Levels and changes are both measured 
for everything but processing timeliness. Features of the awards for FY
2008 are summarized in Table 10.4 below. Total state FSP administra-
tive expenses for FY 2008 were about $3 billion, so, at $48 million, the 
bonuses amount to less than a 2 percent increment in aggregate. For 
the individual state winners, however, the gain can be quite significant. 
The payment accuracy indices are simply the sum of sample-based 
estimates of the dollar value of overpayments and underpayments dur-
ing the year. The FNS Web site reports the components of this measure 
for each state. On average, the overpayments component is four times 
the size of the underpayments amount. The official reports give no in-
formation on precision of estimates, but the sampling strategy is simple 
    
 
         
Table 10.4  Food Stamp Program High Performance Bonuses, FY 2008 
State average Awards Best Best state State award Total awards
Category Definition (%, unweighted) made state score (%) ($, millions) ($, millions) 
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Payment accuracy 
Payment accuracy 
improvement 
Negative error rate 
Negative error rate 
improvement 
Application 
processing 
timeliness 
Program access 
Program access 
improvement 
Total 
Sum of erroneous under- and 
overpayments as proportion of 
total benefits (%) 
Change in payment accuracy 
measure, FY 2007–FY 2008 (Δ %) 
Proportion of applications or cases 
denied, suspended, or terminated 
in error 
Change in negative error measure, 
FY 2007–FY 2008 (Δ %; negative 
identifies error decline) 
Proportion of approved applicants 
given benefit access within target 
time (30 days for normal cases, 
7 days for cases qualified for 
expedited processing) 
Ratio of average monthly number 
of SNAP participants over calendar 
year to number of persons in 
families with incomes less than 
125 percent of the federal poverty 
standard (%) 
Change in program access 
measure, 2007–2008 (Δ %) 
5.0 8 Florida 
3 Georgia 
11.0 4 Nebraska 
0.02 2 Oklahoma 
87.8 6 Montana 
58.6 4 Missouri 
3.8 4 Maryland 
0.8 
−5.6 
0.0 
−6.5 
98.0 
90.0 
10.0 
7.2 24.0 
4.1a 
0.7 6.0 
2.3 
0.3 6.0 
2.6 12.0 
1.4 
48.0 
aGeorgia won awards in both level and improvement categories. 
SOURCE: FNS; definitions paraphrased.
  
 
 
  
 
Financial Performance Incentives 303 
and samples for all states are large enough to produce equivalent preci-
sion.5 No agency can win money for both “best” and “most improved,” 
so Georgia, which scored in both categories, got only one award. The 
FNS gives each winning state agency a base award of $100,000, and the 
remainder is distributed in proportion to average monthly caseload. The 
result is that Florida ended up receiving $7.2 billion and the Virgin Is-
lands got $148,000. The “federalist” character of this exercise is evident 
in the “national average.” This is not, as might be presumed, an estimate 
of the accuracy of all payments in aggregate. It is the arithmetic aver-
age of state estimates, so the Virgin Islands receive the same weight as 
California. The national payment accuracy rate would be a measure of 
FNS performance, and that’s not in accord with the HPB concept. 
The “negative error rate” calculations refer not to costs but preva-
lence of mistakes in actions involving denial, suspension, or termination 
of benefits. This, too, is sample based. Perhaps the most striking thing 
in Table 10.4 is the “national average.” Again, this is not the national 
average for transactions of this sort, but rather the average achievement 
across states. These data pose political problems, since each negative 
error involves denial of benefit to a family in need, and some states 
have rates that are very high—in one case 17 percent. The negative er-
ror rates are the only components of the bonus system for which the full 
“league table” of outcomes for all states is not published on the Web. 
Application timeliness is relatively straightforward. One issue con-
cerns definition of when the benefit is received. FSP/SNAP participants 
may not use their benefit immediately, just as cash recipients may not 
begin spending immediately. The timeliness definition works with the 
point at which the new recipient’s electronic benefits transfer card can 
be used. 
It is common to claim that take-up rates for the FSP/SNAP are low, 
and the FNS has long been criticized for not effectively promoting out-
reach. The program access index is part of the agency’s response. The 
index is the ratio of persons living in households receiving FSP/SNAP
benefits to an estimate of persons living in families with incomes less 
than 125 percent of the national poverty standard (FNS 2009). This 
denominator is intended to approximate roughly the number of persons 
actually eligible for benefits; various adjustments are made to both the 
numerator and the denominator to reflect special state circumstances 
(for example, distribution of food assistance by means other than SNAP
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in Native American reservations). Calling this measure the program 
access index rather than program access rate reflects the agency’s con-
cern that it not be misinterpreted. Over time the program access index 
has been improved, most notably by shifting the base of state poverty 
estimates from the CPS to the much larger American Community Sur-
vey. The American Community Survey sample size is about 3 million 
households per year, compared to roughly 100,000 in the CPS Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement. 
While the American Community Survey may be much larger than 
the CPS, it contains much less data on household characteristics and 
sources of income—factors important in determining FSP/SNAP eli-
gibility. The FNS contracts with a consulting firm, Mathematica Policy 
Research, to develop more sophisticated estimates of state FSP/SNAP
participation rates using the CPS. In one of the few applications of 
Bayesian techniques to empirical study of U.S. welfare policies, the 
Mathematica Policy Research team uses shrinkage estimators to com-
bine observations from state CPS subsamples with regression-based 
predictions of participation based on other states’ experience (Cunning-
ham, Castner, and Schirm 2009). The results are mixed. In FY 2006 
(the latest year for which the CPS-based participation estimates are 
available), the correlation between state ranking on the program access 
index and ranking on estimated participation rates was 0.86; three of the 
top four prizewinners would have still won had the (presumably) supe-
rior participation rate measure of access been employed. For change, 
the results are much different: The correlation is ~0.4 and only one state 
appears in both the top four “most improved” lists. What appears to 
be happening is that the Bayesian shrinkage estimator for state par-
ticipation rates takes out a lot of “noise” in the data, noise that without 
adjustment may be interpreted as change. 
To the agency’s credit, the FNS is aware of these problems and 
has published analyses of them (cf. FNS 2006). The argument for the 
program access index as currently calculated is that the number is avail-
able by the statutory deadline of September of the year following the 
performance year. This is a work in progress; the challenge is to find an 
indicator with a more credible connection to genuine improvement in 
achieved participation rates. 
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Net Effects 
Has the bonus system actually improved performance? It is difficult 
to judge, both because of the absence of a counterfactual and because 
changes over time in eligibility standards have reduced the rigor of 
eligibility definition. Nevertheless, the story is mixed. Average state 
achievement on the Payment Error Rate has fallen from 6.63 in FY
2003 to the 5.01 recorded for FY 2008 in Table 10.4. On the other hand, 
the average negative error rate has increased from 7.6 to 11.0. Access, 
as measured both by the program access index and estimated participa-
tion rates (through 2006), is also up, both for all families and the subset 
with earnings. This of course could simply be the product of publication 
of the “league tables” of state achievement on the various dimensions 
used for HPB assessment. But the bonuses do serve to draw attention 
to data and add to whatever motivation exists for state operators to seek 
improvement opportunities. 
The Missing Element 
If there is a shortcoming here, it is in the absence of an openly 
debated agenda for evaluation and refinement. However, the FNS does 
engage in a number of forums in which federal and state officials con-
fer—most notably the meetings of what is now called the American 
Association of SNAP Directors. The problems with the program ac-
cess and other measures are openly addressed in its sponsored research. 
Nevertheless, there is little institutional apparatus either for developing 
a vision of where the management system should be headed or refine-
ment of the performance indicators for assessing progress toward that 
goal. 
SNAP program administration is an interesting contrast to WIA and 
TANF in that there is a tremendous amount of control on the part of the 
program or state administrators to improve performance over the four 
metrics in use. The metrics, however, are designed to have this effect. 
In essence, the proper or improved functioning of SNAP is the goal, 
whereas the expected levels of performance for WIA and TANF apply 
to the participants of the program (e.g., employment, or reemployment 
rates), who are strongly influenced by behavioral and economic factors 
and labor market conditions. Awarding a program a monetary bonus for 
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performance metrics specific to the functioning of that program (i.e., 
SNAP) may create an environment more conducive to improved pro-
gram performance using HPBs. Regardless, rewarding program rather 
than participant behavior has allowed SNAP to make a much stronger 
connection between the annual performance levels and the amount of 
the incentive award. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM HPB PROGRAMS 
While there are similarities and differences between the three HPB 
programs we have examined, there are a number of lessons that can be 
learned from their use. 
Inadequate Emphasis on Best Practice 
Arguably the greatest failing of the TANF HPB was that after one 
major round of reform, it went nowhere. An important indicator of the 
quality of management systems is the presence of procedures for feed-
back, assessment, and improvement. It is virtually impossible to predict 
in advance all problems and opportunities that will arise in context of 
development of performance assessment and incentive systems. Any 
plan for implementation of a performance assessment and bonus system 
should include provisions for review and adjustment. 
WIA programs similarly missed an opportunity to exemplify bonus 
award winners as leaders in best practices. As shown in Table 10.1, 
HPBs have been awarded to a narrow set of states from year to year, 
and therefore do not appear to be encouraging the spreading of perfor-
mance-enhancing practices which would lead to a wider set of states 
achieving bonuses. 
By contrast, in the SNAP program, the clear connection between 
nationally rewarded outcomes and local management is emphasized by 
the FNS on its Web site, where the data on achievement are followed 
by links to information on “promising practices” for improving access, 
outreach, improving payment accuracy, and managing recent increase 
in demand for SNAP benefits.6 Improvement of local management is 
promoted by FNS regional offices. 
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Insufficient Focus on Objectives 
The WIA monetary incentives are small and are likely to have weak 
impacts on state workforce agencies serving moderate to large numbers 
of participants. Typically, incentives to improve performance are higher 
with high bonus amounts, but in the case of WIA, even if all states were 
to apply for and receive the maximum incentive grant award, this total 
amount would be a very small percentage of annual WIA funding. With 
a weak link between award amounts and program performance, the ob-
jective of improved program efficacy is lost, particularly in large states. 
The TANF HPB indicators are distinctly ad hoc and seem to miss 
essentials. This creates a sense of arbitrariness in the factors determin-
ing which states receive awards. It also creates an unstable link between 
program performance and HPB achievements. Indicators need to be 
motivated by a philosophy of what the system is attempting to accom-
plish in order to improve program performance. 
Only the SNAP program shows promise in connecting the HPB 
with the program objectives. The SNAP bonus program has a direct 
connection with what is done and what should be monitored at the 
“ground level,” i.e., where SNAP eligibility is assessed and benefits are 
calculated and delivered. 
Negative Impact on Program Operation 
WIA differs from previous workforce development programs like 
JTPA in discontinuing use of state or local regression analysis, which 
factored in prevailing regional labor market and economic conditions 
that affect workforce program outcomes in setting targets. Instead, 
states make adjustments for these exogenous factors through a negotia-
tion process in setting performance targets. Offering incentive grants 
may apply pressure at the state level to encourage manipulative behav-
ior to negotiate lower performance targets to increase the likelihood 
of achieving the performance levels required to qualify for incentive 
grants. 
What this pressure does at the programmatic level is to discourage 
frontline service to those participants hardest to serve, which are often 
those most in need, in order to secure higher levels of performance. 
This effect of programmatic disinclination to offer services or to pro-
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cess claims for challenging populations occurs in both the WIA and the 
TANF programs. 
Greater Care Needed Regarding Data Use and Validity 
In the case of TANF, greater caution should be exercised with 
regard to statistical inference. It is doubtful that any honest govern-
mental purpose is served by ignoring the shortcomings of sample-based 
achievement estimators. Where possible, data on the target “universe” 
are better, but such data often come with their own problems. In any 
event, statistical inference based on data to which operators have access 
is better than numbers that cannot be audited. 
The FSP/SNAP bonus systems rest on a good deal of statistical 
inference. A substantial effort is made to report precision of estimation 
and to acknowledge the role of random factors in affecting interstate 
comparisons. The data on participation rates, for example, are reported 
in a league chart that includes confidence intervals around point esti-
mates (see Cunningham, Castner, and Schirm 2009, p. 2). 
All of the three SNAP operations-related performance indicators 
used to award HPBs are subject to, and indeed derived from, a uniform, 
sample-based audit. This methodology diminishes the potential for bias 
and for results skewed by exogenous factors, which reduces the risk of 
creating an award program with unreasonable benchmarks. One draw-
back, however, is that HPBs have been awarded to high performing 
states relative to a national average which, given the wide variation in 
state performance levels, decreases the sensitivity of this approach in 
determining HPB awards. 
The WIA HPB, by contrast, does not make use of statistical infer-
ence. State submissions of performance data for the HPB program are 
accepted by the USDOL, subject to a data validation process adminis-
tered for each state. 
Institutional Development Can Be an Important Product 
The primary original purpose of the NDNH was the creation of a 
database to support pursuit across state borders of noncustodial parents 
obligated to provide child support. Performance assessment for TANF 
is something quite different, and manipulation of NDNH data for this 
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purpose has required substantial administrative investment. Though the 
TANF HPB is not currently in use, the apparatus developed for analysis 
of the NDNH has been used for other DHHS policy research. 
In 2008, a new administration was elected with a new social policy 
agenda. Since the January 2009 inauguration, a new leadership team 
was installed at the DHHS. As of the end of 2010, the social policy 
objectives beyond universal health care had yet to be announced in de-
tail, but planning was under way for the next reauthorization of TANF, 
scheduled for 2010 but deferred until 2011. TANF is the responsibil-
ity of the DHHS Administration for Children and Families (ACF). In 
anticipation of reauthorization, ACF working groups were established 
both to review performance measures and to develop a new set of in-
centives for innovation in social policy, in part following the lead of the 
Department of Education’s “Invest in Education” fund. It appears likely 
that data from the NDNH, restructured in light of HPB performance, 
will play a role in these developments. 
Similarly, the WIA program will await reauthorization until at least 
2011 or 2012. There has been no indication of whether the HPB is to be 
recommended for continuation in the new legislation or not. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Offering monetary bonus awards as an incentive to improve per-
formance—once a favored approach in the business world—has had 
inconclusive impacts on governmental program performance, and 
might actually be encouraging programs to alter their behavior to im-
prove their chances of gaining a bonus at the expense of not serving 
their customers. 
Though PYs 2000–2002 were the highest for receipt of WIA HPBs, 
there isn’t a clear legacy of improved program performance resulting 
from use of this incentive system. The states that received WIA bo-
nuses have done so sporadically and have received differing amounts 
from year to year, and state-by-state comparisons of HPBs between 
states within the same year reveal little logic in how the amounts are 
assigned. At best, this type of incentive appears to have minimal impact 
on improving program performance, and at worst, might decrease pro-
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gram effectiveness. When an HPB is offered through the WIA program, 
the temptation intensifies to either selectively report on only favorable 
performance data or to strategically negotiate performance levels to 
increase the probability of qualifying for a bonus. In addition, the inci-
dences of gaming the system in WIA to obtain monetary performance 
incentives has resulted in reduction of services to difficult-to-serve 
populations for which job entry (a primary performance indicator) is 
particularly challenging. 
TANF programs show some reporting patterns that also indicate 
that select reporting has been occurring in order to increase the reported 
performance rates. Since TANF does not offer the same opportunity 
that WIA does to negotiate expected performance levels for each state, 
those states characterized by a depressed economy have been at a dis-
advantage in qualifying for a bonus. States have been further alienated 
from any benefits of a monetary bonus because of insufficient or invalid 
data, and inconsistent data requirements in TANF have lent an air of 
arbitrariness to the award of these financial incentives. The temporal 
gap between program performance and bonus award is wide due to re-
porting delays and, since no effort has been made to exemplify the top 
performers in encouraging overall performance increases, it isn’t even 
clear from the federal administration of TANF that these bonuses are a 
useful tool for increasing program performance levels. 
The SNAP program offers a more promising bonus model and, 
compared to WIA and TANF, it has large strategic advantages. The 
objective of the program is near-immediate: delivering a well-defined 
benefit to a target population each month. This means that outcomes 
can be observed very soon after the management actions that do or 
do not produce them. Moreover, the foundation of assessment is a 
well-designed audit program for procedures that are intended to be 
identical nationwide. That said, the transparency developed for assess-
ment procedures and the ongoing assessment of measure validity seems 
admirable and worthy of study by social assistance agencies in other 
departments and, for that matter, other countries. It is possible that the 
unusual name and character of the SNAP/FSP has caused the program 
to be overlooked by those from abroad looking for promising practice 
in social assistance governance. 
Federal funding of HPBs in WIA and TANF has in fact significantly 
diminished or ceased by this point, and funding for the SNAP bonus 
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has never been large. Overall, the challenges in estimating the merit of 
these awards based on inconsistent data sources, the fact that the bo-
nuses do not provide any monetary gain to local service providers, and 
the pressure they place on programs to alter their reporting or service 
behavior in a nonaltruistic direction makes HPBs in government pro-
grams an inefficient use of federal resources. 
Notes 
1. As used in this chapter, the term state includes the District of Columbia. 
2. Actually, this definition, taken from the Labor Department’s Annual TANF report, 
is incorrect. The numerator in the actual calculation is the sum across four quarters 
of unduplicated TANF recipient adults with earnings in the current quarter but 
no earnings in the quarter preceding divided by the unduplicated sum across four 
quarters of TANF recipient adults who meet the unemployment criterion, i.e., have 
no reported earnings in the previous quarter (see Wiseman [2006] for more detail). 
3. A higher proportion of children receive TANF assistance at some point during the year.
4. A pilot program is under way at the USDOL to test the effect of economic and 
demographic characteristics on local and state workforce program performance. It 
is possible this pilot program will affect the WIA HPB should it remain available 
for state employment and training programs. 
5. The 1/100th of a percent difference between Mississippi and North Carolina is 
undoubtedly not significant, and the 3.22 percent payment error rate for the mar-
ginal winning “state,” the Virgin Islands, was hardly different from the runner-up, 
Colorado, at 3.32, so chance clearly plays a role. 
6. See http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/government/program-improvement.htm. 
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Ten Years of WIA Research 
Paul T. Decker 
Mathematica Policy Research 
To remain competitive in today’s global economy, U.S. workers 
increasingly need a strong foundation in core work competencies and 
advanced technical skills. In the past two decades, however, concerns 
have mounted about the widening gap between U.S. employers’ need 
for skilled labor and the availability of workers with the requisite skills.
In one national survey, more than 80 percent of U.S. manufacturers 
reported a shortage of skilled workers, and nearly half viewed the skill 
levels of their employees as poor (National Association of Manufactur-
ers and Deloitte Consulting 2005). This skills shortage contributes to 
the growing earnings gap between those who are educated and skilled 
and those who are not (Heckman and Krueger 2003; Katz and Autor 
1999; Lemieux 2006a,b). The continuing poor performance of U.S. 
youth—compared to their counterparts in other countries—in mathe-
matics, science, and literacy suggests that the skills shortage is unlikely 
to attenuate in the near future (U.S. Department of Education 2004). 
In response to rising concerns about our nation’s ability to meet 
these growing demands on the U.S. workforce, Congress made historic 
reforms to the public workforce investment system in 1998, and enacted 
WIA. Congress viewed WIA as a way to end “business as usual” in the 
workforce investment system. WIA consolidated JTPA’s fragmented 
system of employment and training programs and provided universal 
access to basic services. It also promoted customer choice, gave state 
and local agencies more flexibility in service design, strengthened local 
accountability for customer outcomes, engaged businesses, and funda-
mentally changed the services provided to youth. WIA is currently the 
largest source of federally funded employment and training, serving 
over 2 million people annually through its Adult, Dislocated Worker, 
and Youth programs, at a cost of $3 billion (U.S. Department of Labor 
2007). 
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316 Decker 
This chapter describes the existing research on WIA and related 
programs. During the implementation of WIA, the USDOL initiated 
three large studies of the new program: 1) the National Evaluation of 
WIA Implementation (D’Amico et al. 2005); 2) the Evaluation of the 
ITA/Eligible Training Provider Demonstration (D’Amico and Salz-
man 2004); and 3) the ITA Experiment (McConnell et al. 2006). Other 
studies have focused on implementation and early operations of the 
program as well as impacts on participants. Studies of earlier programs, 
including JTPA, may also have relevance for assessing the potential 
benefits of WIA. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss findings from studies of 
WIA implementation and early operations. The next two sections re-
view estimated effects of WIA and related programs on the earnings 
and employment of participants, including both the adult and dislocated 
worker target populations. Then I describe findings from the ITA Ex-
periment, which assessed the effects of different models for structuring 
and administering ITAs, the training vouchers used under WIA to fund 
training. The final section provides a summary and interpretation of the 
findings. 
RESEARCH ON WIA IMPLEMENTATION
Several studies have examined implementation of WIA during the 
six years after it became fully operational.1 My summary of the major 
findings from these studies is organized around seven key principles of 
the WIA program. 
1) Service coordination. WIA has generally succeeded in in-
creasing service coordination through local One-Stop service 
centers, but there have been challenges. Perhaps the greatest 
has been determining the appropriate contribution of various 
program partners to support the One-Stop infrastructure; to 
date, WIA’s mandatory partners have made only limited finan-
cial contributions. Other challenges to coordination include 
conflicting goals among partners and practical obstacles that 
impede partnerships, such as lack of common data systems. 
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2) Customer empowerment. Local workforce investment agencies 
have enthusiastically embraced customer choice by offering a 
wide range of core and intensive services and establishing ITAs 
to facilitate customer choice of training. However, use of the 
eligible training provider list (ETPL) has had its weaknesses. 
For example, some providers have been unwilling to supply the 
information required to be on the list, and others have furnished 
data of questionable reliability (D’Amico and Salzman 2004). 
3) Universal access. State and local agencies have made great 
progress toward the goal of universal access. It has been chal-
lenging, however, for states to provide adequate core services 
with available resources. Tensions have arisen between empha-
sizing core and intensive services for a wide range of customers 
and providing more extensive training for a smaller group. 
Reaching the most disadvantaged customers—including those 
with limited English proficiency, ex-offenders, those with lim-
ited computer literacy, and residents of sparsely populated rural 
areas—has also been difficult (Dunham 2003). 
4) Accountability. Officials at state and local agencies expressed 
the following concerns about WIA’s performance measures as 
first implemented: the 17 performance goals were too numer-
ous and complex, the data used to measure performance were 
of uncertain reliability and received too late by agencies to use 
in managing the program, and local agencies tended to focus on 
“managing” the performance system to “make the numbers.” 
Responding to these issues and the need for common perfor-
mance measures in a wide range of programs, the USDOL
replaced WIA performance measures in 2005 with the Com-
mon Measures. These measures apply to the performance of all 
Labor Department programs administered by the Employment 
and Training Administration, as well as employment and train-
ing programs administered by other federal departments.2 
5) Engaging the private sector. Workforce agencies’ level of suc-
cess in connecting with the private sector has varied. Some 
have been successful, but others are struggling with engaging 
businesses in planning and providing them with high-quality 
services. 
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6) Local flexibility. States and local agencies have embraced the 
flexibility WIA provides; as a result, service design and delivery 
structures vary markedly. Particularly large differences across 
sites occur in how adults and dislocated workers move through 
the system’s tiered service levels, how priority for target groups 
is established, and how much emphasis is placed on training. 
7) Youth program improvement. WIA’s changes to youth pro-
grams have generally been implemented. Nonetheless, agencies 
have faced challenges in identifying eligible providers of youth 
services, finding and retaining at-risk, out-of-school youth, 
verifying and documenting WIA eligibility, locating qualified 
mentors, enlisting youth and parents to serve on youth councils, 
and using interim performance measures. 
ReseaRch on the Impacts of WIa and Related 
pRogRams on dIsadvantaged adults 
Although no large-scale experimental evaluation of WIA’s impacts 
on participants has been conducted to date, some recent nonexperimen-
tal studies, described below, shed light on the impacts on participant 
employment and earnings. Furthermore, a long history of research on 
related employment and training programs can help assess WIA’s likely 
effects. Much of this earlier research has been summarized elsewhere 
(see LaLonde [1995] and King [2004], for example), so here I focus 
most of my attention on the recent work. 
pre-1995 evidence 
Studies of WIA and its predecessors—MDTA, CETA, and JTPA— 
and other employment and training programs targeted to disadvantaged 
workers date back to the 1970s. LaLonde (1995) summarizes research 
generated prior to 1995. Evidence from these studies suggests that 
earlier government training programs generated modest increases in 
participant earnings. For example, LaLonde argues that the studies of 
MDTA and CETA show that these programs increased postprogram 
earnings for disadvantaged adult women but had mixed or even nega-
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tive effects on disadvantaged men. Based on this evidence, LaLonde 
concludes that conventional employment and training services pro-
vided by WIA’s predecessors benefited women, but other and perhaps 
more intensive services were needed for men. 
For disadvantaged women, experimental evidence summarized by 
LaLonde demonstrates that earnings gains are generated by a variety 
of employment and training strategies—including some that are quite 
inexpensive—and that gains, although modest, can persist for several 
years. Programs associated with successful outcomes for women include 
the National Supported Work Demonstration, which tested a supported 
work experience strategy to increase long-term AFDC recipients’ earn-
ings (Hollister, Kemper, and Maynard 1984). Furthermore, Supported 
Work’s positive effects on earnings persisted for at least seven years 
(Couch 1992) after the program ended. Some low-cost job search as-
sistance interventions have also been found to significantly increase the 
postprogram earning of disadvantaged women, and in some cases the 
effects have been surprisingly persistent (Friedlander 1988).   
Post-1995 Evidence 
A critical turning point in the creation of evidence on the efficacy 
of employment and training programs was USDOL’s National JTPA
Study (Bloom et al. 1993). The study used a research design based on 
random assignment of applicants to a treatment group offered JTPA
services or to a control group denied access to JTPA. Furthermore, the 
study sample was intended to be nationally representative, so that find-
ings could be generalized to the program nationwide. This was one of 
the first large-scale efforts to assess the effects of an ongoing national 
workforce development program using random assignment. Although 
the study was unsuccessful in recruiting a nationally representative 
sample, the researchers succeeded in implementing the random assign-
ment design and obtaining internally valid and reliable estimates of the 
JTPA programs overall as well as impacts of different service strategies. 
Findings from the National JTPA Study showed that the program 
generated a modest increase in the earnings and employment of both 
disadvantaged women and men who enrolled in the program. Bloom 
et al. (1997) reported that JTPA increased total earnings among women 
enrollees by an average of $2,738 (converted to 2005 dollars) over the 
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10 quarters following random assignment (see top of Table 11.1). For 
disadvantaged men, JTPA generated a somewhat smaller increase in 
earnings—$2,383, on average. As a percentage of control group means, 
the earnings increase for women—which was 15 percent—was sub-
stantially larger than the increase for men—8 percent. After accounting 
for program costs, the net benefits per enrollee, reported in the final col-
umn of Table 11.1, were nearly identical for women ($763 per enrollee) 
and men ($781 per enrollee). Estimated impacts on postassignment em-
ployment rates, reported in Bloom et al. (1993), were also modest. For 
women, JTPA increased the rate of employment over the six quarters 
after random assignment by 3.5 percentage points, while the impact for 
men was a bit larger at 4.8 percent. 
In the national study, JTPA counselors referred eligible applicants 
to one of three service strategies—1) classroom training in occupational 
skills, 2) a mix of on-the-job training (OJT) and job search assistance 
(JSA), and 3) other services, which could include job search assistance, 
basic education, work experience, or other miscellaneous offerings, but 
not classroom training in occupational skills or OJT. Bloom et al. (1997) 
found that the estimated impacts of JTPA on adult enrollees varied a bit 
by service strategy subgroup, at least for women, as shown in Table 
11.1. For women, the OJT/JSA strategy and the other services strat-
egy produced significantly positive impacts, increasing earnings per
enrollee by $3,416 and $5,886, respectively. In contrast, the point esti-
mate for the group recommended to classroom training in occupational 
skills was substantially smaller, at $939, and not statistically significant. 
For men, the estimates were moderate and consistently positive across 
the three service strategies; however, none of these estimates was statis-
tically significant, even though the overall impact estimate for men was 
positive and statistically significant. 
Subsequent analyses of the National JTPA Study sample by the 
GAO (1996) highlight the persistence of JTPA impacts on earnings. The 
GAO extended the follow-up period for measuring program impacts 
by compiling Social Security earnings records on the sample mem-
bers, which allowed calculation of JTPA impacts five to six years after 
random assignment. The analyses demonstrate that earnings impacts 
persisted beyond the first 10 postassignment quarters in the original 
study. Over the first five to six years postassignment, JTPA increased 
earnings by an average of $4,021 per woman assigned to the treatment 
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group and $3,996 per man. Because only about two-thirds of assign-
ees actually enrolled in JTPA, the long-run effects per enrollee were 
larger—over $5,000, on average, for both women and men. 
After WIA replaced JTPA in 1998, a number of studies attempted 
to examine impacts related to the new program. An early example is the 
ITA Experiment, sponsored by the USDOL to examine the relative ef-
fects of different methods of administering ITAs, the primary vehicle for 
funding training under WIA. The experiment, discussed in more detail 
below, was based on a research design in which WIA training applicants 
were randomly assigned to three ITA models being tested. In contrast 
to the National JTPA Study, the ITA Experiment made no attempt to 
deny services to any applicants. In the past year, however, the USDOL
initiated a new experimental study of WIA impacts, based on random 
assignment of applicants to a group that has access to all WIA services 
or to one or more groups with limited or no access (similar to what was 
done in the National JTPA Study). The study (Bellotti et al. 2009) is 
designed to measure the impacts and cost-effectiveness of WIA services 
on the adult, dislocated worker, and youth populations. It is based on a 
nationally representative sample of WIA applicants, similar to what was 
intended in the National JTPA Study, to generate impact estimates that 
are representative of the program as it operates across the country. 
Study designs that include random assignment provide unbiased 
estimates of WIA impacts with a known degree of precision, based on 
differences in outcomes between treatment and control groups. How-
ever, the need to randomly assign new WIA applicants requires time to 
build the needed sample and measure the outcomes of interest over an 
appropriate observation period. It will be at least a few years before the 
new experimental study will generate useful impact estimates. 
In contrast, studies that do not rely on random assignment can work 
with retrospective data to measure outcomes for prior WIA applicants 
and matched comparison groups, assuming such data are available. The 
program administrative data in the Workforce Investment Act Standard-
ized Record Data (WIASRD) can be combined with state UI claims 
records, state UI wage records, and state ES records to support this kind 
of retrospective research. Two groups of researchers—one led by Caro-
lyn Heinrich (Heinrich et al. 2009) and one led by Kevin Hollenbeck 
(Hollenbeck et al. 2005; Hollenbeck 2009)—have used administrative 
data to conduct nonexperimental studies of WIA impacts on participant 
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Table 11.1  Estimated Effects of WIA and Related Programs on Earnings and Employment of Disadvantaged Adults 
Population or Estimated mean effects or range of effects Estimated social net 
Program Source service strategy (per enrollee unless noted) benefits per enrollee 
JTPA Bloom et al. (1997) Women $2,738*** total earnings in 10 quarters after $763 
assignment (15 percent of control group mean) 
Men $2,383* total earnings in 10 quarters after $781 
assignment (8 percent) 
By service strategy 
Classroom training 
Women $939 total earnings 
Men $1,918 total earnings 
OJT/job search assistance 
Women $3,416** total earnings 
Men $2,109 total earnings 
Other services 
Women $5,886*** total earnings 
Men $1,403 total earnings 
Bloom et al. (1993)a Women 0.0 to 5.3 percent employed per quarter over 6
quarters after assignment (3.5 percent employed
anytime in 6 quarters) 
Men 1.9 to 8.9 percent employed per quarter over 6 
quarters after assignment (4.8 percent employed 
anytime in 6 quarters) 
GAO (1996)a Women $4,021 total earnings per assignee over 5 to 6 years 
after assignment; 1.3 to 3.1 percent employed per 
year over 5 years after year of assignment 
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Men $3,996 total earnings per assignee over 5 to 6 years 
after assignment; 0.3 to 3.7 percent employed per 
year over 5 years after year of assignment 
WIA Heinrich et al. (2009) WIA overall 
Women $482*** to $638*** per quarter for 16 quarters post-
entry; 5.0** to 13.1** percent employed per quarter 
Men $320*** to $692*** per quarter for 16 quarters post-
entry; 4.9** to 11.8** percent employed per quarter 
WIA core/intensive 
Women $216*** to $575*** per quarter; 3.5** to 14.6** 
percent employed per quarter 
Men $148* to $673*** per quarter; 4.6** to 12.3** 
percent employed per quarter 
WIA training vs. WIA
core/intensive 
Women −$223*** to $928*** per quarter; −5.6** to 9.5** 
percent employed per quarter 
Men $194** to $1,301** per quarter; −2.0** to 13.5** 
percent employed per quarter 
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) WIA overall 
Women $887*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 10.6*** 
percent of time employed 
Men $773*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 6.2*** 
percent of time employed 
(continued) 
  
 
 
Table 11.1 (continued) 
Population or Estimated mean effects or range of effects Estimated social net 
Program Source service strategy (per enrollee unless noted) benefits per enrollee 
WIA Hollenbeck et al. (2005) 
WIA trainees vs. WIA
and ES nontrainees 
Women $874*** per quarter postexit; 6.5*** percent of time 
employed 
Men $623*** per quarter postexit; 2.1*** percent of time 
employed 
Hollenbeck (2009)b Adults $459*** per quarter postexit $1,446 
324
 
NOTE: Bloom et al. (1993, 1996) and GAO (1996) are experimental studies; Heinrich et al. (2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005), and
Hollenbeck (2009) are nonexperimental. Earnings impacts are adjusted to 2005 dollars. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); 
**significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
a The authors do not report significance tests for the estimates presented here. 
b Numbers presented here are based on average estimates for Hollenbeck’s (2009) studies 2 and 4 (see his Tables 4 and 5). 
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earnings and employment. Both of these efforts have carefully matched 
various groups of WIA participants to comparison groups of individuals 
who did not participate in WIA, usually drawn from the population of 
UI recipients or ES registrants. 
While the strength of this method is the ability to work with retro-
spective data, the weakness is that impact estimates may be biased if 
the comparison groups differ from WIA participants in ways that are 
not observed or cannot be adequately controlled for in the statistical 
methods. The prevalence of bias in nonexperimental estimates of the 
impacts of employment and training programs and related policy in-
terventions is well documented (see, for example, Fraker and Maynard 
[1987]; Glazerman, Levy, and Myers [2003]; LaLonde [1986]; and 
Peikes, Moreno, and Orzol [2008]). Furthermore, it is usually difficult 
to determine the direction of the bias (Glazerman, Levy, and Myers 
2003). Nonetheless, recent refinements in methodology and data may 
have increased the probability that nonexperimental methods can gen-
erate unbiased estimates under some conditions (Dehejia and Wahba 
1999; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). While the Heinrich et al. 
and Hollenbeck et al. teams use broadly similar data and the same es-
timation methods, their approach to handling the data diverges, largely 
due to characteristics of the data made available to the two teams. I will 
highlight how these variations may explain resulting differences in the 
impact estimates generated. 
For disadvantaged adults, the evidence on WIA impacts in Heinrich 
et al. (2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005), and Hollenbeck (2009) suggests 
that WIA generates increases in earnings and employment that persist 
for at least a few years, and these increases tend to be larger than those
estimated for JTPA. Heinrich et al. estimate that WIA’s overall effect is 
to increase earnings for men and women by $320 to $692 per quarter 
for 16 quarters postprogram-entry. WIA also boosts employment rates 
over this same period by 5–13 percentage points per quarter, on aver-
age (see Table 11.1). The earnings impacts tend to be a bit higher for 
women—starting at around $550 in the first quarter and generally fluc-
tuating between $450 and $650 for the remainder of the 16 quarters. 
In contrast, the initial effects are large for men—about $700 and $550 
in the first and second quarters—but subsequently fluctuate between 
$300 and $500 per quarter. Despite the difference in the point estimates, 
we cannot conclude from these findings that WIA impacts are larger 
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for women, given the uncertainty associated with the nonexperimental 
methods and the standard errors associated with the point estimates. 
Regardless, the time pattern of the estimates shows that for both men 
and women, earnings increases occur immediately—in the first quarter 
after program entry. 
The corresponding estimates of WIA’s overall impacts on earn-
ings presented in Hollenbeck et al. tend to lie above the top end of the 
range of estimates presented in Heinrich et al. The Hollenbeck et al. 
estimates, presented in Table 11.1, imply that WIA overall increased 
earnings for women by $887 per quarter over the first eight quarters 
after program exit. Over the same period, WIA increased the share of 
time women were employed by 10.6 percentage points. For men, WIA
increased earnings by $773 per quarter and employment by 6.2 percent. 
The Hollenbeck et al. estimates tend to be higher partly because 
program exit point is used to begin the observation period. Measur-
ing outcomes from the exit point, which Hollenbeck et al. had to do 
because of available data, effectively ignores the opportunity costs 
WIA participants incur if program participation keeps them from going 
back to work quickly and reduces their earnings. In contrast, using the 
point of program entry to begin the observation period, employed by 
Heinrich et al. and other studies discussed in this paper, allows earn-
ings impact estimates to fully capture opportunity costs associated with 
forgone earnings. Hollenbeck addresses this issue by separately calcu-
lating comprehensive net benefit estimates for WIA using another data 
set, treating forgone earnings as part of program costs. His estimate 
of WIA’s social net benefits per adult participant is $1,446 for the 10 
quarters following program exit. This implies that for adult participants 
the postexit earnings increase that Hollenbeck attributes to WIA par-
ticipation is large enough to outweigh the sum of any forgone earnings 
participants incurred and the direct costs of the program. 
Both the Heinrich et al. and Hollenbeck et al. studies attempt to sep-
arate the effects of WIA training from the effects of other WIA services. 
For adults, estimates from both studies suggest the impacts of training 
average several hundred dollars per quarter after the initial quarters, as 
shown in Table 11.1. The Heinrich et al. estimates of the WIA training 
impacts on quarterly earnings are near zero shortly after program entry 
but increase over the 16 quarters in the observation period. In contrast, 
in the Hollenbeck et al. estimates, there is no lag in earnings impacts, 
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and estimates averaged over the observation period tend to lie near the 
high end of the (wide) range of the Heinrich et al. estimates shown in 
Table 11.1. Again, using the program exit point to begin measuring im-
pacts is one reason Hollenbeck et al.’s estimates tend to be higher. Also, 
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) use a broader comparison group, including 
ES-only participants as well as WIA nontrainees, which may imply that 
the difference between the trainee and nontrainee groups in terms of 
services received goes beyond just WIA training. Regardless, both sets 
of estimates imply that the average marginal effects of WIA training on 
adult earnings are positive. 
Table 11.1 also presents the Heinrich et al. (2009) estimates for 
WIA core and intensive services. The range of estimated effects of core 
and intensive services on quarterly earnings seems broadly similar to 
the range of estimated training effects shown, but the patterns differ 
markedly. In the case of WIA core and intensive services, the effects 
occur immediately and then decline quickly over time, while the WIA
training effects appear gradually and then increase over time. The de-
clining pattern for core and intensive impacts, combined with concerns 
about the accuracy of the nonexperimental methods in estimating core 
and intensive services, lead the authors to conclude that the true pro-
gram impacts of the WIA core and intensive services are likely to be no 
more than $100 to $200 per quarter. 
IMPACTS OF WIA AND RELATED PROGRAMS
ON DISLOCATED WORKERS 
Pre-1995 Research 
LaLonde (1995) asserted that at the time his article was written, rel-
atively little was known from either nonexperimental or experimental 
evaluations about the impact of training on the earnings and employ-
ment of dislocated workers. Although these workers were served under 
JTPA Title III (and subsequently under the Economic Dislocation and 
Worker Adjustment Assistance [EDWAA] Act), they were not part of 
the National JTPA Study. Two key demonstrations from this period 
targeted dislocated workers—the Texas Worker Adjustment Demon-
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stration conducted in 1984 to 1987 (Bloom 1990), and the New Jersey 
UI Reemployment Demonstration conducted in 1986 to 1987 (Corson 
et al. 1989). Both demonstrations used an experimental design to test 
the effect of one treatment that entailed JSA offered to all participants, 
as well as an alternative treatment that combined JSA with an offer of 
classroom training or OJT.3 Both demonstrations found that the JSA-
only treatments speeded reemployment and increased earnings, al-
though the impacts were usually short lived. One exception occurred for 
women in the Texas demonstration, whose earnings impacts persisted
for a full year after random assignment. In both demonstrations, the 
alternative treatment that offered training on top of JSA had no greater
effect on outcomes than the JSA-only treatments. Based largely on 
these findings, Congress mandated that state UI agencies create Worker 
Profiling Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems, to identify unem-
ployment insurance recipients likely to face long unemployment spells 
(based on a statistical recipient “profiling” model). WPRS also directed 
UI recipients to mandatory reemployment services as a condition of 
continued benefit payments. 
Post-1995 Research    
In the 1990s, the USDOL continued to test JSA’s effects on dislo-
cated workers. These efforts included an extended demonstration of a 
mandatory JSA intervention for profiled UI recipients (Decker et al. 
2000) as well as a large-scale evaluation of the WPRS program shortly 
after its implementation (Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997). These 
studies confirmed findings from the earlier demonstrations showing 
that mandatory reemployment services provided to UI recipients likely 
to face long unemployment spells expedited their reemployment. Both 
studies also suggested that a customized approach to JSA, where some 
participants receive less intensive services and others receive more, 
could generate impacts similar to those resulting from a consistent, 
one-size-fits-all approach. A similar study in Kentucky confirmed the 
efficacy of WPRS-mandated JSA services, with somewhat larger esti-
mated impacts (Black et al. 2003). 
In contrast to the substantial body of evidence on JSA’s effects for 
dislocated workers, the effects of more intensive classroom training or 
OJT have not been fully tested for this group using an experimental 
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design. In the mid-1990s, the USDOL initiated an experimental evalu-
ation of dislocated workers served under Title III of JTPA (EDWAA). 
However, the evaluation was abandoned after WIA replaced JTPA. 
Despite the lack of experimental evidence on training for dislocated 
workers, a number of nonexperimental studies of this group may be 
relevant to WIA. For example, Decker and Corson (1995) examined 
the effects of training provided to Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
program participants. This study of the TAA program, which serves 
workers who lose their jobs as a result of increased import competi-
tion, was based on a national sample of TAA trainees in the late 1980s. 
Estimates of the impact of TAA training on earnings in the 12th quarter 
after participants’ initial UI claims was positive, at least for a post-1988 
sample of TAA trainees, but small relative to the size of the training 
investment and not statistically significant (see Table 11.2).4 Based on 
these findings the authors concluded that TAA did not substantially 
increase earnings of TAA trainees, at least in the first three years af-
ter the initial UI claim. In contrast, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
(2005) found a positive effect of community college on the earnings 
of older dislocated workers, based on a sample from Washington State 
in the early 1990s. Their estimates imply that one academic year of 
community college retraining raised earnings of men 35 or older by 7 
percent and earnings of women 35 or older by 10 percent, translating 
into substantial net social benefits in both cases, as shown in Table 11.2. 
Although these results do not relate directly to the effects of any gov-
ernment intervention, they may provide guidance for how dislocated 
workers can be served effectively. Both the Decker and Corson (1995) 
and Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005) studies attempt to address 
a number of challenges common to nonexperimental research on dislo-
cated workers, including how to treat trainees who enter training only 
after a substantial unemployment spell. Both studies also demonstrate 
that earnings impact estimates can vary substantially, depending on the 
methods or specifications used to address these challenges. 
More recently, the studies of WIA conducted by Heinrich et al. 
(2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005), and Hollenbeck (2009) have directly 
estimated WIA’s effects on dislocated workers. Their findings provide 
limited evidence at best that either WIA services overall or WIA training 
efforts are effective for this group. Impacts presented by Heinrich et al. 
and reported in Table 11.2 imply that WIA reduces earnings in the early 
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Table 11.2  Estimated Effects of WIA and Related Programs on Earnings and Employment of Dislocated Workers 
Population or Estimated mean effects or range of effects Estimated social net 
Program Source service strategy (per enrollee unless noted) benefits per enrollee 
TAA Decker and Corson All trainees, pre-1988 −$308 in quarter 12 after initial 
(1995) unemployment insurance claim 
All trainees, post-1988 $527 in quarter 12 after initial unemployment 
insurance claim 
Community Jacobson, LaLonde, Men 35 or older 7 percent $3,587 
college and Sullivan (2005)a 
Women 35 or older 10 percent $9,607 
WIA Heinrich et al. (2009) WIA overall 
Dislocated women −$226*** to $417*** per quarter for 16 
quarters postentry; −2.0** to 7.8** percent 
employed per quarter 
Dislocated men −$199*** to $363*** per quarter for 10 
quarters postentry; 0.2* to 6.3** percent 
employed per quarter 
WIA core/intensive 
Dislocated women −$3 to $482*** per quarter; 1.5** to 7.8** 
percent employed per quarter 
Dislocated men −$28 to $364*** per quarter; 2.4** to 6.1** 
percent employed per quarter 
WIA training vs. WIA
core/intensive 
Dislocated women −$1,126*** to $69 per quarter; −14.0** to 
1.9** percent employed per quarter 
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Dislocated men −$828*** to −$33 per quarter; −9.8** to 0 
percent employed per quarter 
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) WIA overall 
Dislocated women $1,137*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 
15.2*** percent of time employed 
Dislocated men $1,010*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 
11.8*** percent of time employed 
WIA trainees vs. WIA
and ES nontrainees 
Dislocated women $476*** per quarter postexit; 7.1*** percent 
of time employed 
Dislocated men $403*** per quarter postexit; 5.0*** percent 
of time employed 
Hollenbeck (2009)b Dislocated Workers $541*** per quarter postexit −$8,148 
NOTE: All studies in this table are nonexperimental. Earnings impacts are adjusted to 2005 dolllars. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-
tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
a The authors do not report significance tests for the estimates presented here. 
b Numbers shown here are based on average estimates for Hollenbeck’s (2009) studies 2 and 4 (see his Tables 4 and 5). 
  
 
     
  
  
 
 
332 Decker 
quarters after program entry, but participants catch up to their nonpar-
ticipant counterparts, eventually achieving average quarterly earnings 
about $400 higher than nonparticipants three to four years after pro-
gram entry. However, concerns about the estimation methodology lead 
the authors to discount the positive impact estimates and conclude that 
gains from participation are, at best, very modest, even three to four 
years after entry. Table 11.2 also shows that evidence of a marginal ef-
fect of training on dislocated workers is particularly disappointing, with 
quarterly estimated earnings impacts consistently negative or near zero 
through the four-year postentry observation period. 
In contrast to Heinrich et al. (2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005) find 
positive and strong impacts of WIA overall on dislocated workers, av-
eraging $1,137 per quarter for women and $1,010 per quarter for men. 
Not only are the impacts strong and positive, but they occur immedi-
ately, with the largest effects seen in the initial quarters of observation. 
The stark difference between these estimates and the Heinrich et al. 
estimates is probably attributable to methodological differences. As 
explained previously, the use by Hollenbeck et al. of the exit point to 
begin the observation period effectively ignores any forgone earnings 
during the period of program participation. Forgone earnings might be 
particularly high for dislocated workers, since they often have a stable 
work background with relatively high earnings. Hollenbeck (2009) 
shows that once forgone earnings and other program costs are taken 
into account, WIA generates a large net loss for society of −$8,148 per 
participant when it is targeted to dislocated workers (Table 11.2).        
EVIDENCE ON INDIVIDUAL TRAINING ACCOUNTS AND
OTHER TRAINING VOUCHER PROGRAMS 
A key component of WIA is the use of ITAs, a form of training 
vouchers, to fund training. For many years, the USDOL and local work-
force investment agencies have experimented with using vouchers to 
fund training. Under JTPA, many local workforce investment areas were 
already testing vouchers (D’Amico and Salzman 2004; Trutko and Bar-
now 1999). For example, when Eastern Airlines went bankrupt in 1991 
and laid off about 13,000 workers, the Atlanta Regional Commission 
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could not accommodate all workers who needed training, so it issued 
vouchers that participants could use to purchase training themselves. A
study of nine sites that used vouchers for training under JTPA found that 
eight managed the system through the use of a “constrained-choice” 
voucher model, in which the local workforce agency screened provid-
ers, limited occupational choices, provided assessments and counseling 
on training choices, and retained authority to reject a participant’s train-
ing choice (Trutko and Barnow 1999). Administrators in these sites felt 
that with a “pure” voucher model, absent assessment or restrictions on 
training choices, some participants would make poor training choices 
and waste resources. In contrast, the ninth site—the Michigan Thumb 
Area Employment and Training Consortium—granted customers 
broader choices, effectively giving them a checking account that they 
could use to purchase education, training, or support services. 
In anticipation of WIA, the USDOL sponsored the Career Manage-
ment Account demonstration in the mid-1990s to test the feasibility of 
using vouchers to provide training for dislocated workers. Most of the 
13 agencies in the demonstration chose to manage their vouchers in a 
manner resembling the “constrained-choice” model described earlier. 
Findings showed that vouchers were a feasible way to provide training, 
likely to work just as well as a contracted-training system, and led to 
more satisfied customers and staff (Public Policy Associates 1999). 
In 1998, the WIA legislation incorporated training vouchers to em-
power customers to choose their own training and training providers. 
Under JTPA, workforce agencies typically contracted with providers 
for training slots and then directed customers who needed training to 
these providers. In contrast, WIA customers who need training receive 
a voucher or ITA and can choose and pay for their program, subject to 
limitations states and local workforce agencies establish. 
WIA gives states and local workforce agencies considerable flex-
ibility in implementing ITAs. It requires only that ITAs support training 
supplied by a provider on a state’s ETPL and that training be for an 
occupation considered “in demand,” as defined by states and local work-
force agencies. A study of the early implementation of ITAs (D’Amico 
and Salzman 2004) finds that most local workforce agencies chose an 
ITA model in which counselors guided investigation of training options, 
but customers made final training decisions. The study also finds that 
the ETPL was a critical tool for informing customer decisions; at the 
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same time, it gave states control over determining acceptable providers. 
The study points out the natural tension between these two objectives— 
controlling provider access to WIA requires excluding some providers 
from the list, but informing customers requires including enough pro-
viders for the list to be useful. 
The USDOL launched the ITA Experiment in 1999 to provide 
states and local workforce agencies with a systematic assessment of 
alternative approaches for structuring and administering ITAs, and for 
estimating effects of different approaches. The experiment randomly 
assigned 8,000 training-eligible WIA customers in eight sites to one 
of three ITA approaches. The approaches varied according to how 
intense required counseling was (if any was required); whether coun-
selors could reject a customer’s choice; and whether the ITA amount 
was fixed or set by the counselor, as shown in Table 11.3. The following 
approaches were tested: 
• Approach 1: Structured customer choice. This most directive 
approach required customers to receive intensive counseling, 
and counselors had considerable discretion to customize the 
amount of the ITA investment. On one hand, counselors were 
expected to constrain customers by steering them to training 
with a high expected return, and they could reject customers’
choices that did not fit this criterion. On the other hand, counsel-
ors also had much greater discretion to set higher ITA amounts 
(up to a maximum of $8,000 in most sites) if they felt expensive 
training was a sound investment for certain customers. 
• Approach 2: Guided customer choice. This approach, simi-
lar to what most workforce agencies adopted in the transition 
to WIA, involved mandatory counseling. However, counseling 
was less intensive than under the preceding approach. Counsel-
ors could not reject customers’ choices if the chosen provider 
was on the state’s approved list. The amount of the ITA award 
was fixed at $3,000–$5,000, depending on the site. 
• Approach 3: Maximum customer choice. This approach, the 
least structured of the three, did not require customers to partic-
ipate in counseling after being found eligible for WIA-funded 
training, but they could request and receive it. Customers re-
ceived a fixed ITA award of $3,000–$5,000, depending on the 
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site (as in the preceding approach). Counselors could not reject 
customers’ choices if the provider was on the state’s approved list.
These three approaches reflected the spectrum of voucher models 
emerging in the early days of WIA, with the second approach most 
similar to the informed-choice model most sites used in the transition to 
WIA. To make the experiment as informative as possible, the structured 
and maximum customer choice approaches encouraged sites to “push 
the envelope” in their offerings—to adopt models that most sites would 
not have adopted on their own. 
These alternative ITA approaches generated different levels of par-
ticipation in WIA training, with greater service requirements leading to 
both lower participation rates and slower entry into training. Customers 
assigned to the least restrictive model, maximum customer choice, were 
significantly more likely to attend an ITA orientation and to eventually 
use an ITA, as shown in Table 11.4. Attendance rates for this approach 
were 5–7 percentage points higher than for the other two approaches. 
These findings suggest that the mandatory counseling associated with 
the other two approaches deterred some customers from pursuing an 
ITA. Furthermore, analysis of the timing of training reveals that cus-
tomers with maximum choice entered training about two weeks sooner, 
on average, than those assigned to the more directive approaches (not 
shown in table). 
Although maximum choice customers were more likely to pursue an 
ITA, they were much less likely to participate in counseling after the ori-
entation. Postorientation counseling was voluntary for these customers, 
and only 4 percent chose to take advantage of the counseling offered. 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence that these customers made poor train-
Table 11.3  The Three Approaches Tested in the ITA Experiment 
Approach 1: Approach 2: Approach 3:
Structured Guided Maximum
customer choice customer choice customer choice 
Award amount Customized Fixed Fixed 
Counseling Mandatory, Mandatory,
most intensive moderate intensity Voluntary 
Could counselors Yes No No 
reject customers’
program choices? 
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Table 11.4  Summary of Estimated Relative Effects in the ITA Experiment 
Group means Estimated impacts 
Structured Guided Maximum Between Between Between 
Outcomes choice A1 choice A2 choice A3 A1 and A2 A3 and A2 A1 and A3 
Participation 
Attended orientation (%) 69 67 74 2 7*** −5*** 
Received counseling beyond 66 59 4 7*** −55*** 62*** 
orientation (%) 
ITA take-up rate (%) 59 58 66 1 7*** −6*** 
Average ITA award ($, among 4,625 2,861 2,888 1,764*** 27 1,736*** 
recipients) 
Training participation (%) 64 64 66 1 3 −2 
Weeks of training 19 16 18 3** 2** 1 
Earnings and benefits 
Earnings in follow-up period 17,032 16,464 15,724 568 −740 1,308* 
($, 15 months) 
UI benefits received ($) 3,412 3,266 3,483 146 217** −71 
Relative net social benefits ($) — — — −407 −1,169 — 
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level (two-
tailed test). A1 = Approach 1; A2 = Approach 2; A3 = Approach 3. 
SOURCE: McConnell et al. (2006). 
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ing or employment choices (McConnell et al. 2006). In fact, they chose 
occupations, training courses, and training providers that were quite 
similar to those selected by customers assigned to the other two ap-
proaches, who routinely received counseling prior to entering training.
The structured choice approach—Approach 1—was the most di-
rective, but these customers’ training choices were similar to those of 
customers in the other approaches, largely because counselors were re-
luctant to be directive of any customers. Despite the guidance given to 
counselors regarding Approach 1, counselors tended to defer to cus-
tomer preferences, failed to steer customers to high-return training, and 
rarely denied training. They also found it difficult to constrain expendi-
tures. Despite guidance to counselors that average training expenditures 
should be similar across approaches, counselors awarded much higher 
ITA amounts to structured choice customers—$4,625 per trainee—than 
to customers assigned to the other approaches—$2,861 and $2,888 
per trainee, respectively (Table 11.4). They also reported that being 
directive was not in the best interest of customers and that they had 
insufficient information on which to judge customers’ choices. 
Although the ITA take-up rate was higher under maximum choice 
than under the other approaches, the rate of training participation was 
similar—approximately two-thirds of customers assigned to each ap-
proach participated in training during the 15-month postassignment 
follow-up period. As a result, the degree to which the customers as-
signed to the more directive approaches were less likely to pursue an 
ITA was offset by their finding other ways to support participation in 
training. Despite the similarity across approaches in training rates, the 
average duration of training was longer among trainees in Approaches 
1 and 3 than in Approach 2. 
The relative effects of the ITA approaches on earnings and UI 
benefit receipt during the 15-month follow-up period were modest. In-
dividuals assigned to structured choice, the most directive model, had 
somewhat higher total earnings during the postassignment follow-up 
period than individuals assigned to maximum choice, the least directive 
model. The difference in earnings between these groups is $1,308, as 
is shown in Table 11.4, which represents 8 percent of the mean earn-
ings for the maximum choice customers. Average earnings for guided 
choice customers fell between averages for the other two approaches. 
Average UI benefits received were lowest for this group, and the differ-
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ence between the Approach 2 and 3 groups was $217, on average, and 
statistically significant. 
Finally, after accounting for the relative costs as well as the relative 
benefits of the three approaches, McConnell et al. (2006) report that 
estimates of net benefits were highest for guided choice and lowest for 
maximum choice, but the differences are not statistically significant. The 
findings provide no strong evidence that society would either benefit or 
be harmed by a general move from Approach 2 to either Approach 1 or 
Approach 3. However, both switches would be costly from the govern-
ment perspective. The switch from guided choice to structured choice 
would increase costs because customers receive much larger ITAs on 
average. Maximum choice would also increase costs relative to guided 
choice, because the government provides ITAs to a higher proportion of 
customers and pays out more in UI benefits under the former.5 
To explore further the use of vouchers, the USDOL launched 
the personal reemployment account (PRA) demonstration in 2004 in 
seven states. PRAs were vouchers designed to provide an incentive to 
reemployment and increase customer choice by removing counseling 
requirements and restrictions on choice of providers. They were offered 
to UI recipients as an alternative to participation in WIA. PRAs differed 
from ITAs in six ways: 1) they were offered only to UI recipients likely 
to exhaust their benefits (rather than to dislocated and adult workers); 2) 
they were limited to $3,000; 3) they could be used to pay for intensive 
and supportive services as well as for training; 4) they could be used to 
pay providers that were not on the ETPL; 5) customers could receive 60 
percent of their unused PRA balance as a reemployment bonus if they 
became reemployed in their first 13 weeks of UI receipt; and 6) the full 
amount of the account was fully obligated for the customer for one year 
(in contrast with ITAs, from which specific obligations are based on 
training commitments).6 
Three findings from the PRA demonstration are relevant to WIA
(Kirby 2006). First, echoing the findings of the ITA Experiment, few 
customers used their PRAs to pay for counseling or other intensive 
services. Second, many customers chose to use their PRAs to pay for 
supportive services—in five of the seven sites, customers spent more on 
supportive services than on any other service. Third, sites found it chal-
lenging to satisfy the requirement that the full PRA amount be obligated 
for one year, given that many accounts were inactive for long periods. 
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Building on lessons from these previous generations of training 
vouchers, former President Bush proposed in 2006 a new version of 
the training voucher—career advancement accounts (CAAs). Like the 
other training voucher initiatives, these accounts aimed to expand cus-
tomer choice and streamline the delivery of training services, freeing 
up resources to meet the growing education and training needs of the 
workforce. Eight states received CAA demonstration grants in 2006 
and piloted CAAs (see Rosenberg et al. [2007] for an assessment of 
the early experiences in four states). In partnership with the U.S. De-
partment of Defense, the USDOL also offered CAAs to the spouses of 
military personnel in 18 military installations in eight states (Needels 
and Zaveri 2009). 
CONCLUSION 
As WIA has passed the 10-year mark and faces the need for re-
authorization, now is a good time to review the research related to 
the program and think about the implications for the future of WIA
and workforce development policy. The findings from studies of WIA
implementation suggest that the program has largely been successful 
in meeting many of its key process objectives, such as greater service 
coordination and customer empowerment. But meeting these objec-
tives was neither easy nor quick, and at least in the early days of WIA, 
there were challenges to accomplishing the program’s objectives that 
had not yet been fully resolved. Presumably state and local agencies 
have continued to make progress toward the WIA objectives since the 
early implementations studies. For example, the potential trend toward 
greater use of sectoral workforce development programs, in which 
workforce development programs support training opportunities by op-
erating on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market, may 
imply that local workforce agencies are more engaged with the private 
sector now than they were in the early days of WIA.7 Hence, further 
analysis would be useful, depending on the timing of reauthorization 
and how much the reauthorized program would differ from the current 
program. It would be particularly useful to have updated studies of WIA
operations prior to any major overhaul of the system. 
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Although the USDOL has initiated a new evaluation of WIA that 
will be based on an experimental design, the studies of WIA to date 
have been based exclusively on nonexperimental methods. The findings 
from these studies imply that for adult participants, WIA services gen-
erate an increase in earnings and employment for both women and men, 
and the effects tend to persist for at least a few years. These findings 
are broadly consistent with the findings from the experimental study of 
WIA’s predecessor, JTPA. In contrast, the results for dislocated work-
ers are less promising—researchers either find little evidence that WIA
services or WIA training substantially increase earnings of dislocated 
workers, at least in the first four years after program entry (Heinrich 
et al. 2009), or they find that earnings increases due to WIA are far 
smaller than the combination of the opportunity costs and direct costs 
associated with WIA services, at least by 10 quarters after program exit 
(Hollenbeck 2009) . 
These nonexperimental studies of WIA are carefully executed with 
state-of-the-art methods; however, it’s not clear whether they can have 
fully addressed well-known concerns about selection bias in the ab-
sence of random assignment to WIA. Furthermore, the data available 
for these studies have various limitations that constrain the conclusions 
that can be drawn based on the findings. Hence, it is too early to de-
clare WIA a success for adults or a likely failure for dislocated workers 
based on the existing literature. The recently initiated WIA evaluation 
will address most of these issues by applying experimental methods to 
a nationally representative sample of participants to assess the program 
effects. 
For one aspect of WIA—the ITA—we already have a set of findings 
that are based on an experimental assessment of different approaches to 
structuring and administering ITAs. Most local agencies have gravitated 
toward what we call a “guided customer choice” model, with manda-
tory training counseling but ultimately customer-driven training choices.
The experiment tested both more and less counseling-prescriptive alter-
natives to the “guided choice” model. The findings from the experiment 
show that despite the flexibility allowed to local areas in how closely 
they can manage training decisions through ITAs, local staff are reluc-
tant to be prescriptive in guiding training decisions even when they are 
given the clear authority. Furthermore, when limits on ITA amounts are 
eased and counselors are given the authority to customize the amount of 
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training support made available to each participant, counselors tend to 
be generous in their awards across the board, and the amount of the av-
erage ITAs increases substantially. Counselors are particularly reluctant 
to deny an ITA to any eligible participant based on their training choice. 
At the other end of the spectrum of prescriptiveness, when counseling 
requirements are removed and participants are free to make training 
decisions on their own, very few participants seek counseling to guide 
them. At the same time, since these participants face fewer require-
ments, they are also more likely to pursue and ultimately receive an 
ITA. 
Overall, the findings from the ITA Experiment suggest that in the 
current WIA context, deviations from the “guided choice” model of 
providing ITAs would generate, at most, modest changes in earnings 
and other participant outcomes (at least when measured over 15 months 
after training eligibility determination), while at the same time the al-
ternatives would generate higher administrative and training costs for 
local areas. Hence, the evidence supports the widespread use of the 
“guided choice” model by local agencies in the current environment. If 
there is a strong desire among policymakers for the workforce develop-
ment system to be more or less prescriptive in guiding the use of ITAs, 
policymakers will need to make it an explicit goal of the system rather 
than simply provide the flexibility that allows for it at the local level, as 
is done under WIA. 
Notes 
This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the November 2009 conference, “What 
the European Social Fund Can Learn from the WIA Experience,” cosponsored by Eu-
ropean Commission Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunity and the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. I thank Doug 
Besharov and Phoebe Cottingham for their suggestions and Luis Rodriguez for research 
assistance. I also thank Peter Mueser for providing the data used in Heinrich et al. 
(2009). 
1. The most extensive and comprehensive study of WIA implementation was con-
ducted by Social Policy Research Associates and involved visits to 40 local areas 
in 21 states (D’Amico et al. 2005). The Rockefeller Institute of Government 
(Barnow and King 2005), Berkeley Policy Associates (Macro, Almandsmith, and 
Hague 2003), and the GAO (2002, 2004a,b) have also conducted studies. 
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2. See USDOL, Training and Employment Guidance Letter 17-05, available at http:// 
www.doleta.gov/Performance/quickview/WIAPMeasures.cfm. 
3. Although the treatments in the Texas and New Jersey demonstrations were similar, 
the target populations and conditions of participation differed somewhat. The New 
Jersey project targeted new UI recipients across the state who had worked for their 
previous employer for more than three years and mandated their participation in 
JSA as a condition for continued receipt of UI benefits. In contrast, the Texas dem-
onstration targeted voluntary participants in select local JTPA Title III programs. 
4. For the average TAA trainee, training lasted substantially longer than a year, and 
average training expenditures under TAA at the time were substantially higher 
than under JTPA. 
5. The USDOL has initiated a long-term follow-up study, being conducted by Math-
ematica, of the ITA Experiment. The study looks at outcomes six to seven years 
after random assignment (Perez-Johnson et al. 2008). 
6. Supportive services can include financial assistance needed to meet a condition of 
employment or generate a specific job offer; logistical support for training, inten-
sive services, or job search (for example, child care and transportation costs); and 
general expenses in support of job search activities. In the demonstration, all states 
allowed PRA expenditures in categories 1 and 2, but only some states allowed 
PRA expenditures in category 3. 
7. Glover and King (2010) describe the expanding role of sectoral approaches in the 
workforce development system in recent years. 
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Short-Term Net Impact 
Estimates and Rates of Return 
Kevin Hollenbeck 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
This chapter contrasts and compares the net impacts of workforce 
development programs estimated in four independent studies done in 
three states. These estimates were computed using a nonexperimental 
methodology in which individuals who had been served by the work-
force system in the state were statistically matched to individuals who 
had encountered the Employment Service. The impetus for these stud-
ies was a commitment on the part of these states to public accountability 
and data-driven performance monitoring and management. 
In three of the studies from which the net impacts that are reported 
here emanate, rates of return have been calculated for the workforce 
development programs that include a full accounting of the opportunity 
costs of participants’ training investments, tax liabilities incurred due to 
increased earnings, as well as changes in earnings-conditioned transfers 
such as unemployment compensation, TANF benefits, Food Stamps, 
and Medicaid. 
The contributions of this chapter are fourfold: 1) to compare and 
contrast the net impacts on employment and earnings across four inde-
pendent studies; 2) to show the decomposition of the net impacts into 
employment rates, hours, and wage rates; 3) to present rates of return to 
individuals, states, and society; and 4) to point out policy implications 
of the work. 
The next section of the chapter provides detail about the programs 
that were examined in these studies, the specific outcomes for which 
net impact estimates were generated, and the analysis periods. All four 
studies used administrative data from multiple workforce develop-
ment programs, but this chapter focuses on the programs offered by the 
public job training system (administered and funded by WIA and its 
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predecessor JTPA). The succeeding section will present the results of 
the studies for those programs—net impacts and rates of return. Next, 
we discuss briefly how the net impact and rates of return estimates com-
pare to other studies in the literature. The final section presents some 
policy implications of the work. 
PROGRAMS, OUTCOMES, AND TIME PERIODS 
This chapter draws from four studies. Each study examined a 
slightly different set of workforce development programs covering dif-
ferent time periods. Table 12.1 displays the various programs and time 
periods. The first two studies, done in Washington, focused on approxi-
mately the same programs: federal job training for adults, dislocated 
workers, and youth; a state-supported program for dislocated workers; 
apprenticeships; and four types of educational programs: adult basic ed-
ucation, high school career and technical education, community college 
job prep, and private career schools. In the second study in Washing-
ton, rehabilitative services programs were added to the scope of work. 
The programs analyzed for the study done in Virginia overlapped these 
programs somewhat: they included the federal job training programs 
for adults, dislocated workers, and youth; community college career 
and technical education; adult education; and rehabilitative services. In 
addition, this study included trade adjustment assistance, welfare-to-
work, and Food Stamp Employment and Training (FSET). In Indiana, 
we estimated the net impacts of the federal job training programs for 
adults, dislocated workers, and youth; community college career and 
technical education; and trade adjustment assistance. 
As noted in Table 12.1, the time periods in which the participants 
were in the programs varied across the studies. The studies defined par-
ticipation year by when the individual exited from the program. All of 
the studies used the entire universe of program exiters: in 1997–1998 
and 1999–2000 for the first Washington study; in 2001–2002 and 2003– 
2004 for the second Washington study; 2004–2005 for the Virginia 
study; and 2005–2006 for Indiana. To be clear, someone who partici-
pated in a program for three years and who exited sometime during 
 
                                          
 
                                         
                            
  
                    
Table 12.1  Programs Analyzed and Year of Participation, by Study 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Exit year Exit year Exit year Exit year 
Program 1997/1998 1999/2000 2001/2002 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 
Federal Job Training (Adults) JTPA II-A X X 
WIA I-B X X Xa X 
Federal Job Training (Youth) JTPA II-C X X 
WIA I-B X X X X 
Dislocated Workers JTPA III X X 
WIA I-B X X Xa X 
Comm. and Tech. College Worker X X X X 
Retraining 
Secondary Career and Tech Ed. X X X X 
Community College Job Prep. X X X X X X 
Private Career Schools X X X 
Adult Ed./Literacy Xb Xb Xb Xb X 
Rehab. Services 
Vocational Rehabilitation X X X 
Blind and Visually Impaired X X X 
Apprenticeships X X X X 
Welfare-to-Work TANF X 
FSET X 
Trade Adjustment Assistance X X 
NOTE: Year of participation is defined as year of exit from services. Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 
2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 3 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2008) (Virginia); and Study 4 is Hollenbeck 
(2009) (Indiana). 
a Combined in this study. 
b Adult basic education as delivered by community and technical colleges only. 
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1997–1998 is considered to be a 1997–1998 participant, as is someone 
who both entered and exited in 1997–1998.1 
In all studies, the net impacts of participation in the workforce de-
velopment programs on employment and earnings were estimated. The 
data came from the quarterly wage record data generated from the UI 
system, and thus are measured over a calendar quarter. In Washington, 
the wage record data include hours worked in a quarter, so for the stud-
ies undertaken for that state, we estimated the net impacts on hours 
worked per quarter and hourly wages. Virginia had an interest in the 
extent to which participants earned credentials either during program 
participation or within a year of exit, so that outcome was analyzed 
in the Virginia study.2 The Indiana study focused on employment and 
earnings as well as posttraining unemployment compensation benefits. 
The Washington studies also examined the net impact of program 
participation on the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits, 
public assistance benefits (TANF and Food Stamps), and Medicaid 
enrollment. These data were supplied by the state agencies that admin-
ister those programs. Table 12.2 summarizes the outcomes that were 
examined in the studies. As the table notes, all of the studies focused 
on two outcome time periods: a short-term outcome and a longer-term 
outcome. In Washington, these were 3 full quarters after exit and 8–11 
full quarters after exit in the first study (9–12 full quarters in the second 
study); in Virginia, 2 and 4 full quarters after exit, respectively; and in 
Indiana, 3 and 7 full quarters after exit. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Net impacts. Table 12.3 provides a summary of the short-term net 
impacts of the programs on employment rates, quarterly hours of em-
ployment, average wage rates, and quarterly average earnings. All of 
the results in the table for studies 1, 2, and 4 are regression-adjusted, 
and all of the outcomes, except for employment, exclude zero values.3 
For the Study 3 results, the employment rates are differences in means 
and the quarterly earnings results are differences in nonzero medians 
between the program participants and matched comparison groups. The 
wage rate and earnings impacts are in 2005$. Note that these results 
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Table 12.2  Outcomes Examined and Time Periods, by Study 
Outcomes Study 1 and Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Employment Defined as > $100 in a Defined as > $50 in a quarter or Defined as > $100 in a quarter; 
quarter enrolled in school if < 18 > $50 in a quarter (youth) 
Earnings Quarterly earnings totaled across Quarterly earnings totaled across Quarterly earnings totaled 
all employers all employers across all employers 
Hours worked per quarter Hours totaled across all employers Not available Not available 
Hourly wages Earnings divided by hours worked Not available Not available 
Credential completion Not available Credential earned while in Not available 
program or within 12 months 
of exit 
Unemployment compensation Benefits of at least $1 in quarter Not available Benefits of at least $1 in quarter 
TANF/Food Stamp benefits Benefits received by assistance unit Not available Not available 
that included participant of at least 
$1 in quarter 
Medicaid eligibility State Medicaid administrative data Not available Not available 
indicated participant was “enrollee” 
during at least one day in quarter 
Time periods 
Short-term 3 full quarters after exit 2 full quarters after exit 3 full quarters after exit 
Long-term 8–11 full quarters after exit in 4 full quarters after exit 7 full quarters after exit 
Study 1; 9–12 full quarters after exit 
in Study 2 
NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 
3 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2008) (Virginia); and Study 4 is Hollenbeck (2009) (Indiana). 
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Table 12.3  Short-Term Net Impact Estimates for WIA (or JTPA) 
Outcome 
Quarterly Quarterly 
Program Study Employment rate hours Wage rate ($)b earnings ($)b 
Federal Job Training (Adults) 
JTPA II-A 1 
WIA I-B 2 
WIA I-B 3 
WIA I-B 4 
Federal Job Training (Youth) 
JTPA II-C 1 
WIA I-B Youth 2 
WIA I-B Youth 3 
WIA I-B Youth 4 
Dislocated Workers 
JTPA III 1 
WIA I-B 2 
WIA I-B 4 
0.109*** 23.0** 0.77 
0.097*** 52.2*** 1.49*** 
0.034*** —a —a 
0.148*** —a —a
0.061*** −15.3 −0.47 
0.042** 4.7 0.20 
−0.039** —a —a 
0.034 —a —a 
0.075*** 19.6*** −0.55 
0.087*** 58.4*** 1.04*** 
0.170*** —a —a
 349***
  711***
 146***
 549*** 
−175**
 66
 62
 24
 278***
 784***
 410*** 
NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 
3 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2008) (Virginia); and Study 4 is Hollenbeck (2009) (Indiana). *statistically significant at the 0.10 level; 
**statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ***statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
a Virginia and Indiana wage record data do not include hours so no results for quarterly hours or wage rate. 
b In 2005$/2006$. 
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include all participants—those individuals who completed their educa-
tion or training and those who left without completing. 
In examining the first column of data, one can easily discern that 
most of the programs have statistically significant positive net impacts 
on short-term (3 or 4 quarters after exit) employment rates.4 The levels 
of the impacts are generally in the 5–15 percentage point range. WIA
seems to be generally successful at getting participants employed. The 
farthest right-hand column of results shows the net impacts on quar-
terly earnings (for individuals with earnings). Whereas the estimates are 
generally positive, there is more variability in the levels and statistical 
significance of the earnings impacts than for employment. For example, 
the Youth program has earnings impacts that are essentially zero, de-
spite reasonably robust employment rate impacts. 
Table 12.4 displays the results for longer-term outcomes. These re-
sults reflect the extent to which the short-term impacts are retained. The 
results are not substantially different from those in Table 12.3. This sug-
gests that for the most part, the programs’ outcomes do not depreciate 
during the first few years after exit. The programs result in a statisti-
cally significant positive employment net impact, and all of them, save 
federal job training for youth, have statistically significant and positive 
earnings impacts. 
Rates of return. In addition to the net impact analyses, we con-
ducted benefit-cost analyses for the workforce development programs 
in both Washington studies and in the Indiana study. The benefits that 
were calculated included the following: 
• increased lifetime earnings (discounted) 
• fringe benefits associated with those earnings 
• taxes on earnings (negative benefit to participants; benefit to 
society) 
• reductions in UI benefits (negative benefit to participants; ben-
efit to society) 
• reductions in TANF benefits (negative benefit to participants; 
benefit to society) 
• reductions in Food Stamp benefits (negative benefit to partici-
pants; benefit to society) 
• reductions in Medicaid benefits (negative benefit to partici-
pants; benefit to society). 
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Table 12.4  Long-Term Net Impact Estimates of WIA (or JTPA) 
Outcome 
Quarterly Quarterly 
Program Study Employment rate hours Wage rate ($)a earnings ($)a 
Federal Job Training (Adults) 
JTPA II-A 1 
WIA I-B 2 
WIA I-B 4 
Federal Job Training (Youth) 
JTPA II-C 1 
WIA I-B Youth 2 
WIA I-B Youth 4 
Dislocated Workers 
JTPA III 1 
WIA I-B 2 
WIA I-B 4 
0.074*** 23.9*** 0.68** 
0.066*** 35.7*** 0.67** 
0.137*** —b —b
0.053** 2.3 −0.71 
0.103*** 31.1*** 0.77*** 
0.023 —b —b
0.073*** 26.6*** −0.10 
0.064*** 48.8*** 0.97*** 
0.165*** —b —b
 658***
 455***
 463***
  117
 325***
 47
 1,009***
 771***
 310*** 
NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); and 
Study 4 is Hollenbeck (2009). *statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **statistically significant at the 0.05 level, ***statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.01 level. 
a In 2005$/2006$. 
b Data not available. 
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The costs included the following: 
• forgone earnings (reduced earnings during the period of training) 
• tuition payments 
• program costs. 
Most of these costs and benefits were derived from the net impact 
estimates. The details about how these costs and benefits were estimated
or calculated are in Appendix 12A. 
Table 12.5 displays the estimated benefits and costs for the JTPA
and WIA programs analyzed in the two Washington studies and for 
WIA in the Indiana study for the first 10 quarters after program exit and 
for the average working lifetime. The table entries represent financial 
gains (positive benefits or negative costs) or costs (negative benefits or 
positive costs) for the average participant. The costs and benefits are 
shown from three perspectives: 1) for the individual, 2) for the public 
(taxpayers), and 3) for society as a whole. The latter is the sum of the 
first two. The dollar figures are in constant 2005$/2006$ and have been 
discounted at 3 percent. 
The top panel shows that the discounted (net) benefits to the par-
ticipants over the first 10 quarters after exit are generally in the range 
of $2,800–$5,000. The costs to participants are fairly negligible for the 
Adult and Youth programs, but they are quite large (in the form of for-
gone earnings) for dislocated workers. Concomitantly, the short-term 
returns on investment for disadvantaged adult and youth participants 
in this time period are quite substantial—they are either positive or in-
calculable because the costs were nonpositive, whereas the return for 
dislocated workers is negative in all of the studies.5 
For the public, benefits are generally in the $2,400–$6,000 range 
and are typically less than the public costs of providing services. For 
almost none of the programs is the rate of return for the public positive 
in the first 10 quarters. This suggests that these programs do not fully 
pay off within the first 10 quarters after a participant exits. 
Taxes and income-conditioned transfers are transfers between par-
ticipants and the public, so they offset each other in the calculation of 
benefits and costs to society as a whole. Thus the benefits to society in 
the cost-benefit analysis are simply the earnings and fringe benefits of 
participants, and the costs are the participants’ forgone earnings and the 
financial cost of providing the program services. In the first 10 quarters, 
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Table 12.5  Discounted Benefits and Costs and Rates of Return for Federal Job Training Programs over First 2.5 
Years after Exit and over Working Lifetime, by Program 
Private Public Social 
Benefits Costs ROI Benefits Costs ROI Benefits Costs ROI 
Program Study ($) ($) (%) ($) ($) (%) ($) ($) (%) 
PANEL A: Over first 2.5 years 
after exit 
Federal Job Training (Adults) 
JTPA II-A 1 1,106 403 8.24 3,989 3,791 1.36 5,095 4,194 3.07 
WIA I-B 2 4,173 −1,111 — 3,113 5,744 −15.36 7,286 4,633 9.94 
WIA I-B 4 2,804 1,350 10.54 2,916 4,132 −10.29 5,720 5,482 0.85 
Federal Job Training (Youth) 
JTPA II-C 1 −3,646 384 — 1,864 2,605 −4.69 −1,782 2,989 — 
WIA I-B Youth 2 3,313 0 — −1,151 6,617 — 2,163 6,617 −15.96 
WIA I-B Youth 4 671 495 6.03 113 6,550 — 784 7,045 −27.96 
Dislocated Workers 
JTPA III 1 4,944 13,640 −12.49 882 2,885 −12.29 5,826 16,525 −12.45 
WIA I-B 2 4,258 10,746 −10.72 5,770 7,081 −5.59 10,028 17,827 −9.38 
WIA I-B 4 1,993 6,440 −15.76 2,376 6,426 −21.31 4,369 12,866 −17.83 
PANEL B: Over working lifetime 
Federal Job Training (Adults) 
JTPA II-A 1 62,744 403 20.52 25,092 3,791 9.26 87,836 4,194 13.23 
WIA I-B 2 38,928 −1,111 — 6,241 5,744 0.21 45,170 4,633 15.14 
WIA I-B 4 15,825 1,350 16.32 4,084 4,132 −0.04 19,909 5,482 7.60 
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Federal Job Training (Youth) 
JTPA II-C 1 30,235 384 3.08 6,770 2,605 6.08 37,005 2,989 3.61 
WIA I-B Youth 2 29,002 0 — 8,282 6,617 0.07 37,284 6,617 4.55 
WIA I-B Youth 4 7,055 495 13.27 1,184 6,550 −1.73 8,239 7,045 0.22 
Dislocated Workers 
JTPA III 1 81,327 13,640 5.19 25,719 2,885 6.81 107,046 16,525 5.53 
WIA I-B 2 49,201 10,746 5.00 18,440 7,081 5.15 67,641 17,827 5.04 
WIA I-B 4 15,398 5,440 2.64 10,310 6,426 1.50 25,708 12,866 2.13 
NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 
4 is Hollenbeck (2009) (Indiana). Table entries are for average participant. Benefits include earnings, fringe benefits, and income-related 
transfer payments. Costs include tuition and fees (if any), forgone earnings, and public program costs per participant. $ figures are in real 
2005$/2006$. — = return on investment (ROI) could not be calculated because of 0 or negative benefits or costs. 
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the societal benefits exceed the costs for the WIA Adult program, but 
not for the Youth or Dislocated Worker programs. 
The lower panel of the table displays estimated benefits, costs, and 
return on investments of the average individual served by a program 
through their working lifetime. Here we extrapolated benefits from the 
average age of exiters until age 65. For individuals, the discounted (net) 
lifetime benefits tend to be substantial, especially in the two Washington 
State studies. The costs (identical to the costs given in Table 12.5) are 
much less than these benefits, so the participants’ returns on investment 
range from about 2.5 percent (quarterly) to over 20 percent (quarterly).6 
The benefits accruing to the public over the average worker’s lifetime 
are dominated by tax payments on increased earnings. Given that those 
earnings tend to be quite substantial, it is not surprising that the public 
benefits tend to exceed the public costs, and there tend to be positive 
returns to the public for the programs. For society, the story is quite 
similar. The benefits far exceed the costs, and the returns are therefore 
quite handsome. 
Validity. The net impacts and rates of return presented here are, 
in general, quite substantial. Are they believable? Does participation 
in WIA endow clients with these sorts of returns? One question that 
might be raised is the extent to which the methodological approach is 
responsible for the positive findings. While it is generally agreed that 
a random assignment approach is methodologically superior to the 
matching estimators used in the above-mentioned studies, it should 
be noted that according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(1996), the National JTPA Study (NJS) that used a random assignment 
process resulted in a 13 percent earnings impact for adult men and a 15 
percent earnings impact for adult women. The comparable estimate in 
Table 12.4—an earnings impact of $658 (2005$/2006$) is about a 22 
percent impact (mean quarterly earnings are $2,946 for this group). The 
Washington State results reported here are larger than the NJS, but both 
studies imply quite large returns. 
Another issue that might be raised is that the author of this chapter 
is also an author of all of the WIA impact studies cited above. The U.S. 
Department of Labor funded a quasi-experimental evaluation of WIA
whose results are reported in Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008). For 
the WIA Adult program, these authors report a significant quarterly 
earnings impact of about $600 for women and $450 for men (2005:1 $).
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The comparable result reported in Table 12.4 is about $450 for the to-
tal population. For the WIA dislocated worker program, these authors 
report a significant quarterly earnings impact of about $380 for women 
and $220 for men.7 The comparable results reported in Table 12.4 are 
$771 in Washington State and $310 in Indiana for the total population. 
Note that Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) use several quasi-
experimental approaches to estimate the impact of JTPA in the state of 
Missouri, and their preferred specification results in an earnings impact 
of about 14 percent for men and 23 percent for women. All in all, it 
seems like the estimates presented here “fit” within the literature. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The contribution of this chapter has been to extend in two directions 
the net impact estimates that have been generated through nonex-
perimental methods with administrative data. In two studies, the net 
earnings impacts were decomposed into employment, hours of work, 
and wage rate impacts. Secondly, the earnings impacts were combined 
with estimates of impacts on fringe benefits, tax payments, and income-
conditioned transfers to conduct a benefit-cost analysis of workforce 
programs. 
The policy implications of this work are several in number. First, 
the studies add to the inventory of work that demonstrates that useful 
evaluations of the federal job training programs can be done with ad-
ministrative data. Second, the decomposition of net earnings impacts 
into employment, hours, and wage rates adds rich understanding to the 
variation in these impacts across programs. The rate of return analyses 
demonstrate that the public (i.e., taxpayers) and society as a whole can 
benefit financially from education and training investments, although 
the payoffs generally take more than 10 quarters to offset the costs. 
Finally, the results for individual programs are illuminating. WIA
services for adults seem to have a significant positive impact on em-
ployment, wage rates, and earnings. However, the analyses point out 
the large forgone earnings of dislocated workers that dampen their fi-
nancial payoff to training. Policymakers may wish to consider stronger 
support mechanisms for these workers such as stipends during training. 
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Notes 
The contractual support of and provision of administrative data by Washington, Vir-
ginia, and Indiana as well as the resources and support of the Upjohn Institute are 
gratefully acknowledged. Wei-Jang Huang provided invaluable research assistance. 
The usual caveat applies. 
1. In the terminology of Imbens and Angrist (1994), the estimates that we have pro-
duced are local average treatment effects (LATE). If we had used entry date to 
define participation (and matched on it rather than exit date), then we would be 
estimating the average treatment effect (ATE). In general, the former are larger 
than the latter. 
2. The Virginia study also used the wage record data to develop an outcome variable 
that was used to measure employer satisfaction. 
3. The tables in this chapter present results for the entire population. In studies 3 and 
4, we have estimated the net impacts separately by gender as well as for the whole 
population. 
4. The results for Youth are mixed. The two studies in Washington State show posi-
tive and significant employment gain; but neither the Virginia nor Indiana studies 
have this result. In fact, the Virginia employment impact for Youth is negative and 
significant. 
5. The exception to this is JTPA II-C (Youth). The net impact estimate of loss of 
TANF benefits is quite large for this population in Study 1, and this result “drives” 
the negative benefits. 
6. Again, two of the returns are not calculable because costs are negative or zero. 
7. Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) indicate that a difference-in-difference esti-
mate for dislocated workers attenuates these impacts toward zero. 
  
 
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
	 	
	  
 
Appendix 12A 
Methodology for Net Impact
Estimation and Cost-Benefit Analyses 
The net impact evaluation problem may be stated as follows: Individual 
i, who has characteristics X
it
, at time t, will be observed to have outcome(s) 
Y
it
(1) if he or she receives a “treatment,” such as participating in the workforce 
development system and will be observed to have outcome(s) Y
it
(0) if he or she 
doesn’t participate. The net impact of the treatment for individual i is Y
it
(1) − 
Y
it
(0). But, of course, this difference is never observed because an individual 
cannot simultaneously receive and not receive the treatment. 
The time subscript is dropped in the following discussion to simplify the 
notation without loss of generality. Let W
i 
= 1 if individual i receives the treat-
ment, and W
i 
= 0 if i does not receive the treatment. Let T represent the data 
set with observations about individuals who receive the treatment for whom 
we have data, and let n
T 
represent the number of individuals with data in T. 
Let U represent the data set with observations about individuals who may be 
similar to individuals who received the treatment for whom we have data, and 
let n
U 
be its sample size. Let C be a subset of U that contains observations that 
“match” those in T, and let n
C 
be its sample size. Names that may be used for 
these three data sets are Treatment sample (T), Comparison sample universe 
(U), and Matched Comparison sample (C). 
Receiving the treatment is assumed to be a random event—individuals 
happened to be in the right place at the right time to learn about the program, 
or the individuals may have experienced randomly the eligibility criteria for 
the program—so W
i 
is a stochastic outcome that can be represented as follows: 
(12A.1) W
i
 = g(X
i 
, e
i 
) , 
where e
i 
is a random variable that includes unobserved or unobservable charac-
teristics about individual i as well as a purely random component. 
An assumption made about g(C) is that 0 < prob(W
i 
= 1|X
i
) < 1. This is 
referred to as the “support” or “overlap” condition, and is necessary so that the 
outcome functions described below are defined for all X.1 
In general, outcomes are also assumed to be stochastically generated. As 
individuals in the treatment group encounter the treatment, they gain certain 
skills and knowledge and encounter certain networks of individuals. Outcomes 
are assumed to be generated by the following mapping: 
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(12A.2) Y(1) = f (X ) + e
i 1 i 1i 
Individuals not in the treatment group progress through time and also achieve 
certain outcomes according to another stochastic process, as follows: 
(12A.3) Y(0) = f (X ) + e
i 0 i 0i 
Let f (X ) = E(Y(k)|X ), so e are deviations from expected values that reflect 
k i i i ki 
unobserved or unobservable characteristics, for k = 0,1. 
As mentioned, the problem is that Y
i
(1) and Y
i
(0) are never observed simul-
taneously. What is observed is the following: 
(12A.4) Y  = (1 − W )Y(0) + WY(1)
i i i i i 
The expected value for the net impact of the treatment on the sample of indi-
viduals treated: 
(12A.5) E[Y
i
(1) − Y
i
(0)|X, W
i
 = 1] = E (ΔY | X, W = 1) 
= E[Y(1)|X, W = 1] − E[Y(0)|X, W = 0] + E[Y(0)|X, W = 0] 
− E[Y(0)|X, W = 1] 
= fˆ1 (X) − fˆ0 (X) + BIAS, where 
fˆ  k (X ), k = 1, 0, are the outcome means for the treatment and comparison group 
samples, respectively, and BIAS represents the expected difference in the Y(0) 
outcome between the comparison group (actually observed) and the treatment 
group (the counterfactual). The BIAS term may be called selection bias. 
A key assumption that allows estimation of Equation (12A.5) is that Y(0) 
^W|X. This orthogonality assumption states that given X, the outcome (absent 
the treatment), Y(0), is random whether or not the individual is a participant. 
This is equivalent to the assumption that participation in the treatment can be 
explained by X up to a random error term. The assumption is called “uncon-
foundedness,” “conditional independence,” or “selection on observables.” If 
the assumption holds, then the net impact is identified because BIAS goes to 
0, or 
(12A.6) E[Δ Y|X, W = 1] = fˆ1 (X) − fˆ0 (X). 
In random assignment, the X and W are uncorrelated through experimental 
control, so the conditional independence assumption holds by design. In any 
other design, the conditional independence is an empirical question. Whether 
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or not the data come from a random assignment experiment, however, because 
the orthogonality assumption holds only asymptotically (or for very large sam-
ples), in practice, it makes sense to regression-adjust Equation (12A.6). 
Various estimation techniques have been suggested in the literature, but 
they may be boiled down to two possibilities: 1) use all of the U set, or 2) 
try to find observations in U that closely match observations in T. Note that 
identification of the treatment effect requires that none of the covariates X in 
the data sets are perfectly correlated with being in T or U. That is, given any 
observation X
i
, the probability of being in T or in U is between 0 and 1. Tech-
niques that use all of U are called full sample techniques.2 Techniques that try 
to find matching observations will be called matching techniques. The studies 
reported here used the latter, although Hollenbeck (2004) tests the robustness 
of net impact estimates to a number of matching techniques. 
The studies that are discussed here use a nearest-neighbor algorithm us-
ing propensity scores as the distance metric (see Dehejia and Wahba 1995). 
Treatment observations are matched to observations in the comparison sample 
universe with the closest propensity scores. The matching is done with re-
placement and on a one-to-one basis. Matching with replacement reduces the 
“distance” between the treatment and comparison group cases, but it may re-
sult in the use of multiple repetitions of observations, which may artificially 
dampen the standard error of the net impact estimator. Finally, a caliper is 
employed to ensure that the distance between the observations that are paired 
is less than some criterion distance. 
For most of the programs analyzed (and identified in Table 12.1), we used 
the public labor exchange data (known as Job Service, Employment Service, or 
Wagner-Peyser data) as the Matched Sample universe (i.e., set U). This is tan-
tamount to the assumption that were these workforce development programs 
unavailable, then the individuals who were served would have gone to the 
public labor exchange for services.3 
The net impacts for the outcomes listed in tables were estimated by
regression-adjusting levels or difference-in-differences. We generally relied 
on the difference-in-difference estimators except where stark changes in labor 
market experiences were likely to have occurred—for youth and for dislo-
cated workers. The base period for difference-in-difference estimators was for 
quarters −6 to −3 before program registration. The timeline in Figure 12A.1 is 
intended to help explain the analysis periods. The timeline shows the registra-
tion and exit dates for a hypothetical individual of adult age who registered for 
WIA Title I-B in April 2000 (Q2 of 2000) and exited from services in Novem-
ber 2001(Q4 of 2001). The earnings profile shows that this person had average 
quarterly earnings of $2,500 (real) in the base period (1998:Q4–1999:Q3), 
$2,700 in the 3rd quarter after exit (2002:Q3); and $3,100 average quarterly 
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Figure 12A.1  Timeline and Earnings Profile for a Hypothetical WIA Title I-B Adult Client 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Registration 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11 +12 
exit 
Earnings profile 
Calendar quarter 
Analysis quarter 
Real earnings ($) 
98:Q1 
−9 
2,300 
98:Q2 
−8 
1,500 
98:Q3 
−7 
0 
98:Q4 
−6 
1,000 
99:Q1 99:Q2 
−5 −4 
2,800 3,000 
99:Q3 
−3 
3,200 
99:Q4 
−2 
3,200 
00:Q1 
−1 
1,600 
00:Q2 00:Q3 
Training 
0 0 
00:Q4 
1,200 
Calendar quarter 
Analysis quarter 
Real earnings ($) 
01:Q1 01:Q2 
Training 
2,000 0 
01:Q3 
0 
01:Q4 
1,500 
02:Q1 
+1 
2,500 
02:Q2 
+2 
2,700 
02:Q3 
+3 
2,700 
02:Q4 
+4 
2,700 
03:Q1 
+5 
2,900 
03:Q2 
+6 
0 
03:Q3 
+7 
1,600 
03:Q4 
+8 
2,900 
Calendar quarter 
Analysis quarter 
Real earnings ($) 
04:Q1 
+9 
3,000 
04:Q2 
+10 
3,100 
04:Q3 
+11 
3,100 
04:Q4 
+12 
3,200 
Outcome variables ($) 
Earnings (+3)
Avg. earnings (9−12)
Base period earnings (−6 through −3)
2,700 
3,100 
2,500 
Analysis period 
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earnings in the 9th–12th postexit quarters, which were 2004:Q1–2004:Q4. So 
in the regression adjustment of earnings levels, the dependent variables would 
have been $2,700 and $3,100 for the short-term and longer-term outcomes. In 
the regression adjustment of difference-in-differences, the dependent variables 
would have been $200 and $600, respectively. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES4 
Earnings. Benefits and costs are projected for the “average” participant. 
Figure 12A.2 shows the earnings profiles for the average individual in the 
treatment group and in the comparison group. The hypothesis used to con-
struct these profiles is that encountering a workforce development program 
enhances an individual’s skills and productivity (thus increasing wage rates) 
and increases the likelihood of employment. Thus, after the training period, 
the treatment earnings profile is above the comparison earnings profile (both 
hourly wage and employment net impacts are positive). During the training 
period, the treatment earnings will be below the comparison earnings, on aver-
age. These are the forgone costs of training in the form of wages that are given 
up by the participant while he or she is receiving training. 
Figure 12A.2  Age-Earnings Profiles of Training Participants and 
Comparison Group 
Real earnings 
Training participants 
Comparison group 
12 age Training period 
D12 
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The theoretical lifetime earnings benefit is the shaded area in the graph. 
The average comparison group member’s real earnings grow at some fairly 
constant rate (increase in productivity), and the average treatment group mem-
ber’s earnings eventually become higher after training and likely grow faster 
as they accumulate additional human capital in the form of work experience. 
The problem that needs to be solved in estimating the benefits is how to 
compute the shaded area. In general, we have several quarters of outcome data, 
so we can get accurate estimates of the area up to the line denoted D12 (treat-
ment minus comparison difference at the 12th quarter). Because the profiles 
represent the average individual, we use the unconditional net earnings im-
pacts to calculate these benefits. (They automatically control for employment, 
hourly wage, and hours worked impacts.) 
What is unknown (and unknowable) is the shape of the earnings profiles 
into the future after the D12 point. The profiles could continue to move apart 
from each other if the training participants continue to be more and more 
productive relative to the comparison group member, or the profiles eventu-
ally may converge over time if the training effect depreciates. Alternatively, 
the profiles may become parallel to reflect a scenario in which the training 
participants gain a permanent advantage, but then their productivity growth 
eventually matches the comparison group members. The typical approach is 
to extrapolate earnings into the future based on the observed time trend in 
the first 12 quarters after exit. Since the earnings benefits are received by the 
participants in future periods, they need to be discounted. The studies reported 
here used a 3 percent real discount rate. 
Fringe benefits. With additional earnings, workers will also accrue ad-
ditional fringe benefits in the form of paid leave, paid insurances, retirement/ 
savings plan contributions, and other noncash benefits. Two sources of data 
provided estimates of the ratio of fringe benefits (defined as paid leave plus 
paid insurances plus retirement plan contributions plus other) to gross wages 
and salaries (including supplemental pay such as overtime). The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2002), reports this ratio to be 23.3 percent for “All U.S.” and 
20.4 percent for the “West Census Region.” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(2001) reports a ratio of 24.3 percent for the Pacific region. Under the assump-
tion that workforce development program participants are less likely to get 
fringe benefit coverage than the average worker, and to be conservative in our 
benefit estimation, we used the assumption that this ratio would be 20 percent 
(applied to the discounted annual earnings increments). 
Tax payments. Higher earnings will lead to payment of increased payroll, 
sales/excise, local, state, and federal income taxes.5 The increased taxes are 
a cost to participants and a benefit to the public. We used average (marginal) 
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tax rates for each of the taxes and applied these rates to the annual earnings 
changes. For example, we used the current rate of 7.65 percent to estimate the 
future payroll tax liabilities. We relied on IRS data for the federal income tax 
rates that factor in earned income tax credits, and state sources provided aver-
age rates for the other types of taxes. 
Unemployment compensation. Unemployment compensation benefits in 
the future may increase for participants if programs increase employment (and 
therefore the probability of receiving UI) or increase earnings (and therefore 
benefits) or they may decrease if programs decrease the likelihood of unem-
ployment or decrease duration of unemployment spells. Increased UI benefits 
in the future would be a discounted benefit to participants and cost to the pub-
lic. We used a similar empirical strategy as we did for lifetime earnings to 
interpolate and extrapolate these benefits. In particular, we estimated the un-
conditional UI benefit net impacts for the first 12 quarters after exit and used 
these estimates as the average impact for the program in those quarters. Then 
we used the estimate for the 12th quarter after exit to extrapolate for 28 more 
quarters (68 quarters for WIA Youth). In other words, we assumed that the UI 
benefit gain or loss would dampen to 0 after 10 years for the Adult and Dislo-
cated Worker programs and after 20 years for the Youth program. 
Income-conditioned transfers. The maintained hypothesis was that 
participation in the workforce development programs would decrease the prob-
ability of receiving TANF and Food Stamps, and the probability of enrolling 
in Medicaid. In addition, increased earnings may have resulted in reductions 
in benefit levels for TANF and Food Stamps. Finally, if individuals no longer 
receive TANF or Food Stamps, they would not receive any support services 
such as child care or other referrals. 
For TANF/Food Stamps, we followed the same empirical strategy as 
we did for unemployment compensation. We estimated net impacts for un-
conditional TANF benefits and Food Stamp benefits for the 12 quarters after 
program exit cohort and extrapolated beyond that period using the estimate 
from quarter +12. We again assumed that on average, the program participants 
may receive these benefits (or lose these benefits) for up to 40 quarters (or 
80 quarters for the youth program) even though TANF is time limited to 20 
quarters. The reason for going beyond 20 quarters is that these are averages for 
the entire program group, and the dynamics of recipiency will be assumed to 
continue for up to 10 years. 
The typical pattern for the workforce development programs is that in the 
short term, TANF benefits are decreased for participants who exit because, for 
the most part, employment rates increase—at least, some individuals leave the 
rolls. However, as time progresses, some workers begin to lose employment, 
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or become single and have dependent children, and the group’s TANF net im-
pact benefits become positive, although of relatively small magnitude. 
We followed a similar empirical strategy for Food Stamps as we did for 
TANF. We estimated net impacts for unconditional benefits for the 12 quarters 
after program exit and extrapolated beyond that period using the estimate from 
quarter +12. We again assumed that on average, the program participants may 
receive these benefits (or lose these benefits) for up to 40 quarters (or 80 quar-
ters for the Youth program). 
The states did not make actual benefit/usage information for Medicaid 
available, so we estimated net impacts of actually being enrolled in Medicaid. 
Our hypothesis was that training participants will tend to decrease their enroll-
ment rates as they become better attached to the labor force over time and will 
thus lose eligibility. We converted Medicaid enrollment into financial terms 
by multiplying the average state share of Medicaid expenditures per quarter 
times the average number of household members per case. As with TANF and 
Food Stamps, this is a benefit to the participant and a cost to the public. To 
interpolate/extrapolate the net impact of a program on Medicaid eligibility, we 
either averaged or fit a linear equation time series of estimated enrollment net 
impacts. 
Costs. Two types of costs were estimated for each of the programs. The 
first was forgone earnings, which would be reduced earnings while the partici-
pants were actually engaged in the training programs. The second type of cost 
was the actual direct costs of the training. 
Forgone earnings represent the difference between what workforce devel-
opment program participants would have earned if they had not participated 
in a program (which is unobservable) and what they earned while they did 
participate. The natural estimate for the former is the earnings of the matched 
comparison group members during the length of training. Specifically, we used 
Equation (12A.7) to estimate mechanistically the forgone earnings. Note that 
we did not discount forgone earnings, but did calculate them in real $. 
 ˆ (12A.7) Forgone = 0.5×( E− + E−1 ) − E0 × d  ,i  1i i i  i 
where E , E = average quarterly earnings (unconditional) for treatment group −1 0
           in quarter –1 and during training period, respectively. 
Eˆ1 = average quarterly earnings in first postexit period for matched
comparison group. 
d = average training duration. 
i = indexes program. 
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For the most part, the costs of providing services were supplied to us by 
the states. Staff members of the state agencies calculated these costs from ad-
ministrative data on days in the program and daily cost information. 
Appendix Notes 
1. Note that Imbens (2004) shows that this condition can be slightly weakened to 
Pr(Wi = 1|Xi) < 1. 
2. Some of these techniques trim or delete a few outlier observations from U but will 
still be referred to as full sample techniques. 
3. For some of the programs other than the public job training programs focused on 
here, the public labor exchange was not an appropriate counterfactual, and alterna-
tive administrative data sources were used. These programs included secondary 
career and technical education, vocational rehabilitation, and blind and visually 
impaired services. For high school career and technical education, the matched 
comparison universe was all high school graduates in the state. For the other 
two programs, the matched comparison universe was composed of nonserved 
applicants. 
4. This discussion will present general methodological issues. Readers can find the 
specific parameters or estimates that were used in the source reports. 
5. Washington does not have local or state income taxes. 
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The recent economic recession has highlighted and exacerbated 
difficulties faced by low-wage workers in recent decades. Perhaps most 
troubling is a significant and persistent rise in the rate of long-term unem-
ployment—workers unemployed for more than six months. The 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act includes an unprecedented 
level of funding for the public workforce development system and asso-
ciated employment and training programs.1 This injection of resources 
to aid unemployed and underemployed workers nearly doubled U.S. 
federal government funding for WIA programs—youth employment, 
adult job training, dislocated worker assistance, Job Corps, and other 
national activities—that had been steadily declining since the start of 
the WIA program in 2000 (Frank and Minoff 2005). 
Since its inception, there has been no rigorous evaluation of 
the WIA programs that serve adults. In the face of this substantially 
expanded public investment in employment and training, we argue that 
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rigorous evidence on the impact and effectiveness of WIA services 
is needed now to guide the use of these resources in generating the 
greatest potential benefit for workers and the highest possible return to 
taxpayer dollars.2 
WIA is distinguished from its predecessor, JTPA, primarily by the 
introduction of a One-Stop service delivery system designed to improve 
coordination and integration of services, its use of ITAs in training ser-
vices, and changes in governance structures at the state and local levels. 
Prior to the start of the recession in December 2007, WIA had reduced 
the share of low-income individuals served by one-third and decreased 
the length of time spent in training and the expenditures per trainee 
(Osterman 2007). Thus, important changes in both investments in and 
the implementation of public employment training programs have taken 
place under WIA, and yet surprisingly little is known about the impact 
of WIA and its components on labor market outcomes. 
To date, evaluations of WIA have provided very limited informa-
tion on program effectiveness.3 This study employs nonexperimental 
matching methods to evaluate the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker 
programs using data from 12 states that cover approximately 160,000 
WIA participants and nearly 3 million comparison group members. 
Within each state, we compare WIAprogram participants with a matched 
comparison population of individuals who have not participated in the 
WIA program but who are observationally equivalent across a range 
of demographic characteristics, prior participation in employment pro-
grams, and labor market experiences. Comparison group members 
are drawn from those who have participated in the ES under Wagner-
Peyser legislation or who have filed claims for UI benefits. 
This study adds to an expanding literature that evaluates active 
labor market programs. In general, this literature is moderately sup-
portive of the benefits of job training and related active labor market 
programs on participants. Card et al. (2009) observe that job training 
programs, especially longer-duration programs, tend to have very small 
or negative impacts on employment measures in periods of less than a 
year, presumably reflecting “lock-in” effects, but have positive effects 
in the second or third years (see also Dyke et al. [2006]; Hotz, Imbens, 
and Klerman [2006]). One useful benchmark is the random assignment 
evaluation of JTPA program participation in the late 1980s. Program 
enrollees experienced minimal incremental effects in the two quarters 
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after random assignment (which took place at program entry), but the 
increment in quarterly earnings increased to $300–$350 (2006 $) by the 
tenth quarter (Orr et al. 1996, p. 107). 
Our results indicate that the average participant in the WIA Adult 
program obtains a several-hundred-dollar increase in quarterly earnings. 
Adult program participants who obtain training have lower earnings in 
the months during training and the year after exit than those who do 
not receive training, but they catch up within 10 quarters, ultimately 
registering large gains. The marginal benefits of training exceed, on 
average, $400 in earnings each quarter three years after program entry. 
Dislocated workers experience several quarters for which earnings are 
depressed relative to comparison group workers after entering WIA, 
and although their earnings ultimately match or overtake the compari-
son group, the benefits they obtain are smaller than for those in the 
Adult program and in some cases are indistinguishable from zero. 
OVERVIEW OF WIA ADULT AND DISLOCATED
WORKER PROGRAMS 
We evaluate two WIA programs: the Adult program, serving largely 
disadvantaged individuals, and the Dislocated Worker program, serv-
ing those who have lost jobs. Although the Adult program is designed 
largely for individuals who are unemployed, employed individuals are 
eligible to participate if participation allows them to achieve economic 
self-sufficiency. The target population for the Dislocated Worker pro-
gram is workers facing layoffs and those eligible for unemployment 
insurance, although other individuals who have lost their jobs are eligi-
ble if staff decide they fall in several broad categories.4 Participation in 
the WIA programs is voluntary, but access is restricted, as program staff 
must admit participants and authorize any services that are provided. 
The analyses here focus on individuals entering WIA in the period July 
2003–June 2005 (program years 2003 and 2004), which allows suffi-
cient time after the program’s initial startup (July 2000 in most states), 
while providing an extended follow-up period. 
Although legislative requirements establish a general program-
matic structure, states and local areas have a great deal of latitude in 
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implementing the WIA programs.5 States have further specified rules, 
and, in keeping with the spirit of local control in WIA legislation, they 
have also left many decisions to the local agency, the WIB. Legisla-
tion does not define economic self-sufficiency, so whether an employed 
individual requires services is left largely to local discretion. In the first 
few years of WIA implementation, incentives to cream skim in admis-
sion to the program were documented by the GAO (2002), and the point at 
which individuals were formally registered in WIA differed substantially 
across sites. 
For both the Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, WIA legisla-
tion specifies three levels of service. All participants who enter WIA
receive core services, which include staff-assisted job search and place-
ment, provision of labor market information, and basic counseling, 
corresponding closely to the staff-assisted services offered by state 
offices as part of the ES under Wagner-Peyser legislation. Once indi-
viduals receive core services, staff may recommend that they receive 
intensive services, which involve comprehensive assessment, more 
extensive counseling and career planning, and possibly short courses. 
Participants in intensive services may then be recommended to receive 
training services. Under WIA, most training is provided by separate 
organizations—including community colleges, proprietary schools, 
nonprofits servicing the disadvantaged, and others—through a voucher 
(the ITA). 
Given that ES services are very similar to WIA core services, at least 
in terms of their basic structure, individuals needing such services who 
are not accepted into the WIA program are normally referred to ES— 
which is usually available at the same site. In some sites WIA enrolls 
only individuals who are authorized to receive intensive or training 
services. Despite the structure of the ITA as a voucher, WIA program 
staff retain power to determine who will receive the voucher and, in 
consequence, how it is used. Staff are generally required to assure that 
training prepares participants for jobs in high demand, although how 
this is implemented, including the extent of counselor involvement in 
the training decision, is highly variable. 
Those locations that follow the spirit of the sequential service man-
date might be expected to provide training primarily to individuals who 
had been unsuccessful in obtaining employment through less intensive 
services, causing negative selection into training. On the other hand, in 
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most sites, as many as one-third of those who participate in WIA have 
a particular training goal prior to program entry (they are often referred 
to WIA by the training provider), and, in general, WIB staff make an 
effort to accommodate them. Finally, staff are under pressure to pro-
vide training to individuals whose employment outcomes will aid the 
performance measures, so insofar as counselors can identify those who 
will ultimately succeed in the labor market, we would expect positive 
selection. 
In the period of our study, nationwide about one in five WIA par-
ticipants received only core services, and about two in five were coded 
as receiving training services. Of those who received training, up to 
10 percent received on-the-job training and another 5 percent received 
basic skills training. The remainder were coded as receiving occupa-
tional and other training, including an unknown amount of customized 
training for employers. About half of all training was funded by ITAs. 
Little is known about the character or intensity of the training offered, 
but approximately two-thirds of training recipients received some kind 
of credential. Between one-half and one-third of participants exited 
WIA in less than 26 weeks, whereas a similar proportion remained in 
the program for at least a year.6 Both funding and maximum time limits 
for training activities varied dramatically across states and across WIBs 
within a state, as did expenditures per participant. The average state 
spent about $5,000 for each participant exiting the program; the lowest 
average expenditure was about $1,000 and the largest about $15,000 
(USDOL/ETA 2009). 
Although there is potential overlap between Adult and Dislocated 
Worker program participants, in practice they differ quite dramatically 
in terms average age, gender, race, and prior work experience. Given 
that the two programs serve very different functions, each is analyzed 
separately. The analysis presented here does not distinguish core and 
intensive levels of service. 
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STUDY SAMPLE, DATA, MEASURES, AND METHOD
OF ANALYSIS 
Study Sample 
In December 2007, the USDOL issued a notice requesting that state 
workforce agencies provide access to administrative data for use in an 
evaluation of WIA activities funded under federal legislation. Agen-
cies in all 50 states were contacted and efforts were made to negotiate 
agreements by which necessary data would be released to the research-
ers. Funds were made available to cover state expenses, and states 
were promised that individually identifiable state results would not 
be released. Ultimately, agreements were reached and necessary data 
were provided by 12 states: Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Missouri, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Tennessee, 
Utah, and Wisconsin.7 
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, we employ matching 
methods in which program participants are matched with individuals 
in a comparison group based on observed variables.8 All analyses are 
based on state administrative data, with files identifying program par-
ticipants and comparison group members, as well as employment data, 
drawn from each state. The comparison group is drawn from either UI 
claimants or from ES participants (i.e., individuals who register with 
the state’s job exchange service and receive services under Wagner-
Peyser legislation). Of the 12 states in our analysis, 9 have UI claimant 
comparison data, while three have comparison data from ES partici-
pants. Estimates of the incremental impact of training use a comparison 
group consisting of WIA participants who did not receive training ser-
vices, i.e., of those receiving only core or intensive services. 
Data Sources and Measures 
The base data for the 12 states include annual WIASRD or closely 
related data files obtained from each state that provide information on 
all participants exiting the WIA program within a program year (July– 
June). For most states, the data files extend through June 2007 (program 
year 2006). These data also include an individual identifier to allow a 
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match with other state data. The focus of the current analysis is on WIA
participants who entered the WIA program in the period July 2003– 
June 2005. 
Comparison group information derives from state administrative 
data for UI claims or ES participants. UI wage record data provide 
quarterly earnings for all employees in UI-covered firms within a state. 
Data extend through calendar year 2007, which, when matched with 
WIASRD information and information for individuals in the compari-
son groups, generate the study’s primary outcome measures. These 
include earnings and employment for participants for up to 16 quarters 
following participation and for comparison group members in the same 
periods. These data also include earnings prior to WIA participation, 
facilitating the construction of employment histories for participants 
and comparison group members. All earnings have been adjusted for 
inflation to correspond with the first quarter of 2006. 
It has long been recognized that controls for standard demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, education, and race are important. 
In addition to these, we capture local labor market characteristics using 
aggregates of county of residence or service (or where county is not 
available, the local Workforce Investment Area), and the details of the 
labor market experiences of individuals in the period immediately prior 
to program participation.9 Wage record data provide information on 
employment status at the time of initial program involvement and for 
prior years. Additional variables include controls for veteran status and 
prior earnings. 
Analyses are performed separately by gender. Where possible, WIA
participants who enter in a given quarter are also matched with individ-
uals in the comparison sample who have contact with their respective 
programs in the same quarter, providing an exact match on quarter of 
entry. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 13A.1 in Appendix 13A provides sample sizes and means for 
WIA participants and the comparison group in the 12 states. A total of 
95,580 unique individuals entered the WIA Adult program during the 
observation window. Since about 2 percent entered the program more 
than once, the total number of entries was 97,552. Similarly, 63,515 
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individuals entered the Dislocated Worker program, producing a total 
of 64,089 program entries.10 Nearly 3 million unique individuals partic-
ipate in comparison programs (UI claimants or ES participants) and are 
available to be matched to program participants, contributing approxi-
mately 6.2 million quarters of program activity.11 
Individuals who participated in the WIA Adult program are more 
likely to be female and minority than individuals in the comparison 
sample; they are also appreciably younger. These differences reflect the 
fact that participants in the WIA Adult program tend to be economi-
cally disadvantaged, whereas participants in the comparison sample are 
individuals who have recently lost jobs. Therefore, individuals in the 
comparison sample have the characteristics of individuals with rela-
tively strong labor market attachments—white, male, older workers 
with more education. Comparing participants in the WIA Dislocated 
Worker program with the comparison group, it is clear there are fewer 
differences—participants in the WIA Dislocated Worker program are 
more likely to be female and are slightly older, but differences are 
smaller. Participants in the WIA Adult program are less likely to have 
worked continuously in the six prior quarters and are much more likely 
to have not worked in any of the six quarters prior to entering the pro-
gram; they also have much lower annual earnings in the two years prior 
to entering the program. In contrast, participants in the WIA Dislocated 
Worker program have similar labor market attachment and only slightly 
lower earnings than those in the comparison program. 
Approximately 4–5 percent of WIA entrants had previously partici-
pated in WIA (either the Adult or Dislocated Worker program). About 
one-fifth of Adult program participants had prior comparison program 
experience, compared to over two-fifths of Dislocated Workers. About 
two-thirds of comparison program participants had participated in WIA
in the prior two years. 
Within each program, participants who receive training services are 
more likely to be female and much less likely to be black than par-
ticipants who do not receive training services. Differences in education 
are very small. Based on prior earnings, those receiving training ser-
vices appear to have had greater labor market success, but measures of 
employment imply only small differences in employment activity. 
Notwithstanding these differences, there are important similarities 
in the patterns of earnings for treated and comparison cases. The earn-
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ings of the WIA participants display a decline in average earnings over 
the year or two prior to program entry, a pattern called the “Ashenfel-
ter dip” (Ashenfelter 1978; Heckman and Smith 1999), reflecting the 
fact that individuals often enter such programs following a period of 
setbacks in employment. There is a similar decline preceding program 
participation for the comparison group, suggesting that there will be 
sufficient numbers of individuals to match with WIA participants on 
the basis of prior employment. Equally important, the common pattern 
suggests that there may be similarities in the individual employment 
environments faced by the comparison and treatment groups, suggest-
ing that unmeasured factors may be similar as well. 
Method of Analysis 
We estimate the impact of participation in the WIA Adult or Dis-
located Worker programs on outcomes for those who participate, that 
is, the effect of the treatment on the treated. We use propensity score 
matching, which, like other matching and related methods, assumes that 
the outcome that would occur in the absence of the treatment is condi-
tionally independent of the treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
Control variables include calendar quarter of program entry, gender, 
age, years of educational attainment, race/ethnicity, disability status, 
veteran status (for males), local labor market, employment information 
based on wage record data over the two years prior to program entry 
(including employment transitions and earnings), industry of employ-
ment in the prior year, and program participation history up to four 
years prior to WIA entry (WIA; UI or ES). 
Although the conditional independence assumption cannot be 
tested directly, we apply a reasonable specification test that examines 
prior earnings. If subsequent earnings in the absence of the treatment 
would have been the same for treated and comparison groups condi-
tional on measured characteristics, we would expect prior earnings to 
be the same as well. Conversely, if differences in stable factors that 
influence earnings exist between the treatment and comparison group, 
we expect there to be differences in the conditional means. In practice, 
the test based on this comparison amounts to estimating the “effect” of 
program participation on prior earnings. If there is no significant effect, 
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this suggests that there are no stable factors influencing income that dif-
fer for the treated and control group. 
Where the specification test fails, individual fixed effects estimators 
provide an alternative approach to controlling for differences across 
individuals who participate in WIA.12 So long as such differences have 
stable effects on earnings, this specification can eliminate bias. Despite 
the benefits of the difference-in-difference estimators, depending on 
the processes underlying earnings dynamics and program participation, 
estimates may have biases that are not present in cross-sectional match-
ing. The difference-in-difference estimator needs to be understood as 
one of several estimates that make different assumptions. 
The estimator of program impact that we use here is many-to-
one caliper matching with replacement based on the propensity score. 
Matching is based on a constant radius expressed as the difference in 
the log-odds of the propensity score between treated and comparison 
cases. We report conditional standard errors based on methods rec-
ommended by Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) and Imbens (2008). The 
matching model specification was determined separately for each of the 
comparisons by gender within each of the 12 states. 
RESULTS OF IMPACT ESTIMATION FOR
ADULT PROGRAM 
We obtain estimates of WIA program impacts on average inflation-
adjusted earnings and employment in the 16 quarters following pro-
gram start. After obtaining state-specific impact estimates, the mean 
across states is estimated by weighting the estimate for a given state 
by the number of participants who were matched in that state. The 
resulting weighted mean provides an estimate of the average impact for 
matched WIA participants who entered the program during the period 
considered. Associated with each state impact estimate is an estimated 
conditional standard error, which is combined across states in the con-
ventional way to form the standard error for the weighted average. We 
focus on averages across participants in the 12 states to reduce sam-
pling error—which is substantial—and average across idiosyncratic 
state differences. 
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Figures 13.1 and 13.2 provide estimates of the impacts of the WIA
Adult program on earnings for women and men, respectively. The 
horizontal axis extends from 1 to 16, identifying the quarter following 
program entry. The vertical axis is in dollars, indicating the difference 
between average earnings in a quarter for the WIA Adult program par-
ticipants and matched comparison program participants. Also on the 
graph are dashed lines that show the confidence interval for each esti-
mate. The lower dashed line subtracts twice the conditional standard 
error from the estimate, and the upper dashed line adds twice the stan-
dard error.13 Also presented in this figure are the estimates of “impact”
on earnings 10 and 16 quarters prior to program entry, providing a spec-
ification test of the model. 
The estimates reported in the figures imply that, for both genders, 
participants generally earn between $400 and $600 more per quarter 
than matched individuals in the comparison program over our follow-up 
period. For women, the impact estimate over most of the 16 quarters is 
between $500 and $600 per quarter, whereas for men there is a decline 
Figure 13.1  Adult Program Treatment Effect on quarterly Earnings for
Females, WIA versus Comparison Group 
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Figure 13.2  Adult Program Treatment Effect on quarterly Earnings for
Males, WIA versus Comparison Group 
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in the first three quarters, with the level settling in the range of $400. In 
percentage terms, the program increases earnings by about 30 percent 
for women after the second quarter and by about 15 percent for men. 
We calculated analogous estimates for employment based on the 
same methods, using the proportion employed (identified as having 
received positive earnings in the quarter) as the dependent variable. 
The basic pattern of results was very similar to that for earnings. In 
particular, female participants’ employment rate impact estimate was 
13 percentage points in the first quarter after participation but declined 
to about 8 points within a year, and ultimately to about 6 points. Male 
impacts were one or two percentage points lower. The employment pro-
portion is about 0.55 in the absence of the program, so employment 
increases by up to 15 percent. 
As noted earlier, there are substantial differences in the proportion 
of individuals receiving training across the state programs, possibly 
contributing to differing patterns of effects for programs with different 
levels of training. First, long-run program impacts could be higher in 
states with more intensive services. Second, a large share of the value 
may well occur with a greater lag, since training benefits presumably 
  
 
 
 
  
A Nonexperimental Evaluation of WIA Programs  383 
accrue over a more extended period. We separately tabulated impact 
estimates for the seven states that provided training to more than half 
of their participants. In these states taken together, 68 percent of Adult 
program participants received training. The initial effects—during the 
first several quarters after program entry—in these seven states were 
very similar to the aggregate for all states. However, in contrast to the 
full sample, earnings were higher in subsequent quarters, providing 
at least weak evidence that high-training states produce benefits that 
endure longer. 
Taken at face value, these results imply that the program has strong 
and substantial impacts with little or no lag. These could reflect aggres-
sive actions by program staff to help workers obtain employment 
initially, with training assuring benefits that accrue over an extended 
period. Skeptics will argue, however, that the findings of such large 
initial impacts call into question the appropriateness of the compari-
son group and ultimately the validity of the results. With most training 
programs, participants are expected to obtain little benefit initially— 
possibly experiencing earnings reductions—as they engage in training 
activities that supplant employment that would otherwise occur. In these 
data, the mean time in the program is between two and three quarters, 
so we might expect that program participation would hinder partici-
pants’ employment and earnings in the first few quarters. 
In order for selection to cause these results, it must be the case 
that WIA participants have unmeasured attributes that make them 
more likely than those in the comparison program to obtain employ-
ment or higher earnings. Staff admission criteria or participant choice 
would need to select entrants who were appreciably more likely to 
obtain employment than other individuals with similar characteristics, 
employment, and program participation histories. 
One test for selection is provided by analyses that predict prior earn-
ings. Although controls are included for earnings in the eight quarters 
prior to entry, if there are stable factors that improve the employment 
prospects for treated cases relative to matched comparison cases, earlier 
earnings would be higher for the WIA cases. We calculate the differ-
ence in earnings between treated and comparison cases for measures 
applying to the 10th and 16th quarters prior to entry, presenting these 
estimates as inserts in the figures. These estimates show that earnings 
are not higher for WIA participants; in most cases, the differences are 
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small (see Figures 13.1 and 13.2). The largest differences are for male 
WIA participants 16 quarters earlier, for which it appears that WIA
participants had earnings about $100 below those of the comparison 
group. Although not quite statistically significant, the difference mea-
sures suggest a downward bias in program impact estimates; estimates 
from a difference-in-difference model would produce program impact 
estimates that were $100 greater. For males in the seven high-training 
states, earnings of program participants are $230 lower—again a dif-
ference that is not statistically significant. It is therefore clear that if 
selection is causing spurious positive impact estimates, selection is 
unlikely to be based on stable individual characteristics. 
One alternative explanation would be that there are transient dif-
ferences between WIA participants and others. The comparison group 
members receiving unemployment compensation may include a sub-
stantial portion of individuals who are not seeking employment. UI 
recipients classified as awaiting recall are not required to search for 
employment, and many others may have little interest in getting a 
job—despite formal requirements—until benefits are about to expire. 
According to this view, those obtaining UI benefits are in a phase where 
their short-term employment levels are expected to be depressed, 
reflecting the incentives created by UI benefits, which are contingent 
on remaining unemployed. WIA participants, in contrast, have chosen 
to select into a program with the purpose of improving their employ-
ment prospects. 
If the bias is due to benefits provided by UI, it might be expected 
that such differences would be less important for the other compari-
son group, those seeking ES services. Although most UI claimants are 
required to register for ES services, those awaiting recall are exempt 
from this requirement, so the ES sample removes one group whose 
interest in employment may be modest. Since any individual seeking 
support for employment search can obtain ES services, this sample 
includes self-motivated job searchers. 
We estimated Adult program impacts on earnings and employment 
for the three states where ES recipients form the comparison group. The 
most notable difference between these results and the full sample of 
states was that impacts in the first few quarters after entry were smaller, 
in the range of $200 for both men and women. There was a fairly steady 
growth in program impact up through the last quarters. These results 
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support the view that the large impacts on earnings and employment in 
the quarters immediately after WIA entry could be at least partly due to 
differences between WIA participants and the UI claimant comparison 
group rather than to the effects of program participation. Of the nine 
states for which UI claimants are the comparison group, initial program 
impact in only two of them is as small as for the three states where ES 
is the comparison group. 
We also undertook analyses that limited the treated group to those 
receiving UI benefits when they entered the WIA program. In these 
analyses, estimated effects were much smaller. Estimates were negative 
in the first 3–7 quarters after program entry, with quarterly estimates of 
impact after 10 quarters in the range of $200. Adult program partici-
pants who receive UI benefits at the point of entry account for less than 
10 percent of entries during the period of our study. Although this is an 
important group, impacts in this group need not be representative of 
others in the program. These results suggest that impacts for Adult WIA
participants receiving UI benefits are substantially smaller than for the 
full population of participants. In the discussion below of the Dislo-
cated Worker program, we present evidence suggesting that the average 
impact in that program may be smaller than for the Adult program. This 
supports the view that the benefits of WIA for those who lose a “good” 
job may be smaller than for workers with generally poor work histories. 
Impacts of Training 
The heart of WIA services is the basic and vocational skills training 
provided to individuals. Although a variety of training opportunities are 
widely available outside of WIA, for many WIA Adult participants, the 
alternatives available are more costly. It is clear that acceptance into 
WIA alters the type and extent of training these individuals ultimately 
obtain. 
Figures 13.3 and 13.4 present impact estimates of training based 
on analyses where the comparison group is Adult WIA participants not 
receiving training. Earnings impact estimates for females imply a $200 
decrement in the first quarter after program entry, as would be expected 
if time in training limited initial employment options. Earnings catch up 
three or four quarters later, with a positive increment over $800 by the 
end of 10 quarters, implying an earnings increment of about 30 percent. 
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Figure 13.3  Adult Program Treatment Effect on quarterly Earnings for
Females, WIA Training versus Comparison Group 
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Figure 13.4  Adult Program Treatment Effect on quarterly Earnings for
Males, WIA Training versus Comparison Group 
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In contrast, males who receive training appear to experience positive 
initial impacts—in the range of $200 immediately after entry—with the 
increment remaining in the $500–$600 range, 10–20 percent of earn-
ings for the next 10 quarters.14 
The pattern for employment impacts is very similar. For women, 
initial employment is about five percentage points lower for those 
receiving training, and only catches up 4 quarters after entry. By the 
10th quarter, the increment is in favor of training recipients by about 
5 percentage points. For men, the increment is close to zero for 6 or 
7 quarters after program entry, and the ultimate increment is slightly 
smaller than for women, in the range of three to four percentage points. 
The pattern of results does not vary substantially by whether states train 
a large share of their participants, nor are results substantially different 
for ES states. 
Differences in patterns for men and women may partly reflect the 
types of training they receive. A study of exits for program year 2005 
finds that, of males exiting from the WIA Adult program, 37 percent 
received on-the-job training, in contrast to 15 percent for females 
(Social Policy Research Associates 2007). Classroom training would be 
expected to reduce initial earnings and employment by more than on-
the-job training and possibly provide greater earnings with a delay. In 
our sample of Adult program participants who obtain training, women 
average more than three months longer than men between entry and 
exit, consistent with the view that women are obtaining more intensive 
training. 
A word of caution is in order in interpreting the impacts of training. 
One-third of women and nearly half of men receiving training were 
omitted from the analysis because it was not possible to match them 
with Adult program participants who did not receive training. There is 
no certainty that estimates of impact reported here apply for omitted 
individuals. 
Summary of WIA Adult Program Impacts 
Taken at face value, the results reported above imply large and 
immediate impacts on earnings and employment for individuals who 
participate in the WIA Adult program. Those who obtained training 
services have lower initial earnings, but they catch up to other WIA
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participants within ten quarters, ultimately registering large gains. 
Although there is evidence that estimates of effects in initial quarters 
following program entry may be biased, we do not believe a selection 
story can be constructed to explain away estimated effects for later 
quarters. In particular, growth in earnings for those receiving training 
would appear to reflect growth that has been widely observed in related 
programs.15 
RESULTS OF IMPACT ESTIMATION FOR
DISLOCATED WORKER PROGRAM 
Figures 13.5 and 13.6 graph estimated program impacts on quar-
terly earnings for participants in all 12 states in the Dislocated Worker 
program. Participant earnings in the quarter following entry are about 
$200 below the comparison group, but relative earnings show an 
increasing trend over the 16 quarters of follow-up analysis. In the fifth 
or sixth quarter after program entry, participant earnings are equal to 
those of the comparison group. Ultimately, earnings grow to exceed 
those of comparison group workers by up to $400 per quarter. Despite 
the similarity in basic pattern, male earnings peak at around 10 quarters, 
whereas female earnings appear to grow until the end of the four-year 
window. 
In separate analyses, we find that women’s employment is initially 
approximately two percentage points below the comparison group, 
catches up within about three quarters, and is ultimately nearly eight 
percentage points above the comparison group. In contrast, for men, 
there is no initial employment difference, although the growth over 
time is smaller, with the positive increment after three years peaking at 
about six percentage points. 
Dislocated Worker program participants are usually relatively high-
wage individuals who are faced with permanent job loss. The initial 
negative impact estimates imply that their earnings are below unem-
ployed workers with similar prior incomes and work histories. This is 
what would be expected if involvement in training activities precludes 
or reduces employment, inducing lock-in effects. Earnings growth 
observed over the three following years is consistent with the attain-
ment of skills with training. 
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Figure 13.5  Dislocated Worker Program Treatment Effect on quarterly 
Earnings for Females, WIA versus Comparison Group 
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Figure 13.6  Dislocated Worker Program Treatment Effect on quarterly 
Earnings for Males, WIA versus Comparison Group 
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Such an interpretation is based on the assumption that dislocated 
workers are similar in unmeasured ways to the comparison group. Our 
specification test, based on predicting prior earnings, suggests this is 
not the case. The inserts in Figures 13.5 and 13.6 show that there are 
substantial differences between the participant and comparison groups 
16 quarters earlier, with participant earnings more than $200 higher, 
and standard errors implying that these estimates are statistically signif-
icant. Prior employment levels are also several percentage points higher 
for program participants. That participants have higher prior earnings 
suggests the possibility that their higher earnings in later periods may 
not reflect program impact but rather unmeasured factors that become 
apparent in the three years after program entry. 
Some indication of the possible extent of the bias is provided by 
difference-in-difference estimates that subtract the prior quarter 16 
increment. These estimates are provided in Figures 13.5 and 13.6. As 
discussed above, this estimator provides a valid estimate of program 
impact if selection into the program is on the basis of stable charac-
teristics that are not captured by variables that have been controlled. 
The difference-in-difference estimates imply that participants’ earn-
ings catch up to those of nonparticipants with a longer delay and that 
the ultimate impact on earnings is more modest. For women, earnings 
exceed those of nonparticipants only after eight quarters, and the posi-
tive increment is never over $200. These estimates imply that earnings 
are increased by between 2 and 5 percent. For men, the crossover point 
is between 9 and 10 quarters, and the increment is generally less than 
$100, increasing earnings by less than 2 percent. 
Nearly a third of WIA Dislocated Worker participants in our sample 
were receiving UI benefits when they entered the program. Focusing 
on this subgroup—with both program participants and the comparison 
group limited to individuals receiving UI benefits in the nine states 
with the UI comparison group—allows us to control for possible incen-
tive effects of UI receipt. Given that the Dislocated Worker program 
is largely targeted at individuals who have lost jobs, this subsample is 
quite similar to others in the program. 
The results of this analysis show that the earnings of WIA partici-
pants receiving UI benefits do not catch up until 7 or 8 quarters after 
program entry. The initial negative effect is in the range of $700 for 
both men and women, and the maximum positive impact is also lower 
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than the simple estimates reported in Figures 13.5 and 13.6, at about 
$200 for each, implying an average earnings increment of only 2–4 
percent. As in the estimates reported above, the specification tests imply 
that program participants have higher prior earnings than matched com-
parison group members, so even these modest positive impacts may be 
spurious. 
Impacts of Training 
The incremental impact of training is based on a comparison of 
WIA Dislocated Worker participants who obtain training with those 
who do not. Initial earnings for those obtaining training are below those 
of other program participants for 8 quarters for women and for more 
than 10 quarters for men. Differences are $1,100 for females in quarters 
2–4, implying a reduction in earnings of about a third, and $800 for 
males or about 20 percent of earnings. After quarter 10, earnings of 
those receiving training catch up with others, but they do not overtake 
them. Although the initial negative impact estimate is easily statistically 
significant, the confidence interval is large relative to estimated impacts 
after quarter 10. Confidence intervals include both –$200 and $200. 
Of concern is the difference in earnings prior to entry into the pro-
gram. For females, the individuals who select into training have lower 
earnings relative to other WIA participants in the sixteenth quarter prior 
to participation, suggesting that estimates of effects could be down-
wardly biased. This difference is not, however, statistically significant, 
so evidence of selection is inconclusive. Estimates for states offering 
high proportions of training are not substantively different. The pattern 
is similar when employment is taken as the dependent variable. 
Taken at face value, point estimates suggest that WIA Dislocated 
Worker program participants who enter training experience large earn-
ings losses relative to others in their first two years after program entry. 
Although consistent with a large training lock-in effect, these effects 
could be at least partly due to selection on short-term employment pros-
pects, with those who land jobs leaving the program without obtaining 
training. Estimates of effects on earnings and employment three to four 
years after program entry—more than 18 months after program exit for 
most participants—show little evidence that training produces substan-
tial benefits. These negative conclusions must be tempered, however, 
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by the recognition that sampling error alone could obscure substantial 
impacts. It should also be noted that 28 percent of women receiving 
training were omitted from the analysis because no matching compari-
son case could be found; the analogous figure for men is 38 percent. 
Hence, the results may not be representative of the full population of 
those receiving training. 
Summary of WIA Dislocated Worker Program Impacts 
Dislocated workers are likely to face serious difficulties in obtain-
ing reemployment, and the kinds of services WIA offers may require 
time to produce impacts. The pattern of results is consistent with these 
expectations. However, the extent of any benefits that accrue from 
participation is particularly hard to judge. Some specification tests 
suggest that our base results may be biased toward finding positive 
program impacts. Difference-in-difference estimates are smaller than 
the primary reported estimates. These estimates imply that program 
participants’ earnings do not reach the level of earnings of comparable 
nonparticipants until more than two years after participation. Perhaps 
more important, the growth in earnings, relative to nonparticipants, 
slows at that point. As a result, these estimates imply that the gains from 
participation are very modest, even three to four years after entry. 
Where employment is taken as the outcome of interest, estimates 
of program impact are more supportive of the program. Although the 
specification tests again suggest that there are unmeasured differences 
between the treated and matched comparison group, the difference-in-
difference estimates of the program suggest at least a moderate positive 
impact.16 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The estimates of WIA program impact presented here are based 
on administrative data from 12 states, covering approximately 160,000 
WIA participants and nearly 3 million comparison group members. Our 
focus on estimates that represent the average program impact across 
all states reduces sampling error substantially and averages across 
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state-specific idiosyncratic variation. Table 13.1 presents information 
summarizing the implications of our findings. For each WIA program, 
we present annual earnings gains and the quarterly employment incre-
ment based on quarters 11–16. By focusing on these quarters, this 
measure captures the expected long-term benefits of training. If this 
measure is substantial, and the increment in earnings continues for even 
a few years, we argue below that the program will easily satisfy a benefit- 
cost standard. 
Our best approximation of the WIA Adult program’s impact is 
based on the estimates underlying Figures 13.1 and 13.2. We see that 
the average increment in annual earnings for women is nearly $2,400 
per year, or 26 percent of average earnings for these women, and the 
increment for men is about $1,700, or 15 percent of average earnings. 
In a given quarter, program participation increases employment for 
women by about seven percentage points, and for men by about six per-
centage points. Since levels of employment are at base levels of 50–60 
percent, this amounts to more than a 10 percent increase. 
In the case of the Dislocated Worker program, we do not believe that 
the simple estimates are valid indicators of program impact because our 
specification tests suggest that participants are advantaged relative to 
the comparison group. In the face of this difference, Table 13.1 presents 
estimates based on a difference-in-difference structure. Increments in 
Table 13.1  Summary Estimates of Program Impacts, Quarters 11–16 
Annualized earnings Employment 
Program impact $ % Increment % 
Adult program 
Females 2,363* 26 0.067* 12 
Males 1,676* 15 0.062* 12 
Dislocated Worker program 
(difference-in-difference estimate) 
Females 523 3 0.051* 8 
Males 138 1 0.041* 7 
NOTE: *statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Annualized earnings impact estimates 
are based on quarters 11–16, with quarterly averages multiplied by 4. Employment 
refers to nonzero earnings in the quarter, with estimates averaged over quarters 11–16. 
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annual earnings are much smaller than for the Adult program, just over 
$500 for women, and less than $150 for men. Given that average earn-
ings are appreciably higher for this group, these gains amount to less 
than 3 percent of earnings. Difference-in-difference estimates for the 
impact on employment imply four-to-five percentage point increments 
or about a 7–8 percent increase in employment proportions. 
Do the net benefits we find satisfy a benefit-cost test? The costs 
associated with WIA participation are not available, nor are there accu-
rate average costs for those entering the programs over a particular 
period, either for states or for the nation as a whole. However, it is pos-
sible to get some ballpark cost estimates. Published figures suggest that 
per capita direct costs of the Adult program (including ITA costs) aggre-
gated for our 12 states are in the range of $2,400–$2,700 and Dislocated 
Worker costs are in the range $2,800–$3,200.17 Because WIA provides 
some services that would be obtained elsewhere, it reduces expenses— 
either by the participant or others—that would otherwise be incurred, 
which tends to make social costs smaller than actual incurred costs. In 
their benefit-cost analyses of the JTPA program, Orr et al. (1996, pp. 
97, 189, 269) estimate that such substitution is of importance, so social 
costs are less than half as large as the costs incurred due to the program. 
Some social costs, however, are omitted from our direct cost measures. 
When individuals receive certain WIA services, they may draw on other 
subsidies, such as when participants receive training at publicly sub-
sidized community colleges. Orr et al. include such subsidies in the 
costs they use in their analysis, whereas the costs we cite above do not. 
Hence, our cost measures are subject to biases in both directions, and 
it would not be surprising if actual social costs differed by 30 or 40 
percent. 
Even given this uncertainty, the Adult program clearly satisfies a 
benefit-cost standard for both men and women if the earnings impacts 
continue for a period of just two or three years, which seems plausible. 
In contrast, using our best estimate of the impact on earnings for the 
Dislocated Worker program, in order for benefits for women to exceed 
costs, the improvement would need to be long lived, and estimated 
benefits for men could never cumulate to exceed costs at any reason-
able interest rate. Estimates of employment impacts are, however, more 
supportive of the Dislocated Worker program. Judging the program in 
terms of its effects on the least successful workers, these are most likely 
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to be individuals unable to obtain employment. If the program succeeds 
in increasing the number of individuals with jobs, it may be argued that 
those in need are clearly the gainers. Such a view may justify a program 
that fails a benefit-cost standard. 
There are important policy implications of these results that go 
beyond a simple judgment of whether the program is effective. Program 
administrators typically look at the cross-sectional or “point-in-time” 
information that is available to them from performance management 
systems on a regular basis. They do not have at hand the data analy-
sis tools to examine individual employment and earnings histories and 
trajectories for more than eight years (33 quarters that include up to 16 
quarters of follow-up data) for both program participants and a com-
parison group, as in this study. The results of this evaluation show that 
program impacts typically “mature” over time, sometimes increasing in 
magnitude and sometimes diminishing. Insofar as this work underscores 
the fact that long-term impacts are of significance and that outcomes of 
interest may not be apparent for years, this may help to refocus training 
activities in beneficial directions. 
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Table 13A.1  Summary Statistics for WIA Participants and Comparison Group in 12 States 
WIA Adult WIA Dislocated Worker 
Comparison 
Overall No training Training Overall No training Training group 
Sample size 
Unique individuals 95,580 68,255 27,325 63,515 43,513 20,002 2,929,496 
WIA entries, or quarters 97,552 69,712 27,840 64,089 43,894 20,195 6,161,510 
of comparison program 
participation 
Demographic Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Male 0.420 0.445 0.356 0.482 0.494 0.456 0.585 
Black 0.445 0.512 0.277 0.330 0.391 0.198 0.171 
Hispanic 0.031 0.014 0.072 0.022 0.013 0.043 0.064 
Age 32.70 32.91 32.16 40.24 40.14 40.46 39.59 
Years of education 12.27 12.21 12.43 12.55 12.52 12.63 12.42 
Employment 
Employment-employment 0.297 0.294 0.307 0.462 0.465 0.456 0.476 
Employment-not employed 0.208 0.195 0.241 0.281 0.256 0.335 0.279 
Not employed-employed 0.325 0.336 0.297 0.183 0.199 0.149 0.225 
Not employed-not employed 0.168 0.175 0.151 0.070 0.078 0.053 0.040 
Earnings second year prior 8,507 8,203 9,306 19,402 17,782 23,487 20,156 
Earnings in prior year 8,149 8,050 8,398 20,499 19,450 22,779 21,584 
Earnings following year 9,426 9,128 10,171 11,527 11,840 10,845 15,649 
Earnings second year after 10,846 9,916 13,175 14,572 14,213 15,352 17,102 
399
 
Program experience 
WIA in prior two years 0.052 0.058 0.035 0.041 0.044 0.034 0.020 
Comparison program participa- 0.211 0.178 0.297 0.409 0.353 0.551 0.668 
tion in prior two years 
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(Wisconsin), and the Missouri Economic Conference, and in particular for comments 
by Jeffrey Smith, Burt Barnow, Marco Caliendo, Paul Decker, Andrew Leigh, Sheena 
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1. Recovery Act funding may only be used for authorized WIA and Wagner-Peyser 
Act activities and cannot be used to replace state or local funding currently dedi-
cated to workforce development and summer jobs. 
2. Source: http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/agency/reporting/agency_reporting3 
.aspx?agency_code=16&dt=02/12/2010 (accessed February 22, 2010). 
3. Social Policy Research Associates (2004) and Rockefeller Institute of Govern-
ment (2004) undertook process evaluations based on the first three years that the 
program was implemented but undertook no systematic study of participant out-
comes (Barnow and King [2004] provide a summary of the Rockefeller study). 
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) examined outcomes in seven states for WIA participants 
who had completed the program during the period July 2000–June 2002, the first 
two years of implementation in most states. Given that over a third of participants 
require more than a year to complete the program, this sample would have been 
severely censored. 
4. Eligibility criteria can be found at http://www.doleta.gov/programs/general_info 
.cfm (accessed August 2009). 
5. For a discussion of actual implementation, see the Social Policy Research Associ-
ates study of WIA implementation (2004, sections VI and VII), and the Rockefeller 
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Institute of Government (2004; Barnow and King 2004). This section draws pri-
marily from these reports. 
6. These figures are based on participants exiting the program April 2004–March 
2005 (Social Policy Research Associates 2006). 
7. The primary contractor on the project was IMPAQ International, LLC, whose staff 
contacted all states and entered into agreements with nine of them. Three states 
provided data through the Administrative Data Research and Evaluation Project 
under separate contracts with the Department of Labor. 
8. Further details on the methods of analysis can be found in Heinrich et al. (2010), 
which provides a full report of the results of this study. Additional information is 
available in Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008). 
9. Movements into and out of the labor force and between employment and unem-
ployment in the 18 months prior to program participation are strongly associated 
with both program participation and expected labor market outcomes (Heckman, 
LaLonde, and Smith 1999; Heckman and Smith 1999). 
10. Where an individual entered the program more than once during a quarter, this was 
coded as a single entry. 
11. Comparison group individuals may contribute more than one unit as potential 
matches if they had contact with the program in multiple quarters. 
12. Smith and Todd (2005) spell out the basic approach, which they describe as
“difference-in-difference” matching. See also Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky 
(2007). 
13. These correspond to the 95.5 percent confidence interval. 
14. The very high estimates in quarters 15 and 16 should be discounted given the large 
standard errors. 
15. In addition to the analyses presented above, we estimated impacts separately for 
various subgroups, focusing on those that are overrepresented among WIA partici-
pants or who face special challenges or barriers to working in the labor market, 
to wit, nonwhites, Hispanics, those under 26 years of age, those 50 or older, and 
veterans (males only). For the most part, estimated effects for these subgroups 
were similar to those for all WIA participants; there is no evidence of substantial 
differences in impact between these subgroups. Sampling error for many of these 
groups is large, however, implying modest statistical power of tests for subgroup 
differences. 
16. In addition to analyses based on the full population of Dislocated Worker program 
participants, we estimated impacts separately for nonwhites, Hispanics, individu-
als under 26 years of age, those 50 or older, and male veterans. We found no 
evidence of important differences in program impacts for any of these subgroups. 
As in the case of subgroup analysis for the Adult program, sampling error is sub-
stantial, and there may be differences that are not statistically discernable. 
17. These figures are based on taking total expenditures in the indicated programs for 
July 2003–June 2005 as detailed in USDOL/ETA (2009) divided by the number of 
reported exits during this period, or divided by the number of entries identified in 
our data. In the steady state, either of these correctly captures cost per participant. 
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Job training for transitional workers and disadvantaged individuals 
is of keen interest for governments across the globe. Advancements in 
technology and globalized trade make some jobs obsolete or move them 
to lesser developed countries. Such structural transitions mean a sizable 
number of workers can lose their jobs. Also, inevitable business down-
turns lead to cyclical unemployment, which disproportionately affects 
disadvantaged workers with low human capital. In light of structural 
and cyclical changes in the labor markets, governments in industrial-
ized nations have tried to support disadvantaged adults by retraining 
them. In the United States, training or retraining programs oftentimes 
have been accompanied by evaluations. This chapter briefly discusses 
what we have learned from these evaluations and then focuses on the 
related evaluation methods literature that informs how we can best de-
sign such evaluations in the future. 
In the United States, there have been several major shifts in the 
goals, organization, groups targeted, and funding of employment and 
training programs. After the employment programs of the Great De-
pression, MDTA (1962–1972) was followed by CETA (1973–1982), 
JTPA (1982–1998), and eventually WIA (1998–present). CETA trans-
formed a number of population-specific job training programs into 
block grants, which were then given to the states. This marked the first 
step in a devolutionary process that saw increased responsibility for job 
training delegated to states and localities. JTPA further devolved re-
sponsibility to the states. Later, WIA consolidated a number of USDOL
job training programs and created One-Stop centers for job seekers ne-
gotiating their way through an otherwise bewildering system of federal 
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job training programs. WIA includes all adults aged 18 and older, as 
well as dislocated workers and disadvantaged youth aged 14–21. 
The early evaluations of MDTA were nonexperimental (Perry et 
al. 1975) and largely rudimentary (Barnow and Smith 2009). Similarly, 
the CETA evaluations were nonexperimental. These evaluations all 
relied on the CETA Longitudinal Manpower Survey, which combined 
random samples of CETA participants with comparison group data con-
structed from the Current Population Survey. Barnow’s 1987 review 
of the CETA evaluations concludes that they relied on crude matching 
estimators, and lacked local labor market data and recent labor market 
and program participation histories. Even more sophisticated matching 
procedures have failed to consistently replicate experimental findings 
(Barnow and Smith 2009; Pirog et al. 2009), and the absence of data on 
local labor markets, work, and program participation choices has been 
important in arriving at unbiased treatment effects (Card and Sullivan 
1988; Dolton et al. 2006; Heckman and Vytlacil 2007). 
The widely varying findings from the CETA evaluations led to the 
USDOL decision to evaluate JTPA as a randomized experiment. Doo-
little and Traeger (1990) describe the experiment which took place in 
16 of over 600 local JTPA sites, while Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et 
al. (1996) describe the experimental impact results. A variety of authors 
have synthesized numerous evaluations of employment and training 
programs (Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins 1997; Greenberg, Mi-
chalopoulos, and Robins 2003; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; 
LaLonde 1995). Overall, these authors report somewhat disappointing 
results. Impacts for adults are modest, with more positive effects reported
for women than men and negligible impacts for out-of-school youth 
(Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins 2003). The limited effective-
ness of job training programs is hardly surprising when we consider 
participants’ overwhelmingly low human capital levels and relatively 
small amount of job training investment. 
Within the related literature on program evaluation methodologies, 
there has been a hot debate over the accuracy of these largely non-
experimental findings. Researchers interested in government programs 
across the board have been investigating whether and under what cir-
cumstances carefully executed nonexperimental methods can provide 
robust estimates of treatment effectiveness. In fact, the experimen-
tal JTPA study provided data for a variety of studies that constructed 
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nonrandomized comparison groups and used various econometric cor-
rections for self-selection bias to determine how effectively they work 
compared to the experimental results. 
The approach of using experimental data to provide a benchmark 
against nonexperimental findings was used initially by LaLonde (1986) 
and Fraker and Maynard (1987). Both of these studies relied on data 
from the National Supported Work Demonstration. Other related stud-
ies of this type included Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), Diaz and 
Handa (2006), Friedlander and Robins (1995), Heckman et al. (1996, 
1998), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997), Smith and Todd (2005), and Wilde and Hollister (2007). 
LaLonde’s 1986 study was particularly influential. He demon-
strated that many self-selection correction procedures do not replicate 
estimated treatment effects in randomized experiments. In fact, non-
experimental methods were not robust to model specification changes 
in his study of the National Supported Work Demonstration, and the 
effectiveness of the program or estimated treatment effects were radi-
cally different from those determined experimentally. Later, Heckman, 
LaLonde, and Smith (1999) rebutted the LaLonde (1986) study in 
defense of nonexperimental methods, noting that each estimator is as-
sociated with testable assumptions and that by systematically testing 
them, the range of results resembles those originating from experimen-
tal methods. 
The next section of this chapter provides a brief description of the 
types of parameters we may want to estimate in evaluating employment 
and training programs. After that we discuss conventional selection bias 
in studies of employment and training programs, followed by a discus-
sion of pure selection bias and the robustness of different estimators 
that attempt to correct for self-section bias. The final section discusses 
what we have learned from previous studies. 
FITTING THE METHODOLOGY TO THE POLICY qUESTION
When evaluating the impacts of any program, researchers should 
ask two questions. First, what policy question do we need to answer? 
Second, what research designs and econometric methods are best suited 
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to answer the question? In employment and training programs, income 
(Y ) is a typical outcome variable, although researchers have looked at a 
myriad of other possible outcomes, such as weeks worked, labor force 
attachment, and reliance on government cash assistance programs or 
poverty. Regardless of the outcome variable chosen (and for the pur-
poses of this discussion, we focus on income), we need to establish a 
counterfactual. For example, we want to know the incomes of individu-
als given that they participated in a training program (Y
1
) in order to 
compare it to the income of the same individuals without the benefit 
of the program (Y
0
). In theory, a person can occupy either of these two 
potential states (treated or untreated), but in reality only one state is 
realized for a given individual. If people could occupy both states at the 
same time, then the problem of program evaluation would be easy and 
the treatment effect could be depicted as ∆ = Y1 − Y0 . Four commonly 
discussed variants of treatment effects estimates are shown in Figure 14.1. 
In practice, most randomized social experiments are designed to 
obtain intent to treat (ITT) estimates (Panel A of Figure 14.1). Eligible 
participants, frequently identified through administrative data, or those 
who have applied for services are randomly assigned to the treatment 
after which they comply with program requirements to some extent: 
some complete, others drop out, while still others are no-shows. When 
all individuals randomly assigned to treatment are compared to the 
randomized control group, the ITT estimates can be interpreted as the 
average impact over a sample of applicants, some of whom comply to 
some degree with the program. However, program administrators and 
supporters have often raised concerns with ITT estimates, arguing that 
they unfairly bias downward positive treatment effects by including 
the no-shows and even dropouts in the treatment group. After all, no-
shows and dropouts either received no program services or only partial
services. As such, no-shows and dropouts should not be expected to 
benefit either at all or fully from the program. 
Largely in response to these concerns, experimenters created the 
treatment on the treated (TT) estimates. Individuals who started but 
dropped out at some point are typically, but not always, included with 
completers in these estimates. Viewed from this perspective, TT esti-
mates are derivatives of ITT estimates—mechanical approximations 
with known properties and assumptions. 
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Figure 14.1  Variants of Treatment Effects 
A. Intent to treat (ITT) B. Treatment on treated (TT) 
Applicants 
Drop-
outs
No-
shows 
Participants 
Eligible 
Applicants 
Participants 
Eligible 
C. Average treatment effect (ATE) D. Local average treatment effect (LATE) 
Participants 
Eligible 
Ne
w participants 
Old 
participants 
Eligible 
While most experimentors focus on ITT or TT estimation, it would 
be relatively straightforward to design a randomized experiment to 
estimate the impacts of program expansions (the local average treat-
ment effect [LATE]). However, it is likely to be difficult to obtain good 
average treatment effects (ATE) estimates because randomly assigned 
individuals from an eligible population may well fail to comply with the 
treatment protocols. Moreover, unless treatment is mandated by court 
order or another mechanism, the usefulness of such estimates is rather 
limited. Each of these four types of estimators is discussed below. 
ITT. This estimator is depicted in panel A of Figure 14.1. In this 
case, 
ITT= E(Y1 | D = 1, R = 1) − E(Y0 | D = 1, R = 0) , 
including the no-shows and dropouts in the treatment group, where D = 
1 if eligible individuals apply to the program and D = 0 if they do not, 
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and R = 1 for the treatment group members and R = 0 for the controls. 
Under many circumstances this is an interesting and policy-relevant 
parameter that reflects how the availability of a program affects partici-
pant outcomes when participation in the program is incomplete. 
TT. When we want to estimate the effect of a treatment like a job 
training program on actual participants, the parameter of interest is the 
effect of TT, depicted as follows: 
TT = E(∆ | D = 1, X ) = E(Y1 − Y0 | D = 1, X ) , 
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, D = 1 if an individual 
participates in the program, and D = 0 if they do not. 
In our example, TT could compare the earnings of vocational pro-
gram participants with what they would earn if they did not participate 
in the program. This is the information required for an “all or nothing” 
evaluation of a program and provides policymakers with information 
on whether or not the program generates positive outcomes. In panel B 
of Figure 14.1, the TT is depicted as the effect of treatment on partici-
pants. Social experiments randomly assigning eligible applicants to the 
treatment and control groups are generally considered the gold standard 
for obtaining ITT and TT estimates.1 
ATE. This is the average impact that results from randomly assign-
ing a person from the eligible population to a treatment. In panel C of 
Figure 14.1, the shaded rectangle constitutes the entire population for 
which the treatment effect is being estimated, regardless of whether or 
not they chose to participate in the program. The ATE is shown math-
ematically as 
ATE = E(∆ | X ) = E(Y1 − Y0 | X ) . 
Neither component of this mean has a sample analogue unless there 
is universal participation or nonparticipation in the program, or if par-
ticipation is randomly determined and there is full compliance with 
the random assignment. As such, the ATE can be difficult, sometimes 
impossible, to compute. More importantly, however, this estimator is 
typically uninteresting to policymakers, who are typically loath to force 
randomly selected individuals to participate in programs. 
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LATE. This is the effect of treatment on persons who were induced 
to participate by an expansion or increased generosity of a program 
(see panel D of Figure 14.1). For example, LATE could measure the 
effect of a change in a policy (Z) of providing a new stipend or a more 
generous stipend to vocational program participants on those induced 
to attend the program because of the new policy. LATE is shown as 
follows: 
LATE = E(Y − Y | D(z) = 1, D(z' ) = 0) = E(Y   | D(z) − D(z' ) = 1)1 0 1 0o 
where D(z) is the conditional random variable D, given Z = z, and where 
z' is distinct from z, so z ≠ z' . Two assumptions are required to identify 
LATE. First, Z does not directly affect the outcome and program partici-
pation is correlated with Z controlling for other factors. This is a typical 
assumption for IV estimation. Second, there must be compliance with 
the policy change such that there are no individuals who refuse to par-
ticipate if eligible and want to participate if not.2 
Because it is defined by variation in an instrumental variable that is 
external to the outcome equation, different instruments define different 
parameters. When the instruments are indicator variables that denote 
different policy regimes, LATE has a natural interpretation as the re-
sponse to policy changes for those who change participation status in 
response to the new policy. For any given instrument, LATE is defined 
on an unidentified hypothetical population—persons who would cer-
tainly change from 0 to 1 if Z is changed. For different values of Z and 
for different instruments, the LATE parameter changes, and the popula-
tion for which it is defined changes. In other words, when we estimate 
the LATE parameter, we need to make sure who is possibly affected by 
the policy change from z' to z and how to interpret the estimated value 
in terms of relevant policy changes. 
Most randomized experiments focus on estimating the ITT or TT
in order to answer the policy question of how a program changes the 
outcomes of eligibles or eligible applicants and actual program partici-
pants compared to what they would have experienced if they had not 
participated. The ATE estimator is infrequently used largely because 
most researchers and policymakers are reluctant to force program par-
ticipation. Finally, when programs became more generous or eligibility 
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is expanded, the LATE estimator can be used to obtain the incremental 
effect of the policy change. 
While random assignment studies are considered the gold stan-
dard for obtaining program impact estimates, the reality is that the vast 
majority of published evaluations are nonexperimental, with perhaps 
the exception of the randomized clinical trials in the medical literature 
(Pirog 2007). Thus, it is imperative to understand the issues relating to 
selection bias and the construction of a reasonable counterfactual. It 
is also important to follow closely the emerging literature on the non-
experimental designs, estimators and statistical approaches that give 
rise to estimates of treatment effects that better approximate those that 
would be found using random assignment studies. These issues are dis-
cussed in the next three sections of this chapter. 
CONVENTIONAL SELECTION BIAS AND LESSONS FOR
PROGRAM DESIGNS AND DATA COLLECTION
Before addressing which econometric methods are relevant to an-
swer the policy question, we want to discuss the selection bias that 
occurs when participation in job training programs is not randomized. 
Randomization should result in statistically equivalent groups of treat-
ment and control group members in terms of both their observed and
unobserved characteristics. This is not the case with nonexperimental 
studies, which often rely on propensity score matching, instrumental 
variable approaches, difference-in-difference techniques, and other sta-
tistical corrections to attempt to create a reasonable counterfactual or 
comparison group. 
Early in the still ongoing debate on the relative merits of experi-
mental versus nonexperimental evaluation, LaLonde (1986) pointed 
out that the use of nonrandomized comparison groups in evaluations 
can lead to substantial selection bias. Heckman et al. (1996, 1998) 
countered that LaLonde reached his conclusions incorrectly by con-
structing his comparison groups from noncomparable data sources. 
LaLonde’s comparison groups were located in different labor markets 
from program participants, and their earnings were measured using 
different questionnaires. Heckman also noted that LaLonde lacked 
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information on recent preprogram labor market outcomes, which are 
important predictors of participation in training. In sum, Heckman et 
al. (1998) concluded that simple parametric econometric models ap-
plied to bad data should not be expected to eliminate selection bias. In 
1997, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) showed how the bias found 
in estimates of treatment effectiveness can be decomposed into three 
sources. This analysis is still relevant for labor market researchers today 
who wish to construct a counterfactual or comparison group without the 
benefit of randomization. 
The first source of bias that can occur when using a nonrandom-
ized comparison group relates to differences in the values of the same 
observed characteristics in the treatment and comparison groups. This 
would occur, for example, if the treatment group included individuals 
aged 20–60 and the comparison group only included individuals aged 
30–40. 
When we have many observed characteristics, X’s, they can be 
represented as P(X), the propensity score, which is the probability of 
participation in a program based on a vector of observed individual 
characteristics. The second source of bias occurs when propensity 
scores obtained by matching on observable characteristics have differ-
ent distributions over the same range. 
The top panel of Figure 14.2 depicts a situation where both sources
of bias are serious. In the top panel, the treatment and comparison 
groups have a modest overlap in their propensity scores, P(X). In fact, 
no comparison group members are in the left tail of the distribution for 
the treatment group, and conversely, no treatment group members are 
in the right tail of the distribution for the comparison group. This dif-
ference reflects the first source of bias. In the top panel, you can also 
see that the distributions of propensity scores over the same range are 
different. This reflects the second source of bias. Both sources of bias 
are mitigated in the bottom panel of Figure 14.2. 
The third source of bias in estimated treatment effects is from the 
pure self-selection on unobservables such as motivation. This would 
exist, for example, if the treatment group members of a job training pro-
gram were highly motivated in contrast to comparison group members 
who lacked drive or motivation. This is the bias caused by the indi-
viduals’ self-selection behavior based on information that researchers 
cannot observe and details of which are discussed later in the chapter. 
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Figure 14.2  Two Conventional Sources of Bias 
Treatment group Comparison group 
P(X ) 
Treatment group Comparison group 
P(X )
Propensity score matching can moderate bias from the first two 
sources of bias. Reweighting comparison group members so that the 
distribution of the comparison group’s P(X) more closely resembles 
that of the treatment group can further reduce bias from the second 
source. Because much of the bias attributed to selection by LaLonde 
(1986) was actually due to the first two sources described above, Heck-
man, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) continue to make arguments in favor 
of nonexperimental evaluations. 
CONSTRUCTING A COUNTERFACTUAL 
The characteristics of different types of comparison groups, includ-
ing the randomized control group, are described below. The conclusion 
that the quality of data used to form a comparison group and the match-
ing procedures utilized are keys to reducing the conventional bias is 
based on Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), who used data from 
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a randomized control group, the no-shows from the treatment group, 
the eligible but nonparticipating group, and the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) in order to analyze the quality of the com-
parisons achieved. 
Randomized Control Group as an Ideal Comparison Group 
After applying to a program and being deemed eligible, individuals 
are randomly assigned to a control group. Data from the control and 
treatment groups should have nearly the same distribution of observed 
and unobserved characteristics. Because eligible applicants from the 
same local labor markets are randomly assigned to the treatment and 
control groups, and the same survey instruments were used with both 
groups, all three sources of bias should be controlled. 
No-Shows from the Treatment Group as a Comparison Group 
No-shows include individuals who are accepted to the program and 
randomized into the treatment group but who do not participate in the 
program. The simple mean difference between the treatment group and 
the no-show group without matching demonstrates that no-shows have 
similar characteristics as well as overlapping distributions of P(X). The 
main source of bias is from selection on unobservables. 
The Eligible but Nonparticipants (ENPs) as a Comparison Group 
Individuals in the eligible but nonparticipating group are those who 
are located in the same labor market, and are eligible for the program 
but do not apply for the program. These individuals’ information is col-
lected by using the same questionnaire as for the treatment group. There 
were some clear differences in the characteristics and distribution of 
P(X) between the ENPs and the treatment group members. By using 
propensity score matching and reweighting observations, it is possible 
to reduce the first two sources of bias as well as rigorously defined 
self-selection bias. While improvements in the estimated treatment ef-
fectiveness were obtained, the estimated treatment effect was still not 
equivalent to the TT estimate.  
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A Comparison Group from SIPP or Other Data Sources 
To construct a comparison group, it is also possible to apply the 
eligibility criteria for a program to survey respondents in the SIPP or 
other large surveys. Two problems arise from using this approach. First, 
local labor market conditions are likely to be different for comparison 
and treatment group members when the comparison group members 
are selected from preexisting survey data. Second, data collected from 
the treatment and comparison groups are likely to come from different 
surveys or sources of measurement. In models comparing the treatment 
group with the SIPP comparison group, there was some discrepancy in 
observed characteristics and P(X). They found that the first and second 
sources of bias were close to those found when using the ENPs for a 
comparison group. The discrepancies in the local labor markets and the 
questionnaires contributed to bias stemming from selection on unob-
servables; the third component of the selection bias is larger than that 
when they use ENPs. 
Discussion 
When we design training programs and collect information on 
participants to evaluate program effectiveness using nonexperimental 
methods, we need to consider how to develop comparison groups. Sev-
eral factors are critical in reducing bias in our estimates of treatment 
effects: use the same questionnaire or data sources to obtain individual 
labor market outcomes and demographic information, draw individu-
als for the treatment and comparison groups from the same local labor 
markets, and use comparison group members whose observed charac-
teristics largely overlap with those of the participants. 
Restricting analyses to treatment and comparison group members 
with similar characteristics and using propensity score matching can 
reduce the first and second components of conventional bias, even 
though the characteristics of the parameter that we want to estimate 
can change. However, propensity score matching has its own limita-
tions: it cannot control for self-selection on unobservables. Its uses and 
limitations are discussed with related empirical studies surveyed by 
Pirog et al. (2009). This study points out that matching is a nonpara-
metric method that is flexible to any functional relationships between 
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outcomes and programs. However, it needs a large sample size and is 
sensitive to various matching methods. There is no clear guidance for 
superior matching procedures. 
SourceS of Pure Self-Selection BiaS
and emPirical methodS
different Sources of Pure Self-Selection Bias 
There are three reasons why individuals might self-select into an 
employment and training program: 
1) they know they will earn higher incomes after participating in 
the program (heterogeneous response to the program in a ran-
dom coefficient model); 
2) individuals select into the program because their latent or for-
gone earnings are low at the time of program entrance (time 
constant individual heterogeneity in a fixed effect model); and 
3) individuals’ earnings are dependent on previous earnings that 
are low at the time of program entrance (autocorrelation be-
tween earnings in different time periods). 
The first source of self-selection implies that individuals with higher
returns from the program are more likely to participate in training 
programs. The second source of self-selection behavior implies that in-
dividuals with low opportunity costs or low earnings capacity are likely 
to participate in training programs. The third source of self-selection 
behavior implies that the low earnings capacity that encourages pro-
gram participation at the time of participation is positively associated 
with earnings after program. Thus, the first source of self-selection re-
sults in overestimates of the effectiveness of employment and training 
programs while the second and third sources of self-selection result 
in underestimates. In the employment and training literature, it is un-
derstood that all three sources of bias contribute to the phenomenon 
known as “Ashenfelter’s dip”; the fact that participants in employment 
and training programs often have earnings that are temporarily low at 
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the time of program entry but that their earnings usually rebound (even 
in the absence of program participation) (Ashenfelter 1978). 
Different empirical techniques appear to work better or worse 
depending on which sources of bias are operating. Theoretically, we ex-
pect that cross-sectional estimators provide consistent estimates only if 
there is no bias. Difference-in-differences estimators provide consistent 
estimates only if self-selection bias is coming from bias source 2. The 
AR (1) (autoregressive of order one) regression models provide consis-
tent estimates only when self-selection bias is coming from bias source 
3. The use of the instrumental variables method and the Heckman-
selection correction provides consistent estimates only if bias sources 2 
and 3 are present.3 Thus, understanding which sources of bias we have 
in the program is critical in choosing which empirical method to use to 
best answer the policy question. 
In simulations, cross-sectional estimation, difference-in-differences,
and AR (1) regression estimation work relatively well when all three 
sources of bias are present, but it appears that they work well because 
the different biases offset one another (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 
1999). Also, when bias source 1 is present, the estimation methods 
working for TT do not work for ATE. The authors argue that these pa-
rameters differ greatly because there is strong selection into the program 
by persons with high values of individual specific returns. However, 
they are not clear about how bias sources 1, 2, and 3 interact when dif-
ferent nonexperimental methods estimate ATE and TT. It seems that 
when all three bias sources are present, those three biases might offset 
one another. Difference-in-differences and AR (1) regression models 
also provide a similarly low bias in estimation. Finally, instrumental 
variables and the Heckman self-selection correction work best when 
bias sources 2 and 3 are present without bias source 1. However, when 
bias source 1 is present, IV and Heckman correction are the worst meth-
ods to use. 
In sum, difference-in-differences and AR (1) regression estima-
tors seem robust enough over different bias sources to estimate the TT. 
However, this does not mean that they are superior nonexperimental 
methods to others. In addition, it is not clear how offsetting of different 
bias sources works over different data and programs. Further research 
is needed. 
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NEW NONExPERIMENTAL METHODS 
Since the Heckman/LaLonde debate, a number of econometric 
methods have become more popular, and they relate directly to the 
issues of how best to estimate treatment effects for employment and 
training programs in the absence of random assignment. These ad-
ditional methods include the difference-in-differences extension on 
matching, regression discontinuity design, and the marginal treatment 
effect (MTE) using local instrumental variables. Table 14.1 presents our 
summary of these methods as well as those for “kitchen sink” regres-
sion, propensity score matching, difference-in-differences, AR (1), and 
instrumental variables methods. 
Difference-in-Differences Extension of Matching 
As mentioned earlier, propensity score matching can be used to ob-
tain impact estimates for treatment group members whose observable 
characteristics overlap with those of comparison group members. Of 
course, the impact estimates will only be valid for those individuals 
whose characteristics do overlap. Within the range of overlap of observ-
ables, the “comparable” comparison group can also be reweighted to 
better represent the distribution of observed treatment group character-
istics, further reducing bias from different distributions of observables 
between treatment and comparison group members. Neither of these 
adjustments, however, controls for selection on unobservables. 
Difference-in-differences extension of matching, introduced in 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), controls for some forms of se-
lection on unobservables: it eliminates time-invariant sources of bias 
that may arise when program participants and nonparticipants are 
geographically mismatched or have differences in their survey ques-
tionnaire. Unlike traditional matching, this estimator requires the use of 
longitudinal data, which uses outcomes before and after intervention. 
Regression Discontinuity Design 
Regression discontinuity design became popular because it is easy 
to use and easy to present to a general audience. On the other hand, it 
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Table 14.1  Data, Methods, Self-Selection Behavior 
Consistency against 
self-selection on
Methods Data unobservables Note 
(1)a (2)b (3)c 
“Kitchen sink” regression Cross-sectional data No No No Strict parametric assumption on a con-
estimator Repeated cross-sectional data trol function. 
Panel data 
Propensity score matching Cross-sectional data No No No Flexible nonparametric method but large 
Repeated cross-sectional data sample is required. Good at moderating 
Panel data the bias from the mismatched observed 
(Large sample is required) characteristics between the treatment 
and the comparison, and the bias from 
the mismatched distribution in the com-
mon values of observed characteristics. 
Difference-in-differences Panel data No Yes No Sensitive to choosing different time 
points before and after the treatment 
period. 
AR (1) regression estimator Panel data No No Yes It does not need to have outcome before 
the program; outcomes of two periods 
after the program is enough. AR (1) pro-
cess assumption itself can be restrictive 
to represent the earnings dependency in 
practice. 
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Instrumental variable Cross-sectional data No Yes Yes Hard to find a valid instrument variable. 
method Repeated cross-sectional data 
Panel data 
Difference-in-differences Panel data No Yes No Flexible nonparametric method but large 
extension of matching sample is required. Good at moderating 
the bias from the mismatched supports 
between the treatment and the compari-
son, and the bias from the mismatched 
distribution in the common support. 
Regression discontinuity Cross-sectional data Yes Yes Yes Hard to find a clear-cut participation rule 
design Repeated cross-sectional data and a large sample around the thresh-
Panel data old; requires an assumption about the 
functional form of the dependence of 
the outcome on the assignment criterion 
variable. 
Estimation using marginal Cross-sectional data Yes Yes Yes Hard-to-find valid and powerful in-
treatment effect (MTE) Repeated cross-sectional data strumental variables that are needed 
Panel data to estimate a full schedule of marginal 
treatment effects. 
a Individuals select into the program because they know they will earn higher returns from the program. 
b Individuals select into the program because their latent or forgone earnings are low at the time of program entrance. 
c Individuals’ earnings are depending on previous earnings that are low at the time of program entrance. 
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requires a clear-cut participation rule and a large sample around the 
threshold. It also requires an assumption about the functional form of 
the dependence of the outcome on the assignment criterion variable. It 
is not easy to find data that satisfy such conditions (Pirog et al. 2009). 
Under the previous conditions, however, it works like random assign-
ment. A recent study by Battistin and Rettore (2008) uses this method 
and discusses its weaknesses and strengths. They also warn that effects 
are obtained only for individuals around the threshold for participation. 
Thus, if there is a serious heterogeneous response across the population 
of interest, it is hard to generalize the estimates. 
Estimation Using MTE 
The MTE is the mean effect of treatment on those with a particular 
degree of intention to participate in the program. It can vary over dif-
ferent participation rates of participants and nonparticipants, and can 
be understood as a local average treatment effect using instrumental 
variables. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) analyze how we can estimate 
different policy parameters as weighted averages of the MTE. It is at-
tractive in the sense that we can estimate the different policy questions 
only using the MTE. However, it has its own limitation because the 
valid and powerful instrumental variables that are needed to estimate 
a full schedule of marginal treatment effects are often not available to 
researchers (Moffitt 2008). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Because of recessions, technological advancements, global trade, 
and international migration of workers, job training programs in the 
United States have become more inclusive, pushing beyond their initial 
clientele of disadvantaged workers to additionally include more main-
stream segments of the labor force. WIA clearly reflects this trend in 
training programs. Given the expanded scope of WIA, program evalu-
ation has become more important and far more challenging given the 
highly heterogeneous nature of the target population. 
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This chapter summarizes the previous literature related to the meth-
odology of evaluating training programs. We begin by noting that it 
is necessary to understand the policy question being posed so that the 
evaluation design can be tailored to answer that question. If policy-
makers are interested in ATEs for universal programs or LATEs that 
occur when program benefits or enticements are made more generous, 
then nonexperimental methods can be appropriate. After discussing the 
differences in the TT, ITT, ATE, and LATE parameters, the rest of the 
discussion focuses on the traditional question of program evaluation 
which requires estimation of the TT. This question is, how does the pro-
gram change the outcomes of participants compared to what they would 
have experienced if they had not participated? The estimated treatment 
effect for program participants allows policymakers to answer whether 
or not a program should be retained. 
Despite considerable debate in the literature, random assignment 
experiments are still considered the gold standard for such evaluations. 
If random assignment is not possible, we have learned that 
• comparison groups should be drawn from the same local labor 
markets, and 
• the same instrumentation should be used to collect data from 
the treatment and comparison groups. 
Following these practices will reduce bias in estimated treatment 
effects. Unfortunately, this is not enough. To provide better nonexperi-
mental estimates of treatment effects, the comparison group members 
should 
• have observed characteristics that span the same range of val-
ues as members of the treatment group, and 
• even if the observed characteristics span the same range, the 
distributions of these characteristics should also be the same. 
Finding a comparison group that meets all of these criteria may 
well be onerous. For example, large, even very large, sample sizes are 
normally required if one uses propensity score matching to align the 
range and distributions of P(X) that represents observed characteristics, 
X’s, of the treatment and comparison groups. 
Even if all of the above criteria can be met, it is also critically impor-
tant to understand the sources of selection bias so that an econometric 
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estimator can be used to correct for that particular type or combination 
of types of bias. Recall that there are three types of bias that typically 
arise in training programs: 
1) self-selection by individuals who know they will earn higher 
incomes after participating in the program; 
2) self-selection by individuals who enter a training program be-
cause their latent or forgone earnings are low at the time of 
program entrance; and 
3) self-selection by individuals whose earnings are dependent on 
previous earnings that are low at the time of program entrance. 
How to tease out the relative importance these sources of bias a 
priori is neither obvious nor easy. Nonetheless, it is clear that under-
standing how these sources of bias operate in any given evaluation of 
training programs is critical to choosing the most appropriate statistical 
methods. 
Overall, we conclude that the choices made by evaluators regarding 
their data sources, the composition of their comparison groups, and the 
specification of their econometric models will have important impacts 
on the estimated effects of training. If a researcher cannot meet the 
conditions described above, estimated treatment effects from nonexper-
imental methods can give seriously misleading advice to policymakers. 
It has sometimes been argued that randomized experiments are imprac-
tical, take too long to implement, and are costly. However, the time and 
financial costs associated with collecting high-quality (usually longi-
tudinal) data for nonexperiments will likely offset any extra time or 
financial costs of randomization. At the end of this exercise, we are 
forced to conclude that the logistical difficulties encountered in imple-
menting a random assignment experiment must be weighed against the 
likelihood of giving bad advice to policymakers. 
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Notes 
1. Social experiments assigning eligible applicants to the treatment and control 
groups to estimate the TT often have substitutes in the control group. Substitutes 
are individuals that have similar services from other programs even if they are 
assigned to the control group. When there are only no-shows, a Bloom-estima-
tor is used to estimate the TT. When there are no-shows and substitutes, a Wald- 
estimator is used to estimate the TT. For further discussions of technical details and 
assumptions, refer to Bloom (1984) and Heckman et al. (1999, pp. 1903–1905). 
2. There are four types of individuals in the program participation: 1) those who are 
induced to participate in the program if eligible, 2) those who will participate in the 
program whether or not they are eligible, 3) those who refuse to participate in the 
program whether or not they are eligible, 4) those who refuse to participate if eli-
gible and want to participate if not. This second assumption for LATE eliminates 
the fourth type of individuals. 
3. The Heckman-selection correction model is also restricted by the distribution as-
sumption of unobservables. 
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This chapter reviews the U.S. experience in evaluation of job train-
ing programs over the past 40 years, examines why it is so difficult 
to reliably estimate the impacts of training programs with nonexperi-
mental methods, and discusses ways to make experimental evaluations 
more feasible and cost-effective. We focus exclusively on impact 
evaluations, studies that seek to measure the contribution of a training 
program to improving worker outcomes above and beyond what the 
same workers would have achieved without the training (known as the 
counterfactual). Other types of workforce-focused evaluations—such 
as process studies of program implementation, or participation analyses 
that examine program targeting—while important, are not considered 
here. 
A major distinction in our discussion is between experimental 
impact evaluation methods and nonexperimental impact evaluation 
methods. The experimental method randomly assigns eligible appli-
cants for a training program to two groups, a treatment group that is 
allowed to enter the program and a control group that is not allowed to 
enter the program. Only by chance will subsequent outcomes of the two 
samples differ, unless the training improves treatment group outcomes. 
The difference in average outcomes between the treatment and control 
431 
    
 
 
432 Orr, Bell, and Klerman 
groups, tested for statistical significance (to rule out chance as the ex-
planation of the observed difference) is the measure of program impact. 
Nonexperimental impact evaluation methods also measure out-
comes for a sample of training program participants, but—not having 
done random assignment—have no similar control group to compare 
to; instead, preprogram earnings of participants or earnings of some 
set of nonparticipants (called a comparison group) must be used as the 
counterfactual. The challenge is how to find a valid comparison group 
and then how to control for any remaining treatment group/comparison 
group background differences. The obvious approach is to select the 
comparison group from those who were eligible for the program but 
chose not to enroll. However, given that they chose not to enroll, they 
must be different from those who chose to enroll. 
The alternative is to choose a comparison group from among those 
not eligible to enroll (e.g., from a different time period or a different 
geographic area, or not meeting one of the enrollment conditions). 
Again, whatever the condition is that makes the comparison group 
ineligible to enroll will also make them different from those who did 
enroll. Of course, a nonexperimental evaluation can and would control 
for observed differences between the treatment group and the compari-
son group, but nothing guarantees either that the only differences are in 
observed characteristics, or that the nature of the correction for those 
observed differences is correct. Thus, as we argue in detail below, those 
commissioning nonexperimental evaluations will always be left with 
the nagging concern that the nonexperimental methods chosen were not 
successful in producing accurate impact estimates. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF U.S. EVALUATIONS OF
TRAINING PROGRAM IMPACTS
Serious evaluation of government employment and training pro-
grams began in the United States in the 1960s, with nonexperimental 
impact analyses of programs funded by the Manpower Development 
and Training Act (MDTA). To estimate training impacts, analysts 
needed estimates of earnings with training and estimates of the counter-
factual—what earnings would have been, for the same individuals, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Designing Reliable Impact Evaluations 433 
without training. Earnings with training were observed. The challenge 
was to estimate earnings without training. Some early MDTA studies 
took preprogram earnings for trainees as the benchmark. The impact of 
treatment could then be estimated as the change in earnings from be-
fore training to after training.1 This approach clearly gave estimates of 
program impacts that were too large, and the reason was clear. People 
generally enter job training programs when they are at a low point in 
their labor market trajectory—e.g., when they are unemployed. As a re-
sult their earnings tended to rise, even quite substantially, even without 
training’s assistance. The pre–post change measure credited this natural 
rebound to the employment and training intervention, giving the ap-
pearance of a program impact where there was none. 
As it became clear that preprogram earnings were not a good coun-
terfactual, MDTA analysts turned to comparison group strategies, in 
which training participants’ counterfactual earnings were estimated us-
ing a sample of similar workers in a comparison group who did not 
enroll in training. As noted above, the measure of program impact was 
the difference in average outcomes between participant and comparison 
group members, usually adjusted for measured differences in back-
ground characteristics between the two populations. 
In the 1970s, the USDOL sponsored a number of comparison 
group–based evaluations to measure the impacts of their training 
programs and demonstrations from that decade. Launched with high 
expectations, these efforts ended in disappointment. In many cases, 
the results were unclear or inconsistent; in others, they were over-
shadowed by controversy, often acrimonious, about the ability of the 
methods used to produce accurate results. The first of these efforts was 
a series of evaluations of the USDOL’s major job training program for 
disadvantaged workers, CETA. The second was a set of over 400 dem-
onstrations of employment and training programs for youth under the 
Youth Employment Demonstration Program Act (YEDPA). Most of 
these demonstrations involved nonexperimental evaluations. 
More than a half dozen CETA evaluations produced widely diver-
gent estimates of the impact of the program on participants’ earnings, 
even though all the studies were based on essentially the same data 
(Barnow 1987). These differences in results were apparently due to dif-
ferences in the assumptions underlying nonexperimental methods. And 
since those assumptions could not be tested or verified with data, there 
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was no way to know which estimates were most reliable.2 Moreover, 
when researchers applied the same set of nonexperimental methods 
to data drawn from a social experiment, where the experimental esti-
mate provided an unbiased benchmark, the results were again widely 
dispersed and generally did not replicate the experimental findings 
(LaLonde 1986; Maynard and Fraker 1987; Heckman and Smith 1995). 
This experience led an expert panel convened to advise the USDOL on 
the evaluation of JTPA to recommend strongly that JTPA be evaluated 
with experimental methods (Stromsdorfer et al. 1985). 
Similarly, when evaluations of YEDPA of the late 1970s were 
reviewed by a National Academy of Sciences committee, the commit-
tee concluded that “Despite the magnitude of the resources ostensibly 
devoted to the objectives of research and demonstration, there is little 
reliable information on the effectiveness of the programs in solving 
youth employment problems . . . It is evident that if random assignment 
had been consistently used, much more could have been learned” (Bet-
sey, Hollister, and Pappageorgiou 1985, p. 22). 
These recommendations led to the National JTPA Study, in which 
over 20,000 job training applicants in 16 local programs across the 
country, including both adults and youths, were randomly assigned ei-
ther to go into the program or into a control group that was excluded 
from the program. The study had two major conclusions: 1) that the 
adult program components were cost-effective, and 2) that the youth 
programs had no discernable positive effects, and for some youths 
(those with arrest records) might have had a negative effect (Orr et al. 
1995). When the study findings were released, Congress cut the youth 
program by 90 percent but maintained funding for the adult program. 
Since the JTPA study, the USDOL has successfully used ran-
domized designs for many of its other program evaluations and 
demonstration projects. For example, Job Corps, a residential training 
program for youth, was evaluated with an innovative design in which a 
national probability sample of sites was drawn and a small number of 
program applicants were randomly assigned to control status in each 
site (Schochet et al. 2008). The USDOL also followed up on the nega-
tive findings for youth in the JTPA evaluation by testing two approaches 
that had shown promise in previous evaluations—that of the Center for 
Employment Training (Miller et al. 2005) and the Quantum Opportuni-
ties Program (Schirm et al. 2006)—in an attempt to find more effective 
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ways to serve disadvantaged youth. Because the studies had random-
ized designs, there was no disputing the findings when they showed 
both programs to be ineffective. 
Reliance on experimental designs has continued at the USDOL up 
to the present. For example, a recent randomized study of Project GATE 
(Growing America through Entrepreneurship) measured the impact of 
providing microenterprise start-up services on participant employment 
and earnings (Benus et al. 2008). The USDOL’s evaluation of Individ-
ual Training Accounts randomized consumers between three different 
voucher/counseling approaches (McConnell et al. 2006) to get unbiased 
measures of the differential effectiveness of the three strategies. A simi-
lar approach is being taken in the WIA impact evaluation, which will 
use random assignment to determine which consumers participate in 
which WIA program components (Mathematica Policy Research 2009). 
Another randomized study just under way at the USDOL, the Young 
Parents Demonstration, will have a true control group that receives no 
special services.3 
THE CURRENT CONSENSUS
Frustration with the failure of nonexperimental methods to yield 
unequivocal estimates of program effects in cases such as CETA and 
YEDPA led to a consensus among evaluation specialists within the 
U.S. federal government that, where feasible, random assignment is 
the method of choice for evaluating public programs. Bell (2003) has 
argued that random assignment is almost always possible in federal 
workforce evaluations, even for mainline labor market interventions 
like local economic development assistance and UI benefits. This con-
sensus among the technical experts has in turn led policymakers to 
accept experimental designs not only as scientifically accurate, but also 
as a way to avoid the methodological debates that often accompany the 
presentation of nonexperimental results, detracting from their credibil-
ity and deflecting the policy discussion from substance to method. 
Experimental methods are also appealing to policymakers for their 
simplicity. In contrast to the statistical complexity of many nonex-
perimental methods, the experimental method is relatively simple and 
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intuitively understandable. Even nontechnical policymakers can appre-
ciate the logic of a contrast between two groups, one exposed to the 
program and the other not, but differing otherwise only by chance. This 
makes experimental studies more accessible and credible to laypeople 
in the policy process. 
For these reasons, not only has the number of social experiments 
funded and conducted in the United States increased enormously over 
the last three decades, but on a number of occasions, random assign-
ment evaluations have been mandated by Congress.4 For example, the 
landmark welfare reform act passed in 1996 directed the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to evaluate the programs funded under 
the act and “to the maximum extent feasible, use random assignment 
as an evaluation methodology.”5 Similarly, the Education Sciences 
Reform Act of 2002, which established the Institute of Education Sci-
ences, defined “scientifically valid education evaluation” as evaluation 
that “employs experimental designs using random assignment, when 
feasible, and other research methodologies that allow for the strongest 
possible causal inferences when random assignment is not feasible . . . ”6 
Congress has mandated random assignment evaluations of a number 
of specific programs in health, labor, housing, welfare, and education. 
CHALLENGES TO THE CONSENSUS
One might ask, of course, whether nonexperimental evaluation 
methods have become more reliable in the 25 years since the publi-
cation of the National Academy of Sciences panel conclusions quoted 
above. There has, in fact, been a great deal of work on nonexperimental 
estimators during that period, and there is some evidence that they have 
gotten more reliable. Using the same dataset that LaLonde (1986) em-
ployed in his classic analysis of nonexperimental evaluations of CETA, 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999) show that the propensity score matching 
approach proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) could replicate 
the experimental estimates with remarkable fidelity. And a recent 
meta-analysis by Greenberg et al. (2006) shows that, on average, 20 
nonexperimental impact analyses of six job training programs yielded 
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estimates that were quite similar to those obtained by nine randomized 
experiments. 
After closer examination, however, these studies are less encourag-
ing than they might originally seem. A reanalysis of the Dehejia-Wahba 
study by Smith and Todd (2005) found that the results were strongly 
sensitive to sample selection and specification of matching variables. In 
particular, although it was possible to find a nonexperimental approach 
that yielded estimates similar to the (known) experimental results, 
equally plausible approaches—in fact, only slight variations in the 
nonexperimental methods—yielded results different (sometimes very 
much so) from the experimental results. This is similar to the range of 
estimates from apparently reasonable nonexperimental methods which 
was noted by the National Academy of Sciences and others 25 years 
ago. 
In Greenberg et al.’s meta-analysis, the nonexperimental studies 
reviewed evaluated different programs than the experimental studies 
examined.7 The finding of no difference, on average, between experi-
mental estimates for one set of programs and nonexperimental estimates 
for another set of programs does not address the key question—whether 
nonexperimental methods estimate the true impacts for a given pro-
gram. Furthermore, Greenberg et al.’s study seems to confound period 
with method: all but one of the nonexperimental estimates are from 
before 1988, and all but two of the experimental estimates are from 
after 1988. 
TESTS OF NONExPERIMENTAL ESTIMATES AGAINST
ExPERIMENTAL BENCHMARKS
A number of studies do compare experimental and nonexperimen-
tal impact estimates of job training impact for the same program, and
they consistently find that nonexperimental estimates fail to replicate 
the experimental findings when taken one program at a time. Pirog et 
al. (2009), for example, examine 18 articles that explicitly compared 
propensity score matching (PSM), difference-in-differences (DD), or 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates with estimates for the 
same program drawn from randomized experiments. Their summary 
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assessment was that “ . . . all [econometric corrections] are sensitive 
to the sampling frame and analytic model used . . . these corrections 
do not uniformly and consistently reproduce the experimental results; 
therefore, they cannot be relied upon to provide a satisfactory substitute 
for random assignment experiments” (p. 171). 
Of particular relevance here is one of these studies, Glazerman 
et al. (2003), which examines 17 “within-study” comparisons of ex-
perimental and nonexperimental estimates of the impacts of training 
programs—i.e., studies that used both a randomized control group and 
a nonexperimental comparison group to estimate impacts for the same 
program. On the basis of their review, Glazerman et al. conclude that 
nonexperimental methods often produce estimates that differ from ex-
perimental findings by policy-relevant margins. The other paper that 
looks predominantly at nonexperimental validation studies for employ-
ment and training programs is Bloom et al. (2005). The bottom line of 
that assessment is that “. . . with respect to what methods could replace 
random assignment, we conclude that there are probably none that work 
well enough in a single replication, because the magnitude of [program 
group versus comparison group] mismatch bias for any given nonex-
perimental evaluation can be large” (p. 224). 
WHY IT IS NOT WORKING (THE NONExPERIMENTAL
APPROACH) 
The inconsistent performance of nonexperimental methods in eval-
uations of job training programs is not surprising. Job training programs 
are characterized by a selection process that is very difficult to replicate 
in choosing a nonexperimental comparison group. As noted earlier, the 
most common case is that individuals apply to training programs when 
they have lost their jobs. This means that, at the point of application, 
their earnings are atypically low. Even without any intervention, many 
of these individuals would become employed again and their earnings 
would rise. Figure 15.1 shows the path of monthly earnings from the 
National JTPA Study (Orr et al. 1995) over a 30-month period begin-
ning 12 months before application to the program (month 0). As can 
be seen, average earnings of program applicants bottomed out in the 
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month prior to application and then rose steadily for the next 18 months 
to a level roughly double the preprogram level. This is without any as-
sistance from the JTPA program; the figure charts the progress of the 
control group sample. This exhibit illustrates the famous “preprogram 
dip” first noted by Ashenfelter (1978), and the natural recovery from 
the dip.8 
It is the net addition to this upward trajectory caused by the pro-
gram that an experiment measures, using as its benchmark a control 
group that experiences the same preprogram dip as the training group 
and then exhibits the recovery from that dip that the training group 
would have experienced in the absence of training. To yield a valid 
estimate of program impact, a nonexperimental method must be able to 
replicate—either through selection of the comparison group or through 
statistical adjustments—both the preprogram dip and the subsequent 
natural recovery of earnings. Many of the methods frequently used in 
nonexperimental evaluations are not well-suited to this task. 
For example, immediate preprogram earnings (in, say, months −8 
to −1) cannot be used as the basis of matching program participants to 
Figure 15.1  Earnings Relative to Month of Program Entry, JTPA
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a comparison group. Such an approach will almost certainly result in 
a comparison group with lower normal earnings than the participants, 
whose earnings are temporarily depressed. Comparison group earn-
ings will stay down in the outcome period while participant earnings 
naturally rise even if the intervention has no effect. This will impart an 
upward bias on the participant minus comparison group impact esti-
mates. Nor can participant/comparison group differences be removed 
through time-invariant covariates (e.g., education, demographics, etc.) 
in impact regressions or by methods that model time-invariant er-
ror terms. The mismatch between participants and comparison group 
members concerns the dynamics of earnings patterns over time. This 
essentially rules out both the use of propensity score matching on base-
line characteristics and fixed effects estimators. 
We want to be clear that our position is not that nonexperimental 
methods are never successful. Our position is simply that one cannot 
count on their success a priori and—in the absence of a randomized 
evaluation of the same program—cannot reliably tell ex post whether 
they have been successful. From over 40 years of experience with these 
methods, the American evaluation community has come to the conclu-
sion that, if we are to base policy on evaluation results, the stakes are 
too high to accept this kind of risk and uncertainty. Until the evaluation 
community is convinced that some nonexperimental method can pro-
duce consistently reliable estimates of program impact in a given policy 
area, policymakers in that area will remain skeptical of all nonexperi-
mental estimates. To date, whenever such estimators have been tested 
against an experimental benchmark they have been found wanting. 
However, our critique suggests necessary critieria for a more re-
liable approach to designing nonexperimental methods to estimate 
training impacts: statistically control for (e.g., via regression, or better, 
propensity score matching) detailed patterns of pretraining employment 
and earnings when comparing participant and comparison group post-
program outcomes to obtain impact measures. The control variables 
used should include variables that measure the time pattern of earnings 
prior to job loss (this would have to be measured well before job loss) 
and the timing of job loss (i.e., binary employment indicators, perhaps 
by quarter). Recent work by Hollenbeck (2011) and Heinrich, Mueser, 
and Troske (2008) satisfies these necessary criteria. 
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Nevertheless, we suspect that these necessary criteria are not 
sufficient; i.e., that even these improved propensity score methods 
controlling for rich measures of recent employment and earnings will 
not replicate “gold standard” experimental results. These improved 
methods are simply not that different from the earlier approaches (e.g., 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Bloom, Michalopoulos, and Hill 
2005) that have failed replication. More precisely, we can sometimes 
find nonexperimental methods that pass a replication test, but this is not 
enough. To be useful, we need an algorithm—a rule specified before 
looking at the data—that identifies which estimate will be used; and it is 
that estimate that needs to pass replication, i.e., to provide an unbiased 
result just as does an experiment. 
It is possible that the new results imply such an algorithm and 
that it would replicate the experimental results. But this has not been 
tested, and we are skeptical. We therefore urge the European Commis-
sion (EC) not to proceed with a purely nonexperimental approach until 
such an algorithm is proposed and shown to replicate multiple experi-
mental results. Experiments take many years and they are expensive. 
Nevertheless, the alternative—making policy based on flawed nonex-
perimental methods—is much worse. The United States has gone down 
that path, spending billions of dollars on training programs which were 
later shown to have small or even negative impacts (e.g., JTPA; see 
Orr et al. 1995). Proceeding with unproven nonexperimental evaluation 
methods as a guide to policy is setting up the EC to repeat the United 
States’ mistakes.  
MAKING ExPERIMENTS MORE FEASIBLE
AND AFFORDABLE
As a final point, we note that recent advances in experimental meth-
ods in the United States are making random assignment studies more 
feasible and affordable. Feasibility has been enhanced by a number of 
methodological developments, including: 
• spreading the control group over many sites, so that very few 
individuals have to be turned away from program participation 
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by the random assignment “lottery” in any location—a method 
used in the National Job Corps Study (Schochet et al. 2001); 
• allowing program operators to increase the odds of assignment 
to the treatment group for preferred applicants (proposed for the 
Upward Bound evaluation; Olsen et al. 2007); and 
• conducting “bump up” experiments in which more of the in-
tervention is applied to the treatment group than in a normal 
program, rather than applying less than the customary amount 
to the control group (proposed for evaluating the impact of UI 
benefits; Bell [2003]). 
Beyond these methodological advances, advances in data collection 
strategies can substantially lower costs and increase data quality. Early 
evaluations of training programs used survey data. However, survey 
data have several major disadvantages: high cost, leading to relatively 
small sample sizes; nonresponse bias due to imperfect survey tracking 
and refusals; large measurement error for contemporaneous outcomes 
(Duncan and Hill 1985; Bound and Krueger 1991; Bound et al. 1994); 
and limited retrospective histories due to the weakness of recall. 
With the spread of computer technology in the administration 
of (near) universal public programs (e.g., social insurance pro-
grams), the role of surveys and thereby the cost of data collection 
for evaluations can decline sharply, while simultaneously increasing 
coverage, data quality, and earnings history. In most cases, interme-
diate and long-term follow-up can be left entirely to administrative 
data, such as UI quarterly wage data or Social Security Administra-
tion annual earnings records. Surveys need only be used for short-term
follow-up to determine usage of “similar” training services outside the 
program being studied and to capture richer descriptors of the employ-
ment obtained by sample members. 
Existing direct comparisons suggest that findings from survey and 
administrative data are often qualitatively similar. However, adminis-
trative data clearly underreport earnings, apparently omitting earnings 
from the informal sector (Kornfeld and Bloom 1999; Wallace and Have-
man 2007). There is also some evidence of differential nonresponse 
between treatment and control groups in surveys (Schochet, Burghardt, 
and McConnell 2008). In light of these mixed indicators, reliance on 
administrative sources of earnings data is certainly appealing for rea-
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sons of economy. It is on the economy and efficiency front that the 
USDOL now looks to improve its use of experiments.9 That random as-
signment studies provide the “gold standard” of scientific reliability has 
for now been firmly established as the main lesson of past and ongoing 
job training evaluations in the United States. 
Notes 
1. See Bell et al. (1995) for an in-depth history of U.S. training program evaluations 
and their impact estimation methodologies, from the MDTA era through the mid 
1990s. 
2. See Heckman and Hotz (1989) for a (much later) attempt to address this lack of 
ability to test implicit assumptions. 
3. Personal correspondence with Young Parents Demonstration study leader Karin 
Martinson, October 28, 2009. 
4. Greenberg and Shroder (2004) summarize more than 200 completed social experi-
ments; many more have been finished (and others initiated) in the five years since. 
5. Public Law 104-193, Sec. 413(b)(2). 
6. Public Law 107-279, Sec. 102 (19)(D). 
7. In the one case where both a nonexperimental and an experimental evaluation of 
the same program were included, Job Corps, the latter was conducted 18 years 
after the former. 
8. For more recent analyses of the National JTPA Study data with respect to this is-
sue, see Heckman and Smith (1999). 
9. Discussions with ETA evaluation staff, October 29, 2009. 
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Title I of WIA is the largest source of federally funded employment 
services in the United States. Its purpose is to increase the employment, 
job retention, and earnings of its participants. WIA funds the Dislocated 
Workers, Adult, and Youth programs, as well as Job Corps—a primarily 
residential training program for disadvantaged youth—and specific pro-
grams for Native Americans, migrant and seasonal farm workers, and 
veterans. In fiscal year 2008, $4.5 billion was spent on WIA programs. 
The European Social Fund (ESF) provides funding to promote em-
ployment in the 27 member states of the European Union (EU). Over 
the seven years of the current funding cycle (2007–2013), ESF will fund 
$114 billion in services, accounting for about 10 percent of the total EU 
budget. ESF has many important similarities to WIA. They are both 
large and decentralized. WIA allows state and local workforce invest-
ment areas to shape their programs. ESF funds are allocated to member 
states, which funnel the funds to one or more operational programs, 
which in turn have the ability to fund a wide variety of programs and 
services at the local level. A similar wide range of services are funded 
by both WIA and ESF, including counseling, job search assistance, ba-
sic education, vocational training, support services, retention services, 
and entrepreneurial assistance. Services under both WIA and ESF are 
provided by both government and nongovernment agencies, including 
small community-based organizations. 
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Given the considerable amount spent on employment services in 
both the United States and Europe, policymakers, participants, taxpay-
ers, and program administrators on both continents want to know which 
services are effective. For more than three decades, the USDOL has 
invested heavily in conducting rigorous impact evaluations of its em-
ployment programs. In the past decade alone, it has funded experimental 
evaluations of Job Corps, approaches to administering training vouch-
ers, entrepreneurial services, and prisoner reentry programs. (Benus et 
al. 2008, McConnell et al. 2006, and Schochet et al. 2008. The experi-
mental evaluation of prisoner reentry programs is being conducted by 
Social Policy Research Associates and MDRC.) The USDOL has also 
funded nonexperimental evaluations of the WIA Adult and Dislocated
worker programs and the Trade and Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
program (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2008). The nonexperimental 
evaluation of TAA is being conducted by Social Policy Research Asso-
ciates and Mathematica Policy Research. Recently, the USDOL funded 
a nationally representative experimental evaluation of the WIA Adult 
and Dislocated Worker programs that is in its design phase.1 Although 
the EU does sponsor evaluations of its operational programs, much less 
emphasis is placed on impact evaluations. And as noted by Greenberg 
and Shroder (2004), very few experimental evaluations have been con-
ducted on employment programs outside the United States. 
The purpose of this chapter is to inform EU officials about some of 
the lessons learned from conducting impact evaluations of employment 
programs in the United States. It begins by describing the role evalua-
tions have played in decisions about employment policy and programs. 
It then discusses the three key main steps in any evaluation: 1) choosing 
the policy-relevant evaluation questions, 2) choosing the best design, 
and 3) collecting data. The chapter concludes with a summary of our 
recommendations. 
EVALUATION CAN AFFECT POLICY AND
PROGRAMMATIC DECISIONS 
Information on the effectiveness of employment services is needed 
for three main reasons. First, because a considerable amount of gov-
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ernment funds is invested in employment services, taxpayers need 
information on the investment’s return. Second, most people in need 
of employment services are vulnerable and disadvantaged, so it is par-
ticularly important that the services offered to them are helpful. Third, a 
workforce with the skills required by employers is critical for the con-
tinued growth of the economy. As discussed below, evidence on service 
effectiveness has led the U.S. Congress to fund new programs, expand 
existing programs, and reduce funding for others. Evaluation findings 
have also been used by program administrators to improve programs. 
An example of an evaluation that led to a new program is the New 
Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration sponsored by the USDOL in 
the 1980s (Corson et al. 1989). The demonstration involved targeting 
UI recipients who were likely to have difficulty becoming employed 
and randomly assigning them to four groups: 1) a treatment group that 
received job search assistance, 2) a treatment group that received job 
search assistance and training or relocation assistance, 3) a treatment 
group that received job search assistance with a cash bonus for early 
reemployment, and 4) a control group that received no services or bo-
nuses. The evaluation of the demonstration found that compared to the 
control, all three treatments led to increased earnings and employment 
and to benefits to society and claimants that outweighed their costs. 
As a result of this evaluation, in 1993 Congress required all states to 
establish a Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) sys-
tem that identifies UI recipients who are likely to exhaust their benefits 
before they find employment and requires these UI recipients to receive 
reemployment services (Reich 1997). 
Another example of the funding of a program based on research 
evidence occurred at about the same time. In the late 1980s, the USDOL
funded the UI Self-Employment Demonstration in Massachusetts and 
Washington to help UI recipients start their own businesses by offer-
ing financial assistance and workshops on issues related to business 
start-up. The generally positive findings from an evaluation of these 
demonstrations (Benus et al. 1995) led to the 1993 legislation to estab-
lish the Self-Employment Assistance program for UI recipients. 
Congress has also expanded funding for existing programs found 
to be effective. A nonexperimental evaluation of Job Corps conducted 
in the 1970s found that the program increased employment and earn-
ings and was cost-effective for society and for the participants (Mallar 
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et al. 1982). Following these findings, Congress increased funding for 
Job Corps. 
While program designers and administrators nearly always ar-
dently believe their programs are effective, rigorous evaluations have 
sometimes found that they are wrong. For example, an experimental 
evaluation of the youth program under JTPA found that overall the pro-
gram had no significant impact on earnings for youth and may even 
have had negative impacts on male youth who had been arrested prior 
to random assignment (Bloom et al. 1997). The findings from this study 
led Congress to reduce funding for the JTPA youth program and sub-
sequently require major changes in the youth program when JTPA was 
replaced with WIA. 
Evaluation findings have also been used by program administrators 
to improve programs. The Job Corps program examined the services 
it provided Hispanic youth after the National Job Corps Study found 
that the program did not increase earnings for this population of youth 
(Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 2008). A study of different ap-
proaches to providing training vouchers, called individual training 
accounts, found that, contrary to the fears of program staff, the recipi-
ents of the vouchers made similar training and employment choices 
irrespective of whether they were required to be counseled by an em-
ployment counselor at the One-Stop Career Center (McConnell et al. 
2006). This has direct implications for the administration of vouchers. 
CAREFUL DEVELOPMENT OF EVALUATION qUESTIONS 
The first step in any evaluation is to carefully specify what policy-
makers want to learn from the evaluation. Although most evaluations 
involve considerable exploratory analysis, an evaluation can usually 
only address a few questions rigorously. Hence, it is important to design 
the evaluation so that the questions it does ask are the ones that are most 
helpful to policymakers. 
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EVALUATING THE ENTIRE PROGRAM OR
PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
In many cases, the most policy-relevant question is not whether an 
entire program is effective but rather which program components are 
effective. Evaluating an entire program is appropriate if policymakers 
are considering whether to fund the program or the program consists 
of only a few key components. Congress has asked for evaluations of 
entire programs, such as the Job Corps and JTPA programs. When the 
programs are large and comprised of many diverse components, such 
as WIA and ESF, policymakers are unlikely to stop funding the entire 
program, but they do want to know which components of the program 
are effective. In these cases, evaluating specific program components 
is more informative. For example, the USDOL’s nonexperimental WIA
evaluation did not attempt to evaluate the entire program but focused 
on evaluating just the Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, which 
are large but not the only programs funded by WIA (Heinrich, Mueser, 
and Troske 2008). 
If individuals choose which service component to receive, care 
must be taken in interpreting impacts by program component. The im-
pact estimates pertain only to the people who chose that component and 
not to all study participants. During the design phase of the National 
Job Corps Study, program administrators expressed interest in not only 
the effectiveness of the entire program but also in the effectiveness of 
the nonresidential component of the program. Most participating youth 
live at a Job Corps center, but some youth choose to live at home and 
commute to the center (and are referred to as nonresidents). The study 
found that both the residential and nonresidential components of Job 
Corps had positive impacts (Schochet and Burghardt 2007; Scho-
chet, Burghardt, and McConnell 2008). However, as nonresidential 
and residential youth differ, it cannot be concluded that the nonresi-
dential program is effective for those youth who chose the residential 
component. 
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DETERMINING FOR WHOM THE PROGRAM IS EFFECTIVE 
Some programs and policies are effective for some people but not 
for others. In the design phase of the evaluation, policymakers should 
specify which target populations are of policy interest. The JTPA evalu-
ation, for example, focused on four groups with different employment 
needs—adult women, adult men, young women, and young men. The 
National Job Corps Study estimated the impacts for youth in three dif-
ferent age groups—16–17, 18–19, and 20–24. The choice of estimating 
impacts for youth by age was motivated by conversations with Job 
Corps staff who viewed younger participants as much more difficult to 
serve than the older youth. 
It is important to decide on the target populations that are of policy 
interest prior to conducting the evaluation for two reasons. First, the size 
of the target populations will affect the required sample size. Estimating 
impacts for subgroups requires a larger sample, and the required sample 
is larger the smaller the subgroup. Second, it avoids the temptation to 
estimate impacts for numerous subgroups and interpret any significant 
impact as a true program effect. If a large number of subgroup impacts 
are estimated, the estimate of the program impact for some subgroup is 
likely to be significantly positive by chance and may not reflect a true 
positive program impact (Schochet 2009a). Statistical adjustments can 
be made to account for estimating multiple subgroups, but these adjust-
ments result in a loss of statistical power, with the loss increasing with 
the number of subgroups. 
DETERMINING THE COUNTERFACTUAL 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing evaluation questions is 
to determine the counterfactual—the scenario against which the inter-
vention is tested. Evaluations in which the counterfactual is the absence 
of all employment services are rare or nonexistent. WIA is not the 
only source of employment services in the United States—people can 
receive training at a community college funded by a Pell grant, for ex-
ample. Similarly, the ESF is not the only source of employment services 
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in European countries. Hence, if people do not receive employment 
services from WIA or the ESF, they may receive services from other 
sources. In the National JTPA Study, for example, about 40 percent of 
the control group received some employment services not funded by 
JTPA (Bloom et al. 1997). 
It may be that a counterfactual in which other employment services 
can be received is the more appropriate one. Such an evaluation pro-
vides policymakers information about the effectiveness of additional 
WIA funding in the real world, a world in which other services exist. 
The estimated impact of employment services in these cases is likely to 
be smaller because it is based on the impact of additional services, not 
the impact of receiving services versus no services. Hence the estimated 
impact of the JTPA services was not the impact of receiving the services 
versus no services, but the impact of more treatment group members 
receiving services. Correct interpretation of the impacts requires infor-
mation about the receipt of services by both the treatment and control/ 
comparison groups. 
IMPACT EVALUATION DESIGN: CONSTRUCTING
A COMPARISON GROUP 
An ideal evaluation of employment services would compare the 
outcomes of people who receive the services with the outcomes of 
the same people who do not. As this is impossible, the challenge is to 
choose another set of people—a comparison group—who are as similar 
as possible to the people who receive the services. Under an experi-
ment, this comparison group is determined randomly and is referred to 
as a control group. In nonexperimental evaluations, other approaches 
are used to construct a comparison group. Below, we describe the con-
siderations in choosing an evaluation design. 
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ExPERIMENTS 
Experiments involve randomly assigning individuals to two or more 
groups, with each group offered a different set of services. When imple-
mented carefully, random assignment creates groups of individuals that, 
on average, have identical observable and nonobservable characteris-
tics prior to the intervention, differing only in the program services they 
are offered. As a result, the great advantage of experimental designs is 
that differences in average outcomes between the groups can be caus-
ally attributed to the specific interventions under investigation. Under 
other designs, there is always a concern that the differences in outcomes 
are a result of differences in the underlying characteristics between the 
group receiving the intervention and the comparison group (or between 
the groups receiving different interventions). 
The fundamental and unavoidable challenge of experiments is that 
they require that some people are offered more or different services 
than others. This may be politically challenging and often is resisted 
by program administrators. Yet, numerous social service experiments 
have been conducted successfully in the United States and developing 
countries.2 To be successful, the evaluator needs to obtain political sup-
port for the study and minimize the burden on the program and study 
participants. 
Experiments are often more acceptable politically and to pro-
gram administrators when they are used to evaluate a demonstration 
or a pilot of an intervention rather than an existing program. In these 
cases, control group members receive the services they would in the 
absence of the experiment and treatment group members receive more 
services. The USDOL has supported numerous experimental evalua-
tions of demonstrations, including the National Supported Work (NSW) 
Demonstration (Maynard et al. 1979), a series of UI job search assis-
tance and bonus experiments (Corson et al. 1989, 1992; Spiegelman, 
O’Leary, and Kline 1992; Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987), the Indi-
vidual Training Account Experiment (McConnell et al. 2006), and the 
recent evaluation of Project GATE (Growing America through Entre-
preneurship) (Benus et al. 2008). 
If the roll-out of new programs takes place over time, an experi-
ment can be conducted if the order at which potential sites receive the 
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program is determined randomly. In this case early implementation sites 
are the treatment sites and the later implementation sites are the control 
sites, at least until program implementation. This design requires a large 
number of sites to ensure enough statistical power due to the clustering 
of individuals within sites. While we do not know of an example of this 
design in evaluating employment service, it has been used extensively 
in education evaluations—schools have been randomly assigned to ei-
ther receive funding for an intervention immediately or receive future 
funding for the intervention (see, for example, Glazerman et al. [2007]). 
Evaluating existing programs experimentally is more difficult 
because the experiments lead to some people not participating or re-
ceiving fewer services than they would in the absence of the evaluation. 
The control group may also lead to empty slots at the program. The 
best conditions for an experiment occur when there is excess demand 
for the program. With a surplus of people wanting to participate in the 
program, the existence of a control group could affect who receives the 
intervention but not the number of people who received the interven-
tion, and thus, the program would not suffer from empty slots. This was 
the case in an evaluation of Upward Bound, a program to assist dis-
advantaged youth to prepare for, enter, and succeed in college (Seftor 
et al. 2009). The program recruited enough students that the treatment 
group could fill all program slots and the control group was placed on 
a waiting list. If any openings in the program occurred, they were filled 
by selecting students randomly off the waiting list. 
Experiments are also more acceptable when the research groups 
are offered different treatments, so that all study participants receive 
some services. In an evaluation of individual training accounts, people 
who were found eligible for the vouchers were assigned to three groups 
that varied in the extent to which counseling was required and the role 
the counselor played in setting the amount of the voucher (McConnell 
et al. 2006). No one was denied a voucher, and anyone could receive 
counseling by requesting it, even if they were in the group for which 
counseling was not mandatory. 
Randomized encouragement is another experimental evaluation ap-
proach that does not involve denial of services. Under this design, both 
treatment and control group members can receive the intervention, but 
the treatment group is given additional encouragement to receive the 
intervention. This encouragement can take the form of information, fi-
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nancial, or other incentives, but the encouragement must not directly 
affect the outcomes of interest. While we know of no study of employ-
ment services that has used randomized encouragement, it has been 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of health interventions such as the 
influenza vaccine (Hirano et al. 2000). 
Cooperation from program staff is a prerequisite for a careful im-
plementation of an experiment, and so evaluators need to obtain support 
for the study from program staff at all levels, and then train and monitor 
them. Most program staff will support an evaluation if they understand 
that the findings will be used to inform the development of effective 
employment services. Staff must also understand the rationale behind 
an experiment and the drawbacks of alternative designs. 
Evaluators should work with program staff to find ways to reduce 
the burden of the experiment to the program and participants. The 
Web-based random assignment systems used in recent experimental 
evaluations (such as the evaluation of a relationship-skills program, 
Building Strong Families) mean that program staff can learn the re-
search assignment of a program applicant almost instantaneously rather 
than having to wait a few days before knowing the assignment. Another 
way to reduce the burden on program and participants is to have small 
control groups. The National Job Corps Study, for example, had control 
groups that were only 7 percent of all eligible Job Corps applicants 
(Schochet et al. 2008). 
It can be challenging to estimate the impact of service components 
in an experiment because of a lack of information on which services the 
control group would receive. It is sometimes possible to ask program 
staff to predict prior to random assignment which services each sample 
member would receive if they were assigned to the treatment group. If 
the predictions are accurate, an estimate of the impact can be obtained 
by comparing the outcomes of those members of the treatment and con-
trol groups who are predicted to receive the services. This approach 
was used successfully in the National Job Corps Study to estimate the 
separate impacts of the residential and nonresidential services (Scho-
chet et al. 2008). 
A major drawback of experiments is that they cannot provide poli-
cymakers quick answers. The National Job Corps Study began in 1993; 
the last evaluation report was published over a decade later in 2006. It 
takes considerable time for an experiment to provide findings for three 
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reasons. First, it takes some time to obtain political and program sup-
port for the evaluation. Second, it takes time for enough eligible people 
to request the services and be randomly assigned. Typical sample intake 
periods are one or two years. Third, as many programs are designed to 
have long-term effects, follow-up data collection needs to occur for a 
lengthy period after participants enter the program. The total follow-up 
period for the participants in the Job Corps Study was 48 months for 
survey data and 8–10 years for administrative data. 
It is often said that experiments are more expensive than other 
evaluation designs (Levitan 1992). Some costs that are incurred for ex-
periments but not nonexperimenal evaluations include recruiting sites, 
training staff, conducting random assignment, and monitoring. In prac-
tice, experiments can be very expensive—some have cost millions of 
dollars. However, it is not clear that this is because they are experiments 
or because experiments often involve surveys while many nonexperi-
mental evaluations rely only on less costly administrative data. Yet, the 
type of data collected is unrelated to the design—experiments can be 
conducted with administrative data, and nonexperimental evaluations 
can include survey data collection. Rigorous nonexperimental evalu-
ations require more detailed baseline data. More research is needed to 
compare the costs of experimental and nonexperimental designs, hold-
ing constant data collection costs. 
NONExPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
It is not always possible to conduct experiments. Experiments are 
typically not feasible for evaluating entitlement programs (because 
program services cannot be denied to eligible program applicants, 
thereby making it impossible to create control groups), and may not 
be appropriate for evaluating existing employment-related programs 
that are undersubscribed. It may also not be feasible to create control 
groups if there is no way of restricting program services (for example, 
reemployment services that are obtained by computer in one’s home). 
Furthermore, experiments cannot be conducted using retrospective 
treatment samples (that is, past program participants who are identified 
using administrative program data) or treatment samples selected using 
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secondary data (for example, using large national survey data). Fi-
nally, even if random assignment is feasible, program staff may refuse 
to participate in the experiment because of ethical concerns about re-
stricting services to program applicants and the extra burden associated 
with implementing random assignment procedures (such as obtaining 
study consent forms, collecting additional customer information that is 
required for random assignment, notifying customers about random as-
signment results, and so on). 
Consequently, researchers often use nonexperimental methods to 
estimate program impacts. In this section, we briefly discuss two key 
features of two nonexperimental methods that are becoming increas-
ingly popular for evaluating employment and training programs: 1) 
regression discontinuity (RD) methods and 2) propensity score match-
ing methods. We do not discuss pre–post designs where the outcomes of 
program participants are compared before and after program participa-
tion, because of obvious confounding factors that could bias the impact 
estimates (such as changes in economic conditions or participant’s 
health status). In addition, we do not discuss instrumental variables 
methods, because it is often difficult to find defensible instruments that 
are strongly correlated with the decision to participate in an employ-
ment or training program, but that are uncorrelated with the disturbance 
terms that influence key postprogram outcomes (such as employment 
and earnings).3 We conclude this section with a discussion of the avail-
able evidence on the validity of these methods. 
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS 
RD designs are increasingly used by researchers to obtain unbiased 
estimates of intervention effects in the social policy area (see, for exam-
ple, Cook [2008], Schochet [2009b], and Imbens and Lemieux [2008] 
for reviews). These designs are applicable when a continuous “scor-
ing” rule is used to assign the program, policy, or other intervention to 
people or other study units (for example, One-Stop Career Centers). 
People or units with scores above a preset cutoff value are assigned to 
the treatment group and units with scores below the cutoff value are 
assigned to the comparison group, or vice versa. For example, Black, 
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Galdo, and Smith (2007) estimate the impacts of the WPRS system in 
the state of Kentucky using the rule that UI recipients are required to 
receive reemployment services if their model-based UI profiling scores 
are larger than a cutoff value. As another example, the effects of pro-
viding competitive grants to workforce investment areas for One-Stop 
Career Center innovations could be estimated using grant application 
scores and collecting data on a random sample of workers in both the 
winning and losing grantee sites. 
Under an RD design, the effect of an intervention can be estimated 
as the difference in mean outcomes between treatment and compari-
son group units, adjusting statistically for the relationship between the 
outcomes and the variable used to assign people or other units to the 
intervention, typically referred to as the “forcing” variable. A regression 
line (or curve) is fit for the treatment group and similarly for the com-
parison group, and the difference in average outcomes between these 
lines at the cutoff value of the forcing variable is the estimate of the 
effect of the intervention; an impact occurs if there is a “discontinuity” 
between the two regression lines at the cutoff. 
RD designs generate unbiased estimates of the effect of an inter-
vention if the relationship between the outcome and forcing variable 
can be modeled correctly (using parametric, local linear, or other non-
parametric methods, and using appropriate score bandwidths), and 
the forcing variable was not systematically manipulated to influence 
treatment assignments. Furthermore, the forcing variable must be 
reasonably continuous, and should not be binary (such as gender) or 
categorical with no natural ordering (like race). In addition, the cutoff 
value for the forcing variable must not be used to assign people or other 
units to interventions other than the one being tested. This requirement 
is necessary to ensure that the study can isolate the causal effects of the 
tested intervention from the effects of other interventions. 
Well-planned RD designs can yield unbiased impact estimates, and 
may be easier to sell to program staff and participants than experimental 
designs because treatment assignments are determined by rules devel-
oped by program staff or policymakers rather than randomly. However, 
RD designs cannot necessarily be viewed as a substitute for experimen-
tal designs. Sample sizes typically need to be about three to four times 
larger under RD than experimental designs to achieve impact estimates 
with the same levels of precision (Schochet 2009b). The estimate of the 
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impact under the RD design typically pertains to a narrower population 
(those with scores near the cutoff) than under an experimental design 
(those with a broader range of scores). Furthermore, the RD design re-
quires critical modeling assumptions that are not required under the 
experimental design. 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING METHODS 
Propensity score methods involve matching program participants 
to a comparison sample of people using available data on demographic 
characteristics, earnings histories, and local area characteristics. The 
best data source for selecting comparison samples will depend on the 
specific application and study research questions, but options often in-
clude administrative records (such as UI claims data), program data 
on ineligible program applicants or eligible applicants who decide not 
to participate in the studied program, program data for workers who 
are eligible for a related but less-intensive program to the one under 
investigation, and national surveys that cover the same time period as 
the treatment sample data and that include comparable matching vari-
ables. In all cases, the outcomes of the comparison group are intended 
to represent the outcomes of the treatment group had they not received 
the program services under investigation. The relevant counterfactual 
for the study, however, will often depend on the specific data source. 
Under comparison-group designs, assumptions and statistical mod-
els must eliminate differences between the treatment and comparison 
group samples that could result from sources other than the inter-
vention. If these efforts are successful, remaining differences can be 
attributed to the intervention, possibly with some measure of statistical 
confidence. However, if sources of unmeasured differences exist, this 
approach could produce impact estimates that suffer from sample selec-
tion biases. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed a statistical proce-
dure—propensity scoring—to select a matched comparison group. A
propensity score is the probability that a worker with a given set of 
characteristics receives the treatment. Rosenbaum and Rubin proved 
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the key result that individuals with the same propensity score will also 
have the same distribution of the matching variables. 
Several methods can be used to perform the matching, such as near-
est neighbor, caliper, or kernel methods. Smith and Todd (2005a) and 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) conclude that with sufficient sample 
overlap in the propensity scores and well-balanced matching variable 
distributions, impact estimates are relatively insensitive to the choice 
of matching methods. It is critical that the adequacy of the matching 
process be assessed, for example, by comparing the distribution of the 
matching variables and propensity scores of treatment and selected 
comparison group members within propensity score classes. 
Several recent large-scale evaluations of employment and training 
programs have used propensity score matching methods that were struc-
tured to satisfy the conditions discussed above for obtaining credible 
impact estimates. For example, Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) 
estimate the impacts of WIA on the combined effects of core and inten-
sive services relative to no WIA services and the incremental effect of 
WIA-funded training relative to WIA participants who did not receive 
training. The comparison group for their analysis was drawn from UI 
claimants or from ES participants in the 12 study states. The data used 
for propensity score matching were obtained from UI claims data, ES 
data, and WIA program data, and included employment histories, labor 
force status at the time of program entry, demographic characteristics 
(gender, age, race and ethnicity, education attained, veteran status, and 
welfare receipt), and local labor market characteristics. 
As another example, a national evaluation of the TAA program is 
employing a propensity score matching design (Schochet 2005). The 
large TAA program provides training, extended UI benefits, and other 
employment-related services to workers who are displaced from their 
jobs due to trade-related reasons. A random assignment design was not 
feasible for the evaluation—because TAA services cannot be denied to 
eligible workers and so under program rules, it would not be possible to 
construct a control group. Furthermore, it was not feasible to randomly 
assign participants to different service groups, because TAA services 
are voluntary and are tailored to meet the needs of individual clients. 
Consequently, the evaluation is employing a comparison group design 
to obtain estimated impacts, where the comparison group was selected 
using UI claims data from the 26 study states, and using similar match-
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ing variables to those described above for the Heinrich, Mueser, and 
Troske study. 
THE VALIDITY OF NONExPERIMENTAL METHODS 
There is a long-standing debate in the literature about whether 
social programs can be reliably evaluated using nonexperimental meth-
ods. To investigate their validity, data from experiments have been used 
to try to replicate the experimental estimates—the “gold-standard” esti-
mates—using nonexperimental methods. 
In an influential study, LaLonde (1986) finds that the impact results 
from the experimental NSW Demonstration could not be replicated us-
ing a comparison group design. He estimates program impacts using 
a number of standard nonexperimental evaluation econometric meth-
ods, including simple regression methods, difference-in-difference 
methods, instrumental variable procedures, and the two-step estimator 
of Heckman (1979), and finds that the alternative estimators produced 
very different impact results. Fraker and Maynard (1987) came to 
similarly pessimistic conclusions using a slightly different comparison 
sample. Similarly, Peikes, Moreno, and Orzol (2008) find that match-
ing methods produced incorrect impact estimates when compared with 
a randomized design for the State Partnership Initiative employment 
promotion program. 
Using the same data as LaLonde, however, Heckman and Hotz 
(1989) use a broader set of specification tests to help select among non-
experimental estimators, and find that their tests could exclude those 
estimators that produced impact results that differed from the experi-
mental ones. A key specification test that they used was that a credible 
estimator should yield no differences between the treatment and com-
parison groups in their mean outcomes pertaining to the preintervention 
period. 
In an influential study, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) reexamine 
LaLonde’s data using propensity scoring to find matched comparison 
group members for the NSW treatment group; their resulting impact 
estimates were similar to the experimental ones. A key contribution 
of their study was the careful use of model specification tests that 
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yielded treatment and comparison groups with similar distributions 
of the matching variables and propensity scores. Mueser, Troske, and 
Gorislavsky (2007) also conclude using JTPA data that matching meth-
ods may be effective in evaluating job training programs. Smith and 
Todd (2005a,b) caution, however, that the Dehejia and Wahba results 
are not robust to alternative analysis samples and matching variables 
included in their models. 
Glazerman, Levy, and Myers (2003) survey 16 studies that each 
used nonexperimental methods to try to replicate impact findings from 
a social experiment. Their systematic review was intended to shed light 
on the conditions under which nonexperimental methods most closely
approximate impact results from well-designed and well-executed 
experimental studies. They find that nonexperimental methods occa-
sionally replicate the findings from experimental impact evaluations, 
but in ways that are not easy to predict. However, they identify several 
factors that lead to more successful replications. These factors, which 
are similar to the ones that Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) 
find in trying to replicate experimental results from the National JTPA
Study, are as follows: the data should include a rich set of matching vari-
ables relevant to modeling the program participation decision, and in 
particular, preprogram earnings histories; the same data sources should 
be used for the treatment and comparison groups; and the treatment and 
comparison samples should be from the same geographic areas. Bloom, 
Michalopoulos, and Hill (2005) identify similar criteria for increasing 
the chances that nonexperimental methods can produce credible impact 
estimates. 
Studies have shown that the RD approach has promise for evaluat-
ing employment and training programs when experimental methods are 
not viable. Cook, Shadish, and Wong (2008) provide empirical evidence 
that impact estimates based on RD designs can replicate experimental 
estimates in a range of settings. The advantage of the RD approach 
relative to the propensity score comparison group approach is that the 
selection rule for receiving the treatment is fully known under the RD 
approach and can be used to obtain unbiased estimates if the outcome-
score relationship can be modeled correctly. In contrast, the propensity 
score approach assumes that the program participation decision can be 
adequately modeled using observable baseline data, which is typically 
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very difficult to test, suggesting that one never knows for sure whether 
unobservable factors bias the impact findings. 
COLLECTING THE NECESSARY DATA 
Data on outcomes need to be collected for both the treatment and 
control/comparison groups. These data can be obtained from surveys or 
from administrative records. Much more complete and detailed infor-
mation can be obtained from surveys than is typically available from 
administrative databases. Surveys can also collect details that may sug-
gest a job’s quality, such as the receipt of fringe benefits, union status, 
and wage rates. Data on criminal activity, substance abuse, and receipt 
of a wide range of services are often not available from sources other 
than surveys. 
On the other hand, administrative data do not suffer from recall 
error or nonresponse bias. And because they are much cheaper than 
survey data to collect, they can provide data on many more study partic-
ipants over a longer period of time. However, they are more limited in 
the variables they include and may miss some jobs. In the United States, 
state UI agencies collect quarterly earnings from all people covered by 
UI, and these data are often used to evaluate employment programs. 
These data, however, do not cover federal employment, jobs not cov-
ered by UI (such as self-employment or agricultural jobs), or any jobs 
that employees or employers do not want reported. Hotz and Scholz 
(2001) estimate that these data may understate employment by about 13 
percent. In the United States, Social Security data are another potential 
source of administrative data on earnings, which are sometimes used 
in impact evaluations. These data do cover federal and self-employed 
workers and cover all states, but are annual rather than quarterly. 
Baseline data—or data collected prior to the receipt of the inter-
vention—are essential for implementing nonexperimental designs. 
For example, detailed data on the baseline characteristics of both 
participants and nonparticipants are required to construct a matched 
comparison group design. While baseline data are not essential for ex-
periments, they are useful for ensuring that random assignment created 
research groups with similar baseline characteristics. Irrespective of the 
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design, baseline data are also necessary for defining subgroups of in-
terest, adjusting for baseline differences in the treatment and control/ 
comparison groups due to sampling error, and testing and adjusting for 
survey nonresponse bias. Finally, baseline data on program participants 
are useful for describing those who receive the intervention. 
Baseline data can be collected from administrative records, ap-
plication forms, or surveys. In some studies, study-specific forms are 
administered to experiment participants, who typically need to be 
administered a consent form prior to random assignment. A form re-
questing additional baseline and contact information (to aid follow-up 
of the participant) can be administered at the same time. 
Data on the receipt of services is needed to understand differences 
between the receipt of services by the treatment and control/comparison 
groups and hence the interventions and counterfactuals being tested. 
Program participants will likely vary in the intensity of the services 
received. And, as discussed above, study participants in both the treat-
ment and control/comparison groups may also receive services from 
other programs. 
The program is likely to be able to provide detailed and accurate 
data on service receipt among program participants. (Program admin-
istrators may need assistance in collecting these data.) However, these 
data are typically not available for the control/comparison group. Data 
on the service receipt of the control/comparison group are often un-
available from administrative records and hence need to be collected 
using a survey. 
Correctly interpreting estimates of program effectiveness requires 
an understanding of the program as it is actually implemented, rather 
than how it is designed. This understanding requires an “implemen-
tation” or “process” analysis, which requires collecting detailed 
information on the program from program manuals, training materials, 
and budgets; interviewing both managers and frontline program staff; 
observing service provision; and talking with participants. If an impact 
is found, this information is important for replication. If no impact is 
found, or the impact is smaller than expected, this information will 
allow the evaluator to determine whether this was because the interven-
tion was not implemented, because it was not implemented as designed, 
or because it was ineffective. 
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Finally, information on the cost of the program can be used to in-
terpret the magnitude of a program impact and to inform others who 
may be considering replications of the program. A program may have 
positive impacts on earnings, but may not be cost-effective if its costs 
are high. Conversely, a low-cost intervention may be cost-effective 
even if it has modest impacts. With cost data, a benefit-cost analysis 
can be conducted that compares the cost of the intervention with the 
monetary value of the benefits of the employment services. The largest 
benefit of employment services is typically the increase in participants’
earnings after they leave the program, which is already measured in 
dollars. Other potential benefits from participation in employment ser-
vices, such as any reduction in public assistance use or crime, can be 
valued in dollars (see, for example, McConnell and Glazerman [2001]). 
In evaluations where it is difficult to place dollar values on program 
benefits (so that benefit-cost analyses are not possible), some research-
ers instead conduct cost-effectiveness studies where they compare the 
key impact estimates with the per-participant program costs. Benefits 
and costs are examined from different perspectives—usually society 
as a whole, taxpayers, the program’s funder, and participants. Benefit-
cost analysis is useful for comparing interventions to each other, and 
for identifying those interventions that improve participants’ outcomes 
most efficiently.      
RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, we urge the EU to invest in data collection for evaluating pro-
gram impacts. As well as collecting baseline and outcomes data, data 
should also be collected on costs, the implementation of the program, 
and the receipt of services by members of both treatment and control/ 
comparison groups. 
Second, we recommend that the EU consider conducting experi-
ments. While not always possible, there are many situations in which 
they can be done and can yield rigorous findings. They need not be 
large or expensive. 
Third, if experiments are not feasible, we recommend that rigorous 
nonexperimental methods be used, such as regression discontinuity or 
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propensity score matching methods. However, it is critical that these 
methods be carefully selected and applied to ensure that potential sam-
ple selection biases can be overcome to yield credible impact estimates. 
Finally, we recommend that the EU invest in conducting rigorous 
impact evaluation, whether experimental or not. The stakes for the tax-
payers, the participants, and the health of the economy are too high for 
labor market policies not to be based on strong evidence. 
Notes 
1. The USDOL contracted with Mathematica Policy Research to conduct the WIA
Adult and Dislocated Worker Program Evaluation. 
2. The Poverty Action Lab at MIT (www.povertyactionlab.org/papers) has conducted 
numerous experiments in developing countries. 
3. Instrumental variables methods are important in experiments when members of 
the treatment group do not receive the treatment or when control group members 
receive the intervention being tested (Heckman et al. 1998). 
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Improving Impact
Evaluation in Europe 
Jeffrey Smith 
University of Michigan 
This chapter briefly addresses three themes related to the evaluation 
of active labor market programs (ALMPs), drawing on evidence from 
the North American experience and contrasting it with current practice 
in Europe.1 I begin by making the (measured) case for greater use of 
random assignment methods in Europe, including both familiar and, I 
suspect, less familiar, arguments. Second, I make the case for greater 
(which in many European countries means “any”) use of serious cost-
benefit analysis as a component of the evaluation of ALMPs. Third, I 
discuss the organization of the evaluation “industry” in North America 
and offer some suggestions about lessons it provides for the organiza-
tion of evaluation in Europe. 
The conference came at an opportune time given the explosion in 
nonexperimental evaluation work related to ALMPs in Europe. The 
papers by Kluve (2006) and Card, Kluve, and Weber (2009) describe 
and meta-analyze this work; see also Bergemann and van den Berg 
(forthcoming). The European Social Fund surely deserves praise for 
venturing across the pond in search of ways to improve the quality and 
quantity of this evaluation work (broadly conceived to include perfor-
mance management). At the same time, I think it well worth noting that 
the United States and Canada have much to learn from the countries 
at the top of the European evaluation league tables as well. Lessons 
worth learning include both the general value of rich, well-maintained, 
and relatively accessible (to qualified researchers and with appropri-
ate privacy protections) administrative data and the value of specific 
data elements such as caseworker ratings of the employability of the 
unemployed and detailed, complete data on educational qualifications. 
Though this view may generate some controversy, I read the recent 
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nonexperimental evaluations of WIA by Heinrich et al. (2009) and 
Hollenbeck (2009) as indicating that existing U.S. administrative data 
systems do not quite have what it takes to provide compelling impact 
estimates. Perhaps this is not surprising given that the design of current 
U.S. administrative data systems did not include program evaluation as 
an objective. On another policy dimension, certain European countries 
have also done a good job of implementing, documenting, and studying 
regimes of sanctions for benefit recipients not sufficiently inspired by 
the “carrot” side of activation policies. Recent examples here include 
Arni, Lalive, and van Ours (2009), Boockmann, Thomsen, and Walter 
(2009), and Svarer (2007). The United States has sanctions in some 
programs, but to my knowledge, not much in the way of good data on 
them or—what follows immediately from the lack of good data—good 
studies. A related but different point concerns the sometime conflation 
in these sorts of discussions of U.S. policy with optimal policy. I make 
neither the claim that current U.S. policy is optimal in any meaningful 
sense for the current U.S. context or that all or even most of the good 
things about current U.S. evaluation policy can easily transfer to Eu-
rope. Nonetheless, I will argue for the view that some aspects of U.S. 
policy and practice suggest reforms worth considering in some (if not 
all) European countries. 
The tremendous heterogeneity among European countries in the 
current state of research evaluating the performance of ALMPs and, 
more broadly, the heterogeneity in the relevant political and research 
institutions and in evaluation capacity also deserve note. Some Euro-
pean countries remain at the very beginning of the process of seriously 
evaluating their programs, while others have much to teach the North 
Americans. It nearly goes without saying that different aspects of the 
North American experience have relevance to different countries in Eu-
rope, depending on the current state of play in those countries. 
Even on the topics directly covered in this chapter, much remains 
unsaid due to space limitations. In addition, I have not considered a 
variety of other topics closely related to the evaluation of ALMPs, such 
as recent developments in the literature regarding data and methods 
for nonexperimental evaluations (see, e.g., Dolton and Smith [2010]; 
Fredriksson and Johansson [2008]; Sianesi [2004]); performance 
management (see, e.g., Radin [2006]; Barnow and Smith [2004]; and 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith [2002]); statistical treatment rules (see, 
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e.g., Smith and Staghøj [2009] and the references therein); and the 
broader issue of the role of caseworkers as gatekeepers, monitors, and 
information providers (see, e.g., Lechner and Smith [2007] and Buur-
man and Dur [2008]). These omissions reflect not lack of interest or 
importance but rather division of labor over time and among authors.2 
ExPERIMENTATION 
As a quick perusal of the Digest of the Social Experiments (Green-
berg and Shroder 2004) makes clear, the United States has conducted 
the vast majority (indeed, all but a handful) of social experiments, most 
of them related to active labor market programs, primary and secondary 
education, and the criminal justice system.3 The situation has not re-
ally changed since the publication of that volume. In the United States, 
experiments have provided evidence of great value for both policy and 
for our understanding of social interventions more broadly in areas as 
diverse as health insurance, electricity pricing, responses to domestic 
violence, educational interventions related to teachers, schools, and 
curricula, and of course, ALMPs. Widely hailed in the social science 
community (see, e.g., Burtless and Orr [1986] and Burtless [1995]), the 
key advantage of social experiments is that their simple design makes 
them easy to explain and hard to argue with. This gives them a policy-
influencing power not enjoyed by even the cleanest nonexperimental 
designs. 
In addition to these direct benefits, experiments have the under-
appreciated benefit of providing high-quality data for other research 
purposes. In addition to the large literature that uses experimental im-
pact estimates as a benchmark for the study of various combinations of 
nonexperimental estimators and data (see, e.g., LaLonde [1986], Fraker
and Maynard [1987], Heckman and Hotz [1989], Friedlander and 
Robins [1995], Dehejia and Wahba [1999, 2002], and Smith and Todd 
[2005a,b]), experiments also have yielded a lot of substantive knowl-
edge, particularly about low-income labor markets, and have provided 
a platform for methodological analyses of heterogeneous treatment 
effects that avoid the complications associated with first dealing with 
selection bias (see, e.g., Heckman, Smith, and Clements [1997], Bitler, 
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Gelbach, and Hoynes [2006], and Djebbari and Smith [2008]). Ex-
perimental data have even helped researchers to learn about structural 
models (in the sense that economists used that term), as in Todd and 
Wolpin (2006) and Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004). 
The literature documents a variety of limitations of experimental 
evaluations relative to nonexperimental evaluations. These limitations 
weigh against the advantages just discussed. At a most basic level, 
technological, political, and ethical concerns make it impossible to 
randomly assign some treatments of great interest, such as gender or 
family background. Except in unusual circumstances, such as the Pro-
gresa evaluation in Mexico, where random assignment took place at the 
level of relatively isolated villages, experimental evaluations capture 
only the partial equilibrium effects of policies (see Angelucci and di 
Giorgio [2009]). Depending on the placement of random assignment 
in the process of treatment receipt and on the availability of substitutes 
from other sources, both treatment group dropout and control group 
substitution often complicate the interpretation of the estimates from 
experimental evaluations of ALMPs (see the discussions in Heckman, 
Smith, and Taber [1998] and Heckman et al. [2000]). 
The implementation of random assignment sometimes requires in-
stitutional changes that may compromise external validity. In the case 
of the National JTPA Study (NJS), the local sites in the experiment were 
concerned that the requirement of the design that they serve roughly the 
same number of participants while also filling a control group would 
mean digging deeper into the pool of potential participants. Depend-
ing on the nature of this pool and of the selection process, doing so 
could mean serving people with lower expected impacts. Some sites 
reacted to this by changing the nature of their selection process, e.g., 
reducing the number of visits to the center required to enroll, so as 
to reduce the extent of attrition during the process. Obviously, such 
changes compromise the external validity of the results. The scientific 
and political desirability of using volunteer sites also has implications 
for external validity. As documented in Doolittle and Traeger (1990), 
in the NJS, more than 200 of the (approximately) 600 local service 
delivery areas were contacted, and a substantial amount of money was 
spent on side payments in order to induce 16 sites to volunteer to par-
ticipate, and even then at least one site left the experiment early. This 
issue often arises in evaluations of educational interventions conducted 
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by the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) at the U.S. Department of 
Education as well. A related but different point is that heterogeneity in 
the size and organization of local sites may limit the set of sites at which 
it makes budgetary sense to do random assignment. The presence of 
random assignment may also alter the behavior of potential participants 
in ways that less salient and intrusive nonexperimental methods might 
not. For example, it might induce additional selection on risk aversion, 
or it might deter complementary investments. Such changes, sometimes 
dubbed “randomization bias” in the literature, are distinct from Haw-
thorne effects, which result from the mere fact of observation, and pose 
yet another threat to external validity. Heckman and Smith (1995) and 
Section 5 of Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) summarize these 
concerns about experiments. 
In addition to these real issues, policymakers and program adminis-
trators sometimes offer ethical objections to random assignment. In my 
experience, these objections nearly always represent a cover for simply 
not wanting to know the answer. Experiments often provide compel-
ling evidence that treatments do not work at all or do not work well 
enough to pass a cost-benefit test. Educational researchers have dubbed 
the What Works Clearinghouse, a formal compendium of quality-
rated evidence on the impacts of educational treatments funded by 
the IES and operated by Mathematica Policy Research, the “Nothing 
Works Clearinghouse.”4 This usage illustrates the very real empirical 
pattern that many, maybe most, programs fail when subjected to seri-
ous evaluation. Programs that deliver ineffective treatments, and thus 
do not benefit their participants, still benefit important constituencies, 
such as the workers and agencies or firms that provide the treatments. 
Indeed, one sometimes suspects that it is these constituencies, and not 
the population served, who represent the real reason for the program’s 
existence in the first place. These constituencies have an interest in the 
production of low-quality (and sometimes deliberately manipulated), 
nonexperimental evaluations and misleading performance measures in 
place of compelling experimental (or even nonexperimental) evidence. 
One way to confront these specious ethical arguments is to point 
out what they miss, namely the problematic ethical position of forc-
ing taxpayers to fund programs without any serious evidence that they 
pass cost-benefit tests when such evidence could easily be produced. 
Such “speaking truth to power” provides the warm glow of righteous 
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satisfaction and carries some sway with stakeholders not completely in 
the service of their own narrow interests, but it does not always carry 
the day. 
Variants of random assignment that do not require the complete 
denial of service to any potential clients constitute another response to 
the phony ethical arguments offered up against random assignment, as 
these arguments typically revolve around concerns about service denial. 
In contexts where some eligible individuals would not receive service 
anyway, advocates of serious evaluation can (and do) frame random as-
signment as an equitable way to allocate scarce resources. In contexts 
where resource constraints do not bind, variants of random assignment 
that do not assign anyone to a no-services control group can help to 
derail malicious objections. 
The literature offers three variants of random assignment that (more 
or less) avoid a no-treatment control group. One rather obvious vari-
ant consists of random assignment with multiple treatment arms but 
no control arm. For example, in the WIA context one might randomly 
assign some clients to only core and intensive services, while excluding 
them from training services. Another variant consists of a randomized 
encouragement design, as in Hirano et al. (2000). Here eligible indi-
viduals get randomly assigned an incentive to participate. Thus, no one 
is excluded, but the incentive, when properly designed—learning about 
the impact of the incentive represents a side benefit of the design— 
induces exogenous variation in treatment status. The design identifies 
what the literature calls the local average treatment effect (LATE) rather 
than the average treatment effect on the treated. Put less technically, this 
design identifies the mean impact on those induced to participate by the 
incentive, but not the mean impact on all participants. Whether or not 
this parameter merits attention depends on the particular policy context. 
The final design consists of randomization at the margin, as in Black 
et al. (2003). This design does create a no-treatment control group, but 
only of individuals on the margin of participation. In the case of the 
Kentucky Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services System ana-
lyzed in Black et al. (2003), the margin consists of individuals whose 
predicted durations of benefit receipt put them in the last cell of treated 
individuals in a given local office in a given week. The state was willing 
to randomize these individuals but not those with long predicted spells. 
Like the randomized encouragement design, this design does not iden-
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tify the average treatment effect on the treated, but it does identify the 
average impact of treatment for individuals at the margin of treatment. 
This parameter answers a different policy question of what the mean 
impact would be on individuals brought into the program by an increase 
in the number of slots. As with the randomized encouragement design, 
this parameter might have greater or lesser policy importance than the 
average treatment effect on the treated. 
The push for random assignment evaluations of ALMPs (and other 
policies as well) ultimately has great value. For example, the zero (and 
sometimes negative) impact estimates for youth in the NJS led to large 
budget cuts in that program—cuts an order of magnitude larger than the 
cost of this (quite expensive) evaluation; see the discussion in Heck-
man and Krueger (2003). The experimental findings from the National 
Job Corps Study presented in Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 
(2008), which include positive impacts that fade out and so fail to pass 
a cost-benefit test given the high cost of the program, have led to some 
serious thinking about that popular and, prior to the evaluation, essen-
tially untouchable program. Some of the IES experimental evaluation 
results, such as those for the Teach for America Program (Glazerman, 
Mayer, and Decker 2005), abstinence-only sex education programs
(Trenholm et al. 2008), reading and mathematics software (Campuzano 
et al. 2009), and intensive teacher mentoring programs (Eisenberg et 
al. 2009), have had real impacts on expenditures and on the course of 
policy innovation and research. The Europeans can and should get in on 
this worthwhile game. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analysis combines impact estimates with information 
on program costs to produce a direct policy conclusion. In the case 
of impact estimates that capture the average effect of treatment on the 
treated, a comparison of the impacts with the average cost of the pro-
gram provides a clear and direct message about the value of a program 
to the taxpayers who fund it. Historically, many U.S. evaluations have 
included at least rudimentary cost-benefit analyses. The cost-benefit 
analysis associated with the National Job Corps Study presented in 
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Schochet, Burghardt and McConnell (2006) represents a particularly 
fine example. 
In contrast, one can look pretty hard and not find very many Eu-
ropean ALMP evaluations that include serious cost-benefit analyses. 
Munch, Skipper, and Jespersen (2008) provide a notable Danish ex-
ample, while Raaum, Torp, and Zhang (2002) do the same for Norway. 
Osikominu (2009) shows a more common situation, with only a very 
rudimentary comparison of costs and impacts. More generally, and de-
spite these counterexamples, the modal European ALMP evaluation, at 
least in my experience, contains no cost-benefit analysis at all. 
A number of reasons are given for the absence of cost-benefit anal-
ysis in European evaluations of ALMPs, the most common of which 
concerns the European focus on employment impacts, rather than 
earnings impacts, mainly for political reasons. This focus on employ-
ment has led to a lack of good administrative data on earnings in some 
countries, which makes cost-benefit analysis more challenging, as the 
researcher (or the literature more broadly) must come up with a com-
pelling way to translate employment impacts into monetary units. In 
contrast, impacts on earnings, the most common case in North America,
fit easily into a cost-benefit framework. Another reason sometimes
given for the absence of cost-benefit analyses in Europe relates to the 
fact that the estimated employment impacts often turn out negative or 
zero or, in the bright and sunny cases, positive but small enough to make 
the negative result that would emerge from a serious cost-benefit analy-
sis obvious in advance. This is the “why bother when the programs do 
not really work anyway” argument, and it has some sense to it. 
The lack of good cost data also poses a barrier to serious cost-benefit
analysis in many European contexts (and some North American ones 
as well). Ideally, one would have detailed data on both average and 
marginal costs for each service offered, broken down geographically 
in cases where costs varied substantially by, for example, location in a 
large city, a small city, or a rural area. Instead, researchers often have 
available little more than the program budget and the total number of 
persons served. 
Both JTPA and WIA have attempted performance standards mea-
sures that included a cost component. These have faced real difficulties 
in assigning costs shared by JTPA or WIA and other programs, as when 
a variety of programs, often each having multiple funding sources, all 
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share a common physical location as a One-Stop center. These common 
cost allocation issues (and others) are real and challenging, and carry 
over directly from performance measures to the problem of creating 
meaningful cost information for use in cost-benefit calculations. At the 
same time, private firms face similar difficulties and a large literature 
and equally large body of empirical practice in accounting lay out rea-
sonable ways to deal with them. 
In addition to its value at informing decisions about keeping or 
dropping programs, cost-benefit analysis has the further benefit of 
encouraging thinking about important aspects of program design and 
evaluation, and of public policy more generally. First, it encourages 
thinking about the outcomes an ALMP will affect. A focus on outcomes 
other than just earnings, in particular on crime, represents one of the 
notable aspects of the Job Corp cost-benefit analysis highlighted earlier. 
Not only do impacts on crime account for much of the gross impact of 
the program, particularly in the short term, their presence tells us a lot 
about how the program works, and suggests other possible treatments 
that might well pass a cost-benefit analysis. 
Thinking about outcomes and about the behavioral theory that links 
treatments to outcomes also leads to a salutary focus on the possible 
general equilibrium effects (which include spillovers or displacement 
effects) of programs. Johnson (1980) and Calmfors (1994) are classic 
references; see Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) and the citations it con-
tains for pointers to the more recent (and still much too small) literature. 
While difficult to estimate, they deserve a place in cost-benefit analy-
ses, if only in the form of a sensitivity analysis using informal estimates 
drawn from the broader literature. 
Thinking about cost-benefit analysis in a serious way also high-
lights the importance of learning about the duration of program impacts. 
Most evaluations of ALMPs provide only a year or two of follow-up. 
The available evidence on longer-term impacts suggests that sometimes 
impacts remain remarkably steady over time for years after an interven-
tion, as in the National Supported Work Demonstration (Couch 1992) 
and the National JTPA Study (GAO 1996); other times they fade out, as 
in the National Job Corps Study (Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 
2008) and the California GAIN program (Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman, 
2006); and other times they appear only belatedly, as in the evalua-
tion of German training programs by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 
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(2004). The absence of both a clear general empirical pattern and com-
pelling theory on when estimates should persist and when not suggests 
the value of more frequently undertaking long-term follow-up, so as to 
minimize the impact of extrapolation of the sort described in Heckman, 
LaLonde, and Smith (1999). 
Finally, paying attention to cost-benefit analysis focuses policy and 
research attention on two important parameters: the discount rate and 
the marginal social cost of public funds or “excess burden.” Having a 
well-justified social discount rate for use in government budgeting and 
investment decisions represents a basic task of public finance econo-
mists. As noted in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), the discount 
rate employed to bring future net impacts (and costs, if applicable) for-
ward in time to the present can affect the outcome of a cost-benefit 
analysis. Also important, and routinely ignored in North American cost-
benefit analyses (including otherwise exemplary ones like that from the 
Job Corp evaluation), is the fact that a dollar of government budget for 
ALMPs costs society more than a dollar, both because the operation of 
the tax system directly consumes real resources (all those cheery Inter-
nal Revenue Service agents have to get paid) and because all developed 
countries rely on distortionary tax systems. While estimates of the mar-
ginal social cost of public funds vary widely in the literature even for 
specific countries, and we would expect them to vary across countries 
due to differences in tax systems and tax rates and other institutional 
features, the estimates never equal zero and often reach magnitudes 
that suggest the policy importance of incorporating this factor into cost-
benefit analyses and thereby into decisions about program existence 
and funding (see, e.g., Auerbach and Hines [2002] for a survey). 
In sum, cost-benefit analysis represents a useful tool, both in a di-
rect sense via its role in clarifying and systematizing decisions about 
program existence, expansion, or contraction, and indirectly via its 
direction of policy and research attention to important, but often ne-
glected, issues of program design and impact and of public finance 
more broadly. 
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Organizing evaluatiOn research 
Surprisingly little research seeks to document and explain differ-
ences in the quantity and quality of ALMP evaluation across countries. I 
am aware of Riddell (1991) and not much else. Given the heterogeneity 
in both quality and quantity obvious even to the most casual observer, 
this gap in the literature comes as a surprise. Filling the gap represents 
a worthy task for researchers. Because of this gap, my remarks here 
rely mainly on my own observations as a scholar studying evaluation 
methods, a provider of evaluation short courses to graduate students 
at various locations in Europe, a referee and editor handling academic
evaluations, and an occasional evaluation consultant as well as on 
discussions with friends in the academic and policy worlds. The lack 
of quantitative evidence on national variation in quality and quantity 
necessitates the following caveat: I am well aware that low-quality re-
search, such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004, p. 15), with its smiley 
faces and confusion of outcome levels and impacts, or Gregory (2000), 
with its distinctive “sites of oppression matrix” evaluation tool, appear 
everywhere, including the United States and Canada, because of the 
universal demand for evaluation reports that promote the views of inter-
ested parties while providing an appearance of technical understanding 
and objectivity sufficient to fool the reading public. 
I will argue that differences in the quality and quantity of evalu-
ation research across countries result from much more than simply 
differences in the industrial organization of the evaluation industry, 
but those differences play a role and make a good place to start my 
discussion. The evaluation industry in the United States combines gov-
ernment, private for-profit firms, private nonprofit firms, and academia 
in remarkable and complex ways that differ across program types. For 
ALMPs, both nonprofit and for-profit firms, operating on contract to the 
USDOL, have undertaken many of the evaluations of large programs 
such as JTPA, WIA, the Job Corps, the Trade Adjustment Act, and so 
on. Additional evaluation work is performed by academics operating 
with research funding from places like the National Science Founda-
tion or private foundations; this work often uses data from the original 
USDOL-funded evaluations, as with the long series of papers by Heck-
man and various coauthors using the data from the NJS; see Heckman 
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et al. (1998) for an example. Other evaluation work, including process 
evaluation work, is also often contracted out to a somewhat wider set 
of firms than the small number of large firms (e.g., Abt, Mathematica, 
MDRC, etc.) with the capacity to undertake large evaluations. These 
firms compete in both the product market and the labor market; at least 
in regard to economists, they compete for the same newly minted doc-
torates as academic economics departments just outside the top 20. 
Some evaluation work is also done in-house at the USDOL, whose staff 
includes people trained in economics at the doctoral level. A similar 
pattern holds in the education world, though probably with more aca-
demic involvement in the actual performance of the evaluation work, 
as opposed to simply advising or undertaking secondary analyses using 
the data generated by evaluations conducted by others. 
What makes the European evaluation market different from the 
North American ones? First, some European countries have an impor-
tant player in their markets that is absent in the United States in the form 
of (mostly or entirely) government-supported research institutes de-
voted to labor market policy and evaluation that operate (more or less) 
at “arm’s length” from the government itself. I have in mind here the 
IFAU in Sweden and the various institutes in Germany (e.g., the ZEW
in Mannheim, the IZA in Bonn, the DIW in Berlin, and the RWI in 
Essen). My understanding is that these institutes both have base fund-
ing and do work on contract. They maintain a remarkable degree of 
independence, in the sense that they routinely report evaluation results 
indicating that ALMPs have zero or even negative impacts (and other 
more humorous but still somewhat embarrassing-to-the-government 
findings such as paternal leave being more common during hunting 
season and such like). 
Neither the United States nor Canada has any direct analog to these 
institutes. The GAO does some work along the lines of process and 
implementation evaluation, but not much in the way of econometric 
impact evaluation.5 The closest analogue in Canada, the Auditor Gen-
eral, is even less like the European Institutes. The U.S. Congressional 
Research Service largely confines itself to literature surveys. While I 
could imagine the Canadians setting up something like the IFAU, I find 
it hard to imagine the United States doing so, in part because it would 
present real competition to the various DC think tanks. These institutes 
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represent a valuable component of the European scene, and countries 
that do not have them ought to reconsider. 
Size represents a second important contrast between the evaluation 
market in the United States and that in Europe (and in Canada, for that 
matter). Size has two relevant dimensions here. The first is the simple 
magnitude of evaluation research going on. The United States spends 
quite a lot of money on evaluation in a number of policy areas, includ-
ing for programs that it funds in developing countries. To the extent that 
evaluation firms, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, have economies of 
scale over some range, a larger market can support more firms and thus 
allow more competition between firms. The second dimension of size 
concerns the number of potential clients for evaluation research firms. 
My sense is that evaluation firms in the United States face many more 
potential clients both at the national level (where they might deal with 
the departments of labor, education, housing and urban development, 
health and human services, homeland security, transportation, agricul-
ture, and so on, and in some cases even separate parts of particular 
departments), as well as the development banks, states and larger cit-
ies, and private foundations. This diversity of potential clients reduces 
the dependence of the firm on repeated interactions with a single client 
and thus, I think, reduces the potential costs associated with catering 
to the truth rather than to the client agency. Firms in smaller European 
countries with highly centralized governments and no private founda-
tions may face a much, much smaller number of potential clients and 
thus face much stronger pressure to bend to the client’s wishes of the 
moment. 
One easy way to increase the size of the European evaluation mar-
ket is for that market to become truly European rather than national. At 
present, I am aware of very little evaluation work that happens across 
boundaries in Europe. Transforming small national markets into a much 
larger European market would allow greater competition between pro-
viders and would give firms more freedom to avoid clients seeking a 
particular answer rather than necessarily the correct answer. I think en-
try by the major U.S. firms into the European market would aid in these 
developments. This has happened in a very limited way in the UK, with 
MDRC playing a role in the experimental evaluation of the Employ-
ment Retention and Advancement Demonstration (Miller et al. 2008). 
More activity on this front would, in my view, bring great benefits.6 
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In this context, the Association for Public Policy and Management 
(APPAM) is important because it fosters interactions between aca-
demics, government consumers and producers of evaluation research, 
evaluation firms, and policy people interested in the results of evalua-
tions. Bringing these groups together, both via the annual meetings and 
via APPAM’s publications and other activities, represents an important 
contribution not duplicated, to my knowledge, by any European organi-
zation. Efforts to replicate APPAM in Europe, with some linkages and 
occasional joint conferences as with the Society for Labor Economics 
in North America and its younger European compatriot the European 
Association of Labor Economists, would add value. 
Finally, you have to want it. At a narrow level, this means having 
at least some people in government who care about evidence more than 
they care about the party line or about their narrow bureaucratic impera-
tives of budget increase and career advancement. It needs to encompass 
both the levels of administration that change at election time and those 
that do not. It also means that some people at both levels have to under-
stand enough about evaluation to know what to ask for and to evaluate 
what gets produced in response. I think the U.S. practice of having seri-
ous academics spend brief stints in the national administration, say, as 
chief economist at the USDOL or on the Council of Economic Advisers, 
plays an important role in the (very much relative) success the United 
States has had on this dimension, and commend such institutions to 
European governments. The temporary nature of the appointments mat-
ters here precisely because you do not want the academics to assimilate 
into the bureaucratic culture. Rather, you want them to maintain their 
outsider perspective and their academic devotion to getting the right an-
swer (helped along by the threat of ridicule from their university friends 
and colleagues if they sell out). 
The George W. Bush administration provides a useful illustration 
here. At the Labor Department, evaluation research became a low prior-
ity during this administration. More broadly, the department had such 
a poor reputation in regard to its interest in evidence that it could not 
manage to fill the chief economist position with a serious academic 
economist (for eight years!). Contrast this to the distinguished list of 
chief economists under Clinton, which included Larry Katz and Alan 
Krueger. In contrast, less than one mile away, the U.S. Department of 
Education—in particular, the IES under Russ Whitehurst—made a seri-
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ous run at transforming the entire field of educational policy evaluation 
through a program of experimental and high-quality nonexperimental 
evaluations, as well as the funding of a training grant program to create 
a generation of new, quantitative, serious education policy evaluators 
with disciplinary roots at least partially outside of traditional schools of 
education (see the discussion in IES [2008]). How do you create more 
places like IES? I must confess that I do not have a good answer here, 
but we should be thinking about it, because doing so has a very high 
payoff indeed. 
More broadly, the demand for serious program evaluation has to 
come from somewhere. It can come from leaders within government. 
It can come from actors outside government, such as the media and 
public intellectuals. It can come from the general public. But it must 
come from somewhere. Casual empiricism suggests a link at the coun-
try level between the quality and quantity of evaluation and the imprint 
of neoclassical economics. Countries with long neoclassical traditions, 
including the UK, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries, are pretty 
much the same as those with long traditions of serious research de-
voted to the evaluation of social programs. Looking within countries, 
Germany has gotten serious about empirical evaluation research only 
in the last 15 years or so, a time period that coincides with the triumph 
of neoclassical economics within academic economics in that country. 
This observed link between the demand for evaluation and neoclassi-
cal economics might reflect a causal relationship. Alternatively, both 
demand for serious policy evaluation and the dominance of neoclassical 
economics may reflect broader and deeper differences across countries 
in individualism, deference to authority, the importance of social class, 
average education, and so on. Regardless of whether the current rela-
tionship reflects causality or not, one might argue that increasing the 
number of individuals trained in economics, particularly a practical 
version of economics rather than just high theory or theoretical econo-
metrics, at both the undergraduate and graduate levels might represent a 
long-term strategy for increasing the demand for quality policy evalua-
tion, as well as the ability to supply it with domestic labor. Who knows, 
it might even improve European agricultural policy as well! 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has touched on three important areas where the Eu-
ropean Social Fund can learn from the North American experience in 
evaluating ALMPs. I have argued that current European practice lies 
very far from the point where the marginal value of additional experi-
mental evaluations would equal their marginal cost. I have also argued 
that Europe would benefit from much greater attention to careful cost-
benefit analysis following evaluation. Such analyses would allow 
the evaluation results to provide more guidance to policy and, more
broadly, would increase our understanding of how policy works and 
so aid in the design of future policies. Finally, I have argued that much 
room remains for improving the organization of evaluation in Europe. 
The European environment includes distinctive and valuable aspects 
not present in North America, but could usefully incorporate aspects of 
the North American experience as it seeks to improve the overall qual-
ity of European evaluations. 
Notes 
My thoughts on the issues discussed in this chapter have benefited from my interactions 
with a number of scholars over the years, including (but not limited to) Jim Heckman, 
Dan Black, Michael Lechner, Carolyn Heinrich, Burt Barnow, Lars Skipper, and Arthur 
Sweetman. I am very grateful for those interactions, and for comments from Jessica 
Goldberg, but, of course, retain all responsibility for the (occasionally provocative) 
views expressed here. 
1. I use North American in the Canadian manner to mean the United States and Can-
ada but not Mexico. 
2. See Smith (2000, 2004) for broad nontechnical surveys of evaluation methodol-
ogy. See Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), 
and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009) for somewhat more technical surveys. See 
Heckman and Abbring (2007) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) for recent 
technical overviews. 
3. I distinguish here between social experiments and both laboratory experiments 
under fully controlled conditions and the small-scale field experiments that have 
taken the development literature by storm over the last decade. For discussions and 
categorizations, see, e.g., Levitt and List (2009) and Banerjee and Duflo (2009). 
4. The What Works Clearinghouse can be found at http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/. 
  
 
	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
 
 	 	 	
	
	 	
	 	
	 	 	  
	 	 	
Improving Impact Evaluation in Europe 489 
5. For an exception, see GAO (1996), which presents long-term impact estimates for 
the JTPA experiment using administrative data. 
6. This same point applies to Canada as well. 
References 
Angelucci, Manuela, and Giacomo di Giorgio. 2009. “Indirect Effects of an 
Aid Program: How Do Cash Transfers Affect Ineligibles’ Consumption?” 
American Economic Review 99(1): 486–508. 
Arni, Patrick, Rafael Lalive, and Jan van Ours. 2009. “How Effective Are Un-
employment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit.” 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4509. Bonn: IZA. 
Auerbach, Alan, and James Hines. 2002. “Taxation and Economic Efficiency.” 
In Handbook of Public Finance, Volume 3, Alan Auerbach and Martin Feld-
stein, eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1347–1421. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2009. “The Experimental Approach to De-
velopment Economics.” Annual Review of Economics 1: 151–178. 
Barnow, Burt, and Jeffrey Smith. 2004. “Performance Management of U.S. 
Job Training Programs: Lessons from the Job Training Partnership Act.” 
Public Finance and Management 4(3): 247–287. 
Bergemann, Annette, and Gerard van den Berg. 2008. “Active Labor Market 
Policy Effects for Women in Europe—A Survey.” Annales d’Economie et 
de Statistique 91/92: 385–408. 
Bitler, Marianne, Jonah Gelbach, and Hilary Hoynes. 2006. “What Mean Im-
pacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 96(4): 988–1012. 
Black, Dan, Jeffrey Smith, Mark Berger, and Brett Noel. 2003. “Is the Threat 
of Reemployment Services More Effective than the Services Themselves? 
Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System.” American Economic 
Review 93(4): 1313–1327. 
Blundell, Richard, and Monica Costa-Dias. 2009. “Alternative Approaches to 
Evaluation in Empirical Microeconomics.” Journal of Human Resources
44(3): 565–640. 
Boockmann, Bernhard, Stephan Thomsen, and Thomas Walter. 2009. “Intensi-
fying the Use of Benefit Sanctions—An Effective Tool to Shorten Welfare 
Receipt and Speed Up Transitions to Employment?” Unpublished manu-
script. Universität Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany. 
Burtless, Gary. 1995. “The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and 
Policy Research.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2): 63–84. 
	 	 	
 
 
	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	  
  
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	
 	 	
	 	 	
	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	 	
490 Smith 
Burtless, Gary, and Larry Orr. 1986. “Are Classical Experiments Needed for 
Manpower Policy?” Journal of Human Resources 21(4): 606–639. 
Buurman, Margaretha, and Robert Dur. 2008. “Incentives and the Sorting of 
Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies.” IZA Discussion Paper 
No. 3847. Bonn: IZA. 
Calmfors, Lars. 1994. “Active Labour Market Policy and Unemployment: A
Framework for the Analysis of Crucial Design Features.” OECD Economic 
Studies 22: 7–47. 
Campuzano, Larissa, Mark Dynarski, Roberto Agodini, and Kristina Rall. 
2009. Effectiveness of Reading and Mathematics Software Products Find-
ings from Two Student Cohorts. NCEE 2009-4041. Washington, DC: Na-
tional Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, Institute 
of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education. 
Card, David, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber. 2009. “Active Labor Market 
Policy Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 4002. 
Bonn: IZA. 
Couch, Kenneth. 1992. “New Evidence on the Long-Term Effects of Employ-
ment Training Programs.” Journal of Labor Economics 10(4): 380–388. 
Dehejia, Rajeev, and Sadek Wahba. 1999. “Causal Effects in Nonexperimental 
Studies: Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs.” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association. 94(448): 1053–1062. 
———. 2002. “Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-experimental 
Causal Studies.” Review of Economics and Statistics 84(1): 151–161. 
Djebbari, Habiba, and Jeffrey Smith. 2008. “Heterogeneous Program Impacts: 
Experimental Evidence from the PROGRESA Program.” Journal of Econo-
metrics 145(1–2): 64–80. 
Dolton, Peter, and Jeffrey Smith. 2010. “The Econometric Evaluation of the 
New Deal for Lone Parents.” Unpublished manuscript. University of Mich-
igan, Ann Arbor. 
Doolittle, Frederick, and Linda Traeger. 1990. Implementing the National 
JTPA Study. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 
Eisenberg, Erik, Steven Glazerman, Martha Bleeker, Amy Johnson, Julieta 
Lugo-Gil, Mary Grider, and Sarah Dolfin. 2009. Impacts of Comprehensive 
Teacher Induction: Results from the Second Year of a Randomized Con-
trolled Study, NCEE 2009-4072. Washington, DC: National Center for Edu-
cation Evaluation and Regional Assistance, Institute of Education Sciences, 
U.S. Department of Education. 
Fraker, Thomas, and Rebecca Maynard. 1987. “The Adequacy of Comparison 
Group Designs for Evaluation of Employment-Related Programs.” Journal 
of Human Resources 22(2): 194–227. 
	 	 	 	 	  
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	  
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
 
 
	 	 	 	
	 	 	  
 
	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 	  
 
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
Improving Impact Evaluation in Europe 491 
Fredriksson, Peter, and Per Johansson. 2008. “Program Evaluation and Ran-
dom Program Starts.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 26(4): 
435–445. 
Friedlander, Daniel, and Philip Robins. 1995. “Evaluating Program Evalua-
tions: New Evidence on Commonly Used Nonexperimental Methods.” 
American Economic Review 85(4): 923–937. 
Glazerman, Steven, Daniel Mayer, and Paul Decker. 2005. “Alternative Routes 
to Teaching: The Impacts of Teach for America on Student Achievement 
and Other Outcomes.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 25(1): 
75–96. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 1996. Job Training Partnership 
Act: Long-Term Earnings and Employment Outcomes. Report HEHS-96-
40. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Greenberg, David, and Mark Shroder. 2004. Digest of the Social Experiments. 
3rd ed. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
Gregory, Amanda. 2000. “Problematizing Participation: A Critical Review of 
Approaches to Participation in Evaluation Theory.” Evaluation 6(2): 179– 
199. 
Heckman, James J., and Jaap Abbring. 2007. “Econometric Evaluation of So-
cial Programs, Part III: Distributional Treatment Effects, Dynamic Treat-
ment Effects, Dynamic Discrete Choice, and General Equilibrium Policy 
Evaluation.” In Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6B, James J. Heckman 
and Edward Leamer, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 5145–5303. 
Heckman, James J., Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey Smith. 2002. “The Perfor-
mance of Performance Standards.” Journal of Human Resources 37(4): 
778–811. 
Heckman, James J., Neil Hohmann, Jeffrey Smith, and Michael Khoo. 2000. 
“Substitution and Dropout Bias in Social Experiments: A Study of an In-
fluential Social Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2): 
651–694. 
Heckman, James J., and V. Joseph Hotz. 1989. “Choosing among Alternative 
Methods of Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of Man-
power Training.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 84(408): 
862–874. 
Heckman, James J., Hidehiko Ichimura, Jeffrey Smith, and Petra Todd. 1998. 
“Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data.” Econometrica
66(5): 1017–1098. 
Heckman, James J., and Alan Krueger. 2003. Inequality in America: What Role 
for Human Capital Policies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Heckman, James J., and Jeffrey Smith. 1995. “Assessing the Case for Social 
Experiments.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2): 85–110. 
	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	  
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	
 
 
 
 	 	 	
	
	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
492 Smith 
Heckman, James J., Robert LaLonde, and Jeffrey Smith. 1999. “The Econom-
ics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs.” In Handbook of 
Labor Economics, Volume 3A, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds. Am-
sterdam: North Holland, pp. 1865–2097. 
Heckman, James J., Jeffrey Smith, and Nancy Clements. 1997. “Making the 
Most Out of Programme Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting 
for Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts.” Review of Economic Studies
64(4): 487–535. 
Heckman, James J., Jeffrey Smith, and Christopher Taber. 1998. “Accounting 
for Dropouts in Evaluations of Social Programs.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 80(1): 1–14. 
Heckman, James J., and Edward Vytlacil. 2007a. “Econometric Evaluation of 
Social Programs, Part I: Causal Models, Structural Models and Economet-
ric Policy Evaluation.” In Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6B, James J. 
Heckman and Edward Leamer, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 4779–4874. 
———. 2007b. “Econometric Evaluation of Social Programs, Part II: Using 
the Marginal Treatment Effect to Organize Alternative Economic Estima-
tors to Evaluate Social Programs and to Forecast Their Effects in New En-
vironments.” In Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6B, James J. Heckman 
and Edward Leamer, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 4875–5144. 
Heinrich, Carolyn, Peter Mueser, Kenneth Troske, Kyung-Seong Jeon, and
Daver Kahvecioglu. 2009. “New Estimates of Public Employment and Train-
ing Program Net Impacts: A Nonexperimental Evaluation of the Workforce 
Investment Act Program.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 4569. Bonn: IZA. 
Hirano, Kei, Guido Imbens, Donald Rubin, and Xiao-Hua Zhou. 2000. “As-
sessing the Effect of an Influenza Vaccine in an Encouragement Design.” 
Biostatistics 1: 69–88. 
Hollenbeck, Kevin. 2009. “Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Net Impact Es-
timates and Rates of Return.” Unpublished manuscript. W.E. Upjohn Insti-
tute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI. See http://research.upjohn
.org/confpapers/2/ (accessed April 7, 2011). 
Hotz, V. Joseph, Guido Imbens, and Jacob Klerman. 2006. “Evaluating the 
Differential Effects of Alternative Welfare-to-Work Training Components: 
A Re-Analysis of the California GAIN Program.” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 24(3): 521–566. 
Imbens, Guido, and Jeffrey Wooldridge. 2009. “Recent Developments in the 
Econometrics of Program Evaluation.” Journal of Economic Literature
47(1): 5–86. 
Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education (IES). 2008. 
Rigor and Relevance Redux: Director’s Biennial Report to Congress. IES 
2009-6010. Washington, DC: IES. 
		 	  
 
	
	 	  
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	  
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Improving Impact Evaluation in Europe 493 
Johnson, George. 1980. “The Theory of Labor Market Intervention.” Econom-
ica 47(187): 309–329. 
Kluve, Jochen. 2006. “The Effectiveness of European Active Labor Market 
Policies.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 2018. Bonn: IZA. 
LaLonde, Robert. 1986. “Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Train-
ing Programs with Experimental Data.” American Economic Review 76(4): 
604–620. 
Lechner, Michael, Ruth Miquel, and Conny Wunsch. 2004. “Long-Run Effects 
of Public Sector Sponsored Training in West Germany.” IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 1443. Bonn: IZA. 
Lechner, Michael, and Jeffrey Smith. 2007. “What Is the Value Added by 
Caseworkers?” Labour Economics 14(2): 135–151. 
Levitt, Steven, and John List. 2009. “Field Experiments in Economics: The 
Past, the Present, and the Future.” European Economic Review 53(1): 1–18. 
Lise, Jeremy, Shannon Seitz, and Jeffrey Smith. 2004. “Equilibrium Policy Ex-
periments and the Evaluation of Social Programs.” NBER Working Paper 
No. 10283. Cambridge, MA: NBER. 
Miller, Cynthia, Helen Bewley, Verity Campbell-Barr, Richard Dorsett, Gayle 
Hamilton, Lesley Hoggart, Tatiana Homonoff, Alan Marsh, Kathryn Ray, 
James Riccio, and Sandra Vegeris. 2008. Employment Retention and Ad-
vancement (ERA) Demonstration: Implementation and Second-Year Im-
pacts for New Deal 25 Plus Customers in the UK. New York: MDRC. 
Munch, Jakob, Lars Skipper, and Svend Jespersen. 2008. “Costs and Benefits 
of Danish Active Labour Market Programmes.” Labour Economics 15(5): 
859–884. 
Osikominu, Aderonke. 2009. “Quick Job Entry or Long-Term Human Capi-
tal Development? The Dynamic Effects of Alternative Training Schemes.” 
Unpublished manuscript. Breisgau, Germany: Albert-Ludwigs Universität 
Freiburg. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2004. New Deal 25+ Evaluation Report No. 9. Lon-
don: Department for Employment and Learning. http://www.delni.gov.uk/ 
new_deal25plus_final_report.pdf (accessed November 20, 2010). 
Raaum, Oddbjørn, Hege Torp, and Tao Zhang. 2002. “Do Individual Pro-
gramme Effects Exceed the Costs? Norwegian Evidence on Long Run Ef-
fects of Labour Market Training.” Memorandum No. 15/2002. Oslo: De-
partment of Economics, University of Oslo. 
Radin, Beryl. 2006. Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, 
Complexity and Democratic Values. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univer-
sity Press. 
Riddell, Craig. 1991. “Evaluation of Manpower and Training Programs: The 
North American Experience.” In The Evaluation of Manpower, Training 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	  
 
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	  
	 	
 
	
	
 	 	 	 	 	  
494 Smith 
and Social Programs: The State of a Complex Art. Paris: OECD, pp. 43–72. 
Schochet, Peter, John Burghardt, and Sheena McConnell. 2006. National Job 
Corps Study and Longer-Term Follow-Up Study: Impact and Benefit-Cost 
Findings Using Survey and Summary Earnings Records Data, Final Re-
port. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research. 
———. 2008. “Does Job Corps Work? Impact Findings from the National Job 
Corps Study.” American Economic Review 98(5): 1864–1886. 
Sianesi, Barbara. 2004. “An Evaluation of the Swedish System of Active La-
bor Market Programs in the 1990s.” Review of Economics and Statistics
86(1): 133–155. 
Smith, Jeffrey. 2000. “A Critical Survey of Empirical Methods for Evaluating 
Employment and Training Programs.” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volks-
wirtschaft und Statistik 136(3): 247–268. 
———. 2004. “Evaluating Local Economic Development Policies: Theory 
and Practice.” In Evaluating Local Economic and Employment Develop-
ment: How to Assess What Works among Programmes and Policies, Alistair 
Nolan and Ging Wong, eds. Paris: OECD, pp. 287–332. 
Smith, Jeffrey, and Jonas Staghøj. 2009. “Using Statistical Treatment Rules 
for Assignment of Participants in Labor Market Programs.” Unpublished 
manuscript. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
Smith, Jeffrey, and Petra Todd. 2005a. “Does Matching Overcome LaLonde’s 
Critique of Nonexperimental Methods?” Journal of Econometrics 125(1– 
2): 305–353. 
———. 2005b. “Rejoinder.” Journal of Econometrics 125(1–2): 365–375. 
Svarer, Michael. 2007. “The Effect of Sanctions on the Job Finding Rate: Evi-
dence from Denmark.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 3015. Bonn: IZA. 
Todd, Petra, and Kenneth Wolpin. 2006. “Assessing the Impact of a School 
Subsidy Program in Mexico: Using a Social Experiment to Validate a Dy-
namic Behavioral Model of Child Schooling and Fertility.” American Eco-
nomic Review 96(5): 1384–1417. 
Trenholm, Christopher, Barbara Devaney, Kenneth Fortson, Melissa Clark, 
Lisa Quay, and Justin Wheeler. 2008. “Impacts of Abstinence Education on 
Teen Sexual Activity, Risk of Pregnancy, and Risk of Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 27(2): 255–276. 
  
Authors 
Burt S. Barnow is the Amsterdam Professor of Public Service and Eco-
nomics at the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration 
at George Washington University. 
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. 
Stephen H. Bell is an Abt Fellow and a principal associate/scientist in the 
Social and Economic Policy Division at Abt Associates Inc. 
Douglas J. Besharov is a professor at the University of Maryland’s School 
of Public Policy, where he teaches courses on poverty, welfare, children and 
families, policy analysis, program evaluation, and performance management, 
and he is director of the Welfare Reform Academy and the Center for Interna-
tional Policy Exchanges at the University of Maryland. 
Dianne Blank is an assistant director in the Education, Workforce, and 
Income Security Team of the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
William S. Borden is director of Mathematica’s Performance Management 
Group, which develops, tests, and implements high quality performance man-
agement systems. 
Phoebe H. Cottingham recently retired from the position of commis-
sioner of the National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 
within the U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences.
Paul T. Decker is president and chief executive officer at Mathematica 
Policy Research. 
Randall W. Eberts is president of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ-
ment Research. 
Cynthia M. Fagnoni recently retired as the managing director of the Edu-
cation, Workforce, and Income Security Team of the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office. 
495 
  
 
496 Authors 
Aaron Fichtner is assistant commissioner for Labor Planning and Analysis 
at the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development. When he 
wrote his chapter for this book, he was director of research and evaluation at 
the Heldrich Center for Workforce Development at Rutgers University. 
Laura Heald is an assistant director in the Education, Workforce, and In-
come Security Team of the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
David Heaney is senior vice president of MAXIMUS, Inc., which provides 
consulting, program management, and business process outsourcing solutions 
to government. 
Carolyn J. Heinrich teaches at and is the director of the University of
Wisconsin-Madison’s LaFollette School of Public Affairs; she is also an affili-
ated professor of economics and the Regina Loughlin Scholar. 
Kevin Hollenbeck is a senior economist and the vice president of the W.E 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and is the director of Upjohn Insti-
tute Publications. 
Wei-Jang Huang is a senior research analyst at the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research. 
Kyung-Seong Jeon is a research associate in the Department of Economics 
at the University of Missouri-Columbia. 
Haeil Jung is an assistant professor at Indiana University’s School of Pub-
lic and Environmental Affairs. 
Daver C. Kahvecioglu is a research associate at IMPAQ International in 
Columbia, MD, and he specializes in labor and health economics. 
Christopher King is director of and a senior research scientist at the Ray 
Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources, and a lecturer at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin’s Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, where 
he currently holds the Mike Hogg Professorship in Urban Management. 
Jacob A. Klerman is a principal associate in the Social and Economic Pol-
icy Division at Abt Associates Inc. 
David A. Long works with Abt Associates Inc. 
  
	 	 	
	 	
 
 
 
Authors 497 
Alberto Martini is an associate professor of statistics and public policy 
evaluation at the Università del Piemonte Orientale. 
Sheena McConnell is a senior fellow and associate director of research 
at Mathematica, specializing in policies to promote employment and strong 
families in disadvantaged populations. 
Peter R. Mueser is a professor in the Department of Economics and 
in the Harry S. Truman School of Public Affairs at the University of 
Missouri–Columbia. 
Larry L. Orr is currently an independent consultant and a member of the 
faculty of the Institute for Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins University. For-
merly he was the chief economist and the vice president of Abt Associates Inc. 
Maureen A. Pirog is the Rudy Professor of Public and Environmental Af-
fairs at Indiana University and is the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management. 
Peter Schochet is a senior fellow and senior economist at Mathematica, 
specializing in experimental and nonexperimental evaluations of interventions 
in education, employment, and welfare. 
Jeffrey Smith is a professor in the Department of Economics at the Univer-
sity of Michigan and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Kenneth R. Troske is the William B. Sturgill Professor of Economics, the 
Chair of the Economics Department, and the director of the Center for Busi-
ness and Economic Research at the University of Kentucky. 
Carl E. Van Horn is a professor at Rutgers’s Edward J. Bloustein School of 
Planning and Public Policy and is the founding director of the Heldrich Center 
for Workforce Development. 
Stephen A. Wandner is a visiting fellow at the Urban Institute and was 
formerly a senior economist at the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Michael Wiseman is a research professor of public policy, public admin-
istration, and economics at the George Washington University and a visiting 
scholar in the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.  

	   
  
 
  
  
 
 
	 	  
 
  
 
 
      
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
       
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
        
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
Index 
The italic letters f, n, and t following a page number indicate that the subject information 
of the heading is within a figure, note, or table, respectively, on that page. Double italics 
indicate multiple but consecutive elements. 
Accountability, 157, 171 
contractors and, 88, 107n4, 146–147, 
280 
performance measures, and WIA, 
64–75, 65t, 72f, 76nn4–5, 77n6, 
180, 201–202, 317, 347 
as WIA watchword, 12–13, 15, 64, 210 
See also U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 
ACF. See Administration for Children 
and Families, 309 
Active Labor Market Programs 
(ALMPs), evaluation of European,
contrasted with U.S. workforce 
programs, 41–43, 473–476, 479–
485, 488 
ADARE. See Administrative Data 
Research and Evaluation project 
Administrative data, 180 
collection of, 159, 168–169, 211, 
228n3, 321, 325, 464 
lesson from European countries on, 
473–474 
use of, 347, 369, 376–377, 442–443 
Administrative Data Research and 
Evaluation (ADARE) project, 83, 
107n12, 401n7 
ITA caps and experience of, 91, 107n7 
Adult education, workforce programs 
for, 349t 
Adult Education and Family Literacy Act 
(AEFLA) 
legislative funding of, 53t, 55, 277, 
282–283, 288 
states and, 279, 285t 
Adult programs 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act monies for, 1, 
45n2, 371 
common performance measures 
across WIA programs, 212–213, 
317 
earnings and, 373, 377–378, 381–388,
381f, 382f, 386ff, 393t, 401n14 
job tiers in, 7, 45n3, 59, 149, 278, 
318, 374 
participant survey of, 32, 34, 44 
performance measures for, 22, 
64, 65t, 233, 240–248, 245t–247t,
256t–257t, 295, 311n2 
services under WIA, 52t, 58–59, 
76nn1–2, 141, 374–375 
unemployment rate effect on, 236–
239, 245t–247t, 258–259n6, 
258nn4–5, 259nn7–10 
WIA funding stream for, 50, 61, 62t,
63, 156, 315 
workforce, studied across states, 
29–30, 349t, 352t, 353, 354t, 355, 
356t–357t, 358, 372, 377–379, 
380–388, 393, 393t, 394, 
401nn10–11, 448, 467n1 
AEFLA. See Adult Education and Family
Literacy Act 
AFDC. See Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children 
African-American workers, 129, 398t 
Age-earnings profiles, WIA training 
participants and, 365–366, 365t 
Agricultural areas, 204 
farm programs for (see Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act; 
National Farmworker Jobs 
Program [NFJP]) 
worker employment and training for, 
53t, 55, 317, 447 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), 217, 219, 319 
499 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
        
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
      
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
	 	  
 
500 Besharov and Cottingham 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), cont.
TANF and, 288, 289 
Alabama, 256t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
Alaska, 53t, 256t, 286 
ALMPs. See Active Labor Market 
Programs 
American Association of SNAP
Directors, forums, 305 
American Community Survey, 304 
American Public Human Services 
Association, HPB formula 
consultation with, 288, 289 
American Public Welfare Association, 
288 
American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, 170, 188 
appropriations for WIA programs in, 
1, 45n2, 51, 371, 400n1 
APPAM. See Association for Public 
Policy and Management 
Apprenticeships, workforce programs 
for, 349t 
AR (1) (autoregressive of order one) 
estimators, 420, 422t 
Arizona, 256t 
HPBs and, 285t, 293t 
Arkansas, 256t, 286 
Ashenfelter’s dip, earnings and, 377–
378, 419, 439, 439f 
Association for Public Policy and 
Management (APPAM), no analog
of, in Europe, 486 
Atlanta Regional Commission, vouchers 
and, 332–333 
Australia, assessment tool devised in, 
150 
Basic skills training, 33, 53t, 447 
contrasted with general education and
training, 114, 119 
effect of, on earnings, 385–387, 386ff,
391–392, 401n14 
need for, 117, 119, 124, 315 
Bayesian techniques, 304 
BEA. See Bureau of Economic Analysis 
under U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
Behavioral issues 
response to performance targets and, 
280–281, 298–299 
self-selection as, 419–420, 422t–423t,
427n3, 
Benefit-cost analyses, 394 
cost-effectiveness and, 466, 479 
impact evaluation improvement in 
Europe and, 473, 479–482 
methodology for, 361–365 
social, and WIA impacts, 29, 30, 31, 
353, 355–359, 356t–357t, 360n5, 
365–369, 394–395 
Berkeley Policy Associates, study by, 
341n1 
Bias 
conventional, and program design 
lessons, 35, 325, 414–415, 416, 416f 
difference-in-difference estimators 
and, 380, 390, 392, 393t, 394, 
401n12, 401n16, 420, 421, 
422t–423t, 437 
external validity and, 476–477 
regression discontinuity and, 459–
460, 463 
self-selection, with sources and 
methods, 36, 415–416, 419–420, 
425–426, 475–476 
Biotech Workforce Network, partners in, 
115–116, 123 
Blind and visually impaired 
rehabilitation, studied across 
states, 349t 
Block grants, 53t, 289 
BLS. See Bureau of Labor Statistics 
under U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL) 
Bonuses, 454 
downside of, 309–311 
qualification for, 228n1, 289–291 
size of, 281, 284t–285t 
See also High performance bonuses 
(HPBs) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
	 	
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Building Strong Families program, 456 
Bush, President George W., 
administration, 181, 203, 486 
budgets of, 182, 291 
USDOL assistance to states and, 159, 
282, 339 
Business associations, as labor market 
intermediaries, 135–136n2 
Businesses, 145, 147 
performance management model in, 
and competition, 181–184 
tension between, and governmental 
agencies, 143–144 
See also Private sector 
CAAs. See Career Advancement 
Accounts 
California, 256t, 286, 296, 481 
CET in San Jose, 124, 136n13 
regional partnership in San Francisco 
Bay area, 115–116 
Canada, 473, 484, 488n2 
Career Advancement Accounts (CAAs), 
28, 339 
Career Bridge (Web site), 163, 169 
Career education, workforce programs 
in, 349t 
Career Management Account 
Demonstration, dislocated workers
and, 333 
Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical 
Education Act. See Perkins Act 
CBTI. (See Community Based Training 
Initiative) 
Center for Employment Training (CET), 
124, 136n13 
randomized design used for youth by, 
434–435 
replication of, results, 135, 136n13 
Center for International Policy 
Exchanges, University of 
Maryland, 1, 45n1 
Center for Law and Social Policy, 83 
Certification 
ETPLs and, 86–88 
Index 501 
as performance measures in WIA, 64,
65t 
CET. See Center for Employment 
Training 
CETA. See Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act 
Chambers of commerce, 57, 135–136n2, 
366 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 
funding by, 113, 121, 127 
Child care subsidies, TANF and, 290, 
291, 293t 
Clinton, President Bill, administration, 
486 
Colleges and universities 
data collection from, 160–161, 163 
evaluations by, 136n8, 165 
skills training and, 119, 154 
See also Community colleges 
Colorado, 256t, 311n5 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
Community-based organizations, 147 
among labor market intermediaries, 
115, 135–136n2 
services provided by, 116, 127, 447 
Community Based Training Initiative 
(CBTI), USDOL funding of, 
119–120, 136n8 
Community colleges, 116, 163, 349t 
among labor market intermediaries, 
135–136n2 
customers of, 118, 136n7, 329, 330t 
ETPLs and, 87–88 
training delivered through, 115, 154, 
374, 452 
Community Development Block Grants, 
HUD administration of, 53t 
Community indicators, One-Stop 
performance measures as, 73 
Community Services Block Grants, low-
income families and, 53t 
Competition 
among One-Stop operators, 142–143 
Darwinian notion about, 181–182 
funding, for state infrastructures, 171,
203 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
	 	  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
	
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
       
 
  
  
 
502 Besharov and Cottingham 
Competition, cont. 
national, and high-level job skills, 
75–76 
private sector and, 143–144, 146 
U.S. government and think tanks, 
484–485 
Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA), 9, 407 
evaluations of, 35, 318–319, 408, 
433–434 
performance management system in, 
91, 212 
training fund recipients under, 3, 49, 
84t 
Connecticut, 256t, 376 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
Consumer report card (CRC) system 
recommendations for, 170, 171 
set-up by states, 157–158 
state strategies for, 162–169, 164t 
Web sites of, 166, 169 
Consumers of employment and training 
programs. See Participant rate; 
Participant status; Participant 
surveys 
Contractors, 206n3, 304, 401n7 
government, and profit caps, 146–147 
performance-based, and 
accountability, 88, 107n4, 280 
See also Training providers 
Cost-benefit analyses. See Benefit-cost 
analyses 
Council of State Administrators of 
Vocational Rehabilitation, federal-
state partnerships and, 197, 207n9 
Counseling services, 447, 450 
CPS. See Current Population Survey 
CRC system. See Consumer report card 
system 
Creaming the system, program operators 
and, 18, 99, 107n9, 181, 215, 
217–220, 280, 287, 299, 374 
Credentials, 375 
accreditation and oversight of, 154–
155 
adjusted performance targets for, 242t– 
243t, 244, 245t–247t, 247, 250t 
definition of, and USDOL, 68–69 
as performance measures in WIA, 64,
65t, 157t, 190–191 
Current Population Survey (CPS), 304, 
408 
Curriculum development, sector-driven 
training and, 124 
Customer satisfaction in WIA, 188, 278 
collaboration for, 117–118 
empowerment in, 317, 339 
performance measures for, 64, 65t,
76n5 
training outcomes reporting and, 
155–156 
Customized training, 113–137 
definition, 114–116 
effectiveness of, 90, 125–134, 126f,
131f, 135 
exception to ITA rule for, 89, 340–
341 
implementation of, 120–125 
introduction to, 9–11, 113–114 
rationalizing public involvement in, 
116–118 
role of, in WIA, 118–120 
unanswered questions about, 126f,
131f, 134–135 
Data issues, 192, 218, 281 
collection among, 4–6, 7, 46n6, 158, 
159, 160–161, 163, 168–169, 
188–189, 198, 201, 211, 228n3, 
425, 448, 464–466 
collection gaps among, 474, 480 
defining elements among, 189–191, 
194, 203 
quality of, 416–419, 426, 442, 475 
regression model choice among, 
186–187, 304, 436–437 
reliability among, 190–191, 194, 195,
206, 290–291, 317, 434 
reporting and validating among, 
194–195, 206–207n7, 206n5, 
207n8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
	 	
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
       
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
       
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Index 503 
Data issues, cont.
use among, 4, 7, 14, 15, 45–46n5, 64–
65, 179, 193, 203–205, 363, 369n3 
Deficit Reduction Act, TANF funding 
in, 291 
Delaware, 256t 
HPBs and, 285t, 293t 
Demand-driven training, 113, 115, 118, 
134 
Deming, W.E., quality control techniques 
of, 183 
Denmark, ALMP evaluations in, 480 
Design in evaluation research, 457, 483 
bias and, 35, 325, 414–415, 416, 416f,
425–426 
experiments and, 435–436, 441–443, 
454–457, 475–479 
nonexperimental methodologies and, 
436–437, 438–441, 443n7, 457–
458, 462–462 
regression discontinuity and, 421, 
423t, 424, 458–460, 463 
target determinations and, 450–453 
tests about, 437–438, 448 
See also Research treatment effects 
DHHS. See U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 
Disabled workers, 297, 349t 
adjusted performances target for, 
254t, 287 
efficient and effective services to, 
178, 186, 372 
as special hard-to-serve population, 
200–201, 228n1, 282 
training for, 52t–53t, 141 
Disadvantaged workers. See
Economically disadvantaged 
workers 
Dislocated Worker programs 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act monies for, 1, 
45n2, 371 
common performance measures 
across WIA programs, 212–213, 317 
earnings and, 373, 377–378, 388–392,
389ff, 393t 
job search assistance tests of, 27 
job tiers in, 7, 45n3, 59, 149, 278, 
318, 374 
participant survey of, 8, 32–34, 44–45 
performance measures for, 64, 65t,
193, 265, 266t–267t, 268t–270t 
services under, 52t, 58–59, 141, 374–
375 
unemployment rate effect on, 
236–239, 258–259n6, 258nn4–5, 
259–260n12, 259nn7–10, 265 
WIA funding stream for, 50, 61–63, 
62f, 63f, 315 
WIA impacts on, and research, 327–
328, 328–332, 330t–331t, 372 
workforce, studied across states, 29, 
31, 349t, 352t, 354t, 355, 
356t–357t, 358–359, 360n7, 372, 
377–379, 388–392, 393–394, 
393t, 401nn10–11, 448, 467n1 
District of Columbia, 256t, 286, 311n1 
U.S. government in, and think-tank 
competition, 484–485 
DOE. See U.S. Department of Education 
Earnings, 265, 315, 480 
adjusted performance targets for, 241,
242t–243t, 244, 245t–247t, 250t 
as JTPA performance measure, 39, 
358, 439f 
TANF and, 295, 311n2 
USDOL initiatives impact on, 121, 
129, 136n11 
WIA effects on, of disadvantaged 
adults, 318–319, 322t, 325–327, 
352t, 353, 354t, 355, 358–359, 
364f, 365f 
WIA effects on, of dislocated adults, 
327–332, 330t–331t 
as WIA performance measure, 4, 27, 
29–30, 45, 193–194, 233, 289 
EC. See European Commission 
Economic conditions, 236, 467 
adjusting performance targets for, 
234–235 
 
  
 
       
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
	 	  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
       
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
504 Besharov and Cottingham 
Economic Dislocation and Worker Eligible Training Provider Demonstration,
Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) 
Act, 327–328, 329 
Economic growth, 116, 133–134, 135 
Economically disadvantaged workers 
adjusted performance targets for, 279,
287 
CETA and, 433–434 
customized training and good jobs 
for, 113, 115, 116, 129 
enrollment challenges with, 123, 
136n12, 317 
impacts of WIA programs on, post-
1995 evidence, 319–327, 
322t–324t, 355 
impacts of WIA programs on, pre-
1995 evidence, 318–319 
ITAs problems with, 89, 98 
under JTPA, 8, 9, 49 
low human capital of, 407, 408 
mandatory WIA programs for, 
52t–53t 
older workers as, 53t, 55, 104, 178, 
200–201, 282 
Education institutions 
among labor market intermediaries, 
135–136n2 
distance learning and, 135n1 
placement in, 202–203 
postsecondary, and ITA choices, 15 
short-term occupational training 
delivered through, 154 
WIB representatives from, 147 
See also Colleges and universities; 
Technical schools 
Education Sciences Reform Act, 436, 
443n6 
Educational attainment, 222, 265 
as personal attribute, 281, 287 
SEI participants and, 129, 136–
137n14 
U.S. workforce and, 117, 236, 254t 
Educational software, experimental 
evaluation of, 479 
EDWAA. See Economic Dislocation and 
Worker Adjustment Assistance 
ITA evaluation and, 316 
Eligible training provider lists (ETPLs) 
in WIA, 3, 83, 153–171 
factors contributing to 
implementation of, 168–169 
implementation challenges, 60, 159–
162, 317 
implications and future directions, 
104, 170–171 
introduction to, 13–15, 153–156 
outcome reporting on training 
programs, 154–156, 157t 
provisions for, 86–88, 156–159, 157t,
333–334 
state strategies for, 60, 162–168, 164t 
waivers for, 3, 60, 159 
Employees 
current and new, and customized 
training, 125–132, 126f 
job history of, as personal attribute, 
236, 265 
WIA effects on disadvantaged adults 
as, 322t–324t, 325 
WIA effects on dislocated adults as, 
327–328, 330t–331t 
Employers, 125, 193, 315 
as customers, 49, 57–58, 58f, 64, 65t,
135n2, 145 
customized training and, 130–133, 
131f 
in-house training provided by, 9–10, 
113 
skills training investments by, 116–
117, 156 
WIA engagement of, 11–12, 141–142,
144 
Employment and Training 
Administration. See U.S. 
Department of Labor (USDOL), 
Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA) 
Employment and training programs. See
Federal employment and training 
programs; State employment and 
training programs 
 
     
 
  
 
      
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 	    
 
	 	
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
	 	  	 	 		
	
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 	   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
	 	     
  
  
  
  
 
Index 505 
Employment Retention and 
Advancement Demonstration, UK,
485 
Employment Service (ES), 461 
legislative funding of, 52t, 55–56, 74, 
374 
performance measurement system for,
178, 206n1, 258n3 
program operators’ improvement buy-
in under, 197–198, 207n10 
recordkeeping in each state by, 29, 31,
321, 325, 347, 363, 369n3, 376 
Employment services—neither easy nor 
cheap, 447–467 
constructing comparative groups, 453 
data collection, 464–466 
evaluation of program components, 
450–453 
experiment design, 454–457 
introduction to, 38–41, 447–448 
nonexperimental design, 457–458, 
462–462 
policy and programmatic decisions 
affected by evaluation, 448–450 
propensity score matching methods, 
460–462 
recommendations, 466–467 
regression discontinuity design, 
458–460 (see also under
Regression methods) 
See also Design in evaluation research 
Entrepreneurial services, 39, 435, 447 
evaluation of, and USDOL, 448, 449 
ES. See Employment Service 
ESF. See European Social Fund 
ETA. See U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL), Employment and 
Training Administration 
ETPLs. See Eligible training provider 
lists in WIA 
EU. See European Union 
European Association of Labor 
Economists, useful role for, 486 
European Commission (EC) 
lessons for, 225–228, 441, 486–487 
workforce programming meeting for, 
1–2, 43–45, 45n1 
European Social Fund (ESF), 473 
allocations by, 2, 447, 451 
counterfactual determination by, 
452–453 
guidance to, 81, 102, 106, 177, 488 
European Union (EU), 447 
impact evaluations in, 448, 473, 485 
recommendations for, 466–467 
See also specific countries within, 
e.g., Germany 
Ex-offenders, 317, 448, 450 
Family indicators, 73, 456 
child care subsidies as, 290, 291, 293t 
as HPB award criteria, 290, 
293t–294t, 295 
Young Parents Demonstration, 435, 
443n3 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, 
authorized FSP/SNAP HPBs 
under, 299 
Federal Education Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA), 161, 171 
Federal employment and training 
programs 
evaluation of, and policy 
implications, 448–453 (see also
Design in evaluation research) 
FSET, 348, 349t 
management of, 177, 205–206, 210–
211, 228n2 
outcomes of, 150, 153 
rationale for, as public good, 117, 
133–134 
relative burden of, requirements, 
199–201 
shift in how, are provided, 49–50, 
407–408 
U.S. fragmentation in, and funding, 
189, 371, 400n1 
See also Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA); Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA); 
Manpower Development and 
Training Act (MDTA); Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA) 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
     
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
	 	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
506 Besharov and Cottingham 
FERPA. See Federal Education Rights 
and Privacy Act 
FETPIP. See Florida Education and 
Training Placement Information 
Program 
Financial performance incentives. See
Performance incentives as financial 
Florida, 81, 91, 181, 256t 
CRC and ETPL implementation 
strategies in, 162, 168–170 
ETPLs in, 14, 87, 164t 
FSP HPBs awarded to, 302t, 303 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t, 287t 
local workforce areas studied in, 84t,
85, 98–99, 103 
supplemental performance measures 
in, 95, 107n14 
Florida Education and Training 
Placement Information Program 
(FETPIP), 168 
FNS. See U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition 
Service 
Food Stamp Employment and Training 
(FSET). See under Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program 
Food Stamp Program (FSP). See
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) 
Fringe benefits, 366 
FSET. See Food Stamp Employment and 
Training. See under Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program 
GAIN program, California, 481 
Gaming the system, performance 
measures and, 94, 107n13, 189, 
214–215, 222–224, 229n13, 287, 
299, 310 
GAO. See U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 
GDP. See Gross Domestic Product 
Gender 
earnings by, 320–321, 358–359 
net benefits per WIA enrollee by, 
322t–324t, 330t–331t 
General education and training, 114, 119 
Georgia, 256t 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 292t, 302t, 303 
Germany, ALMPs and, 481, 484, 487 
Globalization, 315, 407 
international trade and, 116, 136nn4–5 
Governance issues, 171 
One-Stop centers and, 54, 147–149 
Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA), 73–74, 77n6, 187, 
216, 258n1 
adjusted performance targets and, 
249, 250t, 251f, 252f, 253f 
requirements of, 209, 211–212 
Governmental agencies, 155, 277 
power sharing among, 177, 210, 
228n2, 289 
program benefits to, vs. customers, 
477–478 
ROI and, 180–181 
state, and WIA, 159–162, 166, 169, 
195–196, 233–234 
tension between, and businesses, 
143–144 
GPRA. See Government Performance 
and Results Act 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), total 
trade as percent of, 136n4 
Growing America through 
Entrepreneurship. See Project 
GATE 
Hard-to-serve populations, 200–201, 
224, 228n1, 282, 297 
adjusting performance targets to 
personal attributes of, 234–235 
incentives and, 219, 286–287 
See also specifics, e.g., Ex-offenders; 
Older workers; Veterans 
Hawaii, 53t, 204, 256t 
HPBs and, 286, 292t 
High Growth Training Initiative (HGTI) 
informed sector choice and, 120–121 
USDOL funding of, 119–120 
High performance bonuses (HPBs) 
consequences of, 286–288, 298–299 
 
  
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
	 	
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
  
 
  
 
	 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
	 	
 
  
 
 
	 	  
 
       
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Index 507 
High performance bonuses (HPBs), cont.	 
declining funding for, 282–283 
formulas for, 283, 286, 288, 289 
issues with, 280–281, 291, 295–298, 
303–306 
lessons learned from, 306–309 
variation in receipt of, 283, 284t–285t,
286, 287t, 296, 302t, 303 
High school dropouts, skills gap and, 
117, 254t, 265 
Hispanic workers, 129, 398t, 401nn15–
16, 450 
Homeless workers, as hard-to-serve 
population, 200–201, 228n1, 282 
HPBs. See High performance bonuses 
HUD. See U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development 
Idaho, 256t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 286 
IES. See Institute of Education Sciences 
Illinois, 236, 256t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t, 287t 
Impact estimates and rates of return for 
WIA, 347–369 
conclusions, 359–360 
introduction to, 29–32, 347–348 
methodologies for, 361–369, 364f,
365f 
programs, outcomes, and time 
periods, 348–350, 349t, 351t 
summary, 350–359, 351t, 352t, 354t,
356t–357t 
See also Rates of return (ROR) 
Impact evaluation and reliable design, 
431–443 
current consensus with its challenges 
for, 435–437 
feasible and affordable experiments, 
441–443 
introduction to, 36–38, 431–432 
nonexperimental approach to, not 
working, 38, 438–441, 439f 
nonexperimental estimates vs.
experimental benchmarks, 437–
438, 476 
overview of training impact 
evaluations, 432–435 
See also Design in evaluation 
research 
Impact evaluation improvement in 
Europe, 473–489 
concluding remarks, 488 
cost-benefit analysis, 479–482, 488 
experimentation, 475–479, 488 
introduction to, 41–43, 473–475 
organizing evaluation, 483–487, 488 
Impact evaluation methods, 483, 488n2 
experimental vs. nonexperimental 
approaches, 425–426, 431–432, 
437–438, 476 
fitting methodology to the question, 
409–414, 411f 
studies in multiple states and, 347, 
359, 376, 379–380 
validity of, 462–464, 476–477 
In-house training 
research on, 9–10, 132 
See also On-the-job training (OJT) 
Incentives, 219, 228n4 
impact of, and JTPA services, 220–221 
market mechanisms and, 91–97, 
99–100, 107n15 
SDAs and, 217, 220–221, 222–224 
See also Performance incentives as 
financial 
Income groups, 49, 380, 417 
low-, in workforce (see Economically
disadvantaged workers) 
Indiana, 81, 84t, 88, 256t, 296 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
supplemental performance measures 
in, 95, 96 
WIA impact estimation in, 29–30, 
350–353, 352t, 354t, 355, 
356t–357t, 358–359, 360n3, 376 
workforce development programs in, 
348–350, 349t, 351t, 360n1 
Individual training accounts (ITAs), 
333–338, 336t 
among market mechanisms, 88–91, 
97, 98, 100, 103–104 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
       
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
        
 
       
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
	 	
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
	 	
 
  
  
 
508 Besharov and Cottingham 
Individual training accounts (ITAs), cont.	 
approaches of choice in, 334–335, 
335t, 337–338, 340–341 
early studies on, 28, 83, 316, 321 
ETPLs and, 333–334 
evaluations of, 435, 450 
outcome measures for, recipients, 
156–158, 157t 
pre-, tiers include both core and 
intensive services, 149, 317, 374 
training options for those with, 13, 
15, 34, 333–335, 337–338 
WIA training funds as, 3, 8–9, 59, 
153, 332, 375 
Institute of Education Sciences (IES), 479 
interventions by, 476–477 
leadership of, 486–487 
Integrated Performance Improvement 
(IPI) project, 95–97, 104 
Iowa, 256t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t, 287t 
IPI. See Integrated Performance 
Improvement 
ITAs. See Individual training accounts 
Jewish Vocational Service, Boston, 127 
Job Corps program, 219 
evaluation of, 39, 434, 442, 448, 
449–450, 451 
impact of, and performance measures,
221–222, 229n11 
as mandatory WIA program, 52t, 55, 
371, 447 
Job placement, 218 
customized training and, 90, 125 
mandatory WIA programs for, 
52t–53t 
TANF and, 289, 291, 292t–293t, 295 
as WIA performance measure, 4, 155,
157t, 193, 203, 289, 291, 295 
Job retention, 447 
adjusted performance targets for, 241,
242t–243t, 244, 245t–247t, 250t,
295 
TANF and, 289, 291, 292t–293t 
turnover vs., 117, 136n6 
as WIA performance measure, 4, 
157t, 193, 233–234, 238, 258n5, 
289 
Job search assistance (JSA), 27, 447, 454 
earnings and employment with, 322t,
328, 342n3 
Job seekers, 27, 52t, 56 
as customers, 135n2, 155, 169, 210 
as self-served customers, 5, 7, 60, 67 
service of choice for, 49, 88–89, 317, 
333 
tiered services for, 59, 82, 149, 278, 
374 
WIA programs for, 3, 7, 8, 44, 45n3, 
76nn1–2, 156, 233, 235 
WIBs and service delivery to, 144–
145, 149–150 
Job Service, recordkeeping and data 
from, 363, 369n3 
Job skills, 57, 315 
firm-specific, in training programs, 
114–116, 119 
high, and national competitiveness, 
75–76, 116 
See also Basic skills training 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 407 
access to services of, 8, 13–14, 49 
evaluations of, 27, 37, 224–225, 318, 
349t, 372–373, 394, 408–409, 
434, 450, 489n5 
incentives impact on services 
provided by, 220–221 
participant survey costs of, 45–46n5 
performance management in, 6–7, 
91–92, 107n4, 107n8, 212, 228n5, 
228nn1–2, 235, 258n2, 480 
regression model of, 186–187 
replacements for, 2, 3, 50, 192, 315, 
327 
training fund recipients under, 3, 156 
voucher use under, 332–333 
See also National JTPA Study (NJS) 
John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce 
Development, Rutgers University, 
training outcomes calculated by, 
165 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 	   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
      
 
  
 	   
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
Index 509 
Johns Hopkins University, CBTI 
evaluation by, 136n8 
JSA. See Job search assistance 
JTPA. See Job Training Partnership Act 
Kansas, 256t 
HPB eligibility of, 285t, 286 
Katz, Larry, 486 
Kentucky, 81, 256t, 376 
efficacy of WPRS-mandated JSA
services in, 328, 459, 478 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t, 287t 
Krueger, Alan, 486 
Labor Exchange. See Employment 
Service (ES) 
Labor force. See entries beginning
Workforce... 
Labor market conditions. See Economic 
conditions 
Labor market information (LMI), among 
market mechanisms, 85–86, 97–
98, 103, 106 
Labor market intermediaries, 115, 
135–136n2 
Labor unions. See Trade unions 
Language skills, in hard-to-serve 
populations, 200, 228n1, 282, 317 
Layoffs. See Dislocated Worker program 
Lessons learned 
conventional bias and, 414–416, 416f 
cost and efficiency in, 227 
EC guidance and, 225–228 
HPB programs and, 306–309 
stakeholder input needed, 227–228 
WIA performance measures and, 
209–229 
Literacy training, 191, 201, 279, 315, 
317, 349t 
legislative funding of, 53t, 55, 277 
LMI. See Labor market information 
Local responsibilities, 57, 317 
decision-making as, 6, 21, 49, 90, 93, 
167, 374 
governance and, 6, 21, 49, 90, 93, 
167, 372 
negotiation with states as, 235, 255 
WIB provision as, 3–4, 11–12, 54, 
116, 158 
workforce development planning and 
operations, 113, 206n3, 317, 318 
Louisiana, 81, 256t 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 292t 
Low-income workers. See Economically 
disadvantaged workers 
Maine, 256t 
HPBs and, 284t, 286, 293t 
Manpower Demonstration Research 
Corporation (MDRC), 37, 448, 
485 
Manpower Development and Training 
Act (MDTA), 49, 219, 407 
evaluations of, 35, 36, 318–319, 408, 
432–433 
Manufacturing sector, high-skill and 
high-wage workers in, 193, 315 
Marginal treatment effect (MTE), 
regression model of, 421, 423t,
424, 478–479 
Market mechanisms 
ITAs, 88–91, 97, 98, 100, 103–104 
LMI, 85–86, 97–98, 103, 106 
performance standards and incentives,
91–97, 99–100, 107n15 
provider certification, 86–88, 97, 
100, 104, 107n16 (see also
Eligible training provider lists 
(ETPLs) in WIA) 
ROI in evaluation of, 101–102 
Market mechanisms use in WIA, 81–107,
84t 
conclusions, 97–102 
introduction to, 6–9, 81–82 
key findings about, 85–97 
recommendations for, 102–106 
Maryland, 87, 256t, 376 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 302t 
local workforce areas studied in, 84t,
90 
supplemental performance measures 
in, 94, 96 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
      
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
510 Besharov and Cottingham 
Massachusetts, 256t, 449 
dislocated worker funding stream in, 
63, 63f 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
sectoral employment sites in Boston, 
127–130 
Mathematica Policy Research 
educational clearinghouse operated 
by, 477, 488n4 
ETA study funding to, 89–90, 
107nn5–6 
as evaluation contractor, 206n1, 304, 
342n5, 448 
MDRC. See Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation 
MDTA. See Manpower Development and
Training Act 
Medicaid, 206n1 
data collection for, 293t, 296 
impact and ROR of, 347, 350, 353, 368 
as TANF bonus criterion, 290, 291 
Mexico, 476, 488n1 
Michigan, 236, 256t 
ETPLs problems in, 87–88 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
ITA cap in, 90–91 
local workforce areas studied in, 84t,
85 
program effectiveness in, and 
competition, 181–182 
Michigan Thumb Area Employment and 
Training Consortium, vouchers 
and, 333 
Migrant workers, employment and 
training for, 53t, 55, 447 
Minnesota, 256t, 376 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
Minorities, 129, 450 
barriers to employment for, 401nn15–
16 
WIA program participants as, 378, 
398t 
Mississippi, 256t, 284t, 311n5, 376 
Missouri, 84t, 88, 91, 256t 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 302t 
impact evaluations in, 359, 376 
Monopolies, business model of, 181–184 
Montana, 256t, 376 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 302t 
Mott Foundation. See Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation 
MTE. See Marginal treatment effect 
National Academy of Sciences, 
nonexperimental methodologies 
and, 436–437 
National Association of State Workforce 
Agencies, federal-state 
partnerships and, 197, 207n9 
National Commission for Employment 
Policy (NCEP), JTPA performance
standards and, 224–225 
National Directory of New Hires 
(NDNH) 
data collected by, 296–297, 298, 
308–309 
job entry data in, 291, 292t, 295, 
311n2 
Social Security numbers and, 290–
291 
National Emergency Grants, USDOL
and, 61, 76n3 
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 
Strategies, workforce development
programs and, 121, 136n11 
National Evaluation of WIA
Implementation, USDOL study, 
316 
National Farmworker Jobs Program 
(NFJP), 206n1 
Bush administration and, 182, 
206nn1–2 
program operators’ improvement buy-
in under, 197–198, 207n10 
National Governors Association, 120 
HPB formula consultation with, 288, 
289 
performance improvement and, 84, 
95, 107n15 
National Job Corps Study, 450, 456 
cost-benefit test in, 479–481 
impacts of, 452, 481 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
     
 
      
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
	
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Index 511 
National Job Corps Study, cont.
multiple sites and controls in, 441–
442 
residential and nonresidential 
participants, 451, 456 
time to conduct, 456–457 
National JTPA Study (NJS), 220, 453, 
476, 481 
earnings impact and, 358, 438–439, 
439f, 443n8 
efficacy evidence in, 319–321, 479 
gaming evidence in, 222–224, 229n13 
workers excluded from, 327–328, 434 
National Science Foundation, evaluation 
funding by, 483 
National Supported Work (NSW) 
Demonstration, 319, 454 
data from, 409, 462 
Native Americans 
employment and training for, 53t, 447 
food assistance to, 303–304 
program operators’ improvement buy-
in for, 197–198, 207n10 
NCEP. See National Commission for 
Employment Policy 
NDNH. See National Directory of New 
Hires 
Nebraska, 256t 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 302t 
Netherlands, The, program evaluation 
in, 487 
Nevada, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 285t, 286 
New Hampshire, 257t 
HPBs and, 284t, 286, 293t 
New Jersey, 257t, 286 
CRC and ETPL implementation 
strategies in, 162, 165–166, 168–
171 
ETPLs in, 14, 164t 
UI Reemployment Demonstration in, 
327–328, 342n3, 449 
New Mexico, 257t, 286, 376 
New York State, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 285t, 286 
SEI site in NYC, 127–130 
NFJP. See National Farmworker Jobs 
Program 
NJS. See National JTPA Study 
Nonexperimental evaluation of future 
employment and training 
programs, 407–427 
conventional bias and lessons, 414–
416, 416f 
counterfactual construction, 416–419,
433 
discussion and conclusion, 422t–423t,
424–427 
fitting methodology to the question, 
409–414, 411f 
introduction to, 34–36, 407–409 
new nonexperimental methods, 421–
424, 422t–423t 
self-selection bias sources and 
methods, 419–420 
Nonexperimental evaluation of past WIA
programs, 325, 371–401 
conclusions and implications, 340, 
392–395, 393f 
introduction to, 32–34, 371–373, 
400n3 
overview of adult and dislocated 
worker programs, 373–380, 398t–	 
399 
results of impact evaluation for adult 
programs, 380–388, 381f, 382f,
386ff 
results of impact evaluation for 
dislocated worker programs, 
388–392, 389ff 
Nonprofit organizations, 160 
as third sector, 143–144 
training delivered through, 154, 374 
North America. See Canada; United 
States 
North Carolina, 256t, 311n5 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
North Dakota, 256t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t, 287t 
Norway, ALMP evaluations in, 480, 487 
NSW. See National Supported Work 
Demonstration 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
	 	  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
	 	
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 	
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
512 Besharov and Cottingham 
Obama, President Barack, administration,
151 
2010 budget of, 234, 248–249, 251f,
252f, 253f, 258n1, 259n12 
Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET), LMI and, 86 
Occupational training, 86, 117, 333 
funding of, 2, 154 
WIA Adult program and, 52t, 60, 153 
Ohio, 257t, 285t 
program effectiveness in, and 
competition, 181–182 
OJT. See On-the-job training 
Oklahoma, 257t 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 302t 
Older workers, 178, 329 
barriers to employment for, 401nn15–
16 
as economically disadvantaged, 53t,
55, 104, 178, 200–201, 282 
See also Senior Community Service 
Employment Program (SCSEP) 
OMB. See U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget 
On-the-job training (OJT), 33, 89, 90, 
116 
classroom vs., programs, 320, 322t,
328, 342n3 
firm-specific skills with, 114, 119 
See also In-house training 
One-Stop Career Centers 
consolidation of, 2–3, 17, 26, 50–58, 
52t–53t, 58f, 372 
data collection from, 4–5, 7, 458–459 
governance of, 54, 372 
infrastructure of, 55–56, 166, 206n3, 
316, 480–481 
new role of, 6, 8, 33, 150 
performance measures for, 71–73 
pre-WIA development of, 81–82 
regional partnership with, in San 
Francisco Bay area, 116 
services at, 85, 450 
supervision of, 3–4, 11–12, 44, 101, 
118 
WIB representatives from, 147 
One-Stop systems management, 141–152 
challenge of stereotypes in, 143–145 
conclusions, 151–152 
efficiencies sought in, 142, 143, 149 
fiscal considerations in, 145–147 
governance and, 147–149 
introduction to, 11–13, 141–143 
performance measures in, 149–150, 
182 
WIA principles in, 141–142, 151–152 
O*NET. See Occupational Information 
Network 
Opportunity costs, ROR calculation and, 
347, 355 
Oregon, 88, 95, 257t, 284t 
local workforce areas studied in, 84t,
98–99, 103 
Portland, site in National Evaluation 
of Welfare-to-Work Strategies 
evaluation, 121, 125, 136n11 
Paperwork Reduction Act, requirements 
of, 199 
Participant rates, 303–304, 336t 
Participant status 
achieving enrollment for, 123–124 
(see also Creaming the system) 
active duration before program exit, 
375, 401n6, 401n9 
barriers to, as personal attribute, 
17–18, 236, 297, 401nn15–16 
customer satisfaction measures for, 
64, 65t 
definition of, as WIA mandate, 5, 
92–90 
program benefits to, vs. agency 
providers, 477–478 
types of, 413, 427n2, 435 
Participant surveys, 188, 417 
costs of, 45–46n5, 65, 228n3, 442 
WIA adult and dislocated workers in, 
32–34 
Partnerships, 115, 127, 182, 462 
federal-state, for employment 
training, 197, 207n9 
performance measures for, 73, 142 
 
 
        
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
	 	  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
       
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
       
 
      
 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Partnerships, cont.
public-private, for employment 
training, 10, 24, 56, 118, 122–123,
136n3 
Pathways to Work program, UK, 183, 
204 
Pennsylvania, 257t 
early implementation of WIA in, 
81–82 
HPBs and, 285t, 286, 293t 
Per Scholas, NYC, 127 
Performance improvement, 183 
continuous, and review of existing 
evidence, 151–152 
HPBs and, 297–298, 305 
IPI project, 95–97, 104 
manipulation of, 191–192, 222–224 
National Governors Association and, 
84, 95, 107n15 
Performance incentives as financial, 
277–311 
conclusions, 309–311 
creaming and, 18, 99, 107n9, 181, 
215, 217–220, 280 
feedback for improvement and, 297–
298 
introduction to, 23–25, 277–278 
lessons learned from HPB programs, 
298–299, 306–309 
SNAP high performance bonuses, 
299–306, 302t 
TANF high performance bonuses, 
288–299, 292t–294t 
WIA high performance bonuses, 
278–288, 284t–285t, 287t, 298–
299, 311n4 
See also High performance bonuses 
(HPBs) 
Performance management 
adjustments in, 20–21, 93, 107nn10–
12 
data collection for, 4–6, 7, 46n6 
effective, and its costs, 187–196 
fear and resistance to, 198–201, 206, 
212 
goals of, 180–181 
Index 513 
introduction to WIA, 6, 12, 15–25, 44 
outcomes in, 185–187, 191–192, 196,
205 
standard definitions required for, 
15–17, 180 
standards and incentives in, 91–97 
workforce investment effects of, 
216–225 
Performance measure advancement in 
federal programs, 233–274 
differences in labor market conditions
and personal attributes, 235–240 
estimation, 240–248, 241f, 242t–243t,
245t–247t 
introduction to, 21–22, 233–234 
national performance targets and, 
248–249, 250t, 251f, 252f, 253f,
254tt 
performance adjustment procedures, 
248–255, 250t, 251f, 252f, 253f,
254tt 
state performance targets and, 249, 
251–255, 254tt, 256t–257t 
summary, 255, 256t–257t, 258 
Performance measure lessons from WIA, 
209–229 
adjustments to performance 
standards, 213–216, 226, 228nn7–8 
caution needed on rewards and 
sanctions, 226–227 
distinctive terminology in, 209–211, 
225–226 
introduction to, 18–21, 209–211 
lessons for the European 
Commission, 225–228 
performance management effects in 
workforce investment, 216–225 
program impact and, 221–222, 
229n11 
U.S. workforce development 
programs and, 194, 211–213 
Performance measurement challenges, 
177–207 
analysis framework for management 
issues, 179–187 
conclusions about, 205–206 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
        
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
	 	
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
514 Besharov and Cottingham 
Performance measurement challenges, 
cont.
effective management and its costs, 
178, 187–196 
introduction to, 15–18, 177–179 
reporting and validating data, 194–195 
stakeholder involvement in, 196–202 
WIA performance system, 5, 202–205 
Performance measures in WIA, 64–75, 93 
accountability and, 64–66, 65t, 76n4, 
210 
common, across programs, 212–213, 
317 
data for, 67–70 
definitions for, 184–185, 194, 203, 
206n4 
gaming the system and, 94, 107n13, 
189, 214–215, 222 
goals of, 66–67, 147, 233 
local and state supplements to federal,
70–73, 93, 94–97, 149–150 
participant characteristics as, 210, 
228n1 
relative burden of federal 
requirements, 199–201 
sanctions and, 66, 73–74, 205–206, 
210 
USDOL uniform reporting and, 
74–75, 226 
Performance standards 
adjustments to, 105, 107n17, 213–
216, 228nn7–8, 234 
among market mechanisms, 91–97 
JTPA and, 224–225, 480 
locally determined in SDAs, 6, 21 
Perkins Act 
states and, 279, 285t 
vocational education funded by, 53t,
277, 282, 283 
Personal attributes 
adjusting performance targets for, 
234–235, 252–253, 254tt, 281 
data source for, 236, 239–240, 261–
263, 377 
WIA Adult participants, 242t–243t,
355, 378–379, 398t–399t 
Personal reemployment accounts 
(PRAs), 28, 338, 342n6 
Personal responsibilities, 49, 117 
Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), 288, 289 
DHHS mandates for, 436, 443n5 
Policy implications, 467, 482 
appropriate methodology for 
questions considered in, 409–414, 
448–453 
data quality and advice with, 426, 441 
WIA studies and, 359, 395 
Political support, social experiments and, 
454, 486–487 
Poverty, estimates of, 304 
PRAs. See Personal reemployment 
accounts 
Private sector, 181, 374 
funding by foundations in, 113, 114 
One-Stop management and, 141–152 
partnerships with, 10, 24, 56, 115–
116, 122–123, 317, 339, 342n7 
performance-based payments to, 
182–183 
role in policy guidance for, 49, 118 
WIB representatives from, 4, 11–12, 
147 
See also Businesses 
Productivity, customized training and, 
137n15 
Progresa, Mexico, 476 
Project GATE, 435, 454 
Propensity score matching (PSM), as 
regression model, 421, 423t, 436, 
437, 460–462 
PRWORA. See Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act 
PSM. See Propensity score matching 
Public assistance, 482 
goals of, 296, 305 
recipients of, and job training 
programs, 49, 52t–53t, 141, 228n4 
welfare-to-work programs and, 12, 
121, 129, 136n11, 282, 349t, 436 
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Public assistance, cont.	 
See also specific programs, e.g., Aid 
to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC); Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP); Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) 
Public/Private Ventures (organization), 
early WIA implementation study 
by, 83, 127 
Public sector 
privatization of, services, 182–183 
service quality and, 143–144 
See also Governmental agencies 
Puerto Rico, 204, 286 
adjusted performance targets for, 
257t, 259–260n12 
Quality movement, 183 
buy-in from program operators, 197–
198, 207n10 
Quantum Opportunities Program, 
randomized design used in, 434–
435 
Race, as personal attribute, 281, 287 
Rates of return (ROR) 
calculation of, 347, 353, 355, 
356t–357t, 358–359 
workforce development programs 
across states, 353, 355–359, 
356t–357t 
Regression discontinuity design (RDD), 
421, 423t, 424, 437, 458–460, 463 
Regional Workforce Boards, Florida 
WIBs known as, 168 
Regression estimators 
AR (1) type, 420, 421, 422t 
“kitchen sink” type, 421, 422t 
Regression models, 304 
discontinuity design in, 421, 423t,
424, 437, 458–460, 463 
JTPA and, 186–187, 217 
MTE, 421, 423t, 424 
performance adjustment and, 215–
216, 240–241 
PSM, 421, 423t, 436, 437, 460–462 
See also under Bias, difference-in-
differences estimators and; 
Research treatment effects 
Rehabilitation, under DOE, 53t 
Rehabilitation services, workforce 
programs for, 349t 
Research history of WIA, 178, 315–342, 
341n1 
conclusion, 332–342, 335t, 336t 
impacts of WIA-like programs on 
dislocated workers in, 327–332, 
330t–331t 
impacts of WIA on disadvantaged 
adults in, 318–327, 322t–324t 
introduction to, 25–29, 315–316 
ITA and other vouchers in, 28, 332–
339, 335t, 336t 
WIA principles and implementation 
in, 316–318, 341n1 
Research treatment effects, 410–414, 425 
ATE (average treatment effect), 411f,
412, 413, 420 
comparisons for, 218, 416–419, 425, 
432, 453, 460–461 
interventions and, 442, 455–456, 
458–459, 467n3, 476–477 
ITT (intent to treat), 410–411, 411f,
412, 413 
LATE (local average treatment 
effect), 411f, 413–414, 427n2, 478 
MTE (marginal treatment effect), 421,
423t, 424, 478–479 
TT (treatment on treated), 379, 410–
411, 411f, 412, 413, 417, 420, 
427n1 
See also Design in evaluation 
research 
Return on investment (ROI) 
costs per program participant, 375, 
394, 401n17 
public monies and, 180, 356t–357t,
358, 360n6 
skills training and employers, 116–
117, 132–133, 134 
See also Rates of return (ROR) 
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Rhode Island 
adjusted performance for “entered 
employment” for adult program 
participants in, 257t 
HPBs and, 286, 293t 
Risk 
contracting operators and, 145–147, 
148 
data concerns and, 180, 188 
Rockefeller Institute of Government, 
WIA studies by, 341n1, 400–
401n5, 400n3 
ROI. See Return on investment 
ROR. See Rates of return 
Rural workers, universal access to 
training for, 317 
Rutgers University, FERPA compliance 
and, 165 
Sanctions, 474 
caution needed on, as WIA lesson, 
226–227 
WIA performance measures and, 66, 
73–74, 205–206, 210 
SCHIP. See State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program 
SCSEP. See Senior Community Service 
Employment Program 
SDAs. See Service delivery areas 
Sectoral Employment Demonstration 
(SED), 119, 121 
evaluation of, 122–123, 127 
Sectoral Employment Initiative (SEI), 
123, 124, 125, 127–130 
informed sector choice in, 121, 
136n10 
participants in, 128–129, 136–137n14 
Sectoral training 
firm-specific skills in, 114–116 
informed choices for, 120–121 
SED. See Sectoral Employment 
Demonstration 
SEI. See Sectoral Employment Initiative 
Self-Employment Assistance program, 
unemployed and, 39, 449 
Senior Community Service Employment 
Program (SCSEP), 200, 203 
older low-income workers and, 53t,
55, 104, 178, 200–201 
performance measurement system for,
188, 193, 206n1 
program operators’ improvement buy-
in under, 197–198, 207n10 
Separate State Programs (SSPs), 297, 299 
Service delivery areas (SDAs), 55, 142, 
217 
customer attributes vary between, 
161–162 
incentives and, 217, 220–221, 222–
224 
performance standards locally 
determined in, 6, 21 
Sex education programs, experimental 
evaluation of, 479 
SIPP See Survey of Program Participation 
Skill Shortage Demonstration, informed 
sector choice in, 121 
Skills training. See Basic skills training; 
Job skills; Language skills 
SNAP. See Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program 
Social experiments, 475–479, 488n3 
conduct of, 454–457, 467n2 
random assignment mandates for, 
436, 443n4 
treatment effects of, 410–414, 411f,
427n1 
Social Policy Research (SPR) Associates,
448 
WIA studies by, 82–83, 341n1, 400–
401n5, 400n3 
Social Security data, 464 
state WRIS and, 159, 160–161, 204 
TANF recipients’ and NDNH 
matching of, 290–291 
Social service organizations, 127, 182, 
200–201 
Societal outcomes 
measurement of, 185, 186, 481 
net benefits per WIA enrollee, 
322t–324t, 327, 330t–331t, 394 
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Societal outcomes, cont.
ROR and, 352t, 354t, 355–359, 
356t–357t 
Society for Labor Economics in North 
America, useful role for, 486 
South Carolina, 84t, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
South Dakota, 84t, 257t 
HPBs and, 284t, 285t, 292t 
SPR. See Social Policy Research 
Associates 
SSPs. See Separate State Programs 
State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) 
data collection for, 293t, 296 
as TANF bonus criterion, 290 
State employment and training programs 
ETA and, 195–196 
HPBs for, 278–279, 281, 289, 311n4 
Washington State with, 162–163 
State Partnership Initiative program, 462 
State responsibilities, 317, 372 
applying negotiated standards, 6–7, 279 
data collection, 293t, 296 
decision-making as, 49, 278 
developing publicly accessible 
recordkeeping, 13, 29, 189 
negotiating goals as, 66, 92, 107n8, 
235, 255, 281 
set-up CRC system, 157–158 
shift from federal to, 43–44, 50, 61, 
197 
training fund uses, 1–2, 8 
WIB set-ups, 3–4, 54, 161, 374 
Strengthening Employment Clusters to 
Organize Regional Success Act, 
120, 136n9 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) 
before 2009 as FSP, 277, 290, 293t,
296, 353, 367, 368 
FSET, 348, 349t 
HPBs in, 24–25, 299–306, 302t, 310 
lessons learned from, 306, 307, 308 
performance reporting for, 206n1, 
301, 303 
pre-1995 as FSP, and ROR, 347 
Support services, customized training 
and, 124–125 
Survey of Program Participation (SIPP), 
417, 418 
Sweden, ALMPs and, 484, 487 
TANF. See Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families 
Tax liabilities 
benefit-cost analyses and, 366–367, 
482 
ROR calculation includes, 347, 353, 
355, 356t–357t 
Teach for America program, 
experimental evaluation of, 479 
Teacher mentoring programs, 
experimental evaluation of, 479 
Technical assistance, USDOL and, 159, 
162, 171 
Technical schools, 349t, 374 
data collection from, 160, 163 
Michigan, and ETPLs, 87–88 
skills training delivered through, 119, 
154 
Technical skills, globalization and, 315 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF), 141, 217, 277 
children in, 290, 291, 294t, 295, 311n3 
earnings-conditioned transfer for, 
benefits and ROR, 347, 353, 367–
368 
HPBs in, 23, 24, 278, 288–299, 
292t–294t, 306 
lessons learned from, 306, 307–309 
performance reporting for, 206n1, 310 
studies of, 349t, 350 
Temporary staffing agencies, as labor 
market intermediaries, 135–136n2 
Tennessee, 218, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
WIA in, 83, 376 
Texas, 181, 236, 257t, 284t 
CRC and ETPL implementation 
strategies in, 162, 166–170 
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Texas, cont. 
early implementation of WIA in, 81, 
83 
ETPLs in, 14, 87, 164t 
ITAs in, 91, 107n7 
local workforce areas studied in, 84t,
85, 98–99, 103 
SDAs in, 218–219 
supplemental performance measures 
in, 95, 96–97 
Texas Worker Adjustment 
Demonstration, 327–328, 342n3 
Third sector. See Nonprofit organizations 
Tiedemann, Patrick, 45n1 
Trade, international, exports-imports in, 
116, 136nn4–5 
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
programs, 349t 
earnings and employment impacts of, 
329, 330t, 342n4 
evaluation of, 448, 461–462 
performance measurement for, 206n1,
248, 258n3 
Trade unions, 127, 147 
among labor market intermediaries, 
135–136n2 
service quality and, 143–144 
Training outcomes. See Eligible training 
provider lists (ETPLs) in WIA 
Training programs, 14, 124, 481 
classroom vs. OJT, 320, 322t, 328, 
342n3 
employer investment in, 116–117, 156 
firm-specific skills in, 114–116, 119 
impact overview of, 432–435, 443n1 
replication difficulties with, 10, 408–
409, 434, 463–464 
WIA customer services and, 33–34, 
153, 178, 317 
Training providers, 12, 442 
cooperation of, 26, 88, 160, 317, 456, 
458 
customized training and, 113, 115 
data collection from, 158, 160 
eligibility criteria for, 3, 60, 86–88 
governance issues and, 171, 182 
program benefits to, vs. customers, 
477–478 
selection of participants and services 
by, 280, 287, 374–375 
treatment of, by states, 163, 165 
See also Contractors; Eligible training
provider lists (ETPLs) in WIA 
UI. See Unemployment Insurance 
program 
UI Reemployment Demonstration, New 
Jersey, 327–328, 342n3 
Underemployed workers, funding for job 
seekers among, 156, 371 
Unemployed workers, 407 
faultless, seeking work, 52t, 141, 373 
funding for job seekers among, 156, 
338, 371 
long-term, under JTPA, 8, 27–28, 
61–62, 328 
movement in and out of workforce 
by, 377, 401n9 
Self-Employment Assistance program
for, 39, 449 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, 
159, 206n1 
benefits from, 384–385, 390–391, 449 
compensation from, and ROR 
calculation, 347, 350, 353, 367 
as mandatory WIA program, 52t, 373 
on-time payments for, and USDOL, 
194, 207n8 
recordkeeping in each state by, 29, 
31, 160–161, 290, 321, 325, 376–
377, 464 
records of, and WIA performance 
measures, 4, 7, 14, 15, 45–46n5, 
64–65, 193, 203, 204 
Unemployment rates 
collection of, 240, 241f, 259n11 
local, and adjusted performance 
outcomes, 234, 236–240, 252–
253, 254tt, 258nn3–4, 279 
statistical models and, 238–240, 
258–259n6, 259nn7–10 
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Pathways to Work program in, 183, 204 
United States 
evaluation industry in, 473, 483–484 
political support for social 
experiments in, 454, 486–487 
U.S. Census Bureau, data collection by, 
293t, 296, 298 
U.S. Congress 
appropriations for WIA by, 1–2, 3, 51,
188–189, 206n2, 278 
law and legislation, 1, 2, 9, 35, 
52t–53t, 73, 120, 146, 161, 206n1,
277, 299, 327, 436, 449 
questions about WIA by, 3, 4, 17, 
436, 449 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food 
and Nutrition Service (FNS) 
FSP/SNAP benefits and, 24–25, 299, 
301, 303–305, 306, 311n6 
payment errors and, 301, 303, 311n5 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
BEA, and trade in GDP, 136nn4–5 
U.S. Department of Education (DOE), 
53t, 191 
ETPL recommendations for, 170–171 
IES at, 476–477, 486–487 
state HPBs funded by, 284t–285t 
VR performance measurement under, 
178, 206n1 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), 53t, 309 
data and performance management in,
15–16 
program evaluation by, 436, 443n5 
TANF HPB awards and, 24, 288, 
290–291, 295, 296, 309 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), mandatory 
WIA programs of, 53t 
U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), 
194, 486 
administration of WIA by, 3, 45n4, 
51, 76n4, 118, 119–120, 317, 433, 
448, 454 
BLS under, 85, 118, 366 
Index 519 
data reporting system across federal 
agencies by, 5, 7, 15–16, 46n6, 
74–75 
ETPL recommendations for, 170–171 
evaluations supported by, 433, 448, 
454 
incentive grants authorization by, 277,
282–283, 286, 288, 311n4 
mandatory WIA programs of, 52t–53t, 
113 
performance negotiation with each 
state by, 4, 5, 21–22, 44, 216, 279,
281 
technical assistance from, 159, 162, 
171 
U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), 
Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA), 86 
efficiency measures and, 224–225, 
443, 443n9 
negotiation approach of, 185, 187, 
258n1, 317, 342n2 
performance adjustments by, 93, 
107n11, 177–179, 180, 191, 234, 
256t–257t 
performance adjustments by, and 
JTPA, 235, 258n2 
reporting and validating performance 
data by, 194–195 
state programs and, 195–196 
WIA implementation studies by, 
82–83, 89, 316 
U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) 
data recommendations by, 67, 69, 70, 
74, 489n5 
reports by, 2–3, 27, 45–46n5, 50, 198,
219 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), 74, 107n10, 182, 191, 
203, 283 
U.S. Supreme Court, rulings, 194 
Universal access 
computer technology and, 442, 457 
WIA and, to basic skills training, 315,
317 
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Upjohn Institute. See W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research 
Upward Bound program, 442, 455 
Urban Institute, initiatives evaluated by, 
123, 136n8 
USDOL. See U.S. Department of Labor 
Utah, 87, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 286 
local workforce areas studied in, 84t,
85, 98, 103 
WIA in, 81, 376 
Vermont, 81, 84t, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 286 
Veterans 
barriers to employment for, 282, 
401nn15–16 
efficient and effective services to, 
178, 189 
mandatory WIA program for, 52t, 447 
Virgin Islands, 303, 311n5 
Virginia, 257t 
HPBs and, 285t, 286, 292t 
WIA impact estimation in, 29–30, 
350–353, 352t, 360nn3–4 
workforce development programs in, 
348–350, 349t, 351t, 360nn1–2 
Vocational education, 117 
customized training, 119, 137n15 
effect of, on earnings, 385–387, 386ff,
391–392, 401n14 
legislative funding of, 53t, 277 (see 
also Perkins Act) 
off-the-shelf, 9, 154 
Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) 
programs, 200 
federal-state partnerships and, 197, 
207n9, 349t 
performance measurement system for,
178, 182, 186, 203, 206n1 
Vocational training, provided by ESF and
WIA, 447 
Vouchers, 333, 448 
evidence from, 89–90, 107nn5–6 
federal shift to, 59–60 
research history of WIA and, 28, 
332–339, 335t, 336t 
See also Individual training accounts 
(ITAs) 
VR. See Vocational Rehabilitation 
program 
Wage Record Interchange System 
(WRIS), 159, 160–161, 165, 204 
Wages, 117, 388 
data for, in UI records, 4, 64–65, 69–
70, 87, 94, 159, 160, 203–205, 377 
high, and customized training, 90, 
121, 133, 136n11 
as training outcome measure, 155, 
157t, 193 
Wagner-Peyser Act, 258n3 
ES funding under, 52t, 55–56, 74, 374 
recordkeeping and data from, 363, 
369n3 
workforce development activities of, 
376, 400n1 
WASC. See Work Advancement and 
Support Center Demonstration 
Washington, D.C. See District of 
Columbia 
Washington State, 216, 257t, 329, 369n5, 
449 
CRC and ETPL implementation 
strategies in, 162–165, 168–171 
ETPLs in, 14, 164t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
performance improvement project led
by, 95–97, 163 
WIA in, 29–30, 83, 350–353, 352t,
354t, 355, 356t–357t, 358–359, 
360nn3–4 
workforce development programs in, 
31, 348–350, 349t, 351t, 360n1 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, ETA contract and, 234 
Welfare. See Public assistance 
West Virginia, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 285t, 286 
What Works Clearinghouse, 477, 488n4 
Whitehurst, Russ, leadership of, 486–487 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
      
 
  
 
 
  
 
       
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 	  
 
	 	
 
  
 
  
 
	 	  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
	 	  
  
  
  
  
 
WIA. See Workforce Investment Act 
WIA Standardized Record Data 
(WIASRD), 4–5, 22, 29, 195, 206n6 
personal attributes data from, 236, 
239–240, 253–255, 254t, 261–263 
retrospective data and, 321, 325, 
376–377 
WIASRD. See WIA Standardized Record
Data 
WIBs. See Workforce Investment Boards 
WIN. See Work Incentive Program 
WIRED. See Workforce Innovation in 
Regional Economic Development 
Wisconsin, 257t 
HPB eligibility of, 284t, 285t 
SEI site in Milwaukee, 125, 127–130 
WIA in, 81–82, 376 
Wisconsin Regional Training 
Partnership, Milwaukee, 127 
WISPR. See Workforce Investment 
Streamlined Performance 
Reporting system 
Women workers 
earnings, 319–320, 328, 381–382, 
381f, 386f, 388, 389f, 390, 391 
WIA program participants as, 378, 408 
Work Advancement and Support Center 
Demonstration (WASC), 123–125,
136n12 
Work experience. See under Employees, 
job history of 
Work Incentive Program (WIN), 
performance measures of, 228n4 
Worker Adjustment Demonstration, 
Texas, 327–328, 342n3 
Worker Profiling Reemployment 
Services (WPRS), UI recipients 
and, 328, 449, 478 
Workforce Innovation in Regional 
Economic Development (WIRED) 
evaluation of, 122 
USDOL funding of, 120 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), 1–46, 
277 
accountability as watchword of, 
12–13, 15, 64, 210 
Index 521 
conference conclusions about, 43–45 
congressional appropriations for, 1–2,
45n2, 278, 371, 400n1 
eligibility provisions under, 2, 3, 8, 
13, 82, 141, 149, 373, 400n4 
existence of, 407–408 
goals and purpose of, 1–2, 141–142, 
156, 315, 424, 447 
HPBs in, 23–25, 278–288, 284t–285t,
287t, 306, 307–308, 309 
performance measures of, 4, 64–75, 
202–205 
reauthorization of, 75–76, 81, 93–94, 
107nn10–12, 120, 151, 171, 177, 
277 
services to special populations under, 
178, 182, 200–201, 282–283 
training funds under, 3, 8–9, 12, 60, 
119, 315 (see also Individual 
training accounts [ITAs]) 
See also One-Stop Career Centers 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), future 
evaluation choices, 34–43, 407–
489 
introduction to, 34–43, 407–409, 
447–448, 473–475 
See also Employment services–
neither easy nor cheap; Impact 
evaluation and reliable design; 
Impact evaluation improvement in
Europe; Nonexperimental 
evaluation of future employment 
and training programs 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), 
impact evaluations, 25–34, 315–
401 
introduction to, 25–34, 315–316, 
347–348, 371–373 
See also Impact estimates and rates 
of return for WIA; Impact 
evaluation methods; 
Nonexperimental evaluation of 
past WIA programs; Research 
history of WIA 
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Workforce Investment Act (WIA), 
performance management, 15–25, 
177–311 
introduction to, 15–25, 177–179 
See also Performance incentives as 
financial; Performance 
management; Performance 
measure advancement in federal 
programs; Performance measure 
lessons from WIA; Performance 
measurement challenges 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), 
program implementation, 6–15, 
81–171 
introduction to, 6–15, 81–82, 400–
401n5 
project case studies and reports, 81, 
82–85, 84t, 106nn1–2, 107n3 
See also Customized training in 
WIA; Eligible training provider 
lists (ETPLs) in WIA; Market 
mechanisms use in WIA; One-
Stop systems management 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), 
understanding, 2–6, 49–77 
introduction to, 2–6, 49–50 
key elements in, and how they work, 
50–75 
One-Stop system consolidation and, 
50–58, 52t–53t, 58f, 372 
performance accountability 
provisions and, 64–75, 65t, 72f,
76nn4–5, 77n6 
reauthorization observations in, 
75–76 
structure of programs in, 58–63, 62f,
63f, 76nn1–3 
Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs), 
89, 217 
among labor market intermediaries, 
115–116, 135–136n2 
caps on costs and profit in, policies, 
145–147 
composition of, 147–149, 171 
local and state provision of, 3–4, 
11–12, 54, 161, 168, 255, 374 
responsibilities of, 118–119, 142 
service delivery and, 144–145, 233–
234 
training outcome measures for, 157–
158, 157t 
Workforce Investment Streamlined 
Performance Reporting (WISPR) 
system, 75 
Workforce skills, 116, 133, 315 
WPRS. See Worker Profiling 
Reemployment Services 
WRIS. See Wage Record Interchange 
System 
Wyoming, 84t, 257t 
HPBs and, 292t, 286284t 
YEDPA. See Youth Employment 
Demonstration Program Act 
Young Parents Demonstration, 435, 
443n3 
Youth 
barriers to employment for, 401nn15–
16 
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